Worst error?

[montrose]

I believe that Godfrey was under far less pressure than Reno. The Indian main body had not reached the regimental main line of defense.

Reno's force moved slowly. They were handicapped by the blanket parties carrying the wounded. They had time to carry their wounded, their dismounted men, their factious mules back to their defensive position. They had time to organize a defensive position, meaning designating company left and right limits, coordinating flanks, etc.

I have found no evidence of any Indian casualties during the Weir peak to Reno Hill episode. This is an indicator that they were not present in strength.

Another indicator is the lack of observations of Indians flanking Godfrey. If the Indians had reached a single line with both flanks unsupported, they would have swept around his flanks, staying out of effective range.

This does not mean that Godfrey's action was not critical. By forming an organized delaying force, he forced the leading wave of Indians to wait for main body to reach the fight. He bought time.

My issue is saying that this same action in the valley would have the same outcome.

[montrose]

I would like to look at Godfrey's delaying action with respect to doctrine and training.

It appears that Godfrey and his company sustained training in conducting a withdrawal. He and his company had conducted a sinilar action at Washita.

It is my belief that training was a company affair in the 7th. Godfrey's company was better trained in withdrawal battle drills than the other companies. I believe the 12 companies had widely different training standards.

I have been looking for regimental training inspections, with situational and field training exercises. I have only found a few examples, before the post LBH reforms took place. This gets into regimental commanders, and their own standards. The 4th Cav did a lot more training and appears far more capable at company and above operations. Some of the infantry regiments also appear to have put more effort into this type of collective training.

This is a subjective observation. I have to rely more on diaries and recollections. Daily schedules routinely have a window for drill. But that doesn't mean any drill was actually done. Garrison support details could, and many times did, consume every enlisted man in the unit. And training on guard duty and facing movements is not exactly what you need to be doing to get ready for Crazy Horse.

For example, Ryan mentions some training involving several companies under the supervision of LTC Custer. The unit was near a town, and the local citizens were watching. There were some good indicators of companies conducting mounted movement such as moving from column of twos into line, then attacking.

But then Ryan says that Custer ordered sabre drill, since this drill was popular for the citizens. This sounds more like a dog and pony show than battle focused training.

[montrose]

Godfrey followed doctrine in conducting his withdrawal. He had the men count off by twos. On command, the ones fell back to a designated position, covered by the twos. Then the twos withdrew past the ones to another designated position, etc.

A tactical issue is that while the twos are withdrawing to the ones, firepower drops, since the ones don't want to shoot their withdrawing comrades. In addition, controlling the two groups is difficult for small unit leaders. Some folks who got nervous in the service withdraw with the other group.

Godfrey specifically noticed this happen. Obviously, fear and emotion don't show up in training back at home garrison.

Godfrey's response was brilliant. He split the force in half, one part under himself, the other under Hare. Then he had the two detachments bound backwards one at a time. This not only made for more effective command and control,but also allowed for more sustained firepower from the fire support element.

Modern US Army teaches both techniques. You want a full toolbox to match a given combat situation. I cannot speak for Benning, but for Bragg we recommend bounding overwatch, especially if working with indigenous forces.

As an interesting observation, I came to the same conclusion as Godfrey while conducting live fire exercises at Fort Bragg. We were doing day drills, preparing for a night STX. Myself and my team sergeant rapidly figured out we were going to get someone shot at night, so we changed techniques. It is typical Army that I had to rediscover Godfrey's lesson learned a century later.

[quincannon]

Will: You speak very well for Benning in the above post. Keep up the fire.

[bc]

Very interesting Will. Could you explain "bounding overwatch" for me? I probably know the maneuvers but don't recollect the name.

Let me also take the opportunity to wish all us veterans well and to have a good Veterans Day. Lest we forget.

bc

[quincannon]

Britt: One element, say a fire team, watching and covering the area of forward or rearward movement of their opposite number, by bounds. One unit stays in place, the other moves forward or rearward to the next position of advantage where they in turn can cover the movement of the former covering element. The unit being covered then moves even further to the front or rear so that the process may be repeated.

[AZ Ranger]

Crab

You stated that almost anything Reno could do was better. Better than what Custer did? Seems to me you hit a good point regarding the troops and for all we know the officers and in particular Reno made an assesment of thier battle readiness when making a choice of what to do.

