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Post by fuchs on Apr 19, 2013 9:51:42 GMT -6
How you arrive at your numbers is your business ... I hope not I would like to encourage everyone to participate in his exercise, by adding information that allows us to approach the problem in a quantitative way. Trying to get "accurate numbers" would be hubris, but I think an attempt could be made to establish a ceiling and a floor number, and maybe a rough idea where between those constraints the actual number had been. Could you substantiate this a bit more? In which time-frame, up to which fraction of Southern Cheyenne, reported by whom? Does it check out again other independent information? It's a long way from Oklahoma to the Powder River Country, almost 1000 miles, and the area in between was starting to get settled in 1876. Taking the flight of the Northern Cheyenne out of Oklahoma in 1878 as a reference, it would likely take almost 2 month for a one-way trip.
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Post by wild on Apr 19, 2013 16:59:51 GMT -6
One does not need to know how many Indians were at the LBH.All that is required to be know is the minimum number of Indians required to chase stop and massacre a spread out column of 210 soldiers. My guess is 500 in two parties of 250 approx. And the evidence is such as to suggest that there were multiples of 500s.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 20, 2013 5:41:02 GMT -6
Hi Richard, I don’t know mate, Reno was faced with more than 500 (some reports say it could be high as 900) and these were close onto him, plus he had less men then Custer, but he managed to break out and reach safety, so if GAC had around 500 to 1000 yard start on any huge group of warriors, then why didn’t he do the same, they may have even parted if a large column such as Custer tried to smash through them.
Don’t forget, if say 1000 warriors were spread over a large area, a column of Mounted Troops could break through if concentrated into a tight formation, if such a column hit a line of Indians it would (for a short window of time) have local superiority, and I know Custer’s horses would have been tired, but so were Reno’s but he manage to save two thirds of his Battalion.
So I go along with the theory that the warriors numbers grew from around 50 to 1000+ and maybe more, over a period of time, thus giving Custer no incentive to retreat.
''Untill it was too late, his Battalion was too spread out to have any effect''.
Ian.
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Post by bc on Apr 20, 2013 11:05:55 GMT -6
One does not need to know how many Indians were at the LBH.All that is required to be know is the minimum number of Indians required to chase stop and massacre a spread out column of 210 soldiers. My guess is 500 in two parties of 250 approx. And the evidence is such as to suggest that there were multiples of 500s. And what is the minimum number of NAs needed when the troops run out of ammo on their person? bc
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Post by wild on Apr 20, 2013 11:07:10 GMT -6
Hi Ian I can never understand why the Indians did not finished off Reno.Was it the arrival of Benteen saved him?Or something requiring the attention of the Indians in the vicinity of MTCF? Anyway for Custer there was no such escape. Reno used his command to it's full potential and that included running like hell which allowed it to benifit from the chance arrival of Benteen.Custer led his command in the wrong direction for his support to even indirectly effect his situation. An isolated spread out command would have been a better description. Another difference between Custer and Reno was that Reno was able to form a skirmish line unhindered while I'm suggesting that Custer was engaged in a running fight and unable to break contact to form a defensive line. Regards
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 20, 2013 12:09:50 GMT -6
Hi Richard, I am sure have read somewhere that one of the soldier/survivors said that when Reno first made his charge out of the timber, the Indians where initially surprized and stopped their attack, and it was only when they realised that Reno was running that they gave chase.
Back to Custer;
Where do you think this running fight started, MTC/MTF? But there are only two markers in this location, so I don’t see a running fight there.
If you think it was not at these locations then it may have been at Calhoun Hill, but this is around a mile away, so if GAC had seen that he was facing vast numbers of warriors, he would still have a mile between himself and them, easily enough time to ‘’Get the hell out of there’’.
Ian.
