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Post by montrose on Jan 26, 2014 10:38:20 GMT -6
I am going to use this thread to discuss tactics as it applies to the LBH. I find discussions on the timber site, Reno Hill, Weir point, Battle ridge, etc all suffer from a lack of tactical situational awareness. I see statements like the river is defensible because it is low ground, but Reno Hill is no good because it is high ground and comparable statements.
Let's start with Reno trapped against the LBH river.
Situation. Reno had been advancing toward the village with his right flank on the river and his left flank in the air. The Indians swept past his open flank. The main body should have blocked this effort, by LTC Custer had placed himself out of supporting distance of his regiment advance guard. Reno was forced into an L shaped position with G and A facing north and M west. This still failed as several hundred Indians passed by his force and were now attacking him from the south.
A long discussion on the other board argues that Reno could put every man on line with their backs to the river to face west. The problem here is that the Indians were not attacking from the open prairie to the west. They were conducting a dismounted attack from the north and a mounted attack from the south. The people who claim the low ground by the river is some type of fortress expect the man on the north flank to hold off everything from the village, and the man on the left flank to defeat 500 plus Indians in the south. This is what happens when you apply linear tactics to a nonlinear battlefield.
Another way of looking at this, is that every single man in Reno's force is needed to defend one quarter of his perimeter. To defend the river position requires 300 more men. And once you decide to defend there, your mobility is gone. There is no way to protect the horses from being killed, your perimeter is too small. So if you stay, you will be conducting a last stand. You will be a dismounted force, with your mobility being the pace that your litter bearers can carry your wounded.
The river position has numerous issues. First, the effect of vegetation means you have limited observation and fields of fire. Your soldiers need to be closer than normal intervals. The position is dominated by high ground to east and west. The river itself will prevent a mounted attack, but provides perfect sniping positions. The terrain is an infiltrator's paradise. Indians can easily get within arrow range, where they can fire with impunity from short range. The Indian main attack is coming from the south, so you have no possible options for anything but a die in place.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 26, 2014 11:23:32 GMT -6
Hello William, I suppose you could say the position was ok, with this dry bed forming a natural trench and parapet, the effect would make the troopers feel safe and fight better because of the cover, but having a tree line to your rear is never a good option when fighting irregular light Infantry, if the attackers were gathered in large bands like we seen in this battle, then after a while they could hit you from all points of the compass and having good defensive ground on one side only is not good enough.
As we saw at the Custer battle, the river and trees would be no obstacle for the Indians, so given time they would find chinks in your armour, especially as you only have a limited amount of men to hold you line.
Any decision made to lose the horses would be a tactical mistake, with having a tree line you could use it to tie the horses to, and cut down on the number of horse holders, but this area is just too large to defend 360 % with only 140 men with 100 rounds each.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 26, 2014 21:08:48 GMT -6
When I read these posts by Will and Ian this morning I was reminded of a fairly recent book by Lieutenant General Daniel P. Bolger. It is called "Death Ground" No better name could ever be devised for Reno's timber position, and for all the reasons Will and Ian provided.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 27, 2014 7:18:13 GMT -6
I have a question regarding decision making. Reno was in the advance and expected support. He was continuing the mission. With no support in a timely manner he was faced with a last stand in timber choice or leave and reunite with the regiment, make a stand on the high if you can't reunite.
I think for a long time I believe the choice was how long to remain and keep the mission going but I believe the actual choice was to make a last stand in the timber on defense or attempt to retrograde before it was a forced last stand.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by montrose on Jan 27, 2014 12:24:11 GMT -6
AZ Stranger,
I agree with your two options. The other option is to adopt a hasty defense until his support arrived. I believe his skirmishing and the act of swinging his line back 90 degrees represented this effort.
The problem is his support failed to show up. LTC Custer was not where he was supposed to be. GAC failed to tell anyone what he was doing. If LTC Custer wanted to explore the prairie east of the battlefield, he had that right as commander. He also had the duty and responsibility to tell his subordinates of the change in plan, which he failed to do.
Reno lacked the combat power to continue towards the village. Now he lacked the combat power to return to Ford A. His options were rapidly dwindling. His delays while waiting for support was allowing the enemy to determine his options. A delay of a few more minutes would cause a last stand no matter what Reno intended. A common saying in tactical evaluations is that no decision is a decision.
