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Post by rosebud on Nov 5, 2011 20:12:20 GMT -6
A thank you would have been good enough. I do appreciate the extra effort you put into it. Your welcome Fred,,, Any time I can help. Now be a good little boy and go back to playing your cow-chip checkers. Named one of the cow-chips after you and guess what.....I was playing cow-chip checkers with Fred Wagner da turd. Best wishes Rosebud  |
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 6, 2011 15:42:39 GMT -6
Hunk, not as a debate with you but rather this thought by the Army and Custer in general. I am not a student but rather a reader of this battle, in what I have read it would seem that all the historians believe this to be the case (That Indians would run) I have never understood Custer or the Army's reasoning. I don't know the average size of an Indian village but lets say 500 people with 100-150 warriors. When the Army went on search and destroy missions they had a regiment or half a regiment App 300-350 men. They outgunned and outnumbered the Indians by 2 or 3 to1, of course the Indians would run and get their families out of harms way, we all would. When however they felt they had enough to fight you they wouldn't run but fight. Custer knew this or should have from his own personal experiences. 1- Pawnee Killer attacked him and his regiment. I grant it wasn't much of an attack but it showed that Indians weren't afraid of people in blue uniforms 2- The Washita. While Custer was riding through Black Kettles village the warriors down river had plenty of time to run, but they didn't. They challenged him. It was Custer who left 3- On a Yellowstone expedition Custer took off after some warriors but realized they were drawing him into a trap, and escaped into some timber 4- I know Custer didn't know it but these warriors attacked a force of 1300 on the Rosebud Why would Custer having this personal knowledge that Indians don't always run, would he gaze upon a village, no a small city of 10000 people and 2-3 thousand warriors and have no doubt in his mine that they would run. To the degree that he would divide his command and send 140 men under Reno charging across a valley and think in any way these 10000 people were going to panic and run away. Just never made sense to me Be Well Dan Dan, you pose a legitimate question and there is no short, snappy answer. You have nicely stated the usual scenario associated with attacks on smaller villages. This generally held true for larger villages too because of the reason you have given, namely the protection of their families. It also held true for war parties which would not stand to fight against superior odds as they could not afford to lose their most precious asset – trained warriors. This instilled in the military the mistaken belief that Indians were cowards who would not fight. I don’t think it is true to say however, that there was such a thing as an average size Indian village. The nomadic Plains Indians travelled in gatherings of various sizes from family bands of as few as 20 or 30 to those of far larger numbers, especially as the summer solstice Sun Dance time drew near. Generally speaking bigger groups could not keep together for long because of the problems associated with feeding their horses, scaring off game etc., so it was rare to find any sizeable assembly of Indians in one place for very long. You say that when they felt that they had enough warriors they wouldn’t run but fight. With respect, that is a generalisation, because Indian war parties came in all sizes, from say 10 to hundreds. They did not require any particular number in their party to attack, just opportunity. You speak of Custer’s own experience of Indian fighting, but in essence, this was limited. There was the Washita in 1868. After that there was the Winter-Spring 1869 campaign against the Southern Cheyennes, Kiowas and others, a long drawn out affair which featured very little fighting but was relatively successful. Through 1870 to 1873 the regiment was mostly on police duty in the South and Custer was on detached duty. In 1873 came the two clashes with the Sioux along the Yellowstone and in 1874 the Black Hills expedition. On the Southern Plains in 1867 there was a great deal of chasing after fleeing Indians but no fighting involving regiment strength. So there is nothing in all of this which can be described as vast experience, so far as Custer is concerned, in engaging with Indians. You cite some instances which you feel demonstrate that Custer should have known that Indians sometimes attacked. Whilst I am sure he was well aware of that possibility, it does not impact on the LBH because the Washita apart, all his other fights pre-LBH were against warriors far from their villages and their families. Let’s look at those you mention:- 1) The Pawnee Killer attack occurred during Hancock’s War when the Southern Plains’ tribes were on the prod after Hancock’s high handed methods. Whilst Custer with about 340 men was camped near the Republican River, Pawnee Killer made a brief attack with several hundred warriors, but was beaten off. Custer held a council with him but the Indians then fled and scattered. 