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jag
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Post by jag on Apr 20, 2013 13:09:00 GMT -6
Ian, wild,
Well as it stands today, we have most of these boards dedicated to pro-posting that Custer's sent such and such a company or maybe two to there to do this, because that explains that, and another to there because of this, then this makes that because another place over there needed another company to do that so Custer could laughingly take a paltry two to attack some ford here or there. AND most of this was defensive in nature and offensive at the same moment in time, yet he was intent on charging into the village with anything less than what he went there with, that such actions explains both defensive and offensive in the same moves, you see. This just as satisfying sans justifying to the Neanderthal senses that propose such nonsense as Custer's discovery of the village size and thus the numbers of warriors occurred both early and late; such that it made just as much sense on Reno's battlefield that the warriors there remained at a distance so remote, just like they supposedly did with Custer, that it appeared they were celebrating having just made off with the girls skirts and panties and didn't care what the hell Reno/Custer and his men were doing, and why should they? And Reno was also supposed to have been attacking, yet somehow wasn't, just like Custer, those said to have been within 250 yards of their position with carbines that had an effective range of 500 yards. Reno's moves also being offensive and defensive at the same time, but apparently was distracted and confused by the waving of the small white handkerchief sized apparel at the end of their coup sticks and the colorful loincloths bleached in pastel colors unbecoming the apparel those warriors were wearing, such that he said, "men to your horses we're charging to them" And they say this wasn't an ambush? And why wouldn't they? Reno sans Custer knew what awful shots their men were, after all they didn't have the means to train them, hampered as they were by a tight wad war department more concerned about how many penny's a bullet cost than the life of the man who shot it. No wonder it was said the Cavalry was useless when not on the move. They had to stop to fire their Micky Mouse made look alike rifles and revolvers otherwise they'd end up shooting their comrades or themselves in the attempt, that's a fact, and the Indians would have won anyway. It seems as though somehow Custer's cavalry was doomed that day. They didn't have anything to charge with, no Sabre's, rifle's too unwieldy, Pistols to dangerous to use and just as ineffective while on a bouncing horse, unless at a walk, and then it wouldn't have been a charge, yeah I know, I can see that one too, they'd have been laughed outta their saddles had Custer tried that one. So all they had to charge with was the "yell" 'hi-ho silver and away'. Damn movies and westerns don't have it right at all, yet that's everyone's perception of it, you had to be there, and most of us were when Roy, Hop-a-long, Gene, Matt and Festus and all the others blasted their horses heads off every time they used real ammo.
I don't buy for a moment the feint theory at MTF or anywhere else on that battlefield. It would have been one dumb assed move right after another had Custer tried that one. He would have been, and might as well have been practicing that one on a fence post, or riding a sharp pointed one with turkey buzzard feathers for stabilizers at the other end, because the Indians swarmed. Why do that and then trot your happy ass downstream for a couple of miles and then seriously try to nail a ford there when you'd have an angry mob of thousands behind you AND in front of you too? Sounds like it, doesn't it? Might have been, except for the fact that Curley reported that was the only area on their retreat that didn't have warriors there on their retreat. What the hell did he know anyway? Besides didn't Custer see all those warriors or the equivalent in tepee's from that area 51 - 40, and would have been supposedly known to him before he ever arrived at MTC. Could he not see the vast pony herd from up there? Could he not tell from the size of that, if not from the number of tepee's and all that was beautifully visible from up there how many he would have been up against? If not, he was deaf for not paying attention to his scouts, dumb for pulling what he did and blind for not having seen it when and WHERE he should have. As he apparently didn't even try or apply the aforementioned he didn't even do what every cavalry since Christ was known for - shock, speed nor stealth to those actions downstream... so say some who'd have you believe they'd have a cheap bridge to nowhere to sell you too, and then make you believe the Custer cluster had built it, also making it of more value than nowhere could ever be, which seems to be where everyone in this business wants to go anyway as we've pretty much had consensus that its no more nor any less than what was written about it about 135 years ago.