It is amusing that the Custer fanatics spend so much energy saying that the regiment wounded and the mules should charge north into the empty prairie east of the battlefield. But they can not explain why LTC Custer failed to enter the battle at all.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 27, 2014 13:40:40 GMT -6
Sorry William if I have gone off track a little, but I am trying to piece the timber battle in relation to what choices Reno had and why he and Custer acted like they did.
Was it the norm in those days for small Battalions (between 100 to 200 men) to operate so far apart? Not only that but out of the line of sight of one another. I would have thought that carrying out operations on unknown ground, against an enemy of unknown strength, that a Cavalry Regiment would manoeuvre its three of four Battalions in tandem with each other and not leave gaps of several miles plus terrain features between each of them, Brigade yes, Regiments no.
One of the reasons for this small unit battle group, could be the notion that the Indians always ran, now in the years prior to this we had the Fetterman massacre (they certainly never ran there), and the Washita battle, now Custer had to fool the Indians at Washita so he could escape, again so much for them running, so after these two examples why did they place so much onus on the fact that they would run?
I wonder how much faith Reno placed in Custer being Johnny on the spot, first views the enemy moving out to engage him, so he stops his Battalion and knowing that Custer was somewhere to his right he forms skirmish lines, now he was right in my view, not to move his command any nearer to that village, so he decides to defend the area that he has took and deny it to the enemy, now once he has made this decision then it must be because he was expecting his Commander to enter the fray, now Reno had his hands full, first to keep an eye on the Indians to his front, plus he had an area of timber to his right, which could be filling up with Indians as he stood and also keep an eye for Custer, but after seeing his CO moving to his right and following the high ground, where would he appear, would it enter Reno’s mind that the trees, river and bluffs could limit Custer’s attack plan.
Reno certainly didn’t choose the timber as a defendable area, it was the only place he could go, well either that or retreat, and that was what he eventually did.
At first Custer may have been fully committed in attacking the village as Reno was fighting, and I think that Reno thought this too.
Ian.
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Post by montrose on Feb 6, 2014 12:27:45 GMT -6
1. Purpose. Discuss the tactical implications of a proposed attack of the Reno half of the regiment to save the Custer half of the regiment. 2. Commander's intent. There is no possible way that LTC Custer expected the Benteen and McDougall Bns to have to defeat the enemy main body to reach him. The other board believes this as gospel. It has zero chance of being true. LTC Custer did know that he had sizable enemy elements between him and the rest of the regiment. The Keough Bn disposition is focused to the south, not the west. He must have assumed that the Benteen Bn had sufficient combat power to defeat enemy forces. A trailing unit has a reasonable expectation that the forward units have cleared the area. Not telling the trail units that they would have to fight their way forward shows Custer's mindset. It is mindboggling that GAC or Cooke did not send a messenger warning the follow on units. The most likely reason why is that enemy strength was too high. If the risk was too high to send a messenger or a detachment, then why do the Ford D recon? 3. Linkup point. A more rational approach is to defend one of the ridges south of Battle Ridge. Now Weir ridge has been stated as some great defensive position in the Benteen hating crowd. The problem is that it is a very bad position to defend, and would require at least the entire regiment, I would be more comfortable with 16 companies. It has to be a 360 degree defense and it will be open to fire from all sides. In open terrain some type of defilade is vital to a cavalry unit. You need a place to park your horses, a place for an aid post, and the ability to move your reserve around. None of that exists at Weir. So at best Keough can only occupy a hasty defensive position to buy time. Occupying Weir in this manner does allow time to get a messenger off. This is the time to tell Benteen to leave the trains behind and come up. And the time to give specific orders to McDougall with respect to the trains and his Bn. By staying south of Ford B you are keeping the enemies fastest avenue of approach between yourself and the regiment rear. The farther south you go, the faster you assemble the regiment. So why not stay on Cartwright or Reno Hill? The goal is to assemble combat power to conduct an attack, not scatter it across the prairie. 4. Regiment rear. The challenge for the rear body was assembling the Reno, Benteen and McDougall Bns and preparing for further action. No one has yet been able to prove any significant delay after the trains closed up. The pace of a regimental advance is the pace of the 4 man litter parties. The only good news is that you have a task for the healthy men without horses. Given the situation what do you expect them to do? First, back to commanders intent. LTC Custer did not order Benteen and McDougall to conduct an immediate attack to rescue himself. If this is your interpretation of Martini and Kanipe you need to stop taking LSD and get mental health counseling. This means that Reno and the regiment rear is conducting a movement to contact. They don't know what is ahead of them. The point is that they did try. The real problem here is that in any comparable battle, the commander would have moved his element back to the regiment and assumed command. It was Custer's duty and responsibility to do so. The next problem is and US movement north of Ford B is an error. It means putting the enemy main body in a central position closer to all spread out US elements than those elements are to each other. Call it the ducks in a shooting gallery tactic. It doesn't make any sense, so it is no surprise that no one predicted it. If you are going to sneak around the enemy camp, use the ridges to screen yourself, and do not under any circumstances be on in view of the enemy on the ridges or anywhere near Ford B. Going up and doing the "Here I am, Moe" and shuffling back is an enormous error. www.youtube.com/watch?v=8zD1Y4khapk
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 6, 2014 17:14:41 GMT -6
Montrose, I know nothing about the other board. I will be brief Custer lost long before he engaged or was engaged. Everything you say has you say above has credence. Reno has many flaws, but his initial attack was done right. Even down to deploying a platoon or group to his right to be certain that the woods along the river was clear and that he was he was not being lured into a trap. I think this group got closer to the camp than anyone who did not lose control of their horse.