AZ Ranger

[Reddirt]

You seem to feel that Custer's every decision was putrid. Could you possibly support your stance with some factual information? You see, I have an opinion that the final outcome of this battle was the result of multiple errors committed by multiple individuals.

Maybe you feel that the mistakes that occurred should be placed on the shoulders of others and I, somehow, misunderstood you. If so I apologize. I have always enjoyed your posts as they are always informative.

[fred]

Nov 11, 2011 11:59:48 GMT -6 bc said:

Could you explain "bounding overwatch" for me?

Britt,

Direct from the man who invented the concept, then drove it home through the military bureaucracy.

"1. The technique of platoon battle drill... was developed for the following reasons:

a. It fills the gap between the theories, as published in the field manuals, and the actual battlefield application of those theories.
b. The technique lends itself well to extended order drill.

2. This booklet does not change the organization of squads in any manner. The permanent division of squads into two teams remains constant....

3. The methods of moving the platoon and the formations for this movement under combat and simulated combat conditions will be as outlined....

... c. Bounding Overwatch (Contact with the enemy momentarily probable. Late stage of approach to known or suspected enemy locations.)

This technique does not lend itself to diagramming owing to the number of movements involved.

At least one rifle squad and one LMG are in stationary overwatching positions at all times. The foremost advancing rifle squad moves in a traveling overwatch to the next stationary position designated by the platoon leader. Squads rotate smoothly and rapidly through the three roles-- advancing-- overwatching-- and returning to rear of column and following.

Flank protection may ordinarily be provided by proper selection of stationary overwatches. Properly executed this technique provides:
-- immediate retaliatory fire of one squad and one LMG;
-- a ready reserve of one rifle squad;
-- a minimum force (the foremost advancing squad) engaged on ground selected by, and favorable to, the enemy.

The platoon has three principle techniques for the attack:
a. Fire and Movement (leapfrogging). (In broken terrain.)

This technique is similar to the bounding overwatch with the stationary squads delivering covering fire for the advancing squads. Routes forward for the advancing squads are selected more carefully for cover, and stationary positions are selected more carefully for concealment and cover and access by fire to the then, known enemy positions.

b. Fire and Movement (lawnmower). (In open, coverless terrain.)

When a platoon must attack over open terrain without cover and little concealment, it must do so by rapid fire and movement. The most suitable technique is a line of squads with all A teams advancing while B teams fire and vice versa in rapid succession until assaulting distances are reached. One LMG is with the A teams; the other with the B teams."

This stuff is from my original notes and the old mimeographed sheets from 1962-1963-1964.

I cut my teeth on this stuff until my head spun. There is a lot more, including the traveling overwatch, all developed by the same man. It worked so beautifully, both in practice and in combat, and I am dismayed when I see troops, both in Iraq and Afghanistan moving and fighting in the old Fort Benning horse-manure tactics. When we got some of the old WWII and Korean War pros convinced this stuff would actually work, it became a thing of tactical beauty. It was marvelous to watch a well-drilled platoon properly utilize the concepts. In Vietnam, it was a little tougher because of the dense terrain, but as long as you had visual contact, it worked marvelously.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

Britt,

I might as well add this for the squad:

"A rifle squad has three principle techniques of movement.

a. Traveling (Contact with enemy not expected-- squad moving as part of platoon-- not leading or flanking.

Then there is a diagram of how we set it up.

b. Traveling overwatch (Contact with enemy possible but unlikely. Squad as point, squad as flank protection-- early stages of patrol or independent mission-- speed essential.

Diagrams of organization 50 yards (+) in open. 25 yards in woods or brush. Note... this interval keeps B team out of beaten zone of small arms fire directed at A team. Permits reasonably fast retaliation "overwatching fire" from B team.

c. Bounding overwatch (Contact with enemy momentarily likely.) Late stages of patrol-- enemy location generally but not specifically known.

Squad leader signals B team forward when he reaches point where overwatch becomes ineffective or 100 yards forward, whichever occurs first.

B team overwatching from stationary firing position selected by squad leader. Squad leader simply points to general position of overwatch and B team leader disposes team to accomplish mission.

While B team is moving up squad leader points rifle in direction most plausible enemy positions overwatching in that direction."

Best wishes,
Fred.

