Worst error?

[wild]

With Crab's permission to comment further without in any way wanting to steal his thunder.

The attacking forces should be of such a strenght and the blow delivered in such a determined way as to cause the illusion in the mind of the enemy of an unstopable force.
Despite what Rooster might have said Reno's gallant 130 were not going to achieve such an effect but Custer's 500 would have.
Ya got to start the fire with at least a blow torch not some kindling.
The effect of seeing their best warriors running would have had the same effect on the Indians as the sight of the Guard breaking at Waterloo had on the French.
As Crab says the indians fought as individuals,there would have been no Stonewall to rally behind.
The title of the thread is Custer's worst errorwell for my money it's his failure to effect a cavalry charge with his entire command.

[quincannon]

Richard: In the main the only great chance an inferior force has against a superior in offensive combat is to muster all of your force available, achieve surprise and with one mighty blow to the groin, unbalance him.

If you had limited you comment to attack with the entire command, rather than the more specific cavalry charge, I would be in complete agreement with you here. My reservation is the same as some others in that the shock effect of the mounted only charge would discipate once they entered the more cluttered terrain of the village. Perhaps some combination of mounted and dismounted would have worked. I have never closely reconned the terrain to ascertain how feasible that would be. One thing for sure the idea of rounding up the hostiles in one decisive battle was a pipe dream. A more balanced approach would have been several engagements over as many days. First get them off balance and then pursue.

[crzhrs]

True, but Native Americans were at their best in close quarter combat . . . the closer they got the better chance of killing (and winning honors) . . . which is the exact opposite of Western Forces who prefer to kill from a distance.

[rosebud]

One thing for sure the idea of rounding up the hostiles in one decisive battle was a pipe dream.

I agree completely. The scouts even tried to tell that to Custer but he would not listen.




A more balanced approach would have been several engagements over as many days. First get them off balance and then pursue.

This is even more ridiculous than the pipe dream. They will only get one shot at them and they know it. They will never catch up with them after the first engagement. Crook and Gibbon chased them the rest of the summer just as you suggested. How many did they catch?

Think about this for one second. Custer can charge the village as you suggest. How far do you think they will be able to chase the village on spent horses? They will not be able to chase them for five miles. They just put over 15 hard miles on those horses and the Indians will be leaving on fresh horses. IMPOSSIBLE Can't be done.
Rosebud

[quincannon]

Rosebud: I understand your point and it is quite valid if as was the case later on in the summer and throughout the rest of the campaign the hostile warriors were not burdened with the immediate prospects of getting their families to a place of safety. I think there is a difference here.

Now you will note I did not specify where exactly to attack, or from what direction. I did not specify a mounted attack, but suggested that it may very well be a combination. In fact I gave no specifics at all. High on my target list though would be the hostiles means of mobility. I may not be able to remove it all in one attack, but I could damage it.

Regardless of if it would have worked as I briefly outlined it or not, it would have been far better that what did happen. Had it taken all summer, or all year, or two years for that matter, it could be done. It was done. It was not pretty. It was full of false steps, but in the end it was done, catch or no catch.

[AZ Ranger]

Nov 3, 2011 12:07:59 GMT -6 "Hunk" Papa said:

Nov 2, 2011 22:08:05 GMT -6 AZ Ranger said:

Again his official report

I determined to carry out the other instructions, which were, that if in my judgment there was nothing to be seen of Indians, valleys, &c., in the direction I was going, to return with the battalion to the trail the command was following.

AZ, having seen Fred's rant about how stupid anyone is who believes that Benteen was meant to do anything other than return to the main trail, I will now display my obvious stupidity and risk being burnt as a heretic, by pointing out that it is Benteen himself who has created whatever doubts exist.

You have cited his Official Report wording as to the orders he says he received from Custer but in his RCOI testimony he says something different:-

Q. The matter was left discretionary with you in a great measure?

A. Yes, sir.

Q. State whether or not in bearing to the right to strike the main trail you complied with the instructions he gave you.

A. It was scarcely a compliance.

Q. Did you consider it a violation of his instructions?

A. I must say I did.

In his post, Fred mentioned "so-called lies" and the first question that arises then is, if one of Benteen's versions is the truth, surely the other one must be a lie? The next question is, which is which? The third question is, as you and Fred must have discarded his RCOI testimony if you have a) cited his Report to endorse your opinion and b) believe that he was really meant to return to the main trail, then why do you not regard his RCOI testimony in this respect as a lie? What else could it be and why did Benteen need to lie here, when his Report said otherwise?

