The Victory Disease

[benteen]

Jan 30, 2013 20:46:59 GMT -6 quincannon said:

Will: I don't think I have ever argued that this battle could not be won, should have been won, and that the reason it was not won must be squarely on the shoulders of the commanding officer. Don't think there are to many here that feel otherwise. We can argue the attainment of objectives, we can discuss decisive outcomes or their absence, but victory was there for the taking, but for a number of gross tactical errors, that were certainly not brought about by a healty respect for the enemy.

Folks,

The Colonels statement seems to be the opinion of all those who voice their opinion on this battle. Now certainly I believe that Custers actions were FUBAR from begining to end, and that under a competent commander there would not have been the great loss of life, the chaos, and certainly not the complete annihilation of five companies of US Cavalry. However what makes you feel that this would have been an easy victory for the 7th Cavalry with a competant Officer in command. Gen Crook was said to be a good Officer and he didnt beat them and he had twice the men that the 7th had.

Just to clear up what I mean is, I believe under a competent commander I agree the mission could have been completed.
But I dont believe that an independant victory (Which of course is what Custer as always wanted for himself) could have been achieved

Be Well
Dan

[Dark Cloud]

The thing is, aside from the triviality of the Last Stand, the mission WAS completed. It was completed whether the Army won or lost the battle. The Sioux were never much of a threat and much less of one after the LBH, since they had to keep moving and then dividing and eventually a bunch lunged across the border so we couldn't get them and others collapsed.

No, a surrender did not occur with all the Sioux stomping to the rez, but there was no real chance of that anyway if they won or lost in June with all the game. They'd split up and hope to catch a small enough segment of the Army and defeat it. But the Army made that easy for them before they had to worry about it and they STILL were on the run forever. Win or lose, nothing much different would happen after.

If our Army had Victory Disease it was unlike any other, as there was no chance the Sioux would invade and defeat the US. There was no doubt who would win, and even the vainest delusional military knew mistakes without threatening the obvious. I don't think Victory Disease is best represented by battle, but by what is happening up the line back home. The northern twerps who treated the first Bull Run as a sure thing and had made zero prep for defeat but brought their gowns and dress uniforms for the ball that night: that was it in spades. The Russians who complicated an already incompetent supply system in 1914 in having their dress uniforms sent forward for the march into Berlin. That stuff.

The Japanese had it because they just pretended logistics didn't matter because they would win these early battles and we'd go to the table if not surrender. They had, in real life, no fall back options. They thought preparing for error encouraged it, the usual nitwit rah-rah. THey barely could ship enough oil in peacetime to power the navy, but they made no attempt to protect their tankers at the level needed, their subs wouldn't attack tankers because it wasn't manly. It's like they didn't understand 3rd grade economics, really believed the Emperor was an undefeated God, and they just wouldn't lose.

Unlike Germany - whom we made admit defeat and apologize right off, having learned our lesson at Versailles in 1918 by not making them admit it - Japan never came to grips with admission of defeat, and their school texts today treat it different than it was: theologic and selfish aggression by a Master Race. It's why China, Korea, the Philippines, and all the way to India are not fond of Japan to this day, and make her more unpopular than we are. Victory Disease, in that sense, is still contagious in Japan.

[benteen]

Jan 31, 2013 18:09:56 GMT -6 Dark Cloud said:

The thing is, aside from the triviality of the Last Stand, the mission WAS completed. It was completed whether the Army won or lost the battle.

I shoud have been more precise.Of course you are accurate in saying that the Armys overall mission was completed, I dont think there was ever I doubt that it would be. It was just a matter of time. What I was refering to was a victory at the LBH by one regiment.
The rest of your post looks to be on target and informative as to the title of the thread "The Victory Disease"

Be Well
Dan

[quincannon]

Dan: Custer desired a Cannae type of victory. That was not going to be. Victory though was attainable, and could have been achieved by the concentration of combat power at the decisive place. I believe that place was in the valley, essentially an enlargement of the axis of advance Reno used. Nothing fancy, just a streaghtforward massing of combat power at the southern end of the village, followed by a stand up fire fight.

In essence you take what the other guy gives you, smack him hard, preserve your force, retain the iniatitive, and smack him again as the next opportunity presents itself.

Custer went for all or nothing. He ended up with nothing, althought DC is correct, the outcome of this battle meant very little in the larger perspective. The hostiles were destined to lose. The army and the population that army served was destined to win. It was just a matter of time. A victory, even a tactically inconclusive one that lacked the aspects of decisive, would do nothing more than speed up a process that was already under way.

So the victory disease at LBH was in Custer's mind, and it was every bit as dangerous there as in any place else it manifests itself

[Dark Cloud]

Here's the thing: when commanders start wanting not just to win the war, but every possible and unnecessary battle, and then every battle in a certain way, they have become near reenactors playing with lives and no longer serving their country but themselves. It's why I have probably higher regard for Jellicoe than for most commanders: as primed, schooled, and lustful for glory as anyone, he'd stick to the plan and make sure the war was won by not losing, for which he was damned, of course, depriving Britain of another Trafalgar.

But I don't think that's Victory Disease, which in any case assumes periodic defeats on way to victory.

