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Post by wild on Apr 21, 2013 23:35:04 GMT -6
Jag I think I concur.I say "think" because your bibical style just would not do in the company office.I would hate to have had to deal with an ammo requisition from you.The war would be over by the time I decoded the request. Anyway just for the sake of arguement------ As reqards fighting in platoons;there is a difference between fighting in platoons and fighting by platoons. If platoons were utilised for some tactical reason it would indicate that Custer had some control.It would indicate that the Indians were not within coup counting distance. The final positions of the companys were the best Custer could manage and they indicate he could manage nothing. Best wishes.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 22, 2013 12:44:23 GMT -6
Hello Everyone;
I take everyone’s account on this battle very seriously, I read them all in detail, Dark Clouds, Dans and Richards (I think I have read Richard’s, hey Richard when was the last time you gave us your version of proceedings) all follow the same path, Chuck and Fred both share similar views, and I go along with these views, so now we have Jags version, so I gave him his due, he took time out to write his post so I will treat his account with the respect I give everyone else’s, now to do this I will try and visualise what the writer (poster) is trying to get across, so with the Jag account;
I see Custer and his Battalion thundering down MTC, and once at the bottom the leading elements (HQ/F&E Coy’s) get turned away or deflected, Keogh and his three Companies are at the back of the Battalion and are the last to see the warriors, so the whole Battalion fly down MTC then turn to the left, the warriors are at first took back by this long blue express train that comes thundering past, the head of this train (HQ/F&E) is forced up Deep Coulee and on to Battle Ridge, Keogh’s bunch are chased up to Calhoun hill, now C Company being the tail end Charley, gets caught first, then L and finally I, the rest of the Battalion (HQ/F&E) are being forced more and more east, E Company was the Troop that gets caught first and when the HQ and F Company reaches LSH they are hit by fire from all points of the compass.
Well there you have it, I have tried to figure out what Jag was saying in his post and if I am wrong he is sure to let me know.
P.S. I never said I agreed with this account or version, I was just trying to see things through Jags eyes.
Ian.
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Post by wild on Apr 22, 2013 15:52:21 GMT -6
Hi Ian No one has disproven or seriously questioned the simplex solution.I have always held the view that as long as the simple solution is creditable it trumps all other scenarios. Is it not logical that probability favours simplex over complex? For your Fred/QC solution to be creditable it requires time,distance and certain maneuvers to be extended beyond what the mess on battle ridge would indicate. All I require is a zillion Indians 3 to 4 minutes distant from an strung out column and you get what Benteen described. Best Wishes
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Post by quincannon on Apr 22, 2013 17:26:07 GMT -6
I am not going to argue you point for point. I will just make two statements. One you can't prove one way or the other. The second is easily provable, and if that is what you base your scenario on it is quite easy to prove you incorrect in your scenario. . 1. Where they were found is not necessarily where they were before.
2. I defy you (meaning that zillion Indians) to either walk/run or ride a horse from the west side of the river to Battle Ridge in 3 or 4 minutes at any point, particularly if you are under fire any part of the way. You have not considered the choke points, and factored those into you time and distance. Further you make no allowances for the brokenness of the terrain over much of the area that must be traveled to get mass at the place you desire them to be within your constraints of time.
Just how long do you think it would take for instance for those warriors that engaged Reno to get from the vicinity of retreat ford to Last Stand Hill? There is testimony that approximately half who engaged Reno also engaged Custer. Did Custer stop and wait for them to show up? If it lasted the short time that you speculate that it did, would not that time factor and the showing up of those that engaged Reno be mutually exclusive?