2) I believe that you have somewhat misread the Washita situation. Certainly hundreds of Cheyenne, Arapaho and Kiowa warriors had gathered on the hills on the north side of the Washita and they watched the 7th destroy the equipment plus horses of Black Kettle’s village. They made feints at Custer’s skirmishers but did not try and attack them. As this pressure increased, Custer, with the Black Kettle hostages, the band playing, guidons fluttering and skirmishers out, headed toward the other villages. This caused the warriors to rush to protect their families and Custer withdrew under the cover of darkness. I suggest that Custer would have learned two things from this. Firstly, that hostages were useful in preventing Indians from firing in case they killed their own and secondly, that making threatening moves against their families would cause even very large numbers of warriors to quickly go on the defensive. 3) On 4th August 1873, Custer with about 90 men and some Indian scouts, was resting in some timber somewhere along the Yellowstone, when they were attacked by about 250 Indians who had remained hidden in some wooded areas nearby. A few tried to decoy him into an ambush and here his knowledge of this Indian tactic made him cautious, so he stopped. At this point the full Indian strength emerged from their hiding place and a fight ensued. Custer set up a defensive position in some timber and after some three hours of intermittent fighting in which they took some casualties, the Indians were routed when Custer boldly charged them. Again, it must be stressed that these Indians did not have their families to consider when they attacked. 4) Yes, the LBH village warriors had attacked Crook and successfully in their view, but they had deliberately confronted him at the Rosebud site in order to keep him away from their families. Of course, Crook made no attempt to relay his experience to Terry. I take your point about the numbers but you must not lose sight of two important factors. One is that all through the 1876 Expedition, the Army command had been sending dispatches back and for stating their belief that any one of the commands was capable of handling any number of hostiles they came across. The second is that the greatest concern of ALL the commanders was that the Indians would escape. Put those two attitudes together and most any other 1876 commander in Custer’s position would not have hesitated to move against the camps. You remark that no one could think that Reno’s force of 140 plus men could make 10,000 Indians panic and run away. Yet the non-combatants fled north away from the danger and the camp was in turmoil when he first approached. This is borne out by the following two extracts from Indian accounts, the first from a Cheyenne source and the second from Mrs. Spotted Horn Bull:- “Reno’s attack was a complete surprise, and created panic and confusion, even among the Cheyennes who were considerably distant from the point of attack.” “The man who led those troops must have been drunk or crazy. He had the camp at his mercy, and could have killed us all or driven us away naked on the prairie. I don’t believe there was a shot fired when his men commenced to retreat. (Her husband qualified this by saying, “Not much firing by the Indians”). Perhaps the situation demanded a little more boldness rather than a lot more men. Alexander the Great was vastly outnumbered at Grannicus, but his boldness won the day. On such slender margins is history made. Thanks for your thoughtful input Dan. Hunk |
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 6, 2011 16:00:20 GMT -6
1) Visual will give a 3 dimension picture showing distances,heights,dead ground,the lie and fall of the land,every twist in the river.Verbals are one dimension and cannot convey the tactical complexities of the terrain.Except for general navigation purposes verbals are useless. 2) A rose by any other name. 3) 500 approx 4) It's s.o.p for attacking forces to keep one foot on the ground. You might find a persual of Custer's tactics at the Washita illuminating. 5) A lack of experience would suggest Custer should have exercised more caution? 6a) And they do other things as well like counter attack and gobble up fools like Elliot or Fetterman. 6b) Is that the best mantra the army could produce after 300 years of conflict with the Indian? 7) The tactics he employed were designed to prevent the escape of the Indians.Where he was at fault was in that he failed to configure his forces to deal with such a success. 8) Well if you have Custer -- being defeated by what he did not know and could not have known[/i]and directing Reno under such lack of intell then much of the responsibility is Custer's 9) Custer failed because he failed to get the Indians to run. Reno's 130 troopers hardly knocked on the door.The door should have been battered down by a massed charge by the entire regiment. 10) Maybe we are just on different sides of that mantra you mentioned.You say it justified his actions.I think he failed to appreaciate it's tactical significance. Best Regards [/quote] En garde Monsieur, 1) So Custer was intimately conversant with the terrain East of Gettysburg was he? No, but he was successful there. The same applies to all of his Civil War battles and to the Washita also to other army commanders. You are being facile here Richard. It is a non-argument. 