Another point of interest is, "to return with the battalion to the trail the command was following. I accordingly did so, reaching the trail just in advance of the pack-train." If then, Benteen knew what trail the command was on, what problem would he have had in sending a messenger to Custer who was on that trail, as locating the other command could not have been rocket science?

Sincerely,

Hunk

Sorry for late response I have been training. I don't see as much as a problem as you do. When one deviates from orders if even given permission than the answer would be "It was scarcely a compliance". That is fact. Secondly if the instruction was to continue on to some valley then the answer " It was scarcely a compliance" would also be correct if the deviation done with permission or the developing situation.

Did they have Benteen's report to challenge him if they thought his answers were different enough to matter in what Reno did because of it?

AZ Ranger

[AZ Ranger]

Nov 4, 2011 8:42:57 GMT -6 montrose said:

Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield was a weakness for LTC Custer and the 7th Cav.




Guides. Custer had Crow guides with local terrain knowledge. His use of the guides and their information shows a weird dichotomy.

Benteen’s scout shows a disconnect between Custer and guides. The terrain is not suitable for seeing into the LBH valley. Benteen would have had to move another six miles west to see the LBH valley. Either the Crows terrain knowledge of this area was poor, or Custer didn’t trust their knowledge.

Custer’s move to the right from Ash Creek shows the opposite. He had no eyes on for Ford B and D. He either guessed that there had to be a ford downstream, or he was placing great trust in reports from his guides. I believe the latter.

Custer’s behavior is not consistent. I believe that throughout this day his decisions show a roller coaster between indecision and recklessness.

Scouting. I believe that scouting was a constant problem of the 7th Cav since its creation. Limiting myself to LBH, the use of scouts showed an overabundance of caution and ineffective and inefficient use of scouts.

For example, let us look at LT Varnum’s testimony. He stated that two miles from the river he saw Reno move forward. He then asked Custer for Orders. This shows that he was not scouting ahead of the regiment, he was back the command post. Custer told him he could go forward with Reno “if you want to”. This showed that Custer was not using scouts to screen his advance.

There were points during the advance down Ash Creek that Varnum and a scout detachment covered the high ground on the left, with Hare and a detachment covering the bluffs on the right. This is local security, very close in.

The decision to launch an attack was made about two miles from the river. (I believe Fred would say 1.7 miles from the river). The scouts split, with the majority going with Reno. They were not scouting ahead, but rather ended up as flankers on the right and left of Reno’s force.

At this point Custer wanted to know more about the bluffs to his right. He got ahead of his scouts and was seen up the ridge ahead of everyone. Since he only kept the Crows, I assume he kept them as guides, vice scouts. He wanted their local terrain advice. He later appeared to task F Company for a 6 man detachment to conduct local scouting.

An interesting observation in this same area is Custer’s anger at his scouts. The Indian scouts had paused at the lone tepee. LTC Custer rode up with Gerard and was angry that they were not further ahead scouting. The key point is that Gerard was back with Custer, and not at his appointed place of duty. The Indians did not have ESP. With their translator AWOL, they did not know what Custer wanted done. The inability of Custer to keep a translator with the Rees showed a fundamental flaw in command and control. This should have been identified and sorted out at the beginning of the campaign. Figuring out you have a problem on the day of battle is bad.

Scouts out. The 7th Cav would have been better served by sending their scouts forward. The concept is having the scouts far enough ahead to provide timely information to make a decision. Given the situation on 25 June, this is one or two miles ahead. There is no reason that a scout patrol reach the bluffs vicinity bench mark 3411 before Custer ordered Reno to attack. There was no opposition in this area.

Covering Reno’s advance is a bit harder, since there were Indians fleeing ahead of them. In addition there were scattered Indians across the river in LBH valley. Scouts would need to stay closer to main body as they made contact. Scouts would need to move to flanks and take advantage of local terrain for observation.