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jag
Full Member
Caption: IRAQI PHOTO'S -- (arrow to gun port) LOOK HERE -- SMILE -- WAIT FOR -- FLASH
Posts: 245
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Post by jag on Apr 22, 2013 21:00:17 GMT -6
I am not going to argue you point for point. I will just make two statements. One you can't prove one way or the other. The second is easily provable, and if that is what you base your scenario on it is quite easy to prove you incorrect in your scenario. . 1. Where they were found is not necessarily where they were before. 2. I defy you (meaning that zillion Indians) to either walk/run or ride a horse from the west side of the river to Battle Ridge in 3 or 4 minutes at any point, particularly if you are under fire any part of the way. You have not considered the choke points, and factored those into you time and distance. Further you make no allowances for the brokenness of the terrain over much of the area that must be traveled to get mass at the place you desire them to be within your constraints of time. Just how long do you think it would take for instance for those warriors that engaged Reno to get from the vicinity of retreat ford to Last Stand Hill? There is testimony that approximately half who engaged Reno also engaged Custer. Did Custer stop and wait for them to show up? If it lasted the short time that you speculate that it did, would not that time factor and the showing up of those that engaged Reno be mutually exclusive? 1. is a no brainer, really... "One you can't prove one way or the other" (no one else can either) where they were before, and just as well no one can tell where those Indians came from either. So what's your point? If your going to argue CSS's mantra, it should be, well, should we say interesting. 2. Factor in? As in factor in not just for the Indians but the cavalry as well those same factors. That factoring in? And you nor anyone else could tell how many left Reno to go back and fight that heroic Custer you're trying to portray. Those that said they did didn't arrive there until near the end of that fight there or well after it was over. That being what they said, and what they said was suspect to as much bravado, chest beating and flashing the girlies their mantra as anything else in trying to make that claim. I'd like to see your so called "testimony", or what you'd call "testimony". Bring on that testimony that said 1/2 of the Indians who fought Reno went to fight Custer.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 23, 2013 3:44:13 GMT -6
I will not argue with you either. Two statements.
1. I was not addressing you JAG. Richard made the 3 or 4 minutes statement not you. The burden of proof is on him not me. I say it can't be done in mass and there is no way to prove a negative. He must prove it can be done, and if he can then his scenario is valid. If he can't his theory falls apart.
2. I don't ever recall you having the courage of your convictions enough to lay out completely and in detail what you think happened , so shut up and let Richard answer.
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Post by wild on Apr 23, 2013 5:40:34 GMT -6
When Custer departed 3411/Weir Point he took his command within the tactical orbit of a zillion Indians.
In transiting MTC, Custer came within a mile of MTCF and on Battle Ridge he was less than a mile from the village. I think that those distances at worst allow for no more than a 4 minute ETA. The scenario you support allows for an ETA of 40 minutes. That 40 minutes is not based on reality and I use reality rather than probability such is the enormity of the blunder it underpins. That 40 minutes is provided by you gratis in order to get Custer to Ford D.You have him vanish off North unencombered by tactical considerations. You have him misread the situation on a titanic scale. You have him journey North in search of a Ford when Boyer [who knew the terrain like the back of his hand could have advised him of this. You have him paying for this information with the fragmentation of his command while in contact with the enemy. Ford D is a tactical horror having nothing to recommend it. Further the terrain into which Custer led his command favoured the Indians.Calhoun hill was not the Khyber pass.The terrain masked the approach of the Indians but did not hinder movement.
so shut up and let Richard answer. This is negative. This is a discussion board;posting here is an invitation to all to comment. Let's try to keep this positive. Best Wishes
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Post by quincannon on Apr 23, 2013 6:13:18 GMT -6
You still have to get those Indians across that river through three choke points (look at the terrain and see how terrain on the east side of the river canalizes you into about three, maybe four points of egress) either walking, running, or on horseback with no one providing any central direction, cross a river that is say three or four feet deep at the fording spots, then run, walk, or ride over very broken terrain, all of it up hill for a thousand or more meters depending upon the point of battle ridge you have as an objective, and arrive all together in mass, all this while carrying a weapons, and at least part of it under fire, therefore not knowing what lies ahead of you over the next ridgeline, rise or fold in the ground. You have already increased from your original two minutes to now three or four, so there must have been some change in your thinking somewhere along the line.