2) There are two factors here that need to be clarified. Firstly, neither the pre nor post-CW army considered it necessary to adopt a formal strategy for fighting Indians. Tactics tended to be improvised according to what seemed suitable at the moment. The army manuals in 1876 were still geared to conflicts against white armies and there is little or no mention of Indian fighting in them. The second point then is that the manual guidelines for tactical formations such as an attacking force, a support group and a reserve were not considered necessary for attacking Indians and I would like you to cite me where such formations were used in any Indian engagement on the plains. 3) See (2) for why this would not be used and by extension why with only 500 men it would not have been practical. 4) Custer’s tactics at the Washita were made possible by the surprise element. He had the time to plan and deploy his forces against a sleeping village in a dawn attack. How is it possible to draw any parallels between that and the mid-day advance against the LBH camps where the element of surprise had been discounted? 5) Not in the military mind set of 1876 so far as fighting Indians was concerned. 6) Indeed they do, but Fetterman was not near any village but up against Indians already enraged by high-handed white behavior and in clear fighting mood, whilst Elliott, though in a village attack, got himself isolated whilst glory hunting and paid the price. That was indeed the view of the army of those days and had little to do with the 300 (?) years you mention, more to do with about 50 years of engagements against Plains Indians. 7) I doubt that even the hugely confident Custer had any notion of preventing the escape of the entire population of the camps. That is an absurd thought. The best he could was to cause the majority to flee, capture the rest and destroy their commissary and horses. That would shatter their morale, effectively put an end to their fighting capabilities and see them end up in reservations to prevent their families from starving. 8) You have misunderstood. No amount of reconnaissance would have obtained the ‘intel’ you refer to which involved spiritual matters. The Indians’ morale was already high after Sitting Bull’s vision had made their ‘medicine’ strong and their success against Crook boosted it still further. Now you may scoff at such things, but Custer’s scouts were certainly in awe of them. That is what Custer did not know and could not have known, because the white society and military of the day never made any attempt to understand the Indians’ culture. We know more today than they ever did. 9) Custer did not ‘fail’ to get the Indians to run. The simple truth is that the close proximity of their families made it necessary for the warriors to make a strong defence. That defence was turned into offence when Reno beat his hasty retreat. It handed the initiative to the warriors, boosted their confidence and their sheer numbers did the rest. In fact, there was a point at which the unexpected appearance of Reno had the Indians wavering, causing them to get their families to safety. That moment disappeared once Reno halted. So you advocate a massed charged by the entire regiment against the southern end of the camps? Let’s think about that. The soldiers are armed with single shot carbines and six shot revolvers, but no sabres. What formation do you suggest? A two-line charge or a single line charge? Column of fours or extended skirmisher intervals? The idea is then was to crush the enemy by the sheer force of men and horses which is fine if the enemy meets the charge but Indians would not do that. In addition the tipis would prevent the soldiers from keeping all together so as soon as the first line of dwellings was reached the charging formation would have to fragment. The soldiers are charging using revolvers presumably, so as soon as they are close enough they commence firing – six shots and the revolver is empty. What do they do then? They have no infantry with them to consolidate any breakthrough, no support group and no reserve, unless we count the few that have been left with the pack train. Do they halt, dismount and reload their revolvers? Regroup, deploy as skirmishers and use their carbines? Whatever they do, they will be under constant fire from the Indians and taking casualties. Over to you Richard, it’s your idea! 10) It wasn’t a case of justifying his actions it was THE case that it permeated the thinking of the whole army command structure, which is apparent of you read their dispatches. If by ‘he failed to appreciate its tactical significance’ you mean he did not look at the obverse of that particular coin, namely that they might stand and fight, I think you are wrong. I am sure he did consider that possibility, but discounted it as a serious threat in the light of the unbeaten success rate of regimental size actions against Indians. I’m a bit lost now Richard. Are we at the tie break situation yet? My best. Hunk |
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 6, 2011 17:58:29 GMT -6
1) Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield was a weakness for LTC Custer and the 7th Cav. 2) Guides. Custer had Crow guides with local terrain knowledge. His use of the guides and their information shows a weird dichotomy. 3) Benteen’s scout shows a disconnect between Custer and guides. The terrain is not suitable for seeing into the LBH valley. Benteen would have had to move another six miles west to see the LBH valley. Either the Crows terrain knowledge of this area was poor, or Custer didn’t trust their knowledge. 4) Custer’s move to the right from Ash Creek shows the opposite. He had no eyes on for Ford B and D. He either guessed that there had to be a ford downstream, or he was placing great trust in reports from his guides. I believe the latter. 5) Custer’s behavior is not consistent. I believe that throughout this day his decisions show a roller coaster between indecision and recklessness. 6) Scouting. I believe that scouting was a constant problem of the 7th Cav since its creation. Limiting myself to LBH, the use of scouts showed an overabundance of caution and ineffective and inefficient use of scouts. 7) For example, let us look at LT Varnum’s testimony. He stated that two miles from the river he saw Reno move forward. He then asked Custer for Orders. This shows that he was not scouting ahead of the regiment, he was back the command post. Custer told him he could go forward with Reno “if you want to”. This showed that Custer was not using scouts to screen his advance. 8) There were points during the advance down Ash Creek that Varnum and a scout detachment covered the high ground on the left, with Hare and a detachment covering the bluffs on the right. This is local security, very close in. The decision to launch an attack was made about two miles from the river. (I believe Fred would say 1.7 miles from the river). The scouts split, with the majority going with Reno. They were not scouting ahead, but rather ended up as flankers on the right and left of Reno’s force. 9) At this point Custer wanted to know more about the bluffs to his right. He got ahead of his scouts and was seen up the ridge ahead of everyone. Since he only kept the Crows, I assume he kept them as guides, vice scouts. He wanted their local terrain advice. He later appeared to task F Company for a 6 man detachment to conduct local scouting. 10) An interesting observation in this same area is Custer’s anger at his scouts. The Indian scouts had paused at the lone tepee. LTC Custer rode up with Gerard and was angry that they were not further ahead scouting. The key point is that Gerard was back with Custer, and not at his appointed place of duty. The Indians did not have ESP. With their translator AWOL, they did not know what Custer wanted done. The inability of Custer to keep a translator with the Rees showed a fundamental flaw in command and control. This should have been identified and sorted out at the beginning of the campaign. Figuring out you have a problem on the day of battle is bad. 11) Scouts out. The 7th Cav would have been better served by sending their scouts forward. The concept is having the scouts far enough ahead to provide timely information to make a decision. Given the situation on 25 June, this is one or two miles ahead. There is no reason that a scout patrol reach the bluffs vicinity bench mark 3411 before Custer ordered Reno to attack. There was no opposition in this area. 12) Covering Reno’s advance is a bit harder, since there were Indians fleeing ahead of them. In addition there were scattered Indians across the river in LBH valley. Scouts would need to stay closer to main body as they made contact. Scouts would need to move to flanks and take advantage of local terrain for observation. 13) Of course, any use of scouts is again challenged by Gerard. He fled to the rear and tried to recross the river. He was stopped by Cooke and Keough and ordered to return to his duty. He disobeyed this order and went and hid in the brush. 14) Sending scouts out, when you have no ability to receive their reports, is useless. The scout function was broken starting at Fort Abraham Lincoln The 7th Cav as an entity never understood how to scout, nor how use Indian allies. William, you really don't think much of Custer do you? Yet, whatever his faults may have been, surely it is necessary to try and be fair to the man? You have laid out a whole slew of criticisms but how many of them are well founded? 1) This is a very official military style statement, but what does it really mean? It is unlikely that Custer had omitted to receive as much information as he could from Bouyer and the Crows about the terrain he faced, after all it was their land. Any further details could only be ascertained as the regiment advanced and Custer received intel from the scouting parties. 2) Exactly. There was no 'weird dichotomy' because the scouts were used to lead Custer to the enemy, not to dictate tactics. 