Of course, any use of scouts is again challenged by Gerard. He fled to the rear and tried to recross the river. He was stopped by Cooke and Keough and ordered to return to his duty. He disobeyed this order and went and hid in the brush.

Sending scouts out, when you have no ability to receive their reports, is useless. The scout function was broken starting at Fort Abraham Lincoln The 7th Cav as an entity never understood how to scout, nor how use Indian allies.

Thanks for the insight from your professional opinion I appreciate it.

Steve

[wild]

Hi Cathal
If you had limited you comment to attack with the entire command, rather than the more specific cavalry charge
Yes I know what you are saying Cathal and am in agreement and say as much in my debate with Hunk.Custer had the wrong mix or rather no mix at all.
So going into battle with the army you have rather than the one you would wish for to coin a phrase, I'm going for the terror effect.
The price a regiment would have to pay for such a tactic is what?Just guessing----10% loss to tipis,10% to incoming and blue on blue.100 troopers down in 2 miles? Charge as you say begins to dissipates,rally fall back burning looting wrecking ,I don't know.It really is only a throw af the dice but at least the odds are now 50/50 not 90/10
Regards

[rosebud]

Now you will note I did not specify where exactly to attack, or from what direction. I did not specify a mounted attack, but suggested that it may very well be a combination. In fact I gave no specifics at all. High on my target list though would be the hostiles means of mobility. I may not be able to remove it all in one attack, but I could damage it.

Well I think that, had Custer been able to choose the TIME of the attack, he would have done as you suggest. Every move Custer made from the divide to the battle limit his options.

Its like a card game....Custer left himself with 2 cards to play with and the Indians have a full house.

[AZ Ranger]

I think your right where I think a success could have been pulled out. Just as the Indians are in the open surrounding Reno, Custer charges, Benteen follows across the river and the pack train with the rear guard. All twelve companies engaged at once.

The timing worked in the Indians favor feeding the regiment to them a few companies at a time.

AZ Ranger

[quincannon]

Rosebud: If you will stipulate further that Custer's two cards were mismatched then we reach one of those rare occasions where we are in complete agreement.

[quincannon]

Richard: Were it well planned and if as Rosebud suggests the timing of the attack could have been better thought out, and if surprise was achieved, I think Custer would have had at least a 70-30 chance of a limited objective victory. Only the biggest of big mouths like some of our friends over yonder could ever expect a one bite of the apple consumes all victory.

[rosebud]

Rosebud: If you will stipulate further that Custer's two cards were mismatched then we reach one of those rare occasions where we are in complete agreement.

Well, as they got go the LBH. They were still a pair of cards. Might be a small pair......However Custer choose to split the pair and with that I will agree that they were mismatched.

I am not sure if I am understanding you correctly. Do you think that Custer had an option to use different tactics or take more time to study the situation?

I feel Custer was forced to play the hand dealt to him with no chance in hell for a complete victory. But then we will need to know what they would consider a victory and that would open a whole new can of worms.

Rosebud

[quincannon]

Rosebud: Truth is I don't know if he had the options. On one hand I would say yes, but in truth I don't think one can ever be sure unless one were in his exact place at the time, I think that he thought he had no option, and I guess that is all that matters for purposes of this discussion. It's like the tortise and the hare though, sometimes slow and steady win the race.

What would be a victory for Custer? How about going in with the idea of popping the hostiles a good one, and retain the ability of poping them again another time down the road. Achieving is harder than the saying though.

[rosebud]

Well I guess that in all reality. Custer did just as you say he should. He went down and popped them a good one. He lost around 250 in the process but the Indian did leave. They did split up. Some went directly back to the agency. Sitting Bull left and went to Canada. Crazy Horse only lasted a short time.

When you look at it , Custer and his tactics that day let the Indians know that this was no longer a game they would win. Talking was over.

When they got the Agency Indians to go to talk to Crazy Horse, they let him know that if he did not give up that the army was going go out and wipe him out and anyone with him.

They were not going to be escorted back, they would be killed on the spot. Although Custer lost the battle, the Indians got the message loud and clear.

Rosebud