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Post by quincannon on Nov 8, 2011 12:49:30 GMT -6
Rosebud: Little Big Horn for the Sioux and their allies was like Pearl Harbor for the Japanese, a tactical vitory and a long range stategic defeat. At least the Japanese recovered post war. The Sioux were condemed to a lingering death of hopelessness, at least in part.
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Post by wild on Nov 8, 2011 18:24:22 GMT -6
They were not going to be escorted back, they would be killed on the spot. Although Custer lost the battle, the Indians got the message loud and clear.
The Sioux were condemed to a lingering death of hopelessness, at least in part.
Colonel
As always an officer and a compassionate gentleman
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Post by quincannon on Nov 8, 2011 18:51:04 GMT -6
Richard: There are a couple of fellows over yonder that you will have a difficult time in convincing of the compassionate part. None the less what I wrote above is true. They are a proud and noble people who deserve a lot better than they ended up getting as a group.
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Post by El Crab on Nov 9, 2011 0:20:08 GMT -6
Crab: You have injected human nature into combat. Well done. Thanks guys. I think that human nature is something people just completely disregard. I know I used to struggle to understand decisions made by Custer's troopers. Like running on foot at the end of the fight, when there's so many eyes to see you do it. Or blowing your brains out while fleeing on horseback. Or how a company can hold off 10 times their number. These weren't toy soldiers and plastic Indians. They were real people, forced to make decisions, act and react to being shot at, being threatened, being in danger of grave injury or even death. Also, on the subject of flight on foot, line of sight is another thing it took awhile to introduce to the battle for me. When a trooper ran on foot, only those who could see him would know he was fleeing. And when you stand on various points of the battlefield, line of sight becomes an issue. While it might seem crazy to run towards Indians from LSH to Deep Ravine, we don't know what Indians were visible. And while it wasn't probable that any soldier could flee the battlefield on foot, it wasn't as if every eye was on them. There were Indians all over the field, in various places with various lines of sight. And in the fog of war, being missed is possible. Especially given all the dust, smoke, grass and changes in elevation. The troopers with Custer would've been better off fighting to the death, but human nature prevented that. It seems to me that our training of soldiers has improved, as the boys in WWII were more resolute in the face of certain death. Of course, not everyone fighting, even today, can avoid panicking and crumbling under the pressure of combat. But I'd guess the training has improved dramatically in preparing our combat troops for the shock, stress and terror of battle. And in fostering a bond between troops. The accounts of WWII often point to a reverence for a soldier's comrades, and the feelings of remorse and regret upon being wounded, because they felt they were letting their fellow soldiers down. Custer didn't have to defeat every Indian, just a majority. I think he had enough respect for the warriors to know that they'd be trouble if they stood and fought, but that also they would have to protect their property and families. And that if he could maintain pressure from different directions, the lack of organized resistance would be exploited. He was afraid of his target scattering before he could get to them, but I don't think he was afraid of them scattering when he was in contact. In fact, I think he wanted them to scatter. He wanted them to be thrown into a state of confusion and splinter the camp. He just didn't want them to scatter and escape. Sending Reno down the valley achieved this. I doubt Custer was worried that attacking piecemeal would work to his disadvantage. I think he was working on an improvised attack that continually applied pressure, with soldiers appearing at one point, then more soldiers elsewhere, and still more when Benteen showed up. And the packtrain would be even more. At some point, the Indians, not knowing the strength of the Army, might wonder if EVEN more soldiers were coming. And from where? Custer appearing to the north and east accomplished the next step of this plan, and if Benteen had showed up it would've been just what Custer wanted. I think this plan appeared to him once Reno was sent to attack, and Reno's withdrawl forced Custer to improvise. That is, if you think Custer knew Reno retreated. Custer, if you ask me, was counting on aggression from multiple angles at multiple points in time would never allow the Indians to catch their collective breaths. Of course, this plan leaves you more vulnerable to defeat, but I also think it allows for a greater victory than consolidating the command and attacking with the whole regiment. By the time he would be able to at least get Benteen in his midst, it might be too late to do anything but chase a fleeing village. I think Custer was looking to fight like a boxer would when looking to put their opponent on their heels. Hit them at different points from different angles, never letting them settle into a simple defense. I think its important to remember that Crook, after being attacked in camp, attempted to find the village from which the warriors came from. Even at the risk of dividing his force, his objective wasn't to defeat the warriors. He wanted to locate and threaten their village. In