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Post by quincannon on Apr 29, 2013 11:06:10 GMT -6
Fuch's I missed yours as I was scrolling through, and at the same time answering a telephone call from Fred.
I cannot speak to other events that had Indian encampments consolidated. I don't know what Custer thought or knew. All I can tell you is that I believe his experience was where camps were separated. There was no Center of Lessons Learned in the army of those days, so what happened in one engagement or in one theater would not necessarily be know in the others.
All I can do is look at what happened and decide for myself the reasons why I think it may have happened. I see absolutely no viable reason for sending Benteen out there if Custer did not think the possibility existed that there was an Indian presence in that area. That in turn speaks to separation of the tribal circles. I am a tactician, not an anthropologist. Habits that have a bearing on tactics interest me. The quaint habits of the aborigine do not, unless those habits have an impact on what I am trying to do.
I think Custer was armed to the teeth with no information, bad information, misread signs, preconceived notions, and all the fruits of poor reconnaissance and even a lesser degree of human intelligence (HUMINT). Don't you?
I think Fred will make his presence known in this discussion shortly. Let's see what he has to say.
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Post by montrose on Apr 29, 2013 12:02:44 GMT -6
LTC Custer was conducting a movement to contact from the divide towards the LBH valley.
LTC Custer's actions show that he projected an enemy camp along Ash Creek, vicinity where the Lone Tepee was found. CPT Benteen's move put him into the south fork of Ash Creek. His orders would cause him to attack any Indians found here, and put him into a flank attack on the projected camp on the creek.
Benteen's movement had absolutely nothing to do with any force in the LBH valley. As we can see from Steve Alexander's recreation of the route: at no time could the valley of the LBH be seen from this route. No Indians there could either be seen or fought.
The only Indians Benteen could have engaged would be in the tributaries of Ash Creek. Benteen's orders show that they were in support of operations along Ash Creek, and only Ash Creek.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 29, 2013 12:13:47 GMT -6
And a camp along Ash Creek is further evidence I believe Custer thought the tribal circles spread out, and if not a large camp located much nearer than was the case in reality.
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Post by bc on Apr 29, 2013 12:21:08 GMT -6
Don't forget that as they approached the divide, they found NA trails going south which were partially scouted by Hare and some Rees and perhaps Herendeen as well. These would have been the trails created by the NAs involved in the Crook fight on the Rosebud. At a campsite to their south of and east of the divide, the scouts did find some uniform parts although no one associated the stuff as coming from Crook.
Custer had real concerns about NAs to his south and he still had Terry's order to keep the NAs from moving south. I will know more about this once I go to the Crow's nest this summer just to see what Custer could see and whether it was a good move to send Benteen in that direction. Either way, it was still a good move to send Benteen off on a flank move to the southwest of the main column.
Regarding his order for scouting Tullochs creek headwaters, those headwaters were actually on the west side of the divide and north of the Crow's nest. There were no indications that any NAs moved north from Davis Creek as the crossed the divide. To get there, he has to go by the vill on the LBH anyway. Remember that Tullochs creek is close to the LBH and BH and Bradley took that route as a shortcut when they were marching from the Jellystone. Custer had also sent some scouts to the Eagle's Nest on the 24th which is north of the Crow's nest along the divide and they could tell if there was much NA activity in the area. Evidence was that the NAs were on the LBH and they would have to be dealt with before moving on to Tullochs Creek.
All in all, I think Custer was sharing his plans however without solid intel, they were basically moving on the fly and decisions were made on the fly. Other than the general plan to attack and sweep everything before them, all other plans and orders were being made on the fly.
bc
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Post by fuchs on Apr 29, 2013 12:22:43 GMT -6
I think Custer was armed to the teeth with no information, bad information, misread signs, preconceived notions, and all the fruits of poor reconnaissance and even a lesser degree of human intelligence (HUMINT). Don't you? That's the big question. Regarding the Army of the Plains Indian Wars, I'm somehow confused that on the one hand there are numerous examples of that ignorance you note here. But on the other hand there are the occasional glimpses of good intelligence and reasonably sound understanding of what made the adversary tick. It might indeed be that the reason for this discrepancy was that effectively every officer was on his own private learning curve, without much of a meaningful exchange. And getting an idea of what Custer (mis)understood of the Indians would certainly be helpful in interpreting his actions.
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Post by fred on Apr 29, 2013 12:25:49 GMT -6
I agree only partially with Montrose.
You cannot see into the upper LBH valley from the Crow's Nest... and this is from where the original scout order was formulated.
