|
Post by AZ Ranger on May 22, 2012 11:12:03 GMT -6
If there is a village they are not going anywhere. You can withdraw and send word to Custer if you consider that they are too strong for your force. But regardless of what action you take word must be sent to Custer. Not sure what you mean by that. Seems that was always the fear of the Army that the Indians would run off. Sending word if something was discovered would be appropriate sending word that nothing has been discovered seems a waste of time. How often do send someone horseback to say nothing is discovered and what effect would that have on Custer.
|
|
|
Post by benteen on May 22, 2012 13:24:48 GMT -6
If there is a village they are not going anywhere. You can withdraw and send word to Custer if you consider that they are too strong for your force. But regardless of what action you take word must be sent to Custer. Richard, I agree with Steve that there was no need for a long winded message saying nothing,however, it probably would have been prudent for Benteen to at least let Custer know that he recieved his message. Do we know if he attempted to do this. Which brings me to an issue that I have been in disagreement with historians on. I speak of Keoghs deployment. Where most historians believe that Custer put Keogh there to await Benteen, I dont. It doesnt make sense to me. That Custer would use 3/5 of his command anticipating an event that he didnt know was going to happen. What mean is Custer 1....Did not know if Martini had gotten through to Benteen. Remember Martinis horse was hit, it could have just as easily been Martini. 2.... Did not know exatly where Benteen was or how far away. 3..... Did not know if Benteen was neck deep in warriors like Reno and couldnt come, in fact needed help himself. If Custer sent half his regiment with Benteen/McDougall then he must have thought there was a good posibility of a large force of warriors, in not then why not just send a few scouts to check the area and keep your entire regiment together. Be Well Dan
|
|
|
Post by wild on May 22, 2012 13:37:46 GMT -6
Dan AZ My apologies but I thought what I posted was clear ie the action taken on sighting a village should be conveyed to Custer. Best Wishes
|
|
|
Post by benteen on May 22, 2012 13:52:35 GMT -6
Richard,
Your post was clear to Steve and his answer was on point. He agreed that if Benteen came across a village he should notify Custer, but it was pointless to send a message if you hadnt. I agree with that.
It was me who fouled it up. I thought you meant when Martini got to Benteen.
Hey, listen, getting old aint fun but it sure beats the alternative <G>
Be Well Dan
|
|
|
Post by ulan on May 22, 2012 14:32:32 GMT -6
I speak of Keoghs deployment. Where most historians believe that Custer put Keogh there to await Benteen, I dont. It doesnt make sense to me. That Custer would use 3/5 of his command anticipating an event that he didnt know was going to happen. What mean is Custer 1....Did not know if Martini had gotten through to Benteen. Remember Martinis horse was hit, it could have just as easily been Martini. 2.... Did not know exatly where Benteen was or how far away. 3..... Did not know if Benteen was neck deep in warriors like Reno and couldnt come, in fact needed help himself. If Custer sent half his regiment with Benteen/McDougall then he must have thought there was a good posibility of a large force of warriors, in not then why not just send a few scouts to check the area and keep your entire regiment together. Be Well Dan Is that true?.....I can´t believe that Historians would explain that the troops were positioned there to await Benteen. Personly i would rule out that Custer ever counted on Benteen´s arrival on his position. Still many things are not clear to me about what happend on Custer´s battlefield, but should it be not more logical that Keogh´s position was in retreat or in try to save a possible retreat for the whole battalion?
