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Post by montrose on Jan 10, 2013 7:59:15 GMT -6
1.I have been thinking about the implications of LTC Custer's actions in the north. For the purpose of this discussion, I assume GAC left the Keough Bn on Calhoun Hill to wait for the Regiment minus to close up. He then conducted a strong reconnaissance to the north, to gain information to launch an attack.
2. Lethal Pause, revisited. I was going to state as an assumption that the pause on cemetery ridge indicates that GAC intended Keough to lead the regiment to his location. And here is where DC gets in my head. What if the Indian counteraction to the Ford D approach generated a response that pinned down and overwhelmed the Yates Bn. In other words what if the fatalistic theory traditionally applied to Ford B actually happened at Ford D?
Fred will point out the initial response to the Ford D probe was small and took a few minutes to build up. If GAC hadn't paused on Cemetery Ridge, he could have linked up with Keough. Unless the pause was a reaction to seeing the train wreck on Battle Ridge. Many Indians who fought GAC were maneuvering to get north of Keough, when GAC showed up farther north.
3. What was the attack plan? Now that he had seen the northern end of the camp, and enemy activity in the area, what did George intend to do?
I believe he intended to cross the river to put himself past the northern end of the village. He then intended to attack into and through the village. The objective was the village, not papooses and the Indian AARP detachment.
4. Given whatever you think GAC's plan was, was it feasible?
One of the most dreadful terms to hear in National Training center after action reviews is OBE. A plan overcome by events.
More to follow, I just wanted to get some thought processes started.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 10, 2013 9:01:19 GMT -6
Good morning William;
I remember Chuck and Fred saying that both Keogh and GAC got engaged around the same time, and if this is true then that was the reason that Keogh never went north to link up with GAC and why GAC never got the chance to re-unite with Keogh.
The attack plan could have been a recce, with only two Companies at his disposal GAC was lucky if he had more than 70 fighting men, so if he did hit any trouble he would have had to retire.
Another scenario could be that GAC and Yates had reached the northern fords area only to be shadowed by Crazy Horse and his band, and once they got to the fords CH made his presence known and GAC had to get out of there quick, whilst he was making his way back to Keogh or LSH he then see’s warriors moving on his right flank (west).
GAC orders Yates to place E Company on or around Cemetery Ridge area, to repel these warriors that were trying attack from both the north and west, I am not sure if F Company formed any sort of defence, they may have not dismounted till they got to LSH, but if they found 28 bodies from E Company (NCOs were also found with their men) then E Company must have separated from Yates/F Company and the HQ.
(I wish I could get one of those OBEs, I could write ‘’Ian OBE’’, but I don’t think her Majesty would hand one out for service to painting).
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 10, 2013 10:03:56 GMT -6
Ian: You already have an OBE, we all do. Which of us cannot say that our lives in some measure have not been overcome by events? Now in getting an Order of the British Empire, you are entirely on your own. So write Ian OBE all you want. It is not your fault that you and Her Majesty look at it a little differently.
I see that the pedestrian proletariat was being much maligned over in Oz last night. You know I think AK is a smart guy and will soon discover who buy their uniforms at the clothing sales store, and who buy them at the costume shop.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 10, 2013 10:56:02 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, why thank you, old Liz has over looked me for the last 50+ years, I remember when I was 21 years old, she visited Widnes to open the canal we had refurbished, we even built her a platform and a band stand, it was cold and hard work I can tell you, the work took me and our gang of labourers around 12 months to complete, the Queen turns up and the boss said to us all ‘’you lot get lost, the dignitaries are due now and the last thing they want is you lot hanging around, and you don’t think we are letting you anywhere near the Queen either’’, so we all went to the pub, and after about three hours the royal car comes past the boozer and we all raise our glasses to our glorious monarch, then carried on drinking, boy those were the days (that would be around 1980 I think).
Ian.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 10, 2013 11:13:57 GMT -6
I'd truly think the Queen would more enjoy talking to actual citizens than the crashing bores who compose her official life, and Phillip as well. What a god awful stultifying job it must seem to them, with no exit and no fun whatever.
QE2 is by all accounts a sharp woman who could hold her own in a pub and - if allowed at an earlier age - could drink many under the table.
That said, I feel the need to reiterate my severe hesitations about this Great Northern Journey and dividing an already insufficient force in places not remotely adequate for defense and totally too far apart for an offensive support role. I'm sorry, but I don't think Custer or any officer would proactively place elements where dismounting and being under fire without cover was quite likely, or even probable. Once in contact with the enemy who was not running, they were adhered to them. A tar baby.
I'm not a soldier, but this makes no sense to me. If Fred's book opens my eyes, I'll so admit, but I just do not see it. Ironically, I think these scenarios make Custer out to be far more incompetent than I see him. Just LOOK at that field from Weir Point. No experienced officer would take soldiers there absent intel. Cavalry ground was on the west bank. As, coincidently, was the enemy.