3) The records show that Gibson did say he saw the LBH valley from the heights east of South Reno, so the Crows were not wrong and Custer did trust their knowledge which is why he sent Benteen to the left. 4) Here again, Custer had Bouyer and the Crows to spell out what lay ahead of him. He was using the advice from these scouts and why would he not when those men had camped many times in the LBH valley? At this stage he could not envisage particular fords for any attack move, only that there were possible fords to cross into the camps if and when he needed to. 5) In what way was Custer indecisive? Once he had decided that he had no choice but to advance against the camps, he was very positive. What you describe as reckless is presumably dividing his forces? If so, can you please tell me what he should have done, if not, can you describe what other actions of his would you describe as reckless? 6) Where was Custer cautious in the use of his scouts? You have already indicated where you believe he was ineffective and inefficient in their use so I won't repeat my responses. 7) You are being rather selective in the use of part of Varnum's testimony and later on you describe how he and Hare were scouting to the flanks. This is what Varnum said in his narrative: Lieut. Hare reported to me the night before for duty and I sent him to the right front and I took the left front of the advance. From every hill where I could see the valley I saw Indians mounted.
We marched down a small tributary of the Little Big Horn River. I reported my observations several times. The valley of the river on the left bank is broad and level, but steep and sometimes almost perpendicular bluffs under the right bank from which we were approaching. Behind the highest part of the bluff was the main Indian village. The small branch down which we were advancing empties into it about two miles above the village.
The last time I reported, probably two miles from the river, I saw a squadron of 3 troops passing the head of the column at a trot. I asked where they were going & the Genl. said, “To begin the attack.” I asked instruction & he said to go on with them if you want to.So in reality, Varnum reported to Custer at more or less the same time that Reno was sent into the attack, but up to that point he and Hare had been screening Custer's advance. On top of that, Bouyer and the Crows were ahead of the command, so your point is not well made, as calling what Varnum and Hare were doing 'local security' is a personal opinion, one I have never seen it so described anywhere else. 8) Certainly about 22 of the Ree scouts crossed the river with Reno and many of them went off after the enemy horses as urged to do by Custer. They did not need to scout ahead as all the testimony at the RCOI shows that there was a clear view down the valley and Reno's command was going to advance down that valley quickly. What intelligence could the scouts have discovered in the 15 minutes it took to get to the skirmish line? 9) What did Custer want to know about the bluffs that Bouyer and the Crows could not tell him which you virtually accept by the remarks you make? The use of 6 F men for the purpose you describe is conjectire and we will never know the answer. 10) Here again you are misusing the evidence. In the 'Arikara Narrative' Red Bear makes it clear that Custer (via Gerard as Custer did not speak the Arikara language) had ordered the Rees to go and get the enemy horses. The elated scouts charged off down the trail and started striking the Lone Tipi with their whips, in effect braving themselves up. Other Ree accounts talk of also painting themselves for war. It was then that Custer and Gerard rode up and Custer got angry. So the Rees were not off on their own scouting or doing anything other than ordered and Gerard knew they had to turn off to go with Reno so he did not have to keep up with them at that point. 11), 12) 13) & 14) have already been covered in one way or another. The only additional point to make is that Gerard did not 'flee' to the rear. He saw Indians coming out whilst he was more or less at the rear whilst crossing, went back reported that to Cooke who apparently confirmed that he, Cooke, would report the matter to Custer, so Gerard re-crossed the river. Gerard saw enough of the valley fight, which appears in his testimony, to make ot clear that he was not hiding in the brush. As Reno, DeRudio, Varnum and Hodgson were 'in the brush' too, do we assume that they too were hiding? |
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 7, 2011 7:04:00 GMT -6
Hunk, add what Mrs. Spotted Horn Bull said to what Richard said about the door being battered down by a massed charge by the entire Regiment, just a thought,
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Post by rosebud on Nov 7, 2011 8:53:59 GMT -6
7) I doubt that even the hugely confident Custer had any notion of preventing the escape of the entire population of the camps. That is an absurd thought. The best he could was to cause the majority to flee, capture the rest and destroy their commissary and horses. That would shatter their morale, effectively put an end to their fighting capabilities and see them end up in reservations to prevent their families from starving
Hunk
The first part
I doubt that even the hugely confident Custer had any notion of preventing the escape of the entire population of the camps. That is an absurd thought.