["Hunk" Papa]

Nov 10, 2011 19:13:16 GMT -6 El Crab said:

First off, thanks for being so organized in your replies. I know how long it takes to form a response with all those quotes, but it makes for much more organized and understandable debate. I mostly agree with what you said, but I'll talk a little bit about two points.

Thanks El Crab, I appreciate your comments and the thoughtfulness of your response which prompted a brief return to posting for me.

You might be right about the lack of forming up. It’s not as if Reno was the king of organization from the timber fight on. I'd have to go back to my sources to see, but I've always thought that the men that were informed of the forthcoming departure, mounted and moved out of the timber, not at a charge or helter-skelter, but in a more reserved manner. This doesn't mean Reno attempted to rally his troopers before his "charge", just that you'd be a fool to go scampering out on horseback without at least making sure you had company in doing so.

And if this forming up actually happened, it certainly did not include all of those who ended up leaving the timber. That seemed to be a rather strung out affair.

My apologies for the extended answer here, but as with other parts of the RCOI testimony, this matter is a question of who you believe. This is what Moylan had to say:

“The companies were mounted up, and being unable to form in any order in the timber, I gave my men orders to mount up as rapidly as possible individually and move up out of the timber in order that they might be formed out there. When about one half of my company was mounted up, I went out of the timber and formed the men in column-of-fours as they came up.
M Company came up very soon after and formed on my left at an interval of 15 or 20 yards. G Company, as I understood, did not mount quite so soon or did not get up quite so soon as the other two companies, but they were in the column before it reached the river. During the time the companies were being formed, Major Reno was there on his horse overlooking the formation of the companies. He asked me as to my opinion as to the point we had better retreat to, as it became evident to him that our movement would be entirely on the defensive. It must necessarily be, owing to the force of Indians then in sight and coming down.”

Now compare that to other testimony:

Gerard – “A. After I heard the order given, “Men, to your horses, the Indians are in our rear’ the skirmish line was withdrawn from the hill and every man went for his horse. I took my time. My horse was tied fifteen or twenty feet away, and I got him, and was leading him out, and the soldiers were going by me on a lope. There appeared to be no command or order about it. Some officer was with them, and I hallooed out to him, “What are you going to do?”, and he said, “Charge the Indians!,” and I was not in any hurry to get out; and Charlie Reynolds came up, and I told him I didn’t understand the call, and we would probably be in the way of the movement of the troops. They would undoubtedly come back; and there was no use of us hurrying out; and we would stay there until they came back.

Q. Now state, if you know, who gave the order for the command to leave the timber, how you knew that the command was going to leave.

A. Nothing more than this officer’s order, that I have already stated”.

Herendeen – “Q. You did not see Major Reno speak to Captain Moylan or tarry with him?
A. I did not.
Q. Did Major Reno give any other orders than what you have testified to at this place, this is, “dismount” and “mount’ before leaving?

A. That is all I heard him say.

Q. State whether he started before or after the men.

A. He started before. His horse jumped and the men started.

Q. Did the horse jump as though he had spurs put to him?

A. I should judge so.”

Varnum – “Then I got up to the right of the line, and met Mr. Girard and Charlie Reynolds, and stopped and talked to them I guess about a minute, or two or three minutes, when I heard from the woods cries of “Charge! Charge! We are going to charge!” There was quite a confusion, something about a charge down in the woods, and I jumped up and said, “What’s that?” and started down into the woods and grabbed my horse. Everybody was mounted. I didn’t hear any orders. I just understood the men calling that they were going to charge and I grabbed my horse and mounted him, and this being in the bushes, and the men mounting just outside of the bushes kept me in, and I couldn’t get out until the men had passed. As soon as they passed so that I could get out into the path myself, I came out with the men. The head of the column was then about a couple of rods or something like that from the edge of the timber, as I came out, and I let my horse have his head and pretty soon overtook the head of the column. I had a very fast horse. As I came in with the head of the column, it was probably about halfway from there to the ford at which we crossed soon after. I came up on the left hand side of the column, and I didn’t see any officer at the head, that is, as I came up understand.”

That is 3 to 1 describing chaos rather than organization then. Also, if we examine what Moylan says, he is asking us to believe that the troops were ordered out of the timber to form up, and then he went out and coolly formed them into column-of-fours in full view of hundreds of Indians. This from a man who, according to Benteen, ‘showed the white feather’ on Reno Hill! I know which versions I believe.