Whether to attack, get civvies, get horses, get crackin', you'd cross at MTC to maintain shock and minimal surprise and have short lines to your goals regardless of which they were. Once in sight of the enemy, you do not plant yourself on high ground yet not high enough to see southern approaches and in sight of the enemy and wait for other elements to arrive at an unknown time. They were not fighting an army like themselves who'd react as they might. They knew this.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 10, 2013 11:55:03 GMT -6
DC: Were I a division commander (a period division of about three thousand men) I would not hesitate to do exactly what Custer did. EXACTLY. I would hold them by the nose and maneuver to the hostiles rear by means of a double armed single envelopment. The first to draw attention away from the envelopment. The first envelopment arm to insure my force is secure from being split, and the second and decisive envelopment arm to attain the rear and kill, capture, and destroy all before it.. Three understrength battalions are not three, even understrength, brigades though. You must choose the tactical solution that is in line with your units capabilities. Custer did not, and this was the very first sin of commission.
The real message of Fred's book will be just that. Custer failed to employ his unit within its capabilities. Fred may provide the reasons for that as we examine his work. I think that is what he set out to do. We then must seperate the validity of the tactical concept with the ability to execute it. What is an indicator of tactical incompetence on the part of a regimental commander, may be the very thing we point to as a stroke of genius on the part of the division commander.
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Post by alfakilo on Jan 10, 2013 14:33:40 GMT -6
You must choose the tactical solution that is in line with your units capabilities. Custer did not, and this was the very first sin of commission. Yep. Sometimes knowing the other guy is much a part of knowing thyself. I have yet to see anyone convince me that Custer understood what he was up against. It was there to be seen...he just didn't apparently make the effort. Overcome by events...OBE'ed as the saying goes. Pretty much sums things up. AK
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Post by Gatewood on Jan 10, 2013 14:37:41 GMT -6
Along the same lines as when Longstreet was asked why the south lost at Gettysburg. He replied, "I think the Union army had something to do with it".
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Post by benteen on Jan 10, 2013 16:47:56 GMT -6
1.I have been thinking about the implications of LTC Custer's actions in the north. For the purpose of this discussion, I assume GAC left the Keough Bn on Calhoun Hill to wait for the Regiment minus to close up. He then conducted a strong reconnaissance to the north, to gain information to launch an attack. 2. Lethal Pause, revisited. I was going to state as an assumption that the pause on cemetery ridge indicates that GAC intended Keough to lead the regiment to his location. And here is where DC gets in my head. What if the Indian counteraction to the Ford D approach generated a response that pinned down and overwhelmed the Yates Bn. In other words what if the fatalistic theory traditionally applied to Ford B actually happened at Ford D? Fred will point out the initial response to the Ford D probe was small and took a few minutes to build up. If GAC hadn't paused on Cemetery Ridge, he could have linked up with Keough. Unless the pause was a reaction to seeing the train wreck on Battle Ridge. Many Indians who fought GAC were maneuvering to get north of Keough, when GAC showed up farther north. 3. What was the attack plan? Now that he had seen the northern end of the camp, and enemy activity in the area, what did George intend to do? I believe he intended to cross the river to put himself past the northern end of the village. He then intended to attack into and through the village. The objective was the village, not papooses and the Indian AARP detachment. 4. Given whatever you think GAC's plan was, was it feasible? One of the most dreadful terms to hear in National Training center after action reviews is OBE. A plan overcome by events. More to follow, I just wanted to get some thought processes started. Colonel Montrose, My thought process or opinion is that Custer never ordered Keogh to be in the position he was in. I am not a fan of Custer but I dont think he was a complete fool. Why would any commander place 3/5 of his command in a location to await an event (Benteen coming) that he has no idea is going to happen, Then ride a mile away from them, it makes no sense. Some opinions say he was going to attack the Northern end of the village. With what? 80 men against a village 2 1/2 miles long with 10000 inhabitants and 2500-3000 warriors If he was doing a recon, to find a place to attack, why wouldnt he bring his entire command. That way if he found his spot he could attack immediatley. Why leave 3/5 of his command a mile away. What are they accomplishing. They are not protecting his rear, you could fit a division between Keogh and Custer There have been some hints in the forum that in Capt Freds new book he has a theory that is logical, I look forward to it, as I know it will be based in fact and serious research. Be Well Dan
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Post by wild on Jan 10, 2013 18:21:14 GMT -6
Dan You remind me of the little boy with his finger in the dam .You are holding back a tsunami of conz like maneuverings.Withdraw that brave digit and we'll be up to our eyes in double envelopments, inverted flanking movements and God only knows what else.
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Post by montrose on Jan 10, 2013 18:29:49 GMT -6
DC and Dan,
I agree that LBH reflects poorly on LTC Custer as a commander and as a tactician.
But it reflects poorly on the 7th Cav as well. A good unit enjoys two way communications between a commander and subordinates. This provides feedback to the commander that would help overcome the glaring tactical errors at LBH.
The 7th was GAC's creation from 1866 to 1876. The unit was poorly trained. The unit had a bad command climate, and was riddled with factionalism. Those closest to the commander were yes man, living off the patronage of their boss.
The state of the Army in 1876 was far better than the 7th. Of the 35 regiments in the Army, 34 would have had better outcomes at LBH.