You might be right when you say the ENTIRE population, but I do think Custer was going to prevent as many as possible. Every move Custer makes, and has made, from Rosebud to the battle has Custer stating that he wants no Indians to escape.
Every move he makes from the divide to the battle put troops in position to gather Indians and drive them to the village.
If, as you think, Custer was going to just charge and scatter the Indians. He passed up that opportunity when he did not join forces with Reno and charge the camp. This move would support your theory. Custer's division from Reno and his move to the North tends to dismiss your theory.
Rosebud
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 7, 2011 11:30:33 GMT -6
The first part I doubt that even the hugely confident Custer had any notion of preventing the escape of the entire population of the camps. That is an absurd thought. 1) You might be right when you say the ENTIRE population, but I do think Custer was going to prevent as many as possible. Every move Custer makes, and has made, from Rosebud to the battle has Custer stating that he wants no Indians to escape. 2) Every move he makes from the divide to the battle put troops in position to gather Indians and drive them to the village. If, as you think, Custer was going to just charge and scatter the Indians. He passed up that opportunity when he did not join forces with Reno and charge the camp. This move would support your theory. Custer's division from Reno and his move to the North tends to dismiss your theory. Rosebud 1) You are quite correct sir when you refer to Custer's avowed intention not to let any Indians escape. There is however, a vast gap between words and deeds. I might state an intention to clear up the mess in Afghanistan but carrying out that intention is a non-starter. Even if some predictions of 800 to 1,000 warriors had been correct, he would have hard pushed to corral all of them plus their families. Vainglorious statements from army commanders are morale boosters for their men and not meant to be taken literally. 2) You are entitled to your interpretation of how Custer deployed his troops to 'gather' Indians and 'drive' them to the village. The question that then arises is, how were around 550 men in four separate groups going to 'gather' and 'drive' a minimum of 2,000 warriors plus 6,000 or more others? In my opinion it was going to be more practical for Custer's numerically inferior forces to proceed on the basis I have described. By attacking wirh Reno he would have run into all the problems I described in my response to Richard Wild, unless you have some ideas of how he would have proceeded in that scenario? Hunk |
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Post by benteen on Nov 7, 2011 16:29:04 GMT -6
Hunk,
Although I'm not on board with everything you said, it would be petty and pointless on my part to bring them up. It would have no value and add nothing. Instead I wish to thank you for taking the time to give me an in depth answer, and sharing your excellent knowledge with me as others have.
Be Well
Dan
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 7, 2011 16:51:41 GMT -6
Hunk, Although I'm not on board with everything you said, it would be petty and pointless on my part to bring them up. It would have no value and add nothing. Instead I wish to thank you for taking the time to give me an in depth answer, and sharing your excellent knowledge with me as others have. Be Well Dan Dan, you are not a petty or pointless man, so if you have any thoughts whatsoever on the subject matter, let's have them. It is by exchanging courteous views that we learn and I do mean all of us. Sincerely, Hunk |
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Post by rosebud on Nov 7, 2011 17:34:39 GMT -6
2) You are entitled to your interpretation of how Custer deployed his troops to 'gather' Indians and 'drive' them to the village. The question that then arises is, how were around 550 men in four separate groups going to 'gather' and 'drive' a minimum of 2,000 warriors plus 6,000 or more others?
Hunk
Hunk...I understand what you are trying to say. But if Custer thinks they will run.......Numbers don't matter. He just wants to get as many as possible.