|
|
|
Post by fred on May 22, 2012 21:07:26 GMT -6
I speak of Keoghs deployment. Where most historians believe that Custer put Keogh there to await Benteen, I dont. It doesnt make sense to me. That Custer would use 3/5 of his command anticipating an event that he didnt know was going to happen. What mean is Custer 1....Did not know if Martini had gotten through to Benteen. Remember Martinis horse was hit, it could have just as easily been Martini. 2.... Did not know exatly where Benteen was or how far away. 3..... Did not know if Benteen was neck deep in warriors like Reno and couldnt come, in fact needed help himself. If Custer sent half his regiment with Benteen/McDougall then he must have thought there was a good posibility of a large force of warriors, in not then why not just send a few scouts to check the area and keep your entire regiment together. ...I can´t believe that Historians would explain that the troops were positioned there to await Benteen. Personly i would rule out that Custer ever counted on Benteen´s arrival on his position. Still many things are not clear to me about what happend on Custer´s battlefield, but should it be not more logical that Keogh´s position was in retreat or in try to save a possible retreat for the whole battalion? Of course he did. Think of the situation as it existed... the context. Custer had a very good idea where Benteen was... remember, Boston Custer had passed Benteen at the morass and Boston had joined George (probably on Luce Ridge). Therefore, George had a fairly decent idea of where Benteen was and since George had already traveled that same route he could very easily compute the time of Benteen's arrival. Hell, it took me all of a minute to figure it out in my head when I put it all together. Now... Keogh. Custer had been to Ford B. I figure he was confronted by 25 to 35 Indians. When he pulled back and began to move up the Deep Coulee flats, those Indians crossed and followed... and they were followed by more; their numbers began mounting. By the time Custer, Yates, and Keogh re-united on Calhoun Hill, there were quite a few warriors within sight and more were crossing and joining the fight. Custer needed to get farther north and find the a ford and the limit of the refugees flight. But he also needed to leave a presence behind so Benteen could see and therefore follow... and it had to be a strong presence, simply because a small force would be swept away by what they were seeing crossing the river. Besides, as an added bonus, Benteen's arrival would sandwich those Indians between Benteen and Keogh. In addition, Custer needed his rear protected... and there couldn't have been anything very strong in front of him otherwise he wouldn't have left Keogh behind... and he couldn't go very far if there was. Benteen and Keogh combined would give them half the regiment and if Custer was convinced Reno with six companies could have handled the Indians on the Rosebud, what makes you think Custer felt any differently about six companies under Benteen and Keogh? So to me, this is basic tactics 101, especially when you combine Custer's return to Cemetery Ridge and his brief hiatus there. Otherwise, why was he there? At this point I think I have heard and read every other scenario under the sun and every one is too long, too convoluted, too contrived. What I have just described is the simplest and makes the most sense to me. Plus-- and to me, this is very important-- I can tie the vast majority of Indian accounts into this scenario, one way or another. I can list the Indian names if you want... they all lend something to this narrative. Dan... your points, specifically... (1) why wouldn't Martini have gotten through? There was nothing between Martini and Benteen. Martini left near the head of Cedar Coulee and there were probably no more than 22 Indians in the vicinity and except for a lucky shot they posed no threat whatsoever. Cooke thought he could get through, because he told Martini to return if possible. (2) Already addressed. (3) This is the age-old "scout vs battalion" argument. He sent a battalion because he wasn't sure there was not a Washita-type layout and he did not know how wide the intervening valleys may have been. Benteen was instructed to pitch into anything he found and if so, to send back a messenger. No messenger arrived, so Custer could figure, No Indians. Ergo, Benteen would return, and this was verified by Boston. See... I believe firmly Custer felt in total control of things all the way through and Boston's news on Luce only added to that control. Pieces were falling into place, nice and pat. The village was a single unit-- though Custer had no idea how dense it was and therefore misjudged numbers-- and the Indians were doing precisely what he had expected them to do once he found out they were setting a screen in front of Reno, i. e., running away. That is another reason why Reno, by that time, became nothing more than a useful pawn: he was keeping the "main" force of Indians busy. Or so Custer thought. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by ulan on May 23, 2012 4:10:04 GMT -6
Custer send Martini with orders for Benteen after he saw Reno allready in the fight with many indians. I still believe Benteen with packs he ordered as reinforcement for Reno but not for himself. Custer still had the strongest battalion with five companies on hand and was not in any fight. That was the situation when Martini was riding away and Custer with his man galoping down to the ford. Boston arrived later and had so far nothing to do with Custers orders or intensions when he send Martini. Custer was aware of the overwelming force of the indian around Reno and it was not just his own decision to send Reno reinforcement or not, but i had to do that. Custer had to estimate that Benteen came across Reno´s fighting and that Benteen had to made sure that Reno´s battalion can not be wiped out.