fact, I think if his cavalry had found it, and he had gotten word, you would've seen Crook attempt to break camp and maneuver his remaining force toward the village. I used to think Custer continued north because the Indians weren't running, and he relished the chance to fight a pitched battle with them. That he was thrilled they were giving battle, and drew them out to engage them, and that the poor terrain didn't bother him. Mainly because the opportunity was so rare that he couldn't pass it up. But no longer. I think Crook's efforts to discover the camp the warriors came from points to what sort of warfare the Army wanted to wage. The warriors were doing everything they could to engage soldiers before they got near their villages, while the soldiers did everything they could to get in contact with the villages and fight it out. Custer's actions make me think he wanted to confuse and panic the village, while keeping them from being able to escape in any one direction. And yet another point. If Custer believed Terry and Gibbon might show up to the north at some point that day, this plan makes more sense. Get the village in a state of motion and panic, never allow them to continue fleeing in any one direction (his move to the north ford), keep them in a general area as the rest of his regiment appears, keep in contact and engage the warriors, and the appearance of even MORE soldiers from the north might just break their spirit. Terry wouldn't even have to arrive on the field in time, just his impending presence would do wonders for Custer's plan. If, of course, that was anything he actually thought about. |
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Post by montrose on Nov 9, 2011 6:53:45 GMT -6
When I was assigned to design courses, I had to learn a lot about how people learn Here are some of the things I learned.
Human males reach physical and mental maturity around age 25. Special Forces raised minimum recruitment age to reflect this reality. Physically, young bodies were not able to keep up. Medical disabilty was a major problem, meaning injuries so severe they had to leave the Army. Mentally, they lacked judgement/toughness/maturity.
What is interesting is that I read all this as we designed a new program, but Recruiting Command insisted we start recruiting at 18. Two years later we had data showing that the pass rate for 18 year olds was about 12%, vice 28% for 35 year olds. Observations from the field was that the 18 year olds were marginal performers, not up to standards. Minimum recruitment age for SF was raised to 20, with recruiting focus on 22-28 year olds with 2 or more years of college.
Note that minimum age for recruitment in 1876 was 21. The reasons the post civil war army wanted a higher minimum age were the same factors we dealt with in 2000/2001.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 9, 2011 7:05:04 GMT -6
Custer needed the whole Regiment to have any chance of getting a victory over the Indians, to just hit the village with eight Companies would not be enough, he needed eleven at least (he could keep one company back with the Packs, or if the packs went to Custer Ridge to be used as a fall-back position if the village attack lost momentum.
There are two ways of looking at the village attack with only eight companies:
Troopers hit the village and Indians reel back in shock as battles break out between the tipis; the Indian no-coms flee with Custer giving chase (The Disney Version).
Troopers hit the village and after an initial shock the Indians take on the soldiers in urban style fighting, Indians appear from every point and the Troopers are engaged in close combat, men are falling from the horses and after a losing men on a rapid basis, the command sweeps back over the river in disarray (The Sam Peckinpah Version).
Ian.
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Post by montrose on Nov 9, 2011 7:35:05 GMT -6
Continuation of observations on training.
Individual training. The primary way to retain skills and knowledge is through motor muscle memory. Repetition matters.
Motor muscle memory overcomes emotion: fear, confusion, etc. It also speeds up individual reactions to a given situation. In combat seconds matter, and the man who can gain situational awareness first, decide what to do, and carry out this action faster than an opponent has a huge advantage.
Building motor muscle memory means a detailed thought process on every possible step in the action. So let's look at marksmanship.The process is not learning to zero a weapon and do a marksmanship range.
How about clearing a jam. For the US Army M4/M16 the acronym we use is SPORTS. Slap magazine, pull charging handle, observe chamber, release charging handle, tap forward assist assembly, shoot.
But here is what is interesting. In my mind when I think about this process I hear a Jamaican accent. My team was selected to carry out a raid. During pre combat training our sergeant major ( born in Jamaica) dragged us through a whole series of individual combat drills. We were shooting every day for about 2 weeks in the raid drill, which was very complicated. But every damn time he had us do SPORTS, once a day in daylight, once a day at night. Ten years later I had a jam in a fire fight. I instantly did SPORTS, with a Jamaican accent in my head.
Motor muscle memory kicked in. It happened so fast that I did not consciously think about it. Now, at the time I thought this SGM was total chicken shite having all these trained, experienced Special Forces officers and sergeants waste time pretending to clear a jam. The drill he took us though was doing SPORTS for an entire magazine (30 rounds) twice a day (day and night).
