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Post by montrose on Jul 12, 2012 19:04:22 GMT -6
Cross country movement for a column of trrops is more an art than a science.
There are accordion like movements where units bunch, then get too spread out. Adjusting pace for these movements is physically and mentally draining for man and beast.
The point element helps a lot in making numerous left and right tweaks to find best route for main body. You want this elelement a few hundred yards out. This is so the main colomn doesn't have to stop or countermarch for some local obstacle.
Now the commander is never supposed to take point himself. But many do (I am very guilty of this) take the point job. This lets the commander make all the microdecisions hemself with out delay.
You take a tactical risk, and gain a faster march, with less wear and tear on the unit. Smart move when mking best speed possible heading into battle.
Remember the movement through the hills had already severely strained the endurance of the Benteen Battalion.
Respectfully,
William
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 12, 2012 21:45:42 GMT -6
Steve: I think it was last year that you rode the Benteen scout route. Assuming that your start point was in the approximate location of Benteen's start point, could you detect from that vantage point the difficulty of the terrain from the outset, or was the difficulty only detectable en route? Terrain as you know, especially out here in the west can be very deceptive. What initially looks fairly good to the eye from a distance can be something altogether different once you are on it. We rode it twice and the data is from 2010. You have it right Chuck it was deceptive and mentally depressing because as you top out you see many ups and downs to get to the next ridge. Once you get to the next ridge it repeats itself with number smaller ones between. The picture is the profile of the ride we did in 2010. Steve Attachments:
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Post by bc on Jul 12, 2012 21:48:31 GMT -6
I think you misunderstand the relevance of USMA. The Army draws its officers from USMA, ROTC and OCS. A college degree is preferred for officers, in the fond hope that it will improve their decision making ability. USMA is in the second tier of schools as an institution. Remember, we have programs at MIT, Stanford, Duke, half the Ivies, Georgetown, etc. USMA has had a past history of accreditation issues, due to too many instructors with MAs, and too few PHDs and similar academic quality issues. Now, West Point is not a community college, it has become a decent tier 2 school. In fact, we now have a career path for USMA instructors, where the Army pays for your PHD, and you spend the rest of your career teaching at USMA. So this isn't the problem riven school of the 1970s, many improvements have been made. OK, so now our USMA grads, other college grads,and OCS grads finish school, then what? They are Military Education Level Zero, they don't know squat. They all go to an Officer Basic Course to learn to be a Second Lieutenant. DO you know the skills and knowledge we expect for a new 2LT? There is no grand tactics or theater level campaign planning. Numerous studies have been done on source of commission as a function of officer performance. There is no, repeat no, correlation. USMA grads fail no more, and certainly not less, than any other source. This is due to the fact that book learning does not mean the ability to lead, and the judgment to make effective decisions. In fact, USMA grads are notorious for a rigid, inflexible decision making process. Now here is why the USMA argument is overblown. They have the lowest retention rate of any source of commission. Half leave at the end of their initial contract with the Army. At the 10 year mark, only 20% are still in. Ohhh, and don't assume that the retention is a function of quality. Many of the best and brightest leave the Army at 5 years, and go on the great careers in the civilian world. So I do not see an argument on where folks went to school as relevant to their performance over a 20-30 year career. Yep, and if they only had a good football team and a basketball team, then they would be right there with Notre Dame. Maybe they are already in football. bc
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Post by herosrest on Jul 18, 2012 18:24:54 GMT -6
There is a simple truth that applies to measure all study of Little Big Horn. When orders were sent to Benteen, Custer did not intend to be east of the river when Benteen reached the big village quickly. Despite all supposition otherwise, Benteen was ordered to attack, to do so quickly, and Custer intended to cross into the valley and concentrate his regiment in battle in the valley, at the big village. Any idea otherwise or else is the stuff of fiction. Custer did not get across the river but did not know that would be the way of it when the order was sent to Benteen. Benteen was to join Reno‘s attack and those companies were to join Custer‘s, in the valley at the village.
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Post by plainsman on Jul 18, 2012 18:27:27 GMT -6
Herosrest—
That all seems tenuous in the extreme to me.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 18, 2012 18:38:19 GMT -6
Hi.
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Post by montrose on Jul 18, 2012 18:55:04 GMT -6
Hero wrote,"Custer did not intend to be east of the river when Benteen reached the big village quickly. Despite all supposition otherwise, Benteen was ordered to attack, to do so quickly, and Custer intended to cross into the valley and concentrate his regiment in battle in the valley, at the big village. Any idea otherwise or else is the stuff of fiction. Custer did not get across the river but did not know that would be the way of it when the order was sent to Benteen. Benteen was to join Reno‘s attack and those companies were to join Custer‘s, in the valley at the village."
1. Custer's order to Benteen was a 'You come to me" order. This order was written on the bluffs. So there is NO possible way Custer intended Benteen to enter the valley.
The first place Benteen could have received the attack order that you claim existed would be on Calhoun Hill. So from here Benteen would have to countermarch to Ford A and then swing up the valley to reinforce Reno.