The word is 'surrounded'. It is the clarion call of all in Custerland that is ever proposed as his demise. Lets try the standard measure, unlikely to some, preposterous to others, in an attempt to understand that word. It was 250 some odd troopers that was supposed to cover a mile square area of simple ground filled with 3,097,660 yards, well that's what was originally marked out as Custer's battlefield. So lets go with that. If there were 1 warrior for every yard of that square mile, how many warriors would there have been, oh no... not in depth, just enough to go around that square mile perimeter. There's 1760 yards in a mile X 4 = 7040 warriors. And if in depth by one more file? 14,080 warriors. To much? Lets say 2 yards per warrior. 880 X 4 = 3,250 warriors, one more file, 6,500 warriors. Yet way to many? Every warrior had 4 yards clearance. 440 X 4 = 1760 warriors, one more file = 3,250 warriors. I think it safe to stop there. And Custer and his men? 250/4 = 63 men spaced 28 yards apart for each section of that square mile. Those odds for each section of that square mile at the minimum figured being 1,760 warriors to 63 troopers being 28 to 1. Even if Benteen and Reno with the pack train in tow could have arrived in time, based upon battle start figures, the odds still would not have been any greater than 7 to 1 for each of those miles on the square in the favor of the warriors, this based upon 1760 warriors per square mile / 440 per each segment of that mile. It might make not sense whatever Custer did or ordered done but feed more troops to be killed into that fray, much less attempt any continuation of whatever attack he might have been attempting. I can't ever believe, for a mere second, Custer, or for that matter any of his officers ever gave a fleeting thought that some kind of holding action on those barren hills and ridges, with no cover, with that many warriors, was somehow remotely possible to have won. What this battle didn't reflect, based upon what little evidence exist, doesn't point to a long protracted battle there. The figures coincidental to Indian recollection that there wasn't many solders there to defend. Yet we still will have the absurd notion and silly need for Custer and his men to perform intricate offensive maneuvers when absolutely none offensively were performed. This a ludicrous attempt to give excuse as to why MTF wasn't crossed more than anything. Excuses we don't need. I suppose some will say that none of this points to heroic actions. But it does explain that Custer and his men didn't end up willingly where he and his men were found killed, and is something more in keeping with warrior tactics, results on the field and common sense. And that the Indians attacked quickly, with effectiveness and in force before any of those troopers ever set foot upon the ground, and would have been the reason for those troops fighting in platoons and gives explanation as to why the location of the officers and the dead were found where they were, the field upon which they fought and the ensuing battle less thrilling, less protracted and less heroic than heretofore explained and accounts for everything. Benteen's scattered corn confusion and rout offering the best explanation, was, still is.
It has always been assumed that Custer's actions was based upon his early sightings, you know, ...from way up there area 51-40, and thus also he quickly constructed the odds. Did he? Did he know those odds that early? Or, was it something that was later observed and he didn't see until it was to late? The conclusions most arrive at today totally assumes he knowingly attacked those huge odds against him, thus he was crackers for doing what he did. They all seem to believe that - that magical word 'charge' actually meant, like in the movies and western soaps, that they'd draw some kind of weapon and have at it to the bad guys. All that without giving meaningful thought to accurately fire any weapon from the bouncing/bounding horse and not have hit something they weren't supposed to... oh say like old Iron Butt himself. Let alone try to accurately hit anything with any precision what-so-ever. They think Custer was an intuitive leader out seeking some kind of initiative so he could 'charge' when 'in contact with the enemy'. Really? Charge? With what? If had any intuition at all, he knew one thing, the cavalry had to 'charge' or as Ian said, run like hell. And because the Indian pony's were faster, he had to have known he couldn't have out ran them across open country. And he also knew the only thing he had to charge with was the same loudness Benteen claimed to have heard, you know... all that noise he called cheering. If they couldn't use their revolvers for firing, and believe me, even practicing that one would have required some kind of psycho mind meld with their horse, and they couldn't have fired over their shoulder either, even something more dis-ass-trous, what pray tell did he have to offer the Indians that day when he did dismount to fight them? Reno found out and wanted no part of it and neither did Benteen want to venture father downstream because of it.
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Post by fuchs on Apr 20, 2013 14:28:46 GMT -6
montrose:
Fred:
I'm at the moment trying to reproduce the number juggling Bray and Gray did with the Indian population. Bray's paper is a pleasure to work with, every move and adjustment he made is noted, and properly motivated. Not much to disagree with substantially in there.
Gray's book on the other hand is a PITA to work with. At this point I'm still of the opinion that he ended very close to the mark for the overall numbers, but he's making it very hard to retrace his steps to get there. It looks as if the moment he was satisfied that the numbers made sense to himself, he just dropped it onto the reader, without bothering to tidy it up.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 20, 2013 19:52:54 GMT -6
I am trying to get a handle of the methodology for a census on the reservations. Were there census takers and if not why do we call it that? Seems to me these were estimations of a population confined to the reservations. Is there any reliable methodology to estimate the populations not on the reservations and the difference in population structure between the reservation and off-reservation compositions. Also what populations remained in Canada?