Wasn't the perceived close-quarters threat coming Indians infiltrating the timber in the rear and flanks? I've always guessed the area in the front of the position was relatively clear and open.

Maybe I'll look it up. Probably not. I'm extremely lazy these days, and relying a lot on my memory. After all, my Custer books are practically 6 feet away from me. How can I be expected to go to that much effort?

Bearing in mind that little could be seen through the thick timber I am at a loss to understand how anyone could have been aware of any infiltration, or what firing blind into the timber by Indians was expected to achieve, so whether or not there were Indians coming into the timber from the directions you mention is again a matter of weighing up RCOI testimony.

Wallace said, “After being in line some time, it was reported that the Indians were coming on the opposite side of the creek and trying to get our horses” but as DeRudio testified that it was Wallace himself who was first to make that suggestion, it is perhaps appropriate to consider other testimony on the subject.

Gerard: “Q. Do you mean with Indians in the timber? A. No, sir, there were no Indians in the timber.”

Varnum: “Q. Was the command driven from the woods by the enemy? Did the enemy enter the woods before the command left it?

“A. I don’t know whether there were any Indians in the woods or not at the time. I didn’t see any in the woods at the time. When we first got a chance to talk about it, when we got on the hill, I heard there were Indians behind us in the woods. I heard some of the men say that; they must have meant the timber or bottom that we were in. When I went down to get the horses I had no trouble in getting them. There were no Indians in there where the horses were. Some of the men who had been left as horse-holders were probably firing. They would have been on the skirmish line too. The line on the left of it was under the same hill that the horses were. All I had to do was to ride down the skirmish line to and beyond the left of the line. Captain Moylan said the Indians were getting in on his left and the horses were not covered by the skirmish line and they would probably get in there. I did not see any Indians there, when I went to the horses. I didn’t see any horses being hit there.”

There is no doubt that some Indians got into the timber from the west as they followed the withdrawal of the skirmish line there, as it was from that direction that Bloody Knife was shot, but as nobody testified that they actually saw any Indians in the timber to the rear or flanks, it was perhaps a case of nervousness creating threats which did not exist which in turn created anxiety and a desire to get out into the open as there is nothing worse than trying to remain calm in the face of fevered imagination.

I have been happy to furnish this information as my heart went out to you thinking of how taxing it would have been for you to cross that 6 foot space. After all, you are not as young as you were!!

My understanding is that Godfrey, seeing how basically every other company was offering little to no resistance while heading back to Reno Hill, decided to deploy his company as dismounted skirmishers as a rearguard. And when his soldiers were failing to keep their intervals as they fell back, he restored the proper spacing. And lastly, he threatened to shoot any man from his company if they broke from the line and ran.

It’s my understanding that Godfrey's Company K fought dismounted until a hundred yards or so from the entrenchment site, then ordered his men to dash the rest of the way. By that time, he was within range of the rest of the command, who were no longer retreating but reoccupying the position.

When the confused exodus from Weir Point to Reno Hill began Godfrey, who had apparently received no orders at all, was somewhat nonplussed when M Company rushed past him, closely followed by D Company travelling a bit more slowly, with behind them Indians in great numbers appearing.

Godfrey, in his 1892 article, says, “The Indians almost immediately followed to the top of the bluff, and commenced firing into the retreating troops, killing one man, wounding others and several horses. They then started down the hillside in pursuit. I at once made up my mind that such a retreat and close pursuit would throw the whole command into confusion, and, perhaps, prove disastrous. I dismounted my men to fight on foot, deploying as rapidly as possible without waiting for the formation laid down in tactics. Lieutenant Hare expressed his intention of staying with me, ‘Adjutant or no Adjutant.’ The led horses were sent to the main command. Our fire in a short time compelled the Indians to halt and take cover, but before this was accomplished, a second order came for me to fall back as quickly as possible to the main command. Having checked the pursuit we began our retreat, slowly at first, but kept up our firing. After proceeding some distance the men began to group together, and to move a little faster and faster, and our fire slackened. This was pretty good evidence that they were getting demoralized. The Indians were being heavily reinforced, and began to come from their cover, but kept up a heavy fire. I halted the line, made the men take their intervals, and again drove the Indians to cover; then once more began the retreat. The firing of the Indians was very heavy; the bullets struck the ground all about us; but the ‘ping-ping’ of the bullets overhead seemed to have a more terrifying influence than the swish-thud’ of the bullets that struck the ground immediately about us. When we got close to the ridge in front of Reno’s position I observed some Indians making all haste to get possession of a hill to the right. I could now see the rest of the command, and I knew that that hill would command Reno’s position. Supposing that my troop was to occupy the line we were then on, I ordered Hare to take ten men and hold the hill, but, just as he was moving off, an order came from Reno to get back as quickly as possible; so I recalled Hare and ordered the men to run to the lines. This movement was executed, strange to say, without a single casualty.”

The key factor here is timing, always controversial. Weir Point is what, about 1 ½ half miles from Reno Hill? Edgerly and Weir are reckoned to have made that trip in about 20 minutes, so as the return journey was probably made a little faster because of Indian pressure and as Godfrey did not deploy his men until some way from the Point, his organized retreat was not likely to have lasted much more that 10 minutes at a guess. Nevertheless, he did halt the Indian advance not once but twice and it did demonstrate that a disciplined field of fire did discourage Indians from advancing quickly.

The point I was trying to make was that I despise the notion that Reno had no choice but to flee, that forming his command and attempting to defend themselves as they retreated was folly. Reno lost 40 killed in his retreat, essentially an entire company. And that number is worse when you consider the number of men he had available to him. Reno chose not to make sure all of his command was informed of the upcoming retreat/charge. Let's say Reno decides to get his whole battalion involved in his "charge", then has one company attempt to cover their retreat. Let's say that entire company is wiped out in doing so. That really isn't any worse than what actually happened. And I doubt an entire company would've been wiped out if Reno had left the timber in an organized manner.

Godfrey lost 0 men, while holding off who knows how many warriors with a single company. Dismounted, walking back to Reno Hill, with little to no support from the other companies.

That was the point I was making. That retreat from large amounts of Indians can be accomplished without taking many casualties. And part of that reason is the way the Indians fought. They weren't going to ride pell-mell into Godfrey's company. They likely stayed at a distance, since they were being shot at by 30 or so soldiers. Reno's men just ran for it, and the warriors did not feel they were much of a threat. So they rode in rather close and butchered them.

The Indians didn't fight it out at close range unless they felt they weren't threatened, or were forced to do so. Agreed?

I am sorry that I missed the thrust of your meaning here initially. Personally, I always find it uncomfortable to compare different scenarios with each other. It is a little like trying to explain the difference between silk and satin. They may look and feel the same, but they are essentially different. Godfrey had a base to return to, but Reno came blind out of the timber with no fixed point to aim for, despite the claims that he and Moylan made to the contrary. Godfrey, as Wild says in one of his posts, had someone at his back, Reno claims not to have known where the balance of the regiment was when he fled.

Having said that, it is my opinion that Reno was a nervous man almost from the time he left Custer. He started to worry about the Indians posturing down the valley before he had advanced, sending back two messengers to advise Custer of that fact. Yet, it was well known by soldiers of that time, that warriors always made such a demonstration in the face of an attack as a screen to allow their families to get to safety. Reno then halted prematurely, citing exaggerated numbers of Indians pouring out of a ‘ravine’, when other RCOI testimony makes no such claim, the ‘ravine’ was actually an old course of the river and Indian accounts reveal that they were not in front of Reno in any great numbers initially.

After only a short time on the skirmish line, Reno then went into the timber with many of G Company, in response to Wallace’s false alarm about Indians in the timber going after the horses. Why he did not delegate a subordinate for this task was never explained, but in any event, he never came out of the timber. (I went into greater detail on this matter on the Gobbledegook thread a while ago). Then we have the early withdrawal of the skirmish line, the Bloody Knife incident and a commanding officer not really in command.

You suggest that Reno could have done better, but I don’t think he was personally capable of doing better. Another man, say Benteen, yes, but I feel Reno had convinced himself that his command was in danger, could not see what that danger was in the timber, imagined far greater enemy numbers than there actually were and was desperate to find safety almost anywhere else or with other parts of the regiment.