The claim that the 7th was an experienced Indian fighting unit is a myth. Their performance in 1867 was as poor, if not worse, than in 1876. You have Washita and Aug 1873. The rest is garrison duty, etc.
LTC Custer had far more experience fighting buffalo than Indians. How many days did he spent hunting versus how many days fighting Indians? He wrote extensively about hunting, showing a passion and commitment that he never showed toward creating and leading a combat unit.
He was very much into the perks a commander enjoys, without the responsibilities and hard work commanders have to put in. I have 11 years wearing a green tab, and it was a hard slog.
One thing that makes GAC unique, is his long and frequent leaves between campaigns. He was present for the campaigns, but not the period between campaigns where unit training and preparation takes place. Training in Kansas is hard. It is harder when the commander is sitting in a theater in New York City.
The reputation of the 7th was artificial. It was driven by a relentless publicity machine. GAC spent more time preparing the press coverage of the campaign, than he did in planning for the campaign itself.
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Post by benteen on Jan 10, 2013 19:27:51 GMT -6
Dan You remind me of the little boy with his finger in the dam .You are holding back a tsunami of conz like maneuverings.Withdraw that brave digit and we'll be up to our eyes in double envelopments, inverted flanking movements and God only knows what else. Richard, LOL...Glad to see you posting again my friend, thought you had left us. Hope you had a merry Christmas and have a healthy, happy and safe New Year you and your family Be Well Dan
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Post by benteen on Jan 10, 2013 19:30:29 GMT -6
DC and Dan, I agree that LBH reflects poorly on LTC Custer as a commander and as a tactician. But it reflects poorly on the 7th Cav as well. A good unit enjoys two way communications between a commander and subordinates. This provides feedback to the commander that would help overcome the glaring tactical errors at LBH. The 7th was GAC's creation from 1866 to 1876. The unit was poorly trained. The unit had a bad command climate, and was riddled with factionalism. Those closest to the commander were yes man, living off the patronage of their boss. The state of the Army in 1876 was far better than the 7th. Of the 35 regiments in the Army, 34 would have had better outcomes at LBH. The claim that the 7th was an experienced Indian fighting unit is a myth. Their performance in 1867 was as poor, if not worse, than in 1876. You have Washita and Aug 1873. The rest is garrison duty, etc. LTC Custer had far more experience fighting buffalo than Indians. How many days did he spent hunting versus how many days fighting Indians? He wrote extensively about hunting, showing a passion and commitment that he never showed toward creating and leading a combat unit. He was very much into the perks a commander enjoys, without the responsibilities and hard work commanders have to put in. I have 11 years wearing a green tab, and it was a hard slog. One thing that makes GAC unique, is his long and frequent leaves between campaigns. He was present for the campaigns, but not the period between campaigns where unit training and preparation takes place. Training in Kansas is hard. It is harder when the commander is sitting in a theater in New York City. The reputation of the 7th was artificial. It was driven by a relentless publicity machine. GAC spent more time preparing the press coverage of the campaign, than he did in planning for the campaign itself. Colonel, I couldnt agree with you more. I subscribe to all of your thoughts on Custer and the 7th Cavalry. Hope you are doing well. Be Well Dan
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Post by fred on Jan 10, 2013 21:09:50 GMT -6
I think "montrose" and "quincannon" pretty much know what is in my mind, but there are a few things I still need to attempt to clarify.
One of the keys to what I believe is that there was no pressure to cause Custer any worry. The pressure began mounting after he dropped off Keogh. And Custer did not move one mile from Keogh, he moved closer to 2 1/2 miles away.
There was never any intention to defend the area Keogh was in! I don't know how I can make that any clearer. Calhoun and Harrington were deployed more out of practice than necessity. And their stay there was to be a short one.
Next... while DC has a point regarding terrain, it is irrelevant. There was a mission... a goal... and terrain wasn't going to stop them. If terrain played any part in holding men back it was only in a decrease of speed, not a fear of entering an inhospitable place. Instead of moving at 17 MPH for two miles, maybe the speed dropped to 12 MPH due to difficult terrain.
Next... the halt on Cemetery Ridge was not a deliberate 20-minute-or-so halt. And no one was twiddling his thumbs. Maneuvers, actions, decisions, movement, and fighting were taking place every moment those men were there.
I am going to make this statement one more time... and if someone wants to know more, they will have to e-mail me, then keep it private. Keogh's positioning was not of his choosing. There was a reason and the reason was unknown, even when Custer galloped away. While it would not, in all likelihood, have changed the outcome, the battle would have unfolded differently. Maybe even considerably different. And the more I think about it, the more I think it may have even had an affect on Custer's actions on Cemetery Ridge.
Again, it has never been discussed, never been mentioned-- as far as I know-- and I am willing to bet 99% of those people who have no military experience would never pick up on it. In fact, without proper training in the use of tactics, it is no wonder it has never been mentioned.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 11, 2013 1:21:40 GMT -6
Fred: I have an advantage for I know of what you speak. To me it is a further indicator of no significant threat at the time the two elements split.
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