I still believe that officers experienced in seeing numbers of troops during the CW are better at estimating numbers of individuals. I would suspect that the error would be to underestimate total numbers since warrior were not as visible as troops in formations.
Myself so far would not rely on reservation numbers to set the population of warriors at the LBH. To my knowledge there never was a true census conducted to count the total population of Indians available in 1876.
I don't think using junk data collection helps us to much to see how many warriors were there that day. There were enough.
AZ Ranger
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Post by fuchs on Apr 21, 2013 0:25:50 GMT -6
I am trying to get a handle of the methodology for a census on the reservations. Were there census takers and if not why do we call it that? Seems to me these were estimations of a population confined to the reservations. Is there any reliable methodology to estimate the populations not on the reservations and the difference in population structure between the reservation and off-reservation compositions. Also what populations remained in Canada? That complex of questions is where I'm a bit stuck at the moment. Were there census takers? Sometimes yes, sometimes no. The preferred method after 1876 appear to have been the people doing the counting going through each and every lodge. Other methods were having each head of household reporting the number of people in his lodge, or in fact simple estimates based on lodge numbers. Especially Spotted Tail and Red Cloud are reported to have been fiercely obstructing the efforts to get accurate numbers. Universally consistent, and probably reliable census data is available only from about 1890 onwards. Difference in population structure between the reservation and off-reservation compositions? The aggregate of good counts overwhelmingly suggest the 25/35/40% distribution between warriors/women/children was more or less universal. But specifically for the difference between those out of the reservation in summer 1876 and those still there, I don't have a handle on it yet. And I likely would need more data than I have access to. Specifically the detailed results from the military counts on the reservations in 1876, as well as all the surrender count numbers, broken down to number of men/women/children and tribal affiliation. Reliable numbers for the winter roamers? The total number of lodges was likely around 400 according to: - the estimate of the Indian Office - The counts/estimates of the number of lodges from the camp locations of the consolidated winter roamer camp - The relative numbers of lodges given by Wooden Leg to Maquis add up to around 400 if you anchor it at a Cheyenne lodge number of 50. That number of around 50 Cheyenne lodges is indicated by several sources With error margin and plausible ratios for people per lodge this would correspond to about 1800-2600 people, 450-650 warriors. Still in Canada? Gray gives 250, Bray 400 as estimates. That topic is right up to Bray's area of research, to I'm inclined to give greater credence to his number. The historical evidence appear to point in the opposite direction. At least the numbers that ended up ultimately in the reports can be shown to have been a severe overestimation on numerous occasions. I already provided some examples. It might have been that privately the officers on the ground had a good handle on the numbers, but the paper trail speaks to the contrary. Apart from that, I would suggest that the Indian's highly mobile and to White eyes apparently chaotic way of fighting would lead to an overestimation compared to relatively well ordered formations of soldiers. Correct. But around 1890 there was. Obviously not yielding the exact population of 1876, but a reasonable approximation. From the reservations where reliable numbers are available for the complete 1880s, it appears likely that there was very little intrinsic population change happening in that period on the reservations. This would suggest that the 1876 number was fairly close to the 1890 number. It pretty much rules out a Lakota number of 20000 or more in 1876.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 21, 2013 7:09:26 GMT -6
Hello Jag; I don’t think any of Custer’s five Companies fought in single Platoons, four out of the five had only 38 men, so if there are two Platoons per Company that would be 19 men to each Platoon, now once you take out the Officer and his Orderly plus say the Sergeant, you are left with 16 Troopers, then take away the horse holders and you are left with a skirmish line of twelve men, and that would be no use against some of the Indian totals that are being mentioned in this thread.
Ian.
