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Post by fred on Apr 30, 2013 10:11:04 GMT -6
... more to the point, I blame Terry. In my view, I believe Terry held the opinion of Custer that you said so well. Custer was Terry's loose cannon and it went off in his face. Terry was the adult in the house and he knew better. Had the aftermath been handled in a more responsible and fair manner, I would have put Terry on the hot seat. He didn't create that junkyard dog, but he certainly gave it far too much leash...if any at all. Alfakilo, A very good and apt summation... nicely done. In case you are not aware of it, there is a book by Roger Darling titled, A Sad and Terrible Blunder, and it deals with the Terry side of the campaign, his relationship with Custer, and the Terry trek winding up at the LBH River... an unmitigated disaster! Darling seems fair and while he has a lot of respect for the Gentleman Soldier Terry was, he is also quite willing to criticize and chastise where needed. Very well done. The big criticism I have with the book, however, is his LBH battle depiction is utterly deplorable. I don't know if he out-right lies, but he makes stuff up and he distorts other things, and his time issues are ludicrous, especially if you graph them (which I did). One "lie" was his claim that at the RCOI DeRudio identified by name all three men on the bluffs. Right away, the seeds of doubt creep in. The Custer battle aside, the book has a lot going for it... though if you pick up so much nonsense in one area, you begin to doubt the veracity and objectiveness in others. I don't know. Darling is a pilot, as well, and he took a number of marvelous photos of the area, then hand-draws those photos into maps showing column movements, camps, etc. Great stuff! Well worth the reading, though if I were to read it again, I would skip the battle chapter. I mean it was one of the worst I have ever read, and that includes Darling's rationalization of Custer's interpretations of his orders. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 30, 2013 10:15:00 GMT -6
Ian:
Responsibility lies with Montgomery here. He developed a plan that needed everything to go just right for it to be a success. Nothing ever goes just right and he was much to experienced a commander to not have known that.
Blame goes to Browning. Lots of blame. Courts martial level blame in my view but that is another matter. Browning was informed by his intelligence officer at least two days before the operation that there was aerial reconnaissance pictures of the 9th and 10th SS Panzer Divisions in the Arnhem area. Their presence was confirmed by elements of the Dutch Resistance. Browning ignored the evidence when shown, and relieved his intelligence officer for a nice long rest, as he though him to be suffering from excess strain. The Polish Parachute Brigade commander also told Browning that the plan was unworkable, and the drop zones were much to far from the objective. Browning ignored him too, but he sure cut a dashing figure sporting his tailor mades with nose in the air.
I don't believe anyone is ever satisfied with 80% when the objective of the enterprise, a crossing of the lower Rhine was not achieved. A lot of good people died to hold that road open, and in the end the territory between the line of departure and the culmination point meant little to nothing without that bridge.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 30, 2013 14:53:40 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, I think the German Army showed everyone how resilient it really was, operation Bagration had just finished resulting in the destruction of a full German Army group, the meat grinder in Italy was still in progress with the capture of Rome done and dusted, they also lost Romania and Bulgaria to the Soviets, a month earlier the Allies had virtually destroyed the German seventeenth Army around Falaise with little in the way of Armour escaping, so I think that the time was right for an operation of this kind, if it was a success then it would have shortened the war by months.
There were some areas that should have been looked at more closely like the narrowness of the push and drop zones being miles away from their objectives (which shouldn’t have happened) but there should had been nothing really in the way to stop it, the reports of German Armour in the area where over looked and were put down as been just burnt out units licking their wounds and giving the way the Allies had previously handled the German Panzers in the months previous these should have been no barrier.
Montgomery should have given command of the Airborne mission to Brereton not Browning; Ridgway too would have been a better choice. But at the end of the day Ike sanctioned the operation and going on what had happened to the German Army over the last six months it would take a brave man to bet against the mission not being a success.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Apr 30, 2013 15:39:14 GMT -6
Ian: It is my firm belief that anyone who underrates the German Army at any time since Frederick, makes a huge mistake.
I think the secret to their successes in WWI, especially their ability to rebuild units is in the design of their replacement system, and while it was greatly strained in never broke.