Custer has only been with the crow scouts for 3 days. Will he believe what they tell him.?.....Ask Gibbon and you will have your answer. Gibbon has been with them for over 30 days and they sure haven't earned their keep. Up to this point they have done nothing but give false information.
Rosebud
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Post by wild on Nov 7, 2011 17:51:14 GMT -6
Hi Hunk
So you advocate a massed charged by the entire regiment against the southern end of the camps?
Custer said he would support Reno's charge with the whole outfit.And you qouted Mrs Spotted Horn Bull “Reno’s attack was a complete surprise, and created panic and confusion, even among the Cheyennes who were considerably distant from the point of attack.”
Are you suggesting that Custer knew when he committed Reno's force that a 3troop attack would fare better than an 8 troop attack?And if Reno's attack was the main effort why was it not supported?
Your description of the difficulties cavalry would face in attacking a large concentration of camps is very accurate and I agree.But what were Custer's orders to his unit commanders?"Pitch in".
Do they halt, dismount and reload their revolvers? Regroup, deploy as skirmishers and use their carbines? Whatever they do, they will be under constant fire from the Indians and taking casualties.
A very good arguement for not using cavalry alone.But that was what Custer decided.
1) So Custer was intimately conversant with the terrain East of Gettysburg was he? No, but he was successful there. The same applies to all of his Civil War battles and to the Washita also to other army commanders. You are being facile here Richard. It is a non-argument.Yup and then one day he got wiped out.
But to be serious.A commander who knows the playing field has the advantage over a commander who does not.
Knowledge of terrain is the ne plus ultra of battle preparation.Hell Hunk I think Custer himself even ascended in a balloon once or twice in his CW career.Without horse of course.
a support group and a reserve were not considered necessary for attacking Indians and I would like you to cite me where such formations were used in any Indian engagement on the plains
Other than at the Washita I don't know of any others but that does not mean there are no other examples .I just have not done the reading.
I'll accept that tactics were ad hoc.But ad hoc tactics should at least fit the occasion.Custer's ad hoc tactics were based on nothing more than chance.
4) Custer’s tactics at the Washita were made possible by the surprise element. He had the time to plan and deploy his forces against a sleeping village in a dawn attack. How is it possible to draw any parallels between that and the mid-day advance against the LBH camps where the element of surprise had been discounted?
You asked me for an example of Custer using a covering group.I suggested you check out the tactics used at the Washita that's all.
Indeed they do, but Fetterman was not near any village but up against Indians already enraged by high-handed white behavior and in clear fighting mood, whilst Elliott, though in a village attack, got himself isolated whilst glory hunting and paid the price.
Incidents such as Fetterman and Elliott and probably many others set a pattern that if the Indians got you at a disadvantage they could be doughty fighters.
My guess is that absolutely no thinking went into the tactics needed and that the field commanders were free to adopt any method they considered best.The idea that field commanders operating against the indians would meet together and draw up a best practice tactical system would not have occured to the high command.
Custer did not ‘fail’ to get the Indians to run. The simple truth is that the close proximity of their families made it necessary for the warriors to make a strong defence.
Custer would have known this so why did he not committ his entire force?
And it undermines totally your arguement of Custer expecting the Indians to run.
It wasn’t a case of justifying his actions it was THE case that it permeated the thinking of the whole army command structure, which is apparent of you read their dispatches[/]
Take the thinking of the army and weigh it against known Indian fighting qualities.Would the "running" totally negate Indian fighting potential?Now throw into the mix the disparity in numbers and the [now admitted by you]the possibility the Indians would in fact stand, the odds no longer in Custer's favour.
This mantra you speak of is in effect "trust the enemy".And who ever won a battle by basing his plan of action on trust in the enemy?
Enjoy debating with you Hunk
Stay well
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Post by El Crab on Nov 8, 2011 3:13:51 GMT -6
So we're assuming that every Indian is going to stand their ground. That every Indian is going to be able to look at the situation and know exactly the strength of the force attacking their village?
Custer's advantage is he didn't have women and children and old people to protect. He didn't have his home and possessions to keep out of the enemy's hands. Cavalry showing up and throwing the village into panic is an advantage. Taking the whole regiment in would've likely been successful, at least in taking part of the village.