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jag
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Post by jag on Apr 21, 2013 8:23:42 GMT -6
Hello Jag; I don’t think any of Custer’s five Companies fought in single Platoons, four out of the five had only 38 men, so if there are two Platoons per Company that would be 19 men to each Platoon, now once you take out the Officer and his Orderly plus say the Sergeant, you are left with 16 Troopers, then take away the horse holders and you are left with a skirmish line of twelve men, and that would be no use against some of the Indian totals that are being mentioned in this thread. Ian. 401 Q. State if you examined the route or trail of General Custer in the vicinity of the hostile village. If so, describe it with reference to the village, the stream, and all the developments brought to your knowledge, of the fate of General Custer's command. A. I saw of the trail was on the morning of the 27th when we went to bury the dead. We found the tracks of shod horses on the same side of the river where we were, and on the same side Gen. Custer went down and formed skirmish lines when we came close to where the battlefield was so as to find all the bodies that might have been killed We came upon a few bodies about 3 miles from where we had position on the hill. Each company had orders to bury the dead as they found them, and as we came up to the first hill where they were at all thick, Major Reno called Capt. Moylan to see if he could recognize the bodies there. I went with him, and we found Lieut. Calhoun,, who was in rear of the first platoon of his company. About 20 or 30 feet from there, was Lieut. Crittenden, lying in the rear of the 2nd platoon, both about 15 or 20 feet in rear of their platoons. Q. In regard to the men around General Custer's position? A. There were a good many soldiers killed round there. Q. Did you find any evidences of company organizations? A. No, sir; it seemed to be a rallying point for all of them. I think that was where Gen. Custer planted the guidon, it was the last point, it was not as high as some other points around it, It was the highest point in that immediate vicinity. McDougall 471 I put one platoon in front of the pack train and one in the rear, and charged to where those persons were. I found out then that it was Major Reno and his command. Benteen 368 -369 Q. Give a description of it as far as it came under your observation following as near as you can the supposed route of Gen. Custer. A. I went over it carefully with a view to determine in my own mind how the fight was fought. I arrived at the conclusion then, as I have now, that it was a rout, a panic, till the last man was killed: that there was no line formed. There was no line on the battlefield. You can take a handful of corn and scatter it over the floor and make just such lines. There were none, The only approach to a line was that there were 5 or 6 horses at equal distances like skirmishers. Ahead of those 5 or 6 horses there were 5 or 6 men at about the same distances, showing that the horses were killed and the riders jumped off and were all heading to get where Gen, Custer was, That was the only approach to a line on the field. There were more than 20 killed there. To the right, there were 4 or 5 at one place, all within the space of 20 or 30 yards. That was the condition all over the field and in the gorge. Q. Did you examine the position where Capt. Calhoun's body was found? A. Those were the 5 or 6 horses and men I spoke of. Those were of his company. I buried that company. (Surprise, still no skirmish line.) -386-387- Q. Did the position of the bodies on the Custer battlefield indicate a battle or a rout? A. It indicated that the officers did not die with their companies. Only three officers were found with their companies, That shows that they did not fight by companies. All the officers except Col. Keogh, Capt. Calhoun and Lt. Crittenden were on the line with General Custer.Q. Would that be the fact if the command was overwhelmed while making a stand? A. I think not. QUESTIONS BY THE RECORDER Q. You have stated that the position of the bodies was to be compared with scattered corn. State whether in a charge against an enemy the position of the dead bodies are in a line or scattered? A. Scattered. QUESTIONS BY MAJOR RENO Q. If there had been a charge in all probability the officers would have led it? A. It was their business to do so. Q. Would they not have died as much outside of any enclosure or means of protection as the men themselves? A. There is no royal road to death in a charge. Q. State in what position the officers including General Custer and those about him were found, whether in such positions as indicated they died in a charge or in attempting to make resistance on foot. A. They were in such position, 3 at least, as indicated they had not led in a charge. Q. Was there a circle of dead horses about them? A. Not a line, the arc of a circle.... Q. Do you mean that the officers whose bodies were not found did not die with their companies? A. I mean to say on that field there were three officers killed with their companies. The others were together on the hill. If they had lines the officers would have died with the men.Q. Was the nature of the ground there such as to form regular lines with a command attacked by an overwhelming force of Indians? A. Lines could have been formed, but lines were not formed. They probably had not time to form lines. I think possibly that is the just conclusion.Q. Was it evident that those officers that were found together had all been killed there; or might not some of them been taken there wounded? A, I think they were all killed there. You can believe whatever you like. I'll stick with someone, Capt. Benteen, who was experienced enough to know what he was looking at. Its the best we're ever going to get.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 21, 2013 8:59:45 GMT -6
I know that Companies could split into two Platoons and this procedure was utilised by other Companies of the seventh, but just because Calhoun and Crittenden were found with their Platoons does not mean that they split into two separate units and acted independently, if L Company was detailed to stop any enemy advance on Calhoun hill, then it did so as a whole Company, if they split there fire into two Platoons (to engage targets in two areas), they would still be in the same location.