Victory Disease is the baseless assumption from school children to head of government that fortunate early wins denote a superiority that guarantees later wins and eventual victory. It's a fever dream, a delusion. Japan had that. Don't think the US ever has had that except briefly for about a month in 1861, and certainly not since Vietnam. You can win every battle and lose the war. You can win a gigantic battle with incredible skill and wipe out the army against you and lose the war. For all the fascination with Hannibal, he lost the war, and all his victories did was guarantee the kegs of salt brought to Carthage with truly annoyed Romans.

A mild sense of superiority by a losing commander is not Victory Disease. Victory disease is institutional, and there were many in the Army - like Crook - who knew damned well we could/would get our butts kicked if we didn't shape up and learn.

[wild]

but victory was there for the taking
Disagree but a hard fought result could have been gained.
I believe that place was in the valley, essentially an enlargement of the axis of advance Reno used. Nothing fancy, just a streaghtforward massing of combat power at the southern end of the village, followed by a stand up fire fight
A variation on taking the centre of the village?
Reno held a perimeter of nigh on a 1000 metres with a reduced 7 companies on Reno Hill and obtained a result of sorts.12 Companies holding the centre of the village could have obtained a result closer to Victory.

theologic and selfish aggression by a Master Race.
Japan is not the only country that produced a "master race"





, althought DC is correct, the outcome of this battle meant very little in the larger perspective
Well maybe not in the larger perspective but it was a defining moment in the larger larger perspective.
It ensured that for ever more the US would have an issue to answer in regard to it's relationship with the Native Americans.Unlike our Aussie friends and the Boonangoolie tribe of Tasmania[the who?]

[alfakilo]

I'm reading Gray's Custer's Last Campaign and I've been struck by the sections dealing with Custer's decision to attack on the 25th and the decision to turn right and climb the bluffs while Reno was preparing his charge.

Hard to put into words...but I found myself very sympathetic to Custer's 'between a rock and hard place' position while trying to decide what to do at the Crow's nest...attack now or not? I didn't find his decisions rash or ill thought out. But I did wish I was there that day to warn him that, as the blokes say, once he committed himself, it was 'in for a penny, in for a pound' time. Sometimes discretion really is the better part of valor.

Same with turning right to climb the bluffs. To climb or not to climb, that is the question. A sticky wicket by any reckoning. Damned if he did, damned if he didn't.

That's what commanders get paid for...making the tough calls. Sometimes you win, sometimes you don't. Tough luck for the rest of those 250+ guys, but, hell...they all thought this was going to be a cake walk.

Tough calls to make. Glad I wasn't the guy to make them.

AK

[wild]

But I did wish I was there that day
Don't tempt me.

[quincannon]

AK: I don't have a lot of heartburn with either of these decisions. Both were tough calls. In both the risk worth the reward, had they worked out. Custer had no way of knowing if they would work, nor was there a predetermination that success could be the only outcome. That is as you say what commanders get paid for.

Montrose is critical of Custer for placing two no go features between himself and those he claimed he would support. Had what he did worked out, no mention would ever be made of that fact. Where I find him at fault is when he realized, probably at 3411, that he could not lend immediate support, and possibly things were not going as he invisioned, that he did not attempt to rationally correct the error, rather he compounded it. There is his fault as far as I am concerned.

[alfakilo]

Mar 1, 2013 19:09:11 GMT -6 quincannon said:

Where I find him at fault is when he realized, probably at 3411, that he could not lend immediate support, and possibly things were not going as he invisioned, that he did not attempt to rationally correct the error, rather he compounded it. There is his fault as far as I am concerned.

I can go with that. As you said, at some point, as a competent commander, he should have reassessed the tea leaves. Doing so would have not been wishy-washy or, as in today's parlance, etch-a-sketchy...it would have been simply smart.

Was Custer one of those types who could not admit error, particularly in such a visible situation? I don't know.

Or was he, as has been discussed in an earlier thread, just OBE'd?

AK

[quincannon]

AK: If he was OBE'd at 3411, it is called indecision. The events that led to his demise, and overall mission failure happened when he went further upriver from 3411. Therefore one can only conclude that the correct terminology should be OBC'd (Overcome by Custer).

I listen to Dan a lot. It makes my guts churn trying to reasonably find some value in a man who I would have to think twice about peeing on, were he to be on fire. Answering that first question for me is near impossible. I would like to think he was capable of correcting an obvious error, even though that correction may bring upon him personal embarrassment. The cost of him not being embarrassed would be paid in lives. My wish is to think no officer of sound rational mind would hesitate to make the correction. With Custer I honestly do not know. He was a child in a man's body. A petulent little boy playing at soldier. I just don't know, and that is as honest as I can get.

[wild]

QDCCMy wish is to think no officer of sound rational mind would hesitate to make the correction
The correction required a return journey of 5 miles say 30 minutes.
Reno was running for his life in that time frame.Going back would at best have achieved a Benteen type solution.Going on held out the possibility of victory.What to do? 50/50 call.
One of the many 50/50 calls he got wrong to borrow a quote from somewhere or other.
Interesting then that you have him advance to Ford D a further 4 miles on and a total of 9 miles from Reno's last know position.

and overall mission failure happened when he went further upriver from 3411.
Let us recall what our friend Fred had to say [lots of nodding officer heads]about the situation at 3411.To paraphrase; Custer was happy with the situation All was going according to plan.
Here is the turning point in the battle and we have two opinions from military men at total variance with each other.