All you can make out from there is ridges; ridges indicate valleys, but width-perception is impossible to determine, especially from those distances.
One of Custer's mistakes is that he fought this battle from experience and part of that experience was the camp area of the Washita; another part was the Indian proclivity for custom and rote, thereby indicating the possibility of additional camps farther up the LBH valley.
In addition to that, there was the possibility of smaller, satellite camps, something Benteen felt would not exist, especially given the size of the trail they had followed. Benteen wasn't the CO, however, so he didn't get to call the shots.
When he felt there was no longer any likelihood of Indians "dumb" enough to move into scratch valleys, and when he sent Gibson forward one last time to see if anything could be seen in the distance-- nothing-- Benteen called it quits and moved back toward the main trail.
His mission was legitimate and in the (dim) likelihood he did encounter Indians, he was to attack... and send word back as to what was going on. No platoon or patrol of scouts could have accomplished that mission.
As to Custer's so-called plans... I think Benteen was correct. Custer had no plan, at least when he crossed the divide. He formulated on the fly and by the time he sent Reno forward to attack the village, a reasonable plan had coalesced in his mind. Unfortunately for him-- and 209 others-- he changed it shortly thereafter.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 29, 2013 12:47:01 GMT -6
Fuchs: I can't say I disagree with one word of your summation. Spot on I think.
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Post by montrose on Apr 29, 2013 13:34:12 GMT -6
Fuchs,
The 1876 Army lacked a training system for either units or leaders. Some figured out on their own how to fight an unconventional war against the Indians, like Crook, MacKenzie, Carr, Gatewood, Wood etc. Others never knew what they were doing. GAC was not an isolated case.
GAC had very limited experience at regimental level and below. From 1866 to 1876 he had far, far, far more experience hunting, working as a taxidermist, and peacetime garrison activities, than he did conducting regimental combat operations. Notice his disastrous tactical performance in 1867: the worst performance of any regimental commander in the US Army between 1865 and 1898.
I don't think Custer's main flaw at LBH was arrogance. It was inexperience, and a lifelong reputation for poor tactical skills and knowledge.
Many of us have speculated that GAC was expecting a Washita like distribution of widely separated camps. Yet he was following the Indian trail, and knew, or should have known, that that distribution did not exist.
We also speculate that GAC believed the Indians had broken camp and were scattering. Yet we know that he received messengers stating that the Indians were fighting. From the bluffs he saw the Indians attacking Reno, and he saw the main camp below him. The camp was not torn down and gone; there it was. The information to fight and win the battle were there.
The problem isn't the intelligence. The problem is that GAC didn't understand it, nor did he react to where the enemy was, and what the enemy was doing.
He only committed 3 out of 12 companies to battle. Time is ticking, and he took an extended timeout. He sat on his ass, so the Indians kicked it.
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Post by benteen on Apr 29, 2013 16:56:58 GMT -6
...when explaining why Custer sent Benteen. Sending Benteen off to the left may have been just a simple way of Custer being able to justify why he didn't follow Terry's order to "feel to the left". He tells Benteen to check things out and then return to the main march. Which Benteen did. Square filled. Custer was having his cake and eating it too. Alfakilo, Sir, your opinion is one shared by forum members that are a lot more knowledgeable than I am. But again I go off the reservation and disagree with it. Terry told Custer he knew he would strike the trail that Reno found, but it was his wish that Custer go past it to Tullocks Creek. Once Custer hit that trial. and turned up it to attack the Indians he knew he was committed. He HAD to have a victory. If he attacked and lost and these Indians escaped, Terry would roast him (Which he did in his second report) and his career was over. I believe Custer knew telling Terry that he sent some men to feel to the left at the LBH wasnt going to mean beans to Terry. If he lost it was all over, he was finished. Again this is of course just an opinion, but I belive when Custer left the powder river depot, that was the last thought he had about listening to Terry or anybody else, this was to be his victory and his alone. As Major Elliot said "Heres to a brevet or a coffin" Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Apr 29, 2013 17:31:34 GMT -6
Dan: That same letter of instruction says
"It is of course impossible to give you definitive instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not possible to do so, the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy"
That bit of language is a military license to steal. I don't blame Custer for doing what he did up to a point. He was on the spot, Terry was not
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Post by alfakilo on Apr 29, 2013 17:52:50 GMT -6
Dan: That same letter of instruction says "It is of course impossible to give you definitive instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not possible to do so, the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy" That bit of language is a military license to steal. I don't blame Custer for doing what he did up to a point. He was on the spot, Terry was not And immediately following that, Terry goes on to say: "He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank." I'm not trying to open the Terry order debate again, it's been done to death and I think everyone has marked out their position. I've underlined the part that I was referring to in my thoughts about what Custer had in mid for Benteen to do...and why.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 29, 2013 18:12:37 GMT -6
AK: Yes it does, and by all rights Custer should have complied, unless he saw sufficient reason not to. I don't want to open this thing up again either. I do not dispute a thing you say. My one and only point is that Custer or any commander must have the leeway to deviate, if the situation calls for deviation. So it is not the order at all, or its contents. It is the concept of the commander on the spot to deviate with sufficient reason. Every one of us has done it. You must have had good and sufficient reason to do it, and the most likely of those reasons is a change of circumstances that existed when the order was drafted or given.