As I said Custer lost this before engaged, and his mistakes were compounded by the actions of his command after leaving Reno to fend for himself. We all could have done better planning in backyard football or pickup basketball.
With regard to the lay of land, I have not been to the battlefield in 23 years, and wife and kids in tow, I am going this summer , for me.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 6, 2014 17:18:03 GMT -6
See, this is why I don't get the whole Ford D stuff and other things. The questions you ask are the ones I sort of sense rather than know to be weird, but I've felt that nothing makes sense after MTC. Options are offered as to Custer's intent but he addressed NONE of them, and things that are not for sure - like Keogh's actions, which are now presented as fact rather than unknowable - become nailed into place. It makes more sense to me if my favored theory is correct, because it includes all the puzzling actions by experienced officers cleanly demanding no deep insights. Lucky for me.
That Cooke or Custer never sent a clarifying order when they knew - finally - what God hath wrought that day seems to me to agree with you: they could not, and if they could not the receipt has been signed and delivery accepted. Which is a monstrously bad metaphor for their fate, but I'm going with it.
Regarding Terra Incognita et Estupido Beyondo Comprehension...o, that's a bunch not at all interested in Custer or the issues beyond themselves. The devotion to slander Reno and Benteen is deeply personal and delusional and in no way supported by facts or historical perspective. It's important they not get away with it without being slammed on record, but so long as the attention is focused on themselves, they're happy.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 6, 2014 18:16:50 GMT -6
DC: It makes no sense to you. Imagine how some of us feel who have spent the best part of a lifetime doing this stuff. It makes no sense to us either, and I suspect only those who try to find any excuse to not blame Custer does it make any sense to.
It would be hard to find any principle not violated, It is impossible to apply sound reasoning to the event. That however does not mean it all did not happen in the manner widely accepted.
I watched Little Big Man for the first, and I assure you the only time last night on TCM. I have heard stories about the movie. I understand the deeper message that the writers and producers were trying to get across. I was reminded of what my Dad used to say about how Custer got promoted as portrayed in Died With Their Boots On. He said that was a better excuse than any other he ever heard. Well what was portrayed in that later movie was just as good a excuse as any I have heard. He thought the rules did not apply to him.
