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Post by AZ Ranger on Jan 12, 2013 9:02:04 GMT -6
Nothing to date has replaced the individual mounted soldier. We don't see cavalry riding 600 motorcycles for example. That is what made the horse cavalry unique for me.
As far as mission my son assures me that the Marine infantryman can be as mobile and mission oriented as Army cavalry of today.
AZ Ranger
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Post by wild on Jan 12, 2013 9:20:10 GMT -6
If you must have some type of formation then that terrain limits your mobility and makes the routes chosen predictable if you know the terrain. Precisely. The advantage formation gives is negated by that terrain. The ability to function as an articulated unit is rendered nigh impossible.Cohesion vanishes the advantage as pointed out by AZ going to the individual warrior. Custer might as well have taken post in the LBH itself so out of it's element was the command.
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Post by Gatewood on Jan 12, 2013 9:22:13 GMT -6
Fred, I figured that my comment about a delay would solicit a response from someone, but I did not intend it in the way that you probably perceived it. To begin with, "delay" is probably not a good term to use in describing what occurred, because, to me anyway, it connotes slowness or wasting of time, neither of which I believe occurred.
The way that I perceive it is that Reno's command arrived on the bluffs in some (probably a great amount) of disorder. Some men arrived without horses and some horses arrived without riders. Some of both were wounded and had to be evaluated and cared for. Those not wounded were exhausted and in a state of excitement, requiring some recovery time. Unit structure was largely gone,and one company had no officers. I imagine that some horses that the Indian's had not been able to capture were wandering around outside the perimeter and needed to be rounded up and brought in. At the same time Benteen's command started to arrive, with the pack train not far behind.
To my way of thinking, it took some time to get this all sorted out before any movement was possible, if nothing else than to make temporary command arrangements and to get sound riders paired up with sound horses as needed. I imagine that Reno and Benteen and possibly others were evaluating the situation and discussing what they should do next. Arrangements had to be made for the wounded, ammunition distributed to those that needed it, etc., etc. I'm not sure how long all of that took, and there is much disagreement over it, but it did take "some" time. Possibly it could have been done a little quicker, but I don't know. In any event, I tend to think that whatever time elapsed was spent productively addressing all of the necessary issues such as I have mentioned above, and I by no means think that Reno/Benteen were standing around purposely "delaying" or wasting time. Sure there were some enlisted men and junior officers that indicated they were sitting around with nothing to do, but that was them and I don't think can necessarily be extrapolated to the entire force or senior officers.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 12, 2013 9:32:08 GMT -6
AZ: I agree in principle with your entire post.
DC's use of cavalry country is not really the issue either. I knew why he used it. I have used the same term myself many a time. Cavalry country as we like to think of it is broad open areas, like Brandy Station/Flleetwood Heights, open vistas and the like. Two points though:
If we keep this mindset of the broad open vista as "cavalry country" and at the same time relegate those other areas as no go's or crazy to go there areas for cavalry it skews our view of why cavalry might have gone there and forces us to make possibly wrong conclusions based on preconceived notion.
The case uppermost in point. DC's favorite scenario, and one to which he has obviously given a lot of thought to is roughly Custer gets whacked in MTC, and an informal chain of command takes over, rationality, based upon where they choose to go next goes out the window, and fate takes the lead in what comes next. I believe his words in substance are on the order of --------- no rational officer would lead his men into that country north of MTC. So what then can we conclude to be the genesis of DC's theory, evidence that Custer got whacked, or going onto that terrain (concluded as being foolish) so therefore something must have happened to Custer earlier? Custer may very well have gotton whacked. It may very well have initiated something very foolish, but if we use that as the sole basis we do ourselves a diservice.
The second point is that despite what view the at large population may think of as cavalry country, the truth is that men on horses in tactical formation have done it in less than desireable terrain, they continue to do it today in vehicles (and your correct the vehicles don't require training, only maintenence which may be worse). When the ability to negotiate terrain with either type of beast stops, the mission does not, and good troops press on.
In your various duties do you not do the same? Do you not enter areas of difficulty from both terrain and man? Do you not adapt to what confronts you? You do not need to answer for I know you do. You may go slower. You may exercise more caution in one area, more intensly required from another. You put mission above all else and drive on.
