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Post by alfakilo on Feb 7, 2014 10:00:52 GMT -6
Here is a hypothesis. Tactical decision making at LBH goes from Benteen-superior to Reno-adequate to Custer-unacceptable to Keough-grossly incompetent. I have to admit that I have not followed the Keough controversy too closely. The incompetence you mention...is this his decision to send C CO into Calhoun Coulee to push the NAs back?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 7, 2014 10:40:42 GMT -6
AK, I class waiting for between one or two hours for a pack train unacceptable, especially from a man like Custer, wouldn't he be concerned about how long this would trek would take whilst the village escapes, the valley is the quickest route.
Ian.
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Post by fred on Feb 7, 2014 10:41:09 GMT -6
I just get annoyed at some things I read, especially at the other site. You are not alone, my dear friend. Have you ever, in all your life, since such an effort to condemn one person as this clown “griffith” is attempting to do with Reno? I wouldn’t argue this point until I see more clearly how you have come to your assessment of Keogh. I am not sure I agree… at least not fully. Read Chapter 17. You may change your mind… but I do not know. Oh-h-h, I absolutely agree! No question about it. “Hubris” is too kind a word; “arrogance” is more like it, though I hesitate to use that word because of other mitigating factors. It is a difficult and interesting study, to me, very much like a discussion of whether or not Custer disobeyed his orders. To me, you need to weigh that argument before you discuss the validity of his tactics… not his choices, mind you—but his tactics. There is a difference… at least to me. I will… thank you. And do so, both with your and QC’s encouragement. This has always been the problem, and it will continue to be the problem. Again, just look at your bug-a-boo next door. In my mind, this can only change when one does a proper timing analysis… not a skewed one like John Gray’s—to me, designed to prove a point rather than the other way around, i. e., theory vs context. I would pay to read that. Perfect!Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Margaret on Feb 8, 2014 9:16:02 GMT -6
..something I've been wondering about for some time and been meaning to ask, of those who perhaps ought to know better... that when Custer vacated Medicine Tail Coulee, would it not have been strategically advisable to post troops on the bluffs either side.. that is Boyer's Bluff and Butler Ridge, and also along the other side of Deep Coulee, I suppose... to stop the ingress into these areas of warriors, who would inevitably use these routes..?
... I know when on Nye-Cartridge Ridge they fired into warriors coming up that way... it's just that with troops expected making their way from the south... it would be visible to those troops from Weir Point and quicker to support from there.... as it was, this whole area was opened up for Indians to ascend almost without contest... that doesn't seem right to me... looking at it from Cavalry angle... Custer would still have had time to meander North but the Indians would surely be blocked for a time....
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 8, 2014 9:58:59 GMT -6
Hello Margaret, I think the problem was that Custer didn’t have the man power to occupy all of the areas that needed to be defended and moving on to Calhoun Ridge and Custer Ridge did give them the some advantage but looking at some of the maps of the area, it seems like a defenders nightmare and certainly not an area that you want to be hanging about on for a long period of time, especially when your enemy grows in strength by the minute.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 8, 2014 10:16:54 GMT -6
Concur. Far to much ground, and far to few.
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Post by fred on Feb 8, 2014 11:02:53 GMT -6
Margaret,
You have used the back door to get into the heart of the issue.
The major part of my argument is that Custer felt no serious pressure when he arrived at Ford B. It was this "feeling" that allowed him to continue north. If he believed Reno had drawn virtually the entire opposition to him, there would be little fear of his being trapped. Whatever "little" opposition there was could be handled easily by Keogh and the "on-coming" Benteen. This, of course, is all part of his "fatal mistakes." If I am correct, there would be no need to leave troops on the bluffs controlling the ford crossing.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Margaret on Feb 8, 2014 12:27:03 GMT -6
..thanks for your replies...
Ian and Chuck seem to think this was not the right thing to do, nor the right place to do it....fair enough.... Fred thinks Custer didn't need to cover these fords as there was no threat at that time....
...my argument is that, surely by appearing in force opposite the village, he must have known he would attract attention quite soon.. and that even if believing Reno to be holding his own... and knowing Benteen still had a way to go.... therefore... those fords should be held - in anticipation -- of what would likely occur if vacated...i.e. the little opposition so far would soon see masses of Indians trying to cross there.... it strikes me as careless in the extreme...
...why go to Calhoun Hill and Battle Ridge...? it allows the Indians a clear run across the river... and to possibly cut off Benteen's expected approach... he seems to assume that no Indians are going to trouble him much while he goes about his business...whatever his intentions... along the ridges... after all, with the expected arrival of Benteen, he would have more troops at his disposal...therefore could afford to defend those crossings... to me, it appears he left a huge gap, as if regarding it of no importance..