|
|
|
Post by fred on May 23, 2012 4:37:33 GMT -6
I still believe Benteen with packs he ordered as reinforcement for Reno but not for himself.... That was the situation when Martini was riding away and Custer with his man galoping down to the ford. Boston arrived later and had so far nothing to do with Custers orders or intensions when he send Martini. Custer was aware of the overwelming force of the indian around Reno and it was not just his own decision to send Reno reinforcement or not, but i had to do that. Custer had to estimate that Benteen came across Reno´s fighting and that Benteen had to made sure that Reno´s battalion can not be wiped out. Ulan, I believe you are assuming too much here. From where Custer watched Reno-- and it was still very early... Reno was just dismounting-- Reno was OK and not in any trouble. Also, Custer did not have a good view of the village and could not see the full force of the Indians. Many of the Indians were still on foot and were backing away from Reno's advancing skirmishers and we have no indication of any growing threat to Reno's left flank. Custer's actions-- the hat waving; "Hurrah boys, we've got them!"; the cheering troops... all indicate Custer neither saw nor anticipated trouble. Next... if Custer intended Benteen reinforce Reno, why didn't he say that in the note? Where, in the note is there any intention of Benteen reinforcing Reno? All it says is for Benteen to "be quicK" and "bring packs." If Custer expected Benteen to do the "right thing" on his scout, then he would have expected Benteen to do the "right thing" when he arrived at the battle site. When Boston told George Reno was in trouble, George would have expected any retreat to be in the same direction as Reno's advance. Why would you retreat over ground you did not know? The only reason Reno did not retreat back up the valley is because the force and strength of the Indians forced him to the left into the river. By forcing Reno to the left, Reno had no choice but to enter the stream, climb up the ravines, and occupy the hilltop. And circumstances, as Benteen saw them, dictated Benteen go up the hillside, not cross the river. That meant Reno interjected himself between Custer and Benteen's "reinforcements." Again, when the note was written, it could just as easily have siad, "Hey, Benteen, forget about that scout. All the action is here; come and join in... PS-- bring the packs." In my opinion, it is only after Boston informed George about Reno that George expected Benteen to join up with Custer's command. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by montrose on May 23, 2012 5:39:14 GMT -6
Ulan,
The theory that Custer intended to send Benteen and the packs across Ford A to reinforce Reno has been discussed before.
The evidence points heavily against this.
Custer sent Martini back after the 3411 observations. At this point in time: Reno was in the valley, and Custer was on the bluffs, Benteen and McDougall were still advancing on Ash Creek. Benteen and McDougall did not know the forward force had split. They would soon hit the point where the trails split, and would have no idea which path to follow.
The Martini message showed that Custer wanted both trailing elements to follow him to the right.
The next time Benteen and McDougall would get follow on instructions would be when they linked up with CPT Keough on the south end of Battle Ridge. So Custer's intent was to get his trail battalions to at least Calhoun Hill.
Here is why the reinforce Reno theory fails. If Custer wanted Benteen to reinforce Reno, Benteen would have to countermarch back to Ford A and up the valley to Reno. This makes no sense.
The alternative theory is that Benteen was to cross Ford B, defeat the Indians there, then go south and defeat the Indians on Reno to complete linkup. If Custer felt he lacked the force to cross Ford B with 5 companies, how is Benteen going to do so with 3.
LTC Custer would have stayed at Calhoun Hill if he wanted to launch an attack with Benteen at Ford B. The fact that Custer moved north from Calhoun Hill shows he intended action farther north than that point. Further, he wanted 4 battalions for his intended action
|
|
|
Post by montrose on May 23, 2012 6:05:59 GMT -6
Fred,
I accept that at the time LTC Custer was at 3411, MAJ Reno was dismounting due to a strong Indian position in a ravine (Otter Creek) to his front.
But what else was going on in the valley? A large hunting party is across the valley on Reno's flank. Several hundred Indians are massing as well on the valley's far (Western) side.These two forces were to move past Reno's open flank into his rear.
For timing purposes, we can see their progress through the actions of the Reno Bn. The skirmish line movement from facing north, to facing west, was due to the actions of the Indian western force.
Further, by the time Reno retreated, the Indians had cut him off. Note the numerous reports of Indian bands to the LEFT front during the move to the bluffs. Then add in the many hundreds on the right front. Remember,front at this point means upstream. Gerry had a wonderful map he made showing this. (On the other board).
BLUF: There were adequate signs of Indians massing beyond Reno's flank when Custer was at 3411. However, Custer interpreted this as an opportunity, not a threat. It meant the Indians were not in a position to intervene against Custer moving north. The imminent disaster about to befall the unsupported Reno never crossed his mind as a possible outcome.
|
|
|
Post by Yan Taylor on May 23, 2012 8:33:22 GMT -6
I bet Custer was delighted at what he saw from hill 3411, he saw were the village was located (only part of it though) and seen Maj. Reno carrying out his orders to engage the Indians (drawing them out of the village), he could now move his command closer to its target.
If his thoughts were right and Capt. Benteen had not encountered any satellite villages, he would be under the notion that Capt. Benteen would be joining the party sooner or later.
Ian.
|
|
|
Post by fred on May 23, 2012 8:48:22 GMT -6
I accept that at the time LTC Custer was at 3411, MAJ Reno was dismounting due to a strong Indian position in a ravine (Otter Creek) to his front. But what else was going on in the valley? A large hunting party is across the valley on Reno's flank. Several hundred Indians are massing as well on the valley's far (Western) side.These two forces were to move past Reno's open flank into his rear. Will, I think you may be giving the Indians a little too much credit here. I also think we allow the troops to exaggerate a little with the numbers of warriors in that ravine. It took Reno 12 to 15 minutes to get down the valley: 2 1/2 to three miles at, let's say, 12 MPH... a reasonable gallop. In that, say 12 minutes, a fairly significant number of Indians could have run their way into the ravine (the Otter Creek bed), but I tend to doubt it was many hundreds. Maybe it seemed that way, but I figure "hundreds" is unlikely. The same is true with the western herds. The valley is a mile wide-- or close to it-- and the width of the village was probably not much more than 300 yards. Getting there-- into the herds-- as quickly as all that-- indicates to me some pretty rapid response time and quite frankly, I don't buy it. Also, trooper accounts do not indicate any such response was the case. Before I go any further with this, let me put up probably the best description I have ever read regarding Indian responses: From Charles Kuhlman, Legend into History, pp. 11 – 12: “During the Custer action many warriors loitered in camp or moved about aimlessly, undecided as to whether to go out and fight or wait until the troops actually rode into camp. There was a custom among the Cheyennes and Sioux that at least one man in each family must participate in a battle which concerned the tribe as a whole, but he was not compelled to follow any chief. He could, without subjecting himself to criticism on any legal ground, fight entirely on his own initiative. This is what hundreds of them did throughout the series of actions known as the Battle of the Little Big Horn. Nor did the tribal warriors remain together on any part of the field. The members of the different tribes were everywhere intermingled. Not even the members of the relatively coherent warrior societies fought as a unit. The Cheyenne chief, Two Moon, was with Crazy Horse of the Oglala Sioux, together with members of other tribes, north of the ridge, while the leading Cheyenne war chief, Lame White Man with other Cheyennes was on the south part of the field among Oglalas and others.
“Nor does it seem that there was any conscious co-operation among the chiefs in a large way. There had been neither time nor opportunity to prepare a plan of any kind, however embryonic. Warriors entered the fight as they got ready. The ponies of many of them were in the herds on the benchlands when the alarm came, and we can imagine that it was not, in many cases, an easy task for a warrior to secure a mount. There were no ponies in the camps except the few regularly kept there by the camp police. Many stopped to put on their special war dress, paint and secure their ‘medicine.’ Some of them did not get into the fight at all because when they arrived there was no longer room for them near the troops. They remained outside the ring of warriors who were doing the fighting, and ‘swirled all around him,’ on their ponies, firing over the heads of the warriors between them and the troops. Back of them, toward the close of the fighting, was a dense crowd of old men and boys the troops on Weir Point mistook for warriors.”When Reno ordered his dismount, he had to be facing west already... or, if not perfect west, than toward the foothills. The Indians seen in the valley-- the ones coming back up toward him, then turning back toward the village as Reno advanced-- had to be the same warriors Hare and Gerard had spotted when they were atop Gerard's Knoll: "There go your Indians, running like devils!" Guesstimates of the size of that small force ranged from 30 to 50 (Davern and Hare) and I would then suspect the gun firing, those Indians riding in circles atop the bluffs (Deeds and Brown Back), a couple running into the village warning of the approaching soldiers, alerted enough Indians so as to make the situation seem more precarious than it was. Remember, accounts tell us most of the Indians facing Reno initially were afoot and backed farther and farther away as the troops advanced. Any activity in the west had to be minimal initially and that is why M Company headed in that direction, breaking the skirmish line in two. Also, any Indians heading toward the herds-- on foot, mind you-- would be grabbing horses west of the camp, to the north of the troops, not to the west of them where it was both farther and more dangerous. The threat to Reno's (M Company's) left flank developed in the latter stages of the valley fighting, probably 15 to 20 minutes into it, otherwise M Company would have been turned right away. While certain "clowns" don't believe it, enough in the way of artifacts has been found far enough away from the timber to indicate a substantial soldier far out. That would not have developed had the left-flank-threat been imminent. I believe this absolutely. This I do not buy. I agree here, but not because of any threat to Reno's left. We only have a couple of direct indications along with a couple of assumptions, but Custer and his troops seemed too euphoric at this point to worry about "threats." To my way of thinking Custer believed Reno was advancing right according to the book. All was well in La-La-Land! Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by ulan on May 23, 2012 9:12:22 GMT -6
Ulan, The theory that Custer intended to send Benteen and the packs across Ford A to reinforce Reno has been discussed before. The evidence points heavily against this. Custer sent Martini back after the 3411 observations. At this point in time: Reno was in the valley, and Custer was on the bluffs, Benteen and McDougall were still advancing on Ash Creek. Benteen and McDougall did not know the forward force had split. They would soon hit the point where the trails split, and would have no idea which path to follow. The Martini message showed that Custer wanted both trailing elements to follow him to the right. The next time Benteen and McDougall would get follow on instructions would be when they linked up with CPT Keough on the south end of Battle Ridge. So Custer's intent was to get his trail battalions to at least Calhoun Hill. Here is why the reinforce Reno theory fails. If Custer wanted Benteen to reinforce Reno, Benteen would have to countermarch back to Ford A and up the valley to Reno. This makes no sense. The alternative theory is that Benteen was to cross Ford B, defeat the Indians there, then go south and defeat the Indians on Reno to complete linkup. If Custer felt he lacked the force to cross Ford B with 5 companies, how is Benteen going to do so with 3. LTC Custer would have stayed at Calhoun Hill if he wanted to launch an attack with Benteen at Ford B. The fact that Custer moved north from Calhoun Hill shows he intended action farther north than that point. Further, he wanted 4 battalions for his intended action Hello, i am sorry but i can´t follow how the evidence points heavily against this. Martinis order for Benteen says nothing more that: Stop scouting and come here to the big indian village. Your help and the packs are needed. Hard to understand for me how you find out that Custer meant Benteen to follow him up to the right. The order dosn´t say that. Apart from that if Custer wanted to use any advantage from the Reno fight with all the warriors around him, than Benteen and the packs were too slow anyway. He would probably play away any Advantage and further more he would risk the destruction of Reno´s battalion. Benteen did not know were to go exactly but saw Reno´s battalion in retreat and hard pressed by the indians. His help was needed there and so he fullfilled his order by saving the arrive of the packs. Benteen had not directly order to follow Reno and therefore the scenario to cross the river and ride into the valley is no point to establish anything.
|
|
|
Post by benteen on May 23, 2012 9:37:24 GMT -6
Capt Fred,
Rather than disagree,this has been a bugabo with me about this battle. Could you clear up a few things for me. Custer believes the Indians are doing what he expected, they are running.......How does he come to that conclusion. Every action taken so far has shown the opposite to be true. They attacked Reno and stopped him, when Custer sent a probe to ford B, it was repulsed, why does he think they are running away.
Custer wanted to protect his rear with Keogh while he cut off escaping Indians..... What rear? He has no command left. Once he drops off Keogh he has only 2 companies left. Does he honestly believe he is going to cut off this mass of humanity with 80 troopers. This isnt a village it is a small city with 10000 inhabitants and 2500-3000 warriors whats he going to do with his 80 men
Why would you want to cut them off if they are going North, wouldnt that be just what Terry would want and was hoping for, to get the Indians in a vice between Custer and himself.