Now for all who think I am smoking some funny stuff, reasearch the events of Thanksgiving Day 25 November 1876. Everything I have said about cavalry, mounted or dismounted, easy or rough terrain, will be validated by that research. Everything., and I believe you will conclude like I have that cavalry country is where cavalry needs to operate, not where it wants to, the dismounted operations in conjunction or in addition to mounted are feasible against hostile indians in certain circumstances, and that good commanders and well trained troops can overcome the difficulties of weather and terrain, by adaptation, courage, and determination.
And Steve, as you well know there is no force on earth more powerful than the individual infantryman and his bayonet, the Ultimate Weapon, the guy who closes the last 100 yards even if he does not particularly like the idea.
And your son is also quite correct, giving lie to this infantry mentality crapola we are treated to elsewhere.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 12, 2013 9:46:33 GMT -6
Gatewood the only thing you left out was securing the area they were presently in to some form or fashion. Fine post, and very good wrap up of the process of restoring combat effectiveness. There is an old expression - Hurry up and wait. It is the ninety five percent that do the waiting that also do the b***hing, while the five percent, the ones that do the thinking and planning what comes next, are rarely heard from and usually pounded with critical remarks.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 12, 2013 10:39:02 GMT -6
Hi Gatewood, good post, I agree with you that Reno and Benteen had to take stock of the situation before making their next move, Benteen had to assist Reno when he arrived on the hill, Reno’s men had just been through a ride of hell to get to Reno hill and were not in any fit state to move never mind fight. I feel sorry for Weir, he seemed to be pretty cut up over the prospect of Custer’s men getting into trouble and no help forthcoming from either Reno or Benteen, he therefore took things into his own hands and rode off with his striker closely followed by his Company, the thing that gets me is that Reno spent time searching for the body of his friend and adjutant Lt. Benny Hodgson, this was a combat zone after all and to take time out to search for him was an error on Reno’s part, he should have been sorting out the men in his command that were still living and worrying about absent friends when the battle was over, but when they did decide to move north they arrived at weir peaks in dribs and drabs, Companies were spread out all over the place, similar to Custer’s men, so I don’t think they could have done anymore then pack up and get back to Reno hill, sad about Vincent Charley though, he didn’t deserve that fate.
Ian.
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Post by Gatewood on Jan 12, 2013 10:42:45 GMT -6
Nothing to date has replaced the individual mounted soldier. We don't see cavalry riding 600 motorcycles for example. But exactly 71 years ago (January 1942) Japanese troops riding bicycles played a prominent role in the invasion of Malaya
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Post by Gatewood on Jan 12, 2013 10:46:38 GMT -6
Ian,
As you indicated, Hodgson was Reno's adjutant, and I have seen it postulated that, as such, he may have had some documents on his body that Reno felt should be recovered. No proof of that that I know of, but it sounds plausible.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 12, 2013 10:49:00 GMT -6
AZ is correct in his summation of what, apparently, must now be called a 'position' - and 'my' position - on the definition of a phrase, 'cavalry country.' But then, as ever, he explains my position better than I did. We're talking 1876 cavalry here, or I am, and that seems to involve 'horses' and all that.
I don't think any cavalry officer would take his men north of MTC at speed or even Weir Pt. on the east bank after seeing all the potential advantages for multiple ambush. What we see today is smoothed by the high grass not there in 1876, and shadows and visual creases and other tells to the trained eye would not be welcoming. (AGAIN, where is that photo?) A quick rush down MTC might be warrented into the camp, though. All else strikes me as far too convoluted for any unit, but especially the 7th and I do not think Custer such a fool. Hit them hard first, see what shakes out, Benteen knows what to do.
The land, as AZ says, favors the individual warrior and not mounted unit formations and actions. Where it's best to ride you're a target. Where you can move with some cover, it's slow and not heading where you need to go.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 12, 2013 10:50:23 GMT -6
Ian: Men do strange things in the immediate aftermath of battle. I don't condone Reno's personal quest, but I do understand it. I don't condone Weir's actions either, but also find them understandable. This type of thing is not at all unusual on the battlefield. We give it more attention, and therefore make it more substantive than it really should be, because of the great amount of attention given what in reality is a very minor battle.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 12, 2013 12:09:47 GMT -6
DC: Mountains and jungles offer limited trafficability, often down to single file, and offer opportunity for surprise and ambuscade as well. Should we not go there, because it's hard? Should we write them off and leave them as the exclusive domain of the enemy? Should we provide him defacto sanctuary, because something is difficult?
These are the things your post suggest to a wider audience, and most probably without intention. Fred said irrelevent because of mission. I am saying irrelevent because of mission. I don't like that terrain, don't think Fred is particulary fond of it either, but that too is irrelevent.