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Post by fred on Feb 6, 2014 20:30:59 GMT -6
2. Commander's intent. There is no possible way that LTC Custer expected the Benteen and McDougall Bns to have to defeat the enemy main body to reach him. The other board believes this as gospel. It has zero chance of being true. I agree completely with this comment. I am not sure this is totally true. In the tactical dispositions of the Keogh battalion one element was facing south while the larger portion was facing more southwest. I believe Custer and Keogh both felt the major threat would come across Ford B, and whatever that threat was, could be easily dealt with by Benteen. At this stage of the fight—and based on what Custer knew—this was not an unreasonable assumption. Of course it turned out to be incorrect because of other factors, viz., a complete failure to estimate correctly the enemy strength. Other factors caused that failure. I agree with you regarding the failure to send a messenger, but that should have been done from Luce or Nye-Cartwright Ridge, not Calhoun Hill. By the time they reached Calhoun Hill, both the distance and the risk were too great, even though the overall threat—at that time—was not. Agree completely. Emphatically!100% in agreement. Again, I agree completely. !!!!!!!!!! Correct. I agree. Once again, I agree. The missing element, however, and the one people cannot seem to understand or accept, is that GAC—as he continued to move north— felt he was in full control all the time. There is no other rational explanation for his actions. If I feel no threat, if I feel I am constantly in control and on the offensive and I believe my maneuver elements are, (1) coming to assist, and (2) tying down the enemy, then I can assume the additional risk and continue on my mission as I see fit. This is the primary reason I believe Custer did what he did. Indian accounts support this view, especially in his moving farther north from Calhoun Hill. Who was there to oppose him? Virtually no one except the Wolf Tooth/Big Foot band and even that—according to accounts—was fractured. Archaeological interpretation of artifacts found in 1994, support this theory. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Feb 6, 2014 20:39:27 GMT -6
Options are offered as to Custer's intent but he addressed NONE of them, and things that are not for sure - like Keogh's actions, which are now presented as fact rather than unknowable - become nailed into place. It makes more sense to me if my favored theory is correct, because it includes all the puzzling actions by experienced officers cleanly demanding no deep insights. Because he felt he did not have to address anything. If he felt he was in complete control, with no viable threat, he could do anything he wanted and go any place he wanted. I will cede the point an additional messenger should have been sent back, but from Luce Ridge. By the time "God hath wrought," it was too late: impossible. And that is why I have backed away. If I decided to take on idiots like we see over there-- and there are five in the main: griffith, wild, mackenzie, strange, and mutts -- it would become a full-time job. So far, I haven't made a dime from these boards. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 7, 2014 4:24:17 GMT -6
Before Custer sent Martini back you have got to try and realise what he was seeing and what he thought the outcome would be, it sounds like Martini was sent back with a note scribbled in eagerness, and the main thought on Custer’s mind was that the whole village would scatter if they didn’t act quickly. So now he needs the full weight of his Regiment. The Pack Train would have to move as fast as possible to keep up with what he thought would be a cut and chase.
He wanted Benteen involved and he expected him to be coming from the south, and I still stick to what I have said in the past, that GAC would be crazy to expect the slow moving mules to travel over the ground he had just traversed, if it took him around an hour to get from 3411 to Ford B (thanks Fred) then how long would it take Benteen and the packs.
So at this point (GAC on 3411) the thought that any supporting attacks would stand a better chance coming from the south and via the river, and don’t forget that GAC may still have held faith in Reno to keep holding up his end, and any support including Benteen, Mathey and McDougall would carry enough weight to break any screen set up by the Indians, as he still thought that the village was on the move.
Ian.
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Post by montrose on Feb 7, 2014 5:09:21 GMT -6
Okay, sometimes my sarcasm goes too far, where it degrades from reasonable discourse. I just get annoyed at some things I read, especially at the other site.
Here is a hypothesis. Tactical decision making at LBH goes from Benteen-superior to Reno-adequate to Custer-unacceptable to Keough-grossly incompetent.
So if you have an issue with Reno's decisions, you by definition have a far greater issue with GAC.
Fred, I understand your compelling hypothesis on why GAC made the decisions he did. But following the military decision process framework, he assumed away the threat. I argue that all information he needed to disprove his bad assumptions were there long before Calhoun Hill. And my basis for this is your timing work, and the wonderful discovery of 3411. So stick to your views on why GAC performed as he did. Makes a lot of sense.
Thinking about it, my agenda is a consistent framework for analyzing all performers at LBH. And there is the rub. What I see is one analytical set applied to Reno/Benteen; and another applied to Custer/Keough. The discrepancy is so enormous that I use these boards to dispute rational choice theory. (You all are helping me prove my PHD thesis, for which you have my thanks).
I intend to get into the Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield process and its link to MDMP. The data was available to decision makers at LBH to what was going on and what to do. Benteen in particular showed sound judgement in responding to intel in a timely and useful manner. Custer and Keough did not.
Consider this: What if Benteen and Keough had switched assignments that day? Would that make a difference?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 7, 2014 6:49:51 GMT -6
William; Benteen may have done a better job at defending the area thus holding out longer, but if he received a direct order from Custer to stay put then his Battalion would eventually have been destroyed, the ground favoured the Indians and even though he may have not sacrificed C Company he just didn’t have enough men to cover all the ground and once the enemy infiltrated up the coulees and ravines he was fixed.
The only other way I see it is that once he saw that the game was up he withdrew, but then he would be countermanding a direct order, which I suppose you couldn’t blame him if it saves his men.
Ian.
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