Could his retreat from the timber have been more disciplined? Probably, but the question then is, how could that have been achieved? At the risk of scorn from military purists, perhaps by emerging from the timber in column-of-twos, giving each line just one flank to fire at, whereas in the column-of-fours which it is alleged was used, the two centre files cannot use their weapons.

Certainly the panicked retreat from the timber was meat and drink to the warriors and I do agree with your comments about Indian tactics.

Regards to you.

Hunk

["Hunk" Papa]

Nov 7, 2011 17:51:14 GMT -6 wild said:

It wasn’t a case of justifying his actions it was THE case that it permeated the thinking of the whole army command structure, which is apparent of you read their dispatches[/]

Take the thinking of the army and weigh it against known Indian fighting qualities. Would the "running" totally negate Indian fighting potential? Now throw into the mix the disparity in numbers and the [now admitted by you] the possibility the Indians would in fact stand, the odds no longer in Custer's favour.

This mantra you speak of is in effect "trust the enemy".And who ever won a battle by basing his plan of action on trust in the enemy?

Enjoy debating with you Hunk
Stay well

Richard, I have to take some time out from the boards, but before getting bogged down in some work I have to do, I think it is only right to try and deal with the above points out of courtesy to you.

You believe it seems that it is simply a matter of common sense. It should be, but it isn’t. Our 2011 minds are full of knowledge that people in 1876 just did not have. We know that the Indians did not run. We are amazed that any military commander with only 550 men would even consider trying to attack a gathering of 8,000-10,000 people with a fighting strength of 2,000-2,500 warriors. We know that they were flushed with their perceived victory over Crook. Some of us are dismayed with the way Custer split his small force and didn’t either attack with Reno or at Ford B.

The problem is we were not living in 1876. El Crab has talked of the human nature of the Indians, but that observation applies equally to the white race of the time. They and particularly the military held the Indians in contempt, much the same contempt that the British Raj had for the natives of the sub-continent. The U.S. Army could not differentiate between hostiles and friendlies and made little effort to try. In addition, they did not think of the Indians as a long term problem. They were savages who could be swept aside whenever the army so chose. Cowards who would ran rather than fight. Yes they could spring surprises at times, but they had never done so against any army force above the 80 who had died with Fetterman. Such a reverse was not considered the norm but a force of 550 men was considered more than capable of dealing with any number of Indians it came across.

It is against this white cultural background that we need to measure the ingrained attitude of the U.S. military in their actions against the Indians. To Custer, the foes were just a tiresome bunch of natives who only needed a show of force to make them bow the knee and in thinking that, he was merely an echo of his High Command.

You ask ‘whoever won a battle by basing his plan of action on trust in the enemy?’ One answer is George Armstrong Custer, at the Washita and twice on the Yellowstone in 1873. He believed that the Indians would not stand up to his force each time and each time he was proved right, because he regarded the outcome with the blinkered view of an 1870’s army officer. We can see how lucky he was at the Washita and in his first Yellowstone fight, but in both cases the army, not just Custer, thought each ‘victory’ inevitable.

That the second clash on the Yellowstone was won largely because artillery was employed did not register properly either. The Indians retreated and were disdained for doing so. The fact that Indians avoided any fight against the odds and that this did not demean them within their own culture never occurred to the white military.

The army attitude to Indian fighting is nicely summed up by Godfrey in his ‘Custer’s Last Battle’ where he says with reference to the pre-battle thoughts, “The dispositions for the attack may be said to be ‘made in the dark,’ and successful surprise to depend on luck. If the advance to the attack be made in daylight it is next to impossible that a near approach can be made without discovery. In all our previous experiences, when the immediate presence of the troops was known to them, the warriors swarmed to the attack, and resorted to all kinds of ruses to mislead the troops, to delay the advance toward their camp or village, while the squaws and children secured what personal effects they could, drove off the pony herd, and by flight put themselves beyond danger, and by scattering made successful pursuit next to impossible.”

He follows that with a sentence which begins, “In civilized warfare…” then goes on, “These remarks are made because the firebrand nature of Indian warfare is not generally understood. In meditating upon the preliminaries of an Indian battle, old soldiers who have participated only in the battles of the Rebellion (ACW) are apt to draw upon their own experiences for comparison, when there is no comparison.”