...do I take it Fred, that I could include this omission as part of his 'fatal mistakes'...? that he should have covered those crossings...? or are you saying, as Chuck and Ian do, that this idea was simply a non starter, strategically, and should be discounted completely...?
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alanw
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by alanw on Feb 8, 2014 12:41:31 GMT -6
The major part of my argument is that Custer felt no serious pressure when he arrived at Ford B. It was this "feeling" that allowed him to continue north. If he believed Reno had drawn virtually the entire opposition to him, there would be little fear of his being trapped. Whatever "little" opposition there was could be handled easily by Keogh and the "on-coming" Benteen. This, of course, is all part of his "fatal mistakes." If I am correct, there would be no need to leave troops on the bluffs controlling the ford crossing. Best wishes, Fred. I wonder what Keogh knew of Custer's planned movements. Did Custer even inform him that he was going to attempt to cross at Ford B. If so, what was Keogh to do when that happened - come forward and support Custer at Ford B; cross nearer to where he was stationed somewhere in Calhoun Hill area; wait for Benteen and the Packs? I'm guessing that Keogh was never informed that Custer had a change of plans and was going to move further north. Also, did Keogh mistakenly feel he could comfortably deal with any situation before Custer could return from Ford B, (NOT further north) and Benteen support him? If Custer felt genuinely that there was no danger, then I feel he surely must have believed he would have time to get a message back safely to Benteen with up-to-date position and plans. If custer truly believed that Reno had drawn nearly all of the warriors to oppose him, then he must also have been aware that even if Reno held firm, that ammunition would become an issue and Reno's battalion would be in need of replenishment. If the Indians, (warriors, too) were on the run, or skeddaddling, did Custer expect Reno to mount up from original skirmish line and move forward in pursuit. If so where would Reno have been expected to appear, and would he have been easily visible by Custer's command? Finally, and just speculation on my part, if Custer crossed at Ford B with just 2 companies and the HQ staff, what did he realistically hope to achieve? I'm guessing maybe to capture a body of non-combatants, (similar to the Washita). Just how many non-combatants would he need, or be able to to capture and corral with such a small force - 50, 100, 200? As a result would the rest of the camp surrender, or attempt to disperse in different directions?
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Post by quincannon on Feb 8, 2014 14:21:18 GMT -6
Margaret: Cavalry operations in Virginia during the ACW were largely an exercise in either exploiting fords, or guarding/watching them. It is inconceivable to me then that a man who had served in the cavalry and in Virginia, did not realize the importance of a ford, and how an unguarded or lightly guarded ford one minute could become a festering boil on your backside the very next. The fords should have been heavily outposted, particularly if Custer expected Benteen to follow his trail up on the bluffs. The problem is one not of it being a good idea, but one of non-existent resources to do the job. Custer was waging a Champagne battle on a Budwiser budget.
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Post by fred on Feb 8, 2014 14:24:37 GMT -6
I wonder what Keogh knew of Custer's planned movements. Did Custer even inform him that he was going to attempt to cross at Ford B. I do not believe Custer ever considered crossing at Ford B. Based on that and the fact Keogh was left about one mile in the rear, I think it is safe to assume Custer told him what he planned. I would think Keogh was fairly comfortable where he was at that time. The problem with this is Custer had already sent back Martini. At this point in time there was no need for another messenger. I believe that was why there was emphasis in the note to bring the packs. No one-- I believe-- would think the packs would get involved in the fighting, but would be positioned or split for easy ammunition replenishment. I would think, yes, Reno would have remounted as Indians fled north to protect their families. I think Custer figured that is precisely what would have happened. And Reno would have chased them into Custer. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by montrose on Feb 8, 2014 15:40:19 GMT -6
I wonder what Keogh knew of Custer's planned movements. Did Custer even inform him that he was going to attempt to cross at Ford B. If so, what was Keogh to do when that happened - come forward and support Custer at Ford B; cross nearer to where he was stationed somewhere in Calhoun Hill area; wait for Benteen and the Packs? I'm guessing that Keogh was never informed that Custer had a change of plans and was going to move further north. Also, did Keogh mistakenly feel he could comfortably deal with any situation before Custer could return from Ford B, (NOT further north) and Benteen support him? If Custer felt genuinely that there was no danger, then I feel he surely must have believed he would have time to get a message back safely to Benteen with up-to-date position and plans. If custer truly believed that Reno had drawn nearly all of the warriors to oppose him, then he must also have been aware that even if Reno held firm, that ammunition would become an issue and Reno's battalion would be in need of replenishment. If the Indians, (warriors, too) were on the run, or skeddaddling, did Custer expect Reno to mount up from original skirmish line and move forward in pursuit. If so where would Reno have been expected to appear, and would he have been easily visible by Custer's command? Finally, and