The point is that I can do that drill right now. It is so drilled into me that my body will do it automatically. This frees up my brain to observe the battlefield and find new targets. I am a better soldier because of training in a basic combat skill.
Now in LBH, the 7th was a badly trained unit. Soldiers were doing basic combat skills for the first time in their lives.
The defeat of the 7th Cav started a decade before LBH. The 4th Cav may have been stalemated at LBH, but they would not be defeated. Same for the 9th and 10th.
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walsh
Full Member
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Post by walsh on Nov 9, 2011 7:44:54 GMT -6
Continuation of observations on training. Individual training. The primary way to retain skills and knowledge is through motor muscle memory. Repetition matters. Motor muscle memory overcomes emotion: fear, confusion, etc. It also speeds up individual reactions to a given situation. In combat seconds matter, and the man who can gain situational awareness first, decide what to do, and carry out this action faster than an opponent has a huge advantage. Building motor muscle memory means a detailed thought process on every possible step in the action. So let's look at marksmanship.The process is not learning to zero a weapon and do a marksmanship range. How about clearing a jam. For the US Army M4/M16 the acronym we use is SPORTS. Slap magazine, pull charging handle, observe chamber, release charging handle, tap forward assist assembly, shoot. But here is what is interesting. In my mind when I think about this process I hear a Jamaican accent. My team was selected to carry out a raid. During pre combat training our sergeant major ( born in Jamaica) dragged us through a whole series of individual combat drills. We were shooting every day for about 2 weeks in the raid drill, which was very complicated. But every damn time he had us do SPORTS, once a day in daylight, once a day at night. Ten years later I had a jam in a fire fight. I instantly did SPORTS, with a Jamaican accent in my head. Motor muscle memory kicked in. It happened so fast that I did not consciously think about it. Now, at the time I thought this SGM was total chicken shite having all these trained, experienced Special Forces officers and sergeants waste time pretending to clear a jam. The drill he took us though was doing SPORTS for an entire magazine (30 rounds) twice a day (day and night). The point is that I can do that drill right now. It is so drilled into me that my body will do it automatically. This frees up my brain to observe the battlefield and find new targets. I am a better soldier because of training in a basic combat skill. Now in LBH, the 7th was a badly trained unit. Soldiers were doing basic combat skills for the first time in their lives. The defeat of the 7th Cav started a decade before LBH. The 4th Cav may have been stalemated at LBH, but they would not be defeated. Same for the 9th and 10th. Nicely said. This guy knows what he's talking about. How did you get into special forces? Regards, James |
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Post by quincannon on Nov 9, 2011 9:18:04 GMT -6
"The defeat of the 7th Cavalry started a decade before LBH" The shame of it is that at any time during that decade the course could have been changed by training, but that would mean leadership, the type of which the 7th Cavalry did not have.
Will, your Jamaican Sergeant Major was exercising and old fashioned form of leadership - Telling someone to go to hell, but making sure they enjoyed the trip. He did not set out to win a popularity contest, but put mission and the welfare of the troops he was training first and foremost.
I see so many parents today in my work with kids at church who want to be their childrens buddy instead of their parent. No, they are parents and sometimes that means doing what is best, doing the things that need to be done, instilling discipline, sometimes even making the lives of their kids a little miserable, so that the end product is morally and mentally tough enough to someday face a sometimes immoral, sometimes unjust, always tough world.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 10, 2011 16:36:21 GMT -6
So we're assuming that every Indian is going to stand their ground. That every Indian is going to be able to look at the situation and know exactly the strength of the force attacking their village? No we are not in either case and that was neither written nor inferred. Whilst however, they would not know the exact strength of any attacking force, either red or white, they were warriors from an early age, keenly perceptive, trained to make such observations as to whether or not they were outnumbered. In fact, they usually only attacked other groups when they held the numerical superiority, so that was an assessment they were well capable of making. No argument with those first two sentences. Again correct, as Reno’s approach initially demonstrated. Taking the whole regiment in might have been successful but there are problems with that theory, some of which I pointed out to Wild. In addition, the cavalry at that time was not well trained either in horsemanship or marksmanship so did not use the charge into a village as a tactic. As Don Rickey says in ‘Forty Miles a Day on Beans & Hay’, “Cavalry usually did its actual fighting dismounted…Few men could hit a target shooting from the back of a horse, while mounted men were easy marks for the enemy.” Not a confident basis on which to consider using the charge then and possibly another other reason why Reno halted his valley advance. Whilst that is a reasonable generalisation, it omits the key factor that you mention later “These things happened, not because the Indians were ordered to do so, but because they seemed to feed off each other.” Whether on the offensive or the defensive, the human nature of this culture, something you allude to later, was instinctive, rather like ants when their home is attacked. They did fight as individuals but they also had a fierce group ethic when defending their families. Not in dispute generally speaking, but the pivotal word is enough. What would have been enough at the LBH we will never know and as the discussions on this thread alone make clear, we can only speculate as to what Custer had in mind. What you say might hold true for the soldiers, but misunderstands the priorities of the Indian culture. It simply could not afford to lose its young men in a wasteful way. As you remark, they could not have overrun Reno Hill without taking casualties and there was no point in that as the soldiers were no longer threatening the camps, plus they were going nowhere. Why lose valuable manpower to no purpose? I assume you mean Reno advancing on the village as what he did cannot be deemed an attack I feel. As to the Indians fighting Custer, firstly their blood was up at the danger to their families in Squaw Creek from Custer’s advance to the northern fords, secondly by using the gullies, ravines and contours for protection they minimised the risk to life. Once the soldiers began to retreat they became even more emboldened. Already covered previously, but additionally, it was question of getting the non-combatants to safety then getting back onto the fight. Other than a few who might have felt ‘it was not a good day to die’ I suspect that the vast majority of the warriors were not just like-minded but single-minded in their determination to drive the soldiers away. Came out of the woods and formed up? Only Reno, Moylan and maybe Wallace described the flight from the timber as having any formation. Most of the RCOI testimony begs to differ and I would rather rely on Herendeen, Porter and Gerard for accuracy. The only Indian account we have of giving way before Reno’s timber exit is Wooden Leg, but there are various versions among the RCOI testifiers. That the Indians did so would be no surprise, not because they felt individually threatened but because it was their standard tactic in the face of charging soldiers. They never met any charge head on. You are taking the image of each warrior fighting for personal glory too far. That was their ethos, but only when on the attack. Here again you overstate the case. Godfrey did do as you say, but only for a short while before retreating in the face of the growing threat of being overrun. K Company held for that short while and Godfrey did hold the discipline for as long as he could before wisely falling back. Already covered previously, except for the Zulu factor. Let us put that in perspective. At Isandlwana 20,000 Zulus, with 10,000 to 15,000 engaged, attacked 1,800 British soldiers plus 400 civilians. The vast majority of the British force was killed and the Zulus suffered around 1,000 killed and 2,000 wounded. With those kind of odds and the Zulu method of running directly at the enemy they were certainly going to take losses. The individual Zulu warrior also took great pride in his personal martial prowess. This is just a repetition of prior examples. By this time, the fighting was all but over, the Indians knew they had won, they knew they would get the soldier eventually and there was no longer any need to take unnecessary risks. None of them wanted to get shot? Would you want to? Did any of the soldiers want to? You keep stressing this theme apparently as examples of the human nature of the Indians. What about the human nature of the soldiers, of Custer, Reno and Benteen? Their underlying human nature in those days was to despise the Indians as cowards. How big a part did that play in the approach to the camps? Crab, Wild et al, I am sorry to take so long to respond, but this post hopefully covers most of the questions posed by your individual posts. I will catch up on developments in due course but will be unable to post for a while. My regards to you all. Hunk |
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Post by El Crab on Nov 10, 2011 19:13:16 GMT -6
First off, thanks for being so organized in your replies. I know how long it takes to form a response with all those quotes, but it makes for much more organized and understandable debate. I mostly agree with what you said, but I'll talk a little bit about two points. Came out of the woods and formed up? Only Reno, Moylan and maybe Wallace described the flight from the timber as having any formation. Most of the RCOI testimony begs to differ and I would rather rely on Herendeen, Porter and Gerard for accuracy. The only Indian account we have of giving way before Reno’s timber exit is Wooden Leg, but there are various versions among the RCOI testifiers. That the Indians did so would be no surprise, not because they felt individually threatened but because it was their standard tactic in the face of charging soldiers. They never met any charge head on. You are taking the image of each warrior fighting for personal glory too far. That was their ethos, but only when on the attack. You might be right about the lack of forming up. Its not as if Reno was the king of organization from the timber fight on. I'd have to go back to my sources to see, but I've always thought that the men that were informed of the forthcoming departure, mounted and moved out of the timber, not at a charge or helter-skelter, but in a more reserved manner. This doesn't mean Reno attempted to rally his troopers before his "charge", just that you'd be a fool to go scampering out on