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Post by montrose on Apr 30, 2013 16:09:33 GMT -6
Let me make a simple issue complicated. BG Terry's intent was to prevent the Indians from squirting away to the south. He wanted LTC Custer to get on the downstream side of the Indians so that the Indians would be between GAC and Terry. GAC did get Reno's BN on the far side of the Indians. The problem would be if the Indians were located south of the Ash Creek-LBH river junction. If the whole camp, or satellite villages, were downstream, then GAC would have failed in his orders. LTC Custer was lucky. We know that the Indians had initially camped downstream of Ford A. They had moved to the battle location based on the location of game to hunt. Now, Fred et al will say that Terry had 2 intentions. First, prevent the Indians from escaping to the south. Second, even if you know the Indians went to LBH, continue to move south so as to allow Terry's column to be in position. There is no doubt that LTC Custer was not in compliance with Terry's intended timing. In my assessment, the first priority is a fire-able offense, not the second. I can explain if discussion supports this. Now let's talk court martial for LBH. In March 1876 COL Reynolds had screwed the pooch at the Powder River battle. The charges were dereliction of duty. en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Powder_RiverLTC Custer's performance at LBH was incompetent in an extreme way. In the Universal Code of Military Justice, we make a distinction between incompetence (you had a bad day) and gross incompetence(You are unqualified for your rank and position). GAC at LBH was grossly incompetent. This leads to another issue raised on this thread. The LBH was a winnable fight. Outcomes far better than what occurred were possible. Not only were better outcomes available, but of the 35 Regiments in the Army, at least 30 would have performed better. I have an issue with the hypothesis that because the Indians had greater numbers, therefore the outcome was preordained.
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Post by benteen on Apr 30, 2013 17:08:17 GMT -6
[quote author=montrose board=Queries thread=4137 post=88492 time=
I have an issue with the hypothesis that because the Indians had greater numbers, therefore the outcome was preordained.[/quote]
Colonel,
The outcome was not preordained because the Indians had great numbers, it was preordained beacuse Custer was the commanding Officer
Ok OK folks I know that was a cheap shot, but I just couldnt resist it ;D
Be Well Dan
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Post by quincannon on Apr 30, 2013 17:17:46 GMT -6
Dan: It was not a cheap shot at all. I just said the same thing to Montrose not two minutes ago by PM. The battle was lost, a battle that could have well been won due to the fact that Custer WAS the commanding officer, and HE made the decisions that caused the battle to be lost. Nothing is preordained, except Custer in command, an incompetent and derelict commander would find a way to screw up a steel ball. More fit to carry the hod, than wear the shoulder strap.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 30, 2013 17:45:48 GMT -6
Montrose,
Downstream is north, upstream is south. I know you know this, and we all screw that up (me more than most), but it makes it confusing to the new guys. He'd have to be upstream to keep the Indians between Terry and himself.
<Originally, a huge error on my part mentioning the wrong river, much worse than Montrose...so don't tell anyone.....our secret.....>
Not to be argumentative, but neither Terry nor Custer had a clue where the Rosebud rose, which is in the Wolf Mt.'s, much further away than would make remote sense for Custer to follow per Terry's instructions, which he pointedly said were NOT orders, and that Custer could change them if he saw good reason to do so. Going to the headwaters of the Tongue, a possibility in Terry's mind, in the Bighorns is absurd, and demonstrates the plan was not firmly set in this world. At that point, Terry was relieved of guilt and responsibility. Personally, I think Custer had good reason to do what he did, based on his experience and what scouts and evidence showed him.
There are three issues that must be kept separate. The campaign, the entire LBH battle, the Last Stand portion.
If, as everyone thought, the Indians would always run, Custer is okay in his reasoning to the point where he sent Reno in. At that point, he had carelessly condemned Reno to defensive action that he assumed- but could not - support constructively. At that point, the best that could be considered given the fact the Indians did not run and came at them was a draw, over all. Barely achieved.
Continuing north beyond MTC, for whatever reason, in what seem to be two groups mostly unable to support each other, demanded the results of the LS.
So. The campaign was won, because win or lose the Indians had to keep moving and be unable to get enough game together for winter off the rez. There could have been a series of such defeats for the Army that only would have collapsed the Sioux faster. These wars are a definition case of hypothetically winning all the battles and losing the war faster with each victory for the Indians.
The Battle of the LBH was a draw, with the Army holding the ground and the Indians having to move, although having savaged the 7th and wiping out a big chunk of it.
The Last Stand says it all.
The campaign was won just by keeping the Indians moving. The battle conceptually could have been won if they'd hit the camp in force and things fell their way, but the reality is that the camp was at least five amoebas that reacted differently at different times and not having a common command, could not have a predicted response. It was Too Big To Move, and they HAD to fight.
The five companies were toast when they left MTC behind.
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Post by alfakilo on Apr 30, 2013 17:50:19 GMT -6
Has the question of whether this fight was winnable or not been covered? Here I see two very qualified people suggesting that it could have been...and me, being the dumb-ass pilot in the group, would like to hear how. Not that I am disagreeing at all...just curious. I'm always open to enlightenment from my groundpounding brethren!! AK
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Post by alfakilo on Apr 30, 2013 18:00:37 GMT -6
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Post by quincannon on Apr 30, 2013 18:19:39 GMT -6
AK: A quick answer before I have to leave for a few hours. Not detail quick and dirty.
With trains closed up fairly close but not in the way, Custer's regiment in mass attacks the southernmost circle. This would cause a firefight and flight. Flight to the north and north west. Upon termination, reorganize, consolidate, and hit them again, and again and again. It would be as those things go not a battle of complete destruction, but an appreciable outcome, and the sidebar connected with it is each time you hit over the next few days, as they move away, a little more of their sustenance and therefore their ability to make war is destroyed with each successive action. Something like that tank regiment we spoke of some months ago. Knowing you can't get them all with one strike, you strike them and then with succeeding attacks make their life miserable until they are no longer combat effective. Montrose has a better plan I think and I will let him lay it out.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 30, 2013 18:54:42 GMT -6
You seem to be visualizing them, the whole village, moving as a unit. They'd split up and run in the dark, and the Army would be clueless. If they were stupid enough to split up and go after each group, they'd be clobbered in pieces. The Army, or the 7th, only had that first chance to make it good. Once with wounded and missing mounts, they'd have to do what Crook did.
They knew terms like 'all' was fantasy, and they'd be happy with just burning what was left and keeping them running. Arguably, it's what happened anyway.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 30, 2013 20:35:06 GMT -6
Ulan: The orders were apparently to - go find and if found to pitch into. They are contained in the RCOI. They were VOCO (Verbal orders of the Commander) and not something reduced to writing. AK and Ulan: Don't think Custer liked Benteen much, but I think he evaluated him as a man of good judgment, and sent him on a mission where he knew he would exercise that judgment. If he ran across a medium sized tribal circle out there, his 120 men could have neutralized it ( prevented it from interfering with Custer's plan(s). He would be expected to neutralize, but also exercise judgment in what he could neutralize. In other words if he were to find something huge out there, to report and observe. Chances of finding much out there beyond his own capability were slim I think, and I would be even more positive if I knew the sufficiency of water out there. I do not. AZ does and he will post in due time. Military operations are not about liking someone, they are about selecting someone who can and will do a job, as you and I both know well AK. Keogh's opinion is Victorian era melodrama, not a fair evaluation of mission and intent. I guess that is OK if you are here for melodrama like tying widows and orphans to the railroad track as done by "Desperate Dirty and Depraved Dan Misdeed" but don't think that is the kind of drivel we come here for. Chuck good point. We only found developed water on our Benteen ride. There would appear to me not sufficient to support any large group of Indians and horses. Steve
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Post by quincannon on Apr 30, 2013 21:09:43 GMT -6
Steve: Did not think so. Now I am sure if you say so.
DC: That's conventional wisdom and you may very well be correct. My reason is though that had such happened Custer would be in mass, and while I believe many of the hostiles, with families in tow would get away. I think the bulk of the southern most circles would have to initially stay together in bulk for self protection. I can't prove any of it. I can only speculate on what I think their most likely initial moves would be. Regardless though if they all slit up and all get away, each tribal circle is therefore weaker and they would be hunted down as was Dull Knife and others. If you want to do what you set out to do, you must prepare yourself to stay until it is done, or don't try to do it at all. War ain't easy and it takes time.
It was this attitude on scatteration Oh What must we do What must we do, that was the seed of wining this one battle with one roll of the dice, that led to great mistakes and the result was LBH..
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Post by AZ Ranger on Apr 30, 2013 22:39:44 GMT -6
That water was in noname. The horse Roman was put down due to an injury. He was a great horse for me. Attachments:
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