My personal belief is that is more on the order on ten minutes for those originally arriving on the scene, the first to engage say within two hundred yards. As more came their journey from the river if riding would be quicker because they knew the ground in front of them to the point of engagement was clear or relatively clear. Those walking or running would take approximately the same time to transit this area as those who had walked or run before.
None of this is meant to suggest that I think this is how fast it was done, just how fast it could have been done. I believe a more likely time would be having the first exchange between fifteen and twenty minutes after Custer was on the ridge, and that time allowance is based upon the minimum time I believe it would take to muster sufficient combat power in order to engage.
There is absolutely no question that two thousand plus hostiles were within Custer's zone of action, but you also must take into consideration that his zone of action was several miles long and two thousand or more meters wide. Transit takes time, and I believe it to be more time than you allow.
Moving a mass is not the same as moving in ones or twos or even tens. Moving in mass without any central direction makes it all the more hard to do..
Yes it is an open board, but I addressed the question to you. not him. I have absolutely no interest in what he has to say on this subject or any other. I don't have much interest in what you have to say either, but this was an exception, and I wanted your answer not his jibberish. Clear enough?
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 23, 2013 9:36:22 GMT -6
Good Afternoon everyone.
Thanks for the reply’s, Chuck mentioned the choke points, we have discussed this before about the funnel effect of groups of warriors moving together through a narrow area, at the end of the day the warriors were not stupid, if they saw that the are in front of them was congested and maybe under fire, they would simply move along to another less congested crossing, plus if the warriors fought in tribal groups they would or could cross at various points all along the river as a tribal group, this as Chuck has mentioned would take time, another point to make would be the warriors reluctance in reveal themselves to the Troopers, I would have thought that they used the terrain to move forward, keeping low and firing the odd shot at men over a certain distance, so taking this into account I would suggest that the warriors attacked in a methodical way, moving slowly up hill and trying to find any blind spots like coulees and ravines to attack from. So I don’t think they rushed up hill over open ground to chop down any men who were firing at them.
There are Indian accounts that relate to this, some say that when they had the 50 or so men trapped on LSH (it may have been less than 50) they stayed back and poured fire at the beleaguered men from a distance, it was only when the Soldiers fire slackened that they ran in for the coup de grass. There are also accounts of Braves counting coup, but these would be certain individuals who had the courage to do this act, they could also do this to fire up certain groups to follow suit if the momentum stopped, but I look at the warriors as I would a pack of wolves, following a beaten enemy till he ran, then using this to their advantage to hit them in small groups and attacking single Troopers running in disarray.
Ian.
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Post by benteen on Apr 23, 2013 9:44:14 GMT -6
Colonel/Richard,
Just a guess, but I think you are talking about 2 different actions, where I believe you are both correct.
Richard.. From what I have read, these warriors rode up to a couple of hundred yards of the soldiers, then ditched their ponies and engaged them on foot, using the terrain to move forward. I believe this could be done within the 4 minutes you speak of.
Colonel... I belive you are saying that the warriors couldnt get to the troopers position in four minutes. I agree. Even duck walking crawling etc it would take more than 4 minutes to actualy get to the troopers position.
If this is correct on your opinions, then in my opinion you are both correct, just stating 2 different actions.
Be Well Dan
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 23, 2013 9:52:02 GMT -6
QC,
Understand your point, but try not to get too specific when riled. Example, if you look at Gray's map in CLC, the monument is well within a mile of the river SW of it. A horse can gallop at 15 mph, trot even, and including crossing the river, four minutes from the west back to the monument up a gentle slope with time to spare on a not exhausted horse is possible and perhaps easy at that site.
This actually does not affect your general point, but just saying the search for over precision, especially engaged with the drunk at the bar trying to provoke a fight - he's currently saying I posted something I did not - does nothing but allow needless error and an opening. He's never been to the field.