horseback without at least making sure you had company in doing so. And if this forming up actually happened, it certainly did not include all of those who ended up leaving the timber. That seemed to be a rather strung out affair. Wasn't the perceived close-quarters threat coming Indians infiltrating the timber in the rear and flanks? I've always guessed the area in the front of the position was relatively clear and open. I do think there was some attempt to form up the troopers that were coming out of the timber at first. It might have actually happened due to what training the soldiers did have. It might have been what they tended to do when ordered to mount up and move. You don't have to attribute it to Reno or Moylan or any officer. It could've just been a natural thing for troopers to do, when remounting and beginning to move out on horseback. But its not as if that's an opinion I would defend to the death. Nor do I think it matters much in the grand scheme of things. Maybe I'll look it up. Probably not. I'm extremely lazy these days, and relying a lot on my memory. After all, my Custer books are practically 6 feet away from me. How can I be expected to go to that much effort? Here again you overstate the case. Godfrey did do as you say, but only for a short while before retreating in the face of the growing threat of being overrun. K Company held for that short while and Godfrey did hold the discipline for as long as he could before wisely falling back. My understanding is that Godfrey, seeing how basically every other company was offering little to no resistance while heading back to Reno Hill, decided to deploy his company as dismounted skirmishers as a rearguard. And when his soldiers were failing to keep their intervals as they fell back, he restored the proper spacing. And lastly, he threatened to shoot any man from his company if they broke from the line and ran. Its my understanding that Godfrey's Company K fought dismounted until a hundred yards or so from the entrenchment site, then ordered his men to dash the rest of the way. By that time, he was within range of the rest of the command, who were no longer retreating but reoccupying the position. The point I was trying to make was that I despise the notion that Reno had no choice but to flee, that forming his command and attempting to defend themselves as they retreated was folly. Reno lost 40 killed in his retreat, essentially an entire company. And that number is worse when you consider the number of men he had available to him. Reno chose not to make sure all of his command was informed of the upcoming retreat/charge. Let's say Reno decides to get his whole battalion involved in his "charge", then has one company attempt to cover their retreat. Let's say that entire company is wiped out in doing so. That really isn't any worse than what actually happened. And I doubt an entire company would've been wiped out if Reno had left the timber in an organized manner. Godfrey lost 0 men, while holding off who knows how many warriors with a single company. Dismounted, walking back to Reno Hill, with little to no support from the other companies. That was the point I was making. That retreat from large amounts of Indians can be accomplished without taking many casualties. And part of that reason is the way the Indians fought. They weren't going to ride pell-mell into Godfrey's company. They likely stayed at a distance, since they were being shot at by 30 or so soldiers. Reno's men just ran for it, and the warriors did not feel they were much of a threat. So they rode in rather close and butchered them. The Indians didn't fight it out at close range unless they felt they weren't threatened, or were forced to do so. Agreed? |
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Post by montrose on Nov 10, 2011 21:16:59 GMT -6
I think that comparing the retreats of Reno and Godfrey are an apple and orange situation.
Reno had restricted fields of dire. The enemy had swept past his flanks and were in his rear. He was not moving back from Indians downstream, but reacting to the hundreds of enemies in his rear.
Hunk noticed that there are 2 different views of Reno's movement. M and A company stayed under company leadership, mounted in columns of twos, and started the movement as companies. The right flank was messier. G Company, the M Co flank detachment, and various unattached stragglers all in deep brush.
Chaos lived in those bushes.
One of the faults of ad hoc collections of companies is the lack of command and control assets. The command sergeant major and executive officer would sort out the ash and trash.
Where was the assigned position of the scouts, who was their leader, and what were their orders? Same questions for the aid station. How did these responsibilities change when the line was forced to change direction from facing north to facing south?
For Doc Porter, he went from being in a position heavily protected in the right rear of the line to a highly exposed position in the front. Te refused line left him closer to the enemy village than most of the combat troops.
So I am not surprised that the civilians saw more chaos than soldiers in M and A companies. These issues should have sorted out in training in 1875/6, but were not.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Nov 10, 2011 22:24:02 GMT -6
Nobody has said Reno had no choice but to flee, but that it was, at least, a choice for which some logic and evidence exists in support, and to overturn it one would have to show - based solely on what Reno could possibly have known at the time - a better alternative existed, and then how to accomplish it. I've not read that. Saying "in an organized manner" or just 'sumpin' else' don't do it for me, no how.