The difference here is both Fred and I see a mission, therefore a reason to go there, where you do not. The delta between our two positions then is summed up by different perspective, than any difference in how we all see this terrain.
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Post by wild on Jan 12, 2013 12:23:05 GMT -6
Gatewood Hi. To begin with, "delay" is probably not a good term to use in describing what occurred, because, to me anyway, it connotes slowness or wasting of time, neither of which I believe occurred.I agree "delay" is not a good term to use but not for the reasons you suggest. You see there was no intention or plan to move to Custer.It was Weir what done it with his going off on his own hook.Sad to relate but Benteen also took off without orders,So the Lesser Northern Journey was spontanious rather than deliberate. One side effect of this unforced rout was the undoing of all the good damage limitation which was achieved with Benteen's arrival. No need for me to describe the Weir rout Ian has painted a very vivid picture for us.
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Post by wild on Jan 12, 2013 12:44:35 GMT -6
These are the things your post suggest to a wider audience, and most probably without intention. Fred said irrelevent because of mission. I am saying irrelevent because of mission. I don't like that terrain, don't think Fred is particulary fond of it either, but that too is irrelevent. Irrelevent?To how many elements can that get out of gaol card apply?Obviously it must apply to time;rough terrain would slow the unit yes?Number of Indians the command is in contact with, irrelevent also?Where's Benteen ?Irrelevent.Who is further away Indians or Benteen,irrelevent. Awful pity that Benteen was not familiar with this tactic.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jan 12, 2013 13:20:32 GMT -6
QC, I don't follow your thinking to what you postulate as my position. You keep trying to expand this to concerns not mine. Difficulty is not the issue; willing surrender of all your strengths and exposure of all your weaknesses for no evident reason is. The 7th had clear limitations and they needed to take advantage of their strengths: speed, shock, directed firepower. Instead, we're to believe they stopped, waited, divided in the face of the enemy, perhaps did some intel after three companies were committed to combat with promised support that wouldn't arrive absent a hookup with Benteen and time travel.
To make this the least likely scenario for success, let's move north away from the river and village into terrain that deprives us on using our mounts for anything but dead carcass cover. Is there a shred of activity that might lead to inadvertant success we have failed to squitter upon? Not that I see. Move!
All I'm saying, and interested in, is what you originally expressed confusion over: 'cavalry country.' I only use it in reference to the mounted soldiers of the 7th in 1876, June 25th, and have even less knowledge or interest in hypothetical definitions for later armies.
But to the point, 1876 cavalry should not go into a situation that portends ambush from 360 degrees where being high on a horse increases your value as a target and reduces your ability to respond. In any case, as soldiers they could not fight on horseback according to Ryan and others, who'd know, unless chasing down a fleeing enemy.
You don't go where there is no cover and you have to reduce your firepower by 25% from the start. You'd want to obtain intel on the land before jeopardizing the entire command moving, atop else, AWAY from the target and on to terrain where shock and speed are no longer your friend or on your side. That's why I don't think the 7th moved north of free will or at Custer's choice. That requires thinking he'd risk already committed three companies while he waits for something. Nothing north would be more likely obtained than straight through a seemingly empty village. Shock, speed. Or lope along the river heading north in full view not forgetting to leave 60% of your force way the hell east so to maintain the Moronic Mean of four - 4- groupings of your men out of support of each other, out of sight of at least two others, out of communication, out to lunch.
Not a soldier, but this makes zero, no, sense to me at all. None. And I don't think it happened like that.
Far more important, Broncos today, where my vicarious manhood will triumph OR some people dressed in orange whom I've never heard of nor have any interest in will lose. Snowing in Boulder, like it was winter or something. Hoo-rah.
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Post by benteen on Jan 12, 2013 14:32:30 GMT -6
Gatewood the only thing you left out was securing the area they were presently in to some form or fashion. Fine post, and very good wrap up of the process of restoring combat effectiveness. There is an old expression - Hurry up and wait. It is the ninty five percent that do the waiting that also do the b***hing, while the five percent, the ones that do the thinking and planning what comes next, are rarely heard from and usually pounded with critical remarks. Gatewood, I agree with Colonel Quincannon. Your post was well thought out and clearly stated as to the decisions and impediments that those two Officers faced on Reno Hill. Well done sir. Wish I had this a couple of years ago to use in my difference of opinions with our brothers in the other forum. ;D Be Well Dan
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