This all boils down to white arrogance, the assumption of superiority and a total lack of respect for an enemy perceived as an inferior race. These attitudes were part of the fabric of the society and military in 1876, never questioned and immovable. They could no more change or question them than accept that women had equal rights, or that the ex-slaves they had fought so hard to free had equal rights. It was their nature. It was the way things were.

There are parallels in recent history. In the Second World War, the Nazis attacking the Russians, a nation they considered so inferior that they expected a swift victory, so much so that they did not take any winter clothing with them. In the Vietnam War, General Westmoreland saying in December 1965 that he expected victory by the end of 1967 and this with 200,000 men, on one year tours of duty whereby experienced officers were continually lost, against a North Vietnamese nation of 16 million who were prepared to sacrifice the 1m-3m casualties they suffered. Finally there is the current involvement in Afghanistan, a country which defeated the might of the Red Army.

Are all those who made the decisions in these cases to be condemned by those who condemn Custer or is he the only one who should have known better? It is a recurring theme in history that past military decisions are viewed critically by later historians. It is as it should be, but we should not lose sight of an important perspective, which is try and understand the ethics and prejudices that shaped the lives of those we are being critical about.

I do not expect any of this to sway you one iota, but I thought I would try and explain the background to my way of thinking as your last response to me merited a reply before I ‘retire’ for a while. As one of my schoolmasters was prone to say, “Read, mark, learn and inwardly digest.” “Yeah, right” I hear you say!!

I enjoy our exchanges too and will be back for more in due course. I’ll PM you next weekend after my upcoming London trip.

In friendship.

Hunk

[AZ Ranger]

I thought at end of the day it was Custer that removed himself from the battlefield at Washita?

[El Crab]

Nov 13, 2011 12:24:54 GMT -6 "Hunk" Papa said:

You suggest that Reno could have done better, but I don’t think he was personally capable of doing better. Another man, say Benteen, yes, but I feel Reno had convinced himself that his command was in danger, could not see what that danger was in the timber, imagined far greater enemy numbers than there actually were and was desperate to find safety almost anywhere else or with other parts of the regiment.

Could his retreat from the timber have been more disciplined? Probably, but the question then is, how could that have been achieved? At the risk of scorn from military purists, perhaps by emerging from the timber in column-of-twos, giving each line just one flank to fire at, whereas in the column-of-fours which it is alleged was used, the two centre files cannot use their weapons.

Certainly the panicked retreat from the timber was meat and drink to the warriors and I do agree with your comments about Indian tactics.

Regards to you.

Hunk

Ok, I can buy that. When I say Reno could've done better, I mean it wasn't impossible for Reno, as a human being, to do better. Really, I was saying more about the situation than the leader's ability or lack thereof. That Reno's men were not doomed to annihilation unless they ran, that 40 dead and 20 abandoned wasn't the absolute best case scenario.

But you say Reno, the man he was, couldn't have done better. I can't say I disagree with that argument. Does that make sense?

[AZ Ranger]

I believe that all those that believe that Reno was a coward or drunk have hard time explaining how moving toward Custer with a drunk coward in charge would benefit Custer. Since brave Wier's company turned around then why would a drunk coward be expected to go further? The Indian could always move quicker to the village and the crossings on their side of the river.

Again the worst error was Custer's underestimating the Indians resolve to fight in certain situation and his scouts warned him they had it that day.

Seems Custer chose to follow a different path than at the Washita. If his plan was the same all 12 companies would strike the same target. Instead he fed them his regiment in nice small units. When actually confronted with the larger group of Indians at Washita he removed himself from the area without Major Elliot. If he drew any conclusion at Washita it should be to hit a particular village hard with all 12 companies and fast before the others got ready to fight. He had every reason to believe that the Indians could rally and move toward him even if he attacked from his Washita experience.

To duplicate what Custer did at LBH wouldn't have to send Benteen off somewhere have Reno remain with the captives and then take the remain up against the other villages?

As far as at least one of the Yellowstone expeditions the Indians learned that Custer would retreat if they give him a show of force and outnumber him. That should encourage if they know they had superior numbers.

I don't where Custer underestimated the Indians ability to fight in any of his battles prior to the LBH. Seems he retreated in most of them.

At the same token the officers with the 7th may have over estimated the troops battle readiness which is different. Sgt Ryan believed that they needed to get out of the timber immediately.

AZ Ranger