Been eleven years since I've been there, and yet again I find myself forgetting things about it I swore I'd never forget to prevent my repetitious errors. It's big sky country, of course, but everything condenses in my memory into smaller area.
Another point. Truthfully saying, 'we went north to fight Custer' in some manner of other doesn't mean they got there in time for the actual fight, but they joined the desecration and mop up phase when there may have been a few soldiers still alive. Especially when it appears in English in predicate tenses non-existent in the Sioux language. You have to put them in some tense, but your choices could be affected by what you yourself think happened, so translators are so crucial, yet unvetted. We just cannot know.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 23, 2013 10:39:05 GMT -6
Ian, Dan, and DC: It is very easy to say that this fight was fast, and took thirty to forty minutes from the point of decisive engagement. It is also quite true that the distance is not great from the village side of the river to Last Stand Hill/Battle Ridge. It can be assumed that some rode all the way, some only part, and as Dan suggests, dismounted and infiltrated the rest of the way on foot. It can be presumed that others either ran or walked all the way. Prudence demands that the first to move against Custer did so with some caution, just as any of us would for they knew not exactly what lay ahead. The rest, those that started later would not have to exercise as much caution.
It is not prudent though to have the expectation that every one of those warriors moved at the same time in the same direction over the same fords and through the same choke points and up and over that miasmic swamp of broken twisted terrain all going upward at the same speed and arriving at the same time in such mass as to generate the combat power required for decisive engagement within a period of three or four minutes. What one man can do, and the speed with which he may travel is not a measure of what two thousand can do, either with or without the central direction and positive control the hostiles lacked, except as Ian noted in small groups.
Anything I write about the time I think it would take to accomplish this is not intended to be precise. It is just a best guess based upon experience.
DC I agree with you. You did not to my knowledge say that attributed to you. Richard is a drunk at the bar wishing to pick a fight. That unfortunately is always a given. Were he not to have that attitude, and were he here for a legitimate exchange of ideas, and was receptive to opinions not his own, I would say?
Richard you are correct. For one man it is on horseback a 3 or 4 minute journey in some places and along some of the possible routes. Secondly I believe you to also be correct about the duration of the fight, thirty minutes to at tops forty and finis. Where we disagree is in the amount of time it took for the mass of warriors sufficient in numbers to be overwhelming, to assemble and decisively engage both major groupings of Custer's command. It is only then that your thirty minutes can start. Further I would say that during this necessary period of assembly Custer would have to be completely immobile watching all this transpire before him for your scenario to have any validity. Now you may say what you wish about what others may think he was doing during this period of assembly, and your take on the foolishness of any supposed enterprise he undertook, if any, but what you would have us believe is that he stood there in place, watching this all transpire before him, and was frozen like a deer caught in headlights. Does that seem logical to you? Is that what you would have done? Does not such inaction breech the borders of sanity? He may of in fact done none of the things that Fred, I, and others attribute to him, but doing nothing computes even less.
As it now stands JAG is slightly more lighthearted than Wagnerian Opera, and slightly less painful than a root canal. Wild does not even approach JAG in the category of nonsensical whimsy, but he has the cherry picking championship all wrapped up and the trophy is in the mail.
PS: The accepted definition of decisive engagement, is when one party to the engagement loses the ability to maneuver through either fire placed upon them, maneuver against them, or both. Usually it is both.
PPS: DC, you are again correct in that Richard has never been on this field. He measures all time/distance as if it were a straight line depicted on a map. Reality is that depending upon the route taken the actual time/distance for some of them is better than twice that of a straight line owing to the broken nature of the terrain, and the detours of direction forced upon you by that brokenness. He calls himself a cartographer and yet is seemingly unable to read a map, a fact that has been pointed out to him on more than one occasion.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 23, 2013 12:56:26 GMT -6
DC: Looking at your post in detail, I think you are absolutely correct about the speed of horses in two of the avenues of approach to battle ridge/LSH. The first is the direct approach from Ford B to Henryville, the second is from the lesser fords directly west of LSH, and the one in the foreground of the picture Chris posted a couple of weeks ago. Both are high speed without impediment to travel by any means. The ones in the middle of these two are usable, suitable for infiltration, but not nearly as fast. When you are ready to go up there again, call me.