I think its silly to assume every warrior is going to be cool, calm and collected, and that the whole of the fighting force is going to behave as a unified command. They were free to do whatever they felt best, to act and fight independently.
I hate to use fiction to support my argument, but Rooster Cogburn said something about odds. They don't matter if you put enough of a scare into someone. What Rooster talks about is true. Otherwise, Custer never would've had much success in the Civil War. He seemed to attack larger units nearly every fight, and was successful. If just numbers against you decided the success or failure of an attack, every combat unit would have to wait until they have numerical advantage to attack.
Custer's men might've held out if the entirety of his immediate command was made up of clones of him and/or his brother. Or if Custer could've somehow convinced his every one of his troopers that standing their ground and fighting to the death is the only option, his command may have survived. The converse is also true: if the Sioux were willing to take casualties, they could've easily overwhelmed Reno and Benteen's position. But somewhere between what happened and what is possible, human nature intervened.
The converse of Reno attacking the village came to pass. The Indians fighting Custer were able to attack in ways that were potentially dangerous to their own numbers, but enough of them put aside any fear of mortality. The bravery runs against Keogh, the Suicide Boys attacking, Lame White Man leading the counterattack against C or E&F, depending on which way you lean. These things happened, not because the Indians were ordered to do so, but because they seemed to feed off each other.
Reno's attack might've succeeded, its just not as simple as subtracting his numbers from the numbers he faced. Taking the entire regiment into village in the first attack might've succeeded. It all depends on how many like-minded Indians were willing to stand and fight. Assuredly, there were plenty to give ground while resisting, with the intent of protecting the noncombatants.
The Indians gave way when Reno's command came out of the woods and formed up. They had him outnumbered at that point. Why would they give way? Because they were facing an unrouted foe, who posed a threat to the individual. Which is what the Indians were, a very large group of individuals. Once Reno's men were not threatening their individual safety, they moved back in to attack.
Godfrey was able to maintain a rear guard and hold off warriors coming from the Custer field, flushed with confidence. They could've easily destroyed his command, why didn't they? And conversely, K Company could've collapsed, but they didn't. Godfrey spoke of some of his troopers showing signs of losing discipline, and he acted in a way to keep this from happening.
Lastly, pretty much every officer in the campaign figured they would be confronting a foe greater in numbers than their own. And they felt that each column was strong enough to deal with this numerical disadvantage. They were fighting Indians, not Zulus. I bring up the Zulus a lot, because they were more organized and fought with the assumption that losses will happen if they are to defeat their enemy. Indians were independent fighters, who could do whatever they felt best. Peer pressure (or one-upping each other) seemed to be what allowed them to create cohesion.
The trooper who was menacing warriors all around him with his carbine is the perfect example of Rooster's theory on defeating larger numbers. I want to say this trooper was said to be just below Battle Ridge on the river side, during the flight north of Keogh's battalion. He kept warriors at a distance, no one was willing to deal with him because he was threatening their well-being with his carbine. It wasn't until a warrior rode him down from behind that he was dispatched. At any point, all those warriors around him could've just swarmed in from all sides at once, but they didn't. None of them wanted to get shot.
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Post by El Crab on Nov 8, 2011 3:23:34 GMT -6
One more thought: long ago, in a Barnes & Noble far, far away, I pulled a book off the shelf on the mental aspects of combat. A portion I turned to talked about how relatively bloodless bayonet charges tended to be. It was more about a battle of wills, rather than coming to blows. Either those charging with bayonets fixed would keep their resolve and their enemies would fall back, or those being attacked would stand their ground and the bayonet charge would falter before bringing those blades to bear. Because humans much prefer to kill at an impersonal distance, or not kill at all. Stabbing or being stabbed is not something we like to contemplate, let alone participate in.
Point being, when faced with situations where its fight or flight, its not always about the numbers, its about the individual and how he reacts. Plenty of larger units have fled from the attack of smaller units in the history of warfare.
I should've bought the book. I do have a few books on the psