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Post by fuchs on Apr 30, 2013 23:20:06 GMT -6
AK: A quick answer before I have to leave for a few hours. Not detail quick and dirty. With trains closed up fairly close but not in the way, Custer's regiment in mass attacks the southernmost circle. This would cause a firefight and flight. Flight to the north and north west. Upon termination, reorganize, consolidate, and hit them again, and again and again. Where in the history of the Plains Indians wars are example of any Army column accomplishing that? I was under the distinct impression that once the Indians were in flight mode, the Army couldn't keep up. Yes, despite women, children, etc... If only because if they tried, they would have to move so recklessly that they would expose themselves to ambushes. Even discounting the "scatteration" problem. I think the Nez Perce (technically not Plainsers, but close enough) in 1877 and and the Cheyenne in 1878 outpaced several pursuing army formations, as long as they kept going forward all-out. I don't know, but to me it appears that there's the implicit assumption that just because we have Cavalry, it has the mobility advantage on the enemy. Despite the historical evidence that even a whole Indian band had at least the strategic mobility of a cavalry regiment and in battle the Indian warriors demonstrated significant superiority in tactical mobility. (Sorry if I jumbled the correct military terminology) This leads to another issue raised on this thread. The LBH was a winnable fight. Outcomes far better than what occurred were possible. Not only were better outcomes available, but of the 35 Regiments in the Army, at least 30 would have performed better. I have an issue with the hypothesis that because the Indians had greater numbers, therefore the outcome was preordained. What would be your definition of "winning"? Destroying the lodges? Killing X number of warriors? Killing Y number of "I don't care as long as it is an Indian"? How to accomplish this? I can see the conservative variant of simply concentrating your force from the outset and slowly rolling over the camp by virtue of your superior firepower and C&C in a semi-static, controlled and compact battle. (From what I've read, this would have been the closest thing to standard operating procedure, unless you managed to deploy your forces for an encirclement before the Indians noticed you.) But that would mean the vast majority of the Indians would escape, and probably a good number of lodges, too. If you wanted an overwhelming victory, what other options were there besides what Custer tried, given the intel he had? Keep in mind that likely less than half the number of warriors that faced Custer's column were able to fight Crook, who had about twice Custer's numbers, to a standstill. And that was a preemptive strike, I see little reason they would have fought less determined with their families just around the corner. DC is completely correct in that in principle there was no need to win any battle at all in the campaign. Just the need to demonstrate to the Indians that the Army had the will and capability to harass them into submission, summer or winter, no matter how long it took or how many casualties it sustained. But such a war of attrition wouldn't yield very good headlines, or glowing victory reports to your military superiors, would it? And it would be much more expensive than a single swift, decisive strike. The politicians might start to grumble.
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Post by quincannon on May 1, 2013 7:20:31 GMT -6
Fuchs:
Where is there: Absolutely nowhere that I know of,. To assume based upon the fact that it had not been done, that it could not be done I think a bad assumption. No one had ever handled panzers the way Rommel did until he did it.
Cavalry and tribal movement have mobility parity. Warriors unencumbered have superior mobility. Very true. All I need though is mobility parity.
Fuchs all these things came to pass. The warriors were run down and defeated within a year. The folly was in going into this thinking that we are going to beat them once and go home. The folly is the thinking going into every war that victory is not only attainable but will be quick and easy. The folly was underestimating a determined opponent. The folly was leaving the bases they came from and not being prepared to stay out there as long as it took to get the job done.
So yes what I proposed had not been done before, but that is not an indicator that it could not be done
The secret to winning is never giving up.
Crook was surprised, should not have been, and placed in check, not defeated. For the hostiles in the short run, one was as good as the other. In the long run nowhere near decisive.
Had a McKenzie or a Miles been in overall command of this campaign, men of demonstrated skill and determination I believe all this would have played out quite differently, and we would not be sitting here talking about it today.
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Post by Dark Cloud on May 1, 2013 8:04:39 GMT -6
QC,
The warriors were not run down, though. Many in Canada. The others came in when they could not feed the families. There were battles they lost, true, but had those battles not taken place at all, what would be different overall in 1879, an arbitrary date? They still had to keep moving.
I don't think it could be done as you suggest, either, without the Indians changing into an 'army' with central command and logistics. They didn't deal with 'defense in depth' or any of those things. They only knew divide and squish if the enemy was foolish enough to play their part.
Nobody is suggesting, fuchs, that engage and lose in perpetuity till enemy gave up was an actual strategy. But the issues are these on the plains.
Once you engage, you have wounded. You may have lost mounts so you also have infantry. You cannot keep the wounded with you if you're on the run after prey, so you send wounded and dismounted men to shelter with protection. What does that leave you to continue the mission?
In the small units of the Indian wars, it left you squat, and your career would not survive explaining how you failed to care for the wounded and left them to die a horrid death, etc.
So: in the Indian Wars, you had to find, hit the enemy with enough damage that they were unable to continue to function without help, either from another tribe or the rez. Victory or defeat, you did not have enough to pursue to any constructive point, and win or lose, the enemy still had to run.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 1, 2013 8:10:30 GMT -6
Good afternoon everyone.
The problem I always get when try and divulge Cavalry tactics is that I always get mixed up with the European style and the U.S. style, the Europeans had loads of different types of Cavalry, from the light Hussars and Lancers, Dragoons and Heavies like the British Heavy Brigade and French Cuirassiers with their breast plates, and each one of these where trained and used in a different roles, but the U.S. style of Cavalry is of one type only, they could be equipped with a Sabre (that’s if they were trained in this field) plus Pistols and Carbines, it’s like they did away with the Heavies and combined Light Cavalry with Dragoons. But I am not sure if the same rules apply to both continents when used in a charge, but I guess when any European Cavalry Squadron charged it would be so disorganised afterwards that it was fit for nothing, rather like a one shot weapon, would this be the same with the U.S. Cavalry of this period (1870s)? Or were they more flexible then the Europeans.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on May 1, 2013 8:21:00 GMT -6
DC: Very much truth in what you say. We differ in our overall vision though.
The overarching objective of war is to destroy your adversaries ability to make war. I don't much care how that is accomplished.
Going back to Montrose's point. I believe that in the hands of a different commander, a much more suitable outcome could have been achieved at LBH. Not complete victory on the order of Hannibal over Rome at Cannae, but one that would disrupt, and go toward the overall campaign objective of destroying the hostiles ability to make war.
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Post by quincannon on May 1, 2013 8:24:48 GMT -6
Ian: Good points. Look at the difference being somewhat like a toolbox versus a Swiss Army Knife.
The European Cavalry being single tools designed for specific battlefield jobs.
American Cavalry as one tool designed for a variety of battlefield jobs
Now is the Swiss Army Knife as good as a tool primarily designed for the task at hand? In most cases no it is not.
Is having a Swiss Army Knife readily available better than having to go back out to the truck to obtain the tool you need? I suspect it is.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 1, 2013 9:00:11 GMT -6
The same can be said about Infantry Regiments, a line Regiment had (in the British Army) eight line Companies (standard Infantry men) plus a Grenadier Company (the best unit in the Regiment) and a Light Company (probably used as skirmishers) so you had three different types of Infantry trained in various roles, but I think that this changed around 1860 and the Light and Grenadier Companies were deleted and placed in separate Battalions or Regiments. I think the U.S. adopted the same pattern after the ACW, all though I don’t think the U.S. had different units like the Guards and Light Infantry, just the one type (Infantry), but I may be wrong and someone will enlighten me.
Chuck, the problem we had concerning Cavalry was tradition, the various types of Regiment (Light, Medium & Heavy) were kept going far too long, and should have changed to one standard type, once the lance and swords were replaced by Bolt-Action Rifles and Light Machine Guns they should of standardised to one type of Cavalry, they did of course but did it later then the U.S, we had too many old Cavalry men wanting to keep traditions alive, I bet you had the same problem when the Tank came along, but give the U.S. Cavalry there due they did change, and when the Infantry tried to restrict the use of Tanks to an Infantry weapon only, they got round it by calling them Combat Cars.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on May 1, 2013 9:36:33 GMT -6
Ian: From what little I know of British Infantry you are correct. The light infantry emerged as regiments about the turn of the 18th century into the 19th. My old friend Sharpe was a green jacket. US infantry has always been a general purpose force until the advent of armor in the late 1930;s. The 6th was the first to change over to armored infantry. Still then it was more of up equipping them, giving them transport to keep up with tanks. This stayed pretty much the same until the advent of the IFV, where infantry could remain mounted until forced by action to dismount.
We have designated infantry with different parenthetical designations over the years such as light, airmobile, airborne, but while there may be some structural changes associated with these different roles, in the main they are differences in the type of equipment and not a change in the basic role of the infantry. For instance a designation like 196th Infantry Brigade (Light) would differ from the 172nd Infantry Brigade only in the type and scale of equipment.
There was great resistance in the U S Cavalry to a change over to mechanization writ large. The last Chief of Cavalry, (retired in 1942) John Herr advocated as late as 1953 that a horse mounted division of cavalry should be retained in the USA force structure.
Specific purpose cavalry in the European tradition had its place, and in the specific time frame they operated were the proper solution for the task at hand. Firearms changed cavalry, and the rapidity of fire, as it grew in capability, both rapidity and range forced cavalry first to become more general purpose and then forced them to seek other mounts. The US Cavalry adopted a general purpose configuration in 1855 after experimentation with dragoons and mounted rifles on the Plains and the Mexican War. Official re-designation took six more years.
The name Combat Car was a result of law The National Defense Act of 1921 gave tanks to the Infantry. Combat Cars was a sneaky way to get around the letter of the law. It was not the infantry that was restrictive in the use of tanks, but rather the U S Congress.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 1, 2013 9:49:47 GMT -6
Thanks Chuck, I have just been going over my old American Civil War rule book and the main units that stand out from the standard Infantry are, Sharpshooters (a special Corps of eight Companies), Zouaves (I have come across these before in my Napoleonic Games) and finally the Wisconsin Regiments (the author keeps addressing the Wisconsin’s as if they were special).
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on May 1, 2013 10:01:33 GMT -6
Ian: 1st and 2nd U S Sharpshooters were the exception to any rule. Zouaves were boys playing dress up but no change in function only fashion. Wisconsin's Iron Brigade was special, in that it was a very hard bunch, but no different than any other infantry in organization or role. They wore funny hats. If that author is Philip Katcher, he is a source not worth a bucket of piss, at least not on U S subjects. Don't know about others he has written about. When I see his name I pass it by as unworthy of my attention.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 1, 2013 13:29:17 GMT -6
No Chuck, his name is Terence Wise, on the wargame theme, I remember the older guys at our club using their Grenadier Companies (remember we had one per Regiment) in a very unusual way, if we had six Regiments of line, they group together the six Grenadier Companies to form one strong Battalion, they would use this Battalion to lead the attack, now I am not sure if this practice was ever used in real life or not, I may do a search tomorrow if I get time, this course I am on is never ending.
One last note; when we were talking about Light Infantry and Cavalry, it reminded me of one of my first ventures with modelling, when Airfix brought out there new German Reconnaissance kit in the early 1970s, I decided to make my own Afrika Korps Recce unit, it was a simple force with six Sd.Kfz 222 Armoured Cars, six Kübelwagens, four Motorcycles-sidecars (and a Platoon of Infantry in seven Sd.Kfz 250s (the Motorcycles and Sd.Kfz 250s were Esci kits and I wanted to add the more heavier Sd.Kfz 231 Armoured Cars but none were available at that time in 1/76 scale). I never really used it in any wargames and it was my pride and joy, but once I did blood it when I was taking part in a Western Desert Battle set around 1942, I kept them out of harm’s way until I decided a flank attack, unfortunately my opponent had sent a Troop of Daimler Armoured Cars on an interception course, well my Recce unit was roughly handled by these big Armoured Cars (the Daimler was armed with a 2 pdr Gun and my Sd.Kfz 222s had only 20mm) and got a hiding, they never saw action again and were resigned to life in my sideboard.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on May 1, 2013 13:58:02 GMT -6
Ian: I don't know, if the heavies and the lights were ever task organized as you describe in Europe. I do know they were by the Mexicans at the Alamo. It was the light companies from all or most of the line battalions that were task organized to assault the 18 Pound gun on the southwest corner of the Alamo, just about where the steps leading down to the Paseo del Rio are now, maybe twenty feet to the left as you are looking from the Alamo, west toward the river.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 2, 2013 8:14:27 GMT -6
Chuck, the only nation (up to now) I can find who used this formation in battle was the Napoleonic French, here is what I found;
‘’The Grenadier Company would usually be situated on the right side of a formation, traditionally the place of greatest honour. During a campaign, Grenadier Companies could be detached to form a Grenadier Battalion or occasionally a Regiment or Brigade. These formations would then be used as a shock force or the Vanguard for a larger formation’’.
I was surprized to find that this type of detached deployment could be so large as a Brigade, given that the standard line Regiments needed there Grenadier Companies to bolster moral, it would leave a hell of a lot of Regiments short on Grenadiers.
Maybe the Mexican Army adopted French tactics, and the grouping of Companies from different Regiments was standard practice, due to any French military influence.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on May 2, 2013 8:42:14 GMT -6
Ian: I think it very likely that the Mexicans adopted French technique. Santa Anna considered himself the Napoleon of the West. Sam Houston did not agree, and he walked right into Sam.
I know that Hood's Texas Brigade ANV did something similar during the ACW. They placed the skirmishers of each of the regiments under one commander, to form something on the order of a brigade skirmish company or battalion, to advance a head of the brigade.
Don't really know if the armies on both sides did this or not. I would think it the best way, but the regiments themselves may have provided and controlled their own skirmishers. I will have to check that out.
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 2, 2013 9:10:33 GMT -6
Chuck; wiki says that the Zouaves were used as Light Infantry in the early part of the ACW, the North had 70 such Regiments and the South 25, it goes on to say;
‘’The Zouaves utilised Light Infantry tactics that emphasised open-order formation, with several feet between soldiers, rather than the customary close order, with its characteristic 'touch of elbows’. They moved at double time, rather than marching at a stately cadence’’.
I have had a look at the Winfield Scott tactics on Skirmishing, it says that each Regiment would deploy one Company of light Infantry to screen the advance, but if Scott followed the French system to the letter (I think he adopted French tactics or did his own take on them) then the tactic of detaching and grouping of all of the Brigades Light Companies would be an option.
Ian.
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