just speculation on my part, if Custer crossed at Ford B with just 2 companies and the HQ staff, what did he realistically hope to achieve? I'm guessing maybe to capture a body of non-combatants, (similar to the Washita). Just how many non-combatants would he need, or be able to to capture and corral with such a small force - 50, 100, 200? As a result would the rest of the camp surrender, or attempt to disperse in different directions? Pack Train. The purpose of the pack train was to give the regiment sufficient supplies for an extended patrol. The ammunition in the trains was not for mid battle replenishment. It was to prevent a single engagement from ending the patrol. Look at the 8 and 11 August 1873 fights. They fought the first battle, replenished from the trains, and went on the pursuit to force a second battle. If there was any reason to believe that they needed more ammunition to fight a single battle, then the ammunition would have been distributed back at the divide. Keough Bn. LTC Custer left the Keough Bn on the south end of Battle Ridge. We can only speculate as to GAC's estimate of the situation and his orders to Keough. It appears most probable that GAC had a local enemy threat, but he did not regard it as dangerous. Keough's orders were likely hold this ground until Benteen and McDougall arrive. After they arrive order the trains to do Action A and Benteen and the combat power to do Action B. The problem is that after LTC Custer left, the situation changed. CPT Keough did not react to the rising threat until it was far too late. When he did react he did so in an incompetent manner. His main line of defense was on Calhoun Hill. He had one company there and managed to get the other two companies scattered far away all out of support of one another. Custer coup d'oeil. (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Coup_d'%C5%93il) LTC Custer was a charismatic leader whose normal procedure was to ride to the scene of a battle, look at friendly and enemy forces, and order an attack. Charge, you wolverines. He had a pronounced weakness for tracking and managing assets not in his line of sight. He had been lucky many times, where bad decisions put him in a hole, and luck or other people got him out of it. Luck is not a replacement for competence. A few years ago we had a chief of staff of the Army whose mantra was 'Hope is not a method'. Same thing. Once LTC Custer left the bluffs, he got wrapped around whatever he intended to do vicinity Battle Ridge, and placed Reno on a sideburner. We can see that from that point until he died, he took no action in any form to support the Reno Bn. A combination of assuming away the threat and out of sight, out of mind. Custer's intent. I believe Custer intended to conduct a regimental sized attack with the Yates, Keough, Benteen, and McDougall Bns somewhere between Ford B and D. He probably intended to split his force and attack at both areas. Reno becomes a blocking force to the south. I don't support the papoose theory. He intended to attack and defeat the Indian warriors. Custer's failure was an inability to manage time and space. The clock was ticking when he sent Reno across Ford A. He was incapable of massing combat power for whatever end at any time since then. I regard Custer and Keough as suffering from deer in the headlight syndrome. They repeatedly failed to act to what was happening around them. Instead they stuck to preconceived assumptions, and hoped things would get better. No decision is a decision.
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Post by fred on Feb 8, 2014 20:50:05 GMT -6
Fred thinks Custer didn't need to cover these fords as there was no threat at that time.... Margaret, I did not mean to give you the wrong impression: I said-- or should have-- I believe Custer felt no need to cover the ford, not that I felt he didn't need to cover it. Personally, my opinion is that he should not have been there in the first place. It is my opinion that by the time Custer arrived at Ford B, he had already found out Reno was in a modicum of trouble. If I am correct, then I believe Custer showed no apprehension, thinking a retreating Reno would only draw more and more warriors to him (... to Reno). Irrelevant if 90% of the warriors were chasing Reno and the other 10% were running down the valley with the families. Yep. And a complete misjudging of his opposition. Custer never should have gone north of Medicine Tail Coulee... at least not without Benteen... or a better plan. Going north was one of those fatal mistakes. You can include "this omission" as part of one of those fatal errors. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 8, 2014 21:03:57 GMT -6
I love Margaret's flowers. They class up the joint. I also like the way she drew out the answer that we have been hesitant to openly express on these boards for all to long. I believe that at least four of us, Fred, Montrose Ian, and myself consider that the widely accepted scenario of moving off of B to Calhoun, separating, with Custer going north to D (in my case not all the way but close enough) is what did happen. I also believe all of us think it was a stupid thing to do, Happening, and the happening being stupid are not mutually exclusive. I for one don't know why he chose to do that. I would suppose there are a few reasons, but none of those reason equate to smart.
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Post by mac on Feb 9, 2014 5:57:04 GMT -6
You can add me to the list Chuck. Lets not worry about the outcome for the moment but look at what Custer did....He went around his enemies position, found they were still unaware of his presence and then marched down to them and announced himself. Would one not use the ridges to stay hidden, send NA scouts to quietly find the village extent then carry out your assault using surprise? Cheers
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