What I was trying to say was this, if Custer and his Battalion were forced away from the village by a swarm of warriors, the tactic of dropping one Platoon off here and another one further along the track with no support would be suicide, I could only imagine the shock on the men’s faces when for instance, we had Keogh saying to Calhoun you try and stall them, and Calhoun then ordering Crittenden with around 22 men to dismount and engage surging warriors, then the rest of the Company rode off in the same direction as the Battalion, leaving them with no support and isolated. That would seem like a sacrifice to me, you stay and we are withdrawing ‘’good luck’’.
Benteen could have been right, concerning the placement of Companies, maybe one Platoon stood and the other one ran, but as you said we will never know.
Ian.
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jag
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Post by jag on Apr 21, 2013 9:24:00 GMT -6
I know that Companies could split into two Platoons and this procedure was utilised by other Companies of the seventh, but just because Calhoun and Crittenden were found with their Platoons does not mean that they split into two separate units and acted independently, if L Company was detailed to stop any enemy advance on Calhoun hill, then it did so as a whole Company, if they split there fire into two Platoons (to engage targets in two areas), they would still be in the same location. What I was trying to say was this, if Custer and his Battalion were forced away from the village by a swarm of warriors, the tactic of dropping one Platoon off here and another one further along the track with no support would be suicide, I could only imagine the shock on the men’s faces when for instance, we had Keogh saying to Calhoun you try and stall them, and Calhoun then ordering Crittenden with around 22 men to dismount and engage surging warriors, then the rest of the Company rode off in the same direction as the Battalion, leaving them with no support and isolated. That would seem like a sacrifice to me, you stay and we are withdrawing ‘’good luck’’. Benteen could have been right, concerning the placement of Companies, maybe one Platoon stood and the other one ran, but as you said we will never know. Ian. At Calhoun what company line would be established with two platoons 20 to 30 yards apart. Platoons are what they are, platoons. And they didn't fight that way either as Benteen said they were running towards Custer's position at the time, reread it. That they were forced to do something else who the hell knows. But they were in platoon formation, not company. And just who said anything about dropping off anything? Where does this come from? Benteen never said anything about "dropping off" this or that company, this or that platoon, in fact not one of those viewing that field ever said any such thing. That's because they didn't, they didn't have the time to do anything fanciful, fantastic, heroic. It was just as Benteen said, they weren't allowed the time for such things. This is some modern day nutcase's mythical thoughts injected into this that's caused all the confusion concerning this. They were forced from the river back and away from that position by the Indian pressure, which came immediately, swiftly and without warning, so much so that they barely had a chance to dismount, hold their own horse, and then grab their revolver, and have had no time at all to have fired one shot off before being overran and rolled up like a rag doll. Near Custer's position those that survived that onslaught, and only about 40 or so did out of C,E and F company's headed for the peak of LSH thinking some such thing as it would provide some kind of protection. It didn't and they were dispatched shortly after their arrival there. It would be interesting to have Indian statements about what kind of weapons they picked upon LSH. My thoughts would be that most of those were revolvers and barely if any rifles there. I know everyone wants Custer to be the brilliant hero standing gallantly up there leading his men. He wasn't, not that he wasn't capable, he didn't because there wasn't time.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 21, 2013 9:42:35 GMT -6
I agree with Benteen and Jag's take. Benteen knew of what he spoke. He said all this under oath, subject to cross and contest from other officers. Nobody did. Nobody. What vague inferences of a stand a heroic fight are from those concerned about Maggie and La Custer and no condemnation to them. Godfrey lied under oath about mutilations, since he changed his story through the years. Good for him. If Benteen was lying or wrong, you'd think all the heroes and Custer shills would have been all over him. But no.
Also, this business of trying to get precise data from recordings of 'census' counts by individuals of highly dubious enthusiasm for institutions that flourished only in corruption is what I mean when I suggest that focus on all this detail is a fog. You can pretend you're obtaining truth but, that's all.
Soldiers and scouts who watched the camp depart on the 26th, PLUS Terry's estimate of those sent north to confront him, suggest a reasonably accurate size. Huge numbers of people, with an abnormal percentage of single males.
"Warrior" totals might include those old enough to leave the camp and attack, say, Crook. Whatever that total was, they were augmented by younger and older males and females in defense of the camp at LBH with firearms and not.
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