The alternative is for Benteen to cross Ford A, defeat 2,000 Indians, and then head upstream to find Reno.
2. You propose a hypothesis that Custer expected to be in the village when Benteen and McDougall arrived. SO how do you explain the lethal pause? For 20 minutes LTC Custer sat on the north end of Battle Ridge, under little enemy pressure. He had the ability to move and chose not to.
I think a far better hypothesis is that Custer was waiting for Benteen and McDougall to reach first Calhoun Hill, and then to his location. He was planning a major attack with all 4 Battalions. (With all the attachments, McDougall had the manpower of a 3 company force).
William
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Post by herosrest on Jul 18, 2012 19:06:07 GMT -6
Confusions about Custer‘s intentions reach far back in time but were crystalised by Frederick Whittaker who believed that Benteen and Reno should have marched quickly from Reno Hill to the sound of the guns.
That is a completely different matter to the ofders sent previously to BEnteen, before Reno pulled out of the valley. No one knew what Reno would do, until he did it and the mrssage to Benteen was sent beforr Reno did the retreat. Was Custer clairvoyant? Of course he was not. He was a soldier, commanding a regiment in battle and issuing orxdrs to his senior subordinte officers. To attack!
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Post by quincannon on Jul 18, 2012 19:14:47 GMT -6
For that order to have meant anything but COME TO ME, there would have had to have been a positive order to Benteen from Custer prior to Benteen moving off to the west. Something along the lines of ----- I am sending Reno across at this ford (Ford A). You will complete your present mission, and if you find nothing return pick up Reno's trail and follow him to lend support. There was no such order given,. That and the fact that Custer's order had a later date/time group, and where it was written (on the bluffs) saying specificly COME ON (meaning to me). Were it to convey some other meaning it would have said GO TO not COME ON. I am very critical of that note, its absence of positive information, but those two words are the only thing in the damned scrap of paper that IS clear
HR You are either barking up the wrong tree, in the wrong forest, on the wrong planet, or you are testing us to see if we are still awake.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 18, 2012 19:30:29 GMT -6
The note can have been written in urdu and cofed with the enigma cypher for all its relevance. Reno had not retreated when it was written. Custer had not attempted to cross the river and only later did the five companirs retreat from the river ~ after Reno‘s retreat and Benteen‘s decision not to renee the fight in the valley, as he reported to Terry on the 27th.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jul 19, 2012 7:01:38 GMT -6
HS where do you think Benteen was located when he received the note from Martin?
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Post by Gatewood on Jul 19, 2012 12:12:58 GMT -6
In regard to the confusion over orders and Custer's plan or intent, let me postulate something that has been rattling around in my head and see what others think of it.
First, I have no real problem with Custer splitting his forces as he did, as given the circumstances and what he knew, it seems a reasonable disposition. However, I theorize that the leadership assignments could have been handled differently/better. We had a discussion a couple of weeks ago in which the general consensus was that Benteen, as the third in command, was appropriately assigned his command to operate semi independently from the rest of the regiment. OK, so far, so good. Now, what if French (or whomever) had been given command of the "valley battalion" and Reno, as overall second in command, was given command of the larger "maneuver" element, which, after all, had originally been his "wing", rather than Custer accompanying it himself and effectively demoting himself to wing/battalion command. Instead, what if Custer, with his HQs staff and a supply of messengers, had remained in the vicinity of Weir or 3411, where he could observe various portions of the battlefield and would have been somewhat centrally located between the diverse elements of his command and better able to direct and coordinate them as necessary. Would that have not been a better location and function for the overall commander? Is it possible that this was the biggest mistake that Custer made - transitioning from regimental to wing commander with no one effectively exercising regimental command?
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Post by quincannon on Jul 19, 2012 12:27:44 GMT -6
Interesting. My gut says the best task organization would have been how an 1876 cavalry regiment was designed to be organized - Three battalions with two squadrons of two troops each. The wing organization which was in the book envisioned the colonel and the lieutenant colonel each having a wing. Don't think the latter would be appropriate in this situation. Going to have to think about it some and post later, but there is much more to consider than just who commands whom and what and from where.
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Post by wild on Jul 19, 2012 12:30:05 GMT -6
Events moved faster than messengers. Check Balaclava where the force commander had a better view than the cavalry commander; this leading to the confusion and disaster. In a word no it would not.
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Post by herosrest on Jul 19, 2012 14:15:26 GMT -6
Benteen saw the tail end of Reno‘s retreat,as did Edgerley. Godfrey placed Benteen on the bluffs before seeing Reno‘s command. Benteen was a mile or less from From forf A when Martini met him. DeRudio saw Weir and Edgerey approach Ford A before divering onto the bluffs.
custer rode with his command to Medicine Tale creek if that is not accepted as understood,there is no point studying the battle. Trumpeter Martin was sent back to Benteen from Ford B ~ That is known from Martini at the Reno Inquiry.
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