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Post by benteen on Apr 29, 2013 18:12:55 GMT -6
Dan: That same letter of instruction says "It is of course impossible to give you definitive instructions in regard to this movement, and were it not possible to do so, the Department Commander places too much confidence in your zeal, energy, and ability to wish to impose upon you precise orders which might hamper your action when nearly in contact with the enemy" That bit of language is a military license to steal. I don't blame Custer for doing what he did up to a point. He was on the spot, Terry was not And immediately following that, Terry goes on to say: "He will, however, indicate to you his own views of what your action should be, and he desires that you should conform to them unless you shall see sufficient reason for departing from them. He thinks that you should proceed up the Rosebud until you ascertain definitely the direction in which the trail above spoken of leads. Should it be found (as it appears almost certain that it will be found) to turn towards the Little Bighorn, he thinks that you should still proceed southward, perhaps as far as the headwaters of the Tongue, and then turn toward the Little Horn, feeling constantly, however, to your left, so as to preclude the escape of the Indians passing around your left flank." I'm not trying to open the Terry order debate again, it's been done to death and I think everyone has marked out their position. I've underlined the part that I was referring to in my thoughts about what Custer had in mid for Benteen to do...and why. Alfakilo Sir, that is exactly what I was pointing out. Custer knew full well what Terry wanted him to do and went against it Colonel, I am not about to debate military meaning with an army Colonel, but as you say this is a liscense to steal by a subordinate, could it not also be a courtesy from a commander since he doesnt know what exactly his subordinate will run into. As a side note about Terrys orders, my own feelings are that they were perfect CYA. Terry knew Custer. Heck the whole Army knew Custer. Just an opinion, but I think Terry knew full well that when Custer struck that trail that he was going to follow it and attack. If Custers attack failed, he could show that Custer disobeyed the intent of his order and blame him for the failure of the expedition. If Custer succeded, he could show how he felt confident in Custers zeal etc to do as he thought best and share in the victory. Very smart man this Gen Terry. Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Apr 29, 2013 18:22:26 GMT -6
Dan: I, like AK have no desire to get into Terry's orders. They are what they are and not likely to change.
What I will do is tell you what I believe about a license to steal and courtesy.
Writing an order is an art form. If you have a subordinate that you really trust, that order will contain language giving that subordinate a maximum of leeway in the performance of the duty you wish him to do. If you have a lesser degree of trust and confidence in another subordinate, the language used will be much more restrictive.
A good example of the former would be Marshalls to Eisenhower "You will enter upon the Continent of Europe and destroy the German Army"
Had Marshall had a lesser degree of confidence, that LOI to Eisenhower might just have added how to do it, where exactly to do it, and what sequence to do it in.
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Post by fred on Apr 29, 2013 18:23:38 GMT -6
Remember something, gentlemen, when it comes to these orders. First of all, they were issued by a general and regardless of Custer's former rank, the brevet business, and his time in service, a general is a general. Some how, some way, their orders always seemed to me to carry more weight than any others. Terry's inclusion of the phrase regarding his belief the Indians were on the LBH precludes any discretion given, and that discretion pertained only to Custer's actions once he had reached the top of the Rosebud and the top of the LBH-- if he saw fit!
More importantly, however, is Custer knew Terry's intentions! And while there was a lot of CYA after the debacle, history tells us Custer acted against those intentions. To me, that is the condemnation. One other thing... when you assess Custer's tactics once beyond the divide, you must assess them in relation to Terry's orders and his intent. By itself, the tactics employed were not unsound, though they got completely out of hand. When combined with Terry's intentions, Custer's tactics were a complete disaster.
Best wishes, Fred.
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