Be Well Dan
|
|
|
Post by fred on May 23, 2012 12:17:39 GMT -6
Custer believes the Indians are doing what he expected, they are running.......How does he come to that conclusion. Every action taken so far has shown the opposite to be true. They attacked Reno and stopped him, when Custer sent a probe to ford B, it was repulsed, why does he think they are running away. Dan, You and "Ulan" are assuming too much. Please... try to remember the context when various events occurred. When Custer sent Martini with the note things were going very well. If you want to read anything into the note, read in the context of when and where it was written. What was happening... what had Custer seen... then try to figure the intent. We have instances of hat-waving; we have an instance of, "Slow down boys! There's enough for all of us!" We have an instance of cheering. So what can we read into the note from that? Custer saw the valley... he could-- from "3,411"-- see much farther up valley than he could see in detail, down the valley. Right? What did he see up-valley? Nothing... no Indians, no villages, no camps... nothing. Therefore, time to bring Benteen back. And we better hurry, because we have a full-scale brou-ha-ha going on and the Indians are on the run. How do we know that? Well, because they always ran, didn't they? And the tactics they were employing, i. e., dust-making, warriors coming out to screen the village, warriors backing away as the troops came closer... all these things were classic. Custer could also see across the valley and what he saw there were running Indians... were they running for their horses-- and why?-- or were they running away? So when Martini was sent back, Reno had not lost a man and Custer had not fired a shot. Custer? He needed to get ahead of the fleeing Indians and cut them off... so he proceeded north. Benteen? Well... when Benteen got there, he would know what to do and when he wanted to know where Custer was, the messenger would tell him. (Only Martini was an idiot, a "clown"... and quite possibly, that's a literal assumption!) Again, Dan, you are making an assumption: you are assuming Custer was in trouble. Someone here-- you? "Ulan"?-- used the word, "repulsed," regarding Ford B. Custer was not repulsed at Ford B! "Repulsed" intimates he was forced away; that intimates if he were forced away, he intended to attack. Neither is the case. When he mounted Luce Ridge he was still well over a mile from the middle of the valley... a mile from the river. So he dropped off Keogh to protect his rear and await any possible signal or action if need be. After all, there were Indians in the area. We know of at least 22 of them by name or inference on the east side of the river between Weir Peaks and MTC. We also know of a party of about 50 more under the titular leadership of Wolf Tooth and Big Foot, two Cheyenne. These latter guys were probably in upper MTC at the time and could represent a fair threat to the troops' rear. Therefore, Keogh.... The reason Custer went to "3,411" rather than Sharpshooters' Ridge or Weir Point was that he needed to get closer to the action, not necessarily higher. Those who insist he need "height," not "close," do not understand very much about military tactics. SSR was another 300 yards away, and even when DeRudio claimed he saw three figures-- Custer, Cooke, and one other-- atop "3,411," he claimed to an incredulous audience they were 1,000 yards away. In reality, they were closer to 1,400 yards away. SSR would have completed a full mile. Ridiculous! So the side-trip to Ford B was less to find a crossing point there, than it was to get as close as he could to the scene-- the valley-- and see what he could, e. g., the extent of the village, what was happening through the dust this far down-river, etc. Like the Indians fronting the village farther up the valley, Custer used Smith's Gray Horse Troop as a screen and Smith stationed himself along the river's edge. That brought a hail of fire that may have even wounded Smith. But repulsed? No way. As I posted earlier, there simply were not enough Indians to repulse a Girl Scout Troop. No... he does not. Custer sees all he can see at Ford B, so he turns and heads toward the high ground farther north: Calhoun Hill. Keogh joins him there. And what is the situation? Sheer mayhem in the valley. Indians running all over the place: west, north.... At Luce, Custer learned two valuable items: (1) Reno was in some trouble; and (2) Benteen was on the way. Fine. Now we are sitting atop Calhoun Hill and we have a lot more data to sift through. If Reno is in trouble, we can assume he will head back the way he came. That means Indians-- lots of 'em-- heading up the valley in possible pursuit. But Benteen is on the way and the messenger will tell him where Custer went... and that is now where Benteen should be heading. (And forget the packs at this point; they are irrelevant. ( Remember the context when the note was written!) Now... Custer is in no trouble. The sniping as he moved up the Deep Coulee flats was even less than what greeted him at Ford B. He has lost only two men, one whose horse went berserk and crossed the river; and Trumpeter Dose, shot in the back by a lucky arrow as Custer pulled away from the ford, probably about 500 yards from the river. Not your basic fighting retrograde!So, all five companies sit atop Calhoun Hill. Indian bullets-- if there are any at this point-- are falling way short of the troops, with possibly a couple of pesky and indignant exceptions. Custer tells Keogh and Yates what he plans next: Benteen is coming and he should be here by about 4 PM. (It is currently 3:23 - 3:26 PM). That gives Custer about a half-hour to head north, find a crossing point below the fleeing Indians, and circle back part-way to some high ground where he would wait for a few moments for Keogh and Benteen to join him. In the meantime, Keogh is to sit back; await Benteen; and protect Custer's disappearing rear as he heads north. The only Indians of any threat-- ha!-- are coming across the river at Ford B. Once Benteen arrived, the six companies would ride the crest of Battle Ridge and see Custer waiting for them on Cemetery Ridge. The combined eight companies would then cross at the new fording point-- Ford D-- and rout, maim, slaughter, and kill every redskin in sight. That'll team 'em!"Terry who?"-- GAC Best wishes, Fred.
|
|