If there is a way, show how. Time it out. If it's a series of sequential firing lines, show direction, horse holders, all that. Estimate casualties and how they'd be attended and how that attention would affect the momentum of the retreat, which was the best thing they had going.
The 7th could not fight on horseback absent a retreating enemy. We've been all over this, and the evidence seems pretty conclusive.
Things to consider:
Much is made that he had no casualties to speak of when the Heroic Charge/Infamous Flight began. If he stayed and took more wounded, then again his flight or ANY movement was compromised sans rescue, because losing horses and men requires other horses and men to compensate. This doesn't bode well for any movement of use to an offense or for his own defense then or later.
He's at the kitchen window of the village, they aren't going to let him stay there. They could burn or smoke him out. I'm of the opinion that others here - officers, combat vets - have concluded he didn't have enough men to hold the perimeter and once the Sioux were in the timber with them, night wouldn't be fun.
I can't know, of course. But I don't think it right to allow Open Season on Reno from people who've never been in combat or even served. We have no standing to do so. For all I know, he was a coward, but there's ample evidence it was, at the least, not a chronic condition and he deserves, after all, some credit for being a brevetted general. It rings all wrong to say that Custer shouldn't be remembered for his one loss, but Reno somehow should only be judged by this one day and his actions about which learned opinion is divided.
I've asked openly if combat vets would enjoy the same sort of coverage for their actions by the same sorts as here in the past. Nobody addressed it, which I conclude it's not something they'd enjoy. We've all read enough to know that some really good soldiers had some really bad, awful, not good days, and that just becomes part of the record. I cannot concede that even applies to Reno, who may have done the best that could have been done with the weapons he had.
It's so much fun to read the other board these days, where Costume Lad is not faring well. Good. Deserved.
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Post by El Crab on Nov 11, 2011 2:23:04 GMT -6
I don't need to detail what Reno should've done. Just about anything was better than what he did.
Reno had 175 soldiers and scouts heading into the valley. He lost some of the scouts, who stole ponies and headed away with their loot. Which was what was expected of them. But he still had 3 companies and the scouts who stayed. Probably around 140-155 armed persons. His actions to extract his command from the valley resulted in 40 KIA, and another 15 or 20 left in the timber. You're really going to stick to your guns and say that's the best anyone could hope for in that situation?
How about ordering the trumpeters to blow the commands. That's why they're there and why they have those shiny brass instruments. That would be better than what Reno did. Which was yell his intentions to anyone who could hear.
Let's start there. Reno should've used his trumpeters.
As for the training, just because they weren't Special Forces, it doesn't mean the soldiers weren't skilled enough to do anything but flee on horseback. In fact, one could argue that fleeing on horseback gave the Indians even more of an advantage than attempting to move from the valley using tactics of the day. The Indians were better at horsemanship and had fresher mounts. They also had close quarters weapons that didn't need to be reloaded. Reno played right into their hands, putting his command in a position where they were at the mercy of the Indians.
Reno's command couldn't hope for any better result than 40 killed and 20 more left to their fate in the timber. I can't agree.
I do agree with Montrose that Godfrey's actions retreating from Weir Point aren't quite the same as Reno's situation, but it does point out the fact that troopers in the Seventh were capable of performing something more complicated than mounting up and riding hell-for-leather. One company, ably commanded, covered the retreat of the other 6 companies to Reno Hill. It was possible for these troopers, as crappy as the training was in their day, to perform what was ordered of them by their company commander.
I do think Reno had a bad day. A very bad day. I don't think his performance in the valley is par for the course for his capabilities. But I do think there were better options than what he decided on.
The troopers under his command deserved better than what they got. Bugle calls would've been a good start.
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Post by wild on Nov 11, 2011 4:02:45 GMT -6
Crab
The difference between Reno's retreat and Godfrey's was that Godfrey had the comfort of knowing he had the sanctuary of 6 companies to fall back on.In actual fact the 7th probably had local superiority in numbers.
Reno had no such luxury.He was attempting to break contact on mounts which were slower than the Indians',outnunbered with no obvious sanctuary in sight.The only advantage he had was a few seconds surprise.
A formation was the last thing Reno required.For formation read big slow moving target,narrow front,direction obvious.
There are times when leadership is a handicap.
Leadership is one slow idea,a mob is 130 fast ideas.I'll go with the 130 some are bound to be right.
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