Ian what you describe is the basis of all tactics, fire and maneuver. It is practiced in some form by every combatant that has ever taken the field regardless of culture to some degree of sophistication or other. People tend to get all hung up with the word tactics, thinking it both magical and complicated. It is only the practical application of common sense. At its lowest level it is nothing more than you cover me and I'll move, then I will cover your movement. Nothing complicated at all. As a formation grows larger the concept remains, and the execution requires a higher degree of control.
I know you love old westerns. I watched one the other night that had Fort Phil Kearney one quarter of its actual size, two survivors of the Fetterman Massacre (one a bad guy who did not escape for long, and the other a wounded good guy who told on him), Springfield breech loading rifles showing up just in time in the field for the wagon box fight which was more of a take cover under the wagons and shoot the damned guns fight. You would have been very proud of Red Cloud though, displaying the talents of the likes of Marshall Ney. He deployed his native tribesmen in platoons, companies, and squadrons, and his maneuvers would have given pause to St. George Cooke. All of this was to no avail, for with each measured and sequential charge the gallant feathered warriors again exhibiting the command and control of one of the great captains were mowed down by on command volley fire, every one being hit and thrown from the saddle in a display of marksmanship not seen this side of the USMC competition marksmanship team from Quantico. Tomahawk was the name, and it was filmed in some of the most beautiful terrain I think I have ever seen on film, if you discount John Ford's Monument Valley.
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Post by bc on Apr 23, 2013 19:39:04 GMT -6
I saw part of that movie too. They treated the trapdoor springfield like the second coming of Christ. Everyone had muzzleloaders until the springfields arrived to save the day. Of course no one ever heard of a Henry or Spencer or Winchester. Jimmy Steward in Winchester 73 made more sense.
bc
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Post by wild on Apr 23, 2013 23:32:45 GMT -6
Understand your point, but try not to get too specific when riled. Example, if you look at Gray's map in CLC, the monument is well within a mile of the river SW of it. A horse can gallop at 15 mph, trot even, and including crossing the river, four minutes from the west back to the monument up a gentle slope with time to spare on a not exhausted horse is possible and perhaps easy at that site.
This actually does not affect your general point, but just saying the search for over precision, especially engaged with the drunk at the bar trying to provoke a fight - he's currently saying I posted something I did not - does nothing but allow needless error and an opening. He's never been to the field This is called coating the pill.He agrees with me and yet suggests that I want to start a fight. And Elsewhere I've said they ended up where they did because of constant pressure. I think any reasonable person would agree that the above is equivalant to my When Custer departed 3411/Weir Point he took his command within the tactical orbit of a zillion IndiansAnd if that is not enough he has posted that beyond MTC he[Custer] was cooked.
but try not to get too specific when riled. He's a colonel he does not get emotional when under fire.
Dan I'm saying that beyond MTC Custer did not have the luxury of 40 minutes time out in which to fragment his command and go ford searching. There are two variables here 1 ETA for Indians,2 ETA [and return]from Ford.And Custer pays the price in advance by splitting his command. And what is he taking this risk for? a recce not a substantive tactical advantage.What happened to Boyer.Recall Boyer was the reason Custer missed out Weir point or so we are told by the ford D people. QC say I measure distances in straight lines.I do this because it is the shortest distance between two points and as Custer had the greater distance to travel it actually favours him. I'm not debating how the Indians actually engaged Custer or the timing of such action but the amount of time Custer had to play with. Much is made of the influence of the terrain on the action.The depth of the LBH is given as 4 feet and movement must pass through choke points.I would draw attention to the speed with which Reno forded the river and the speed with which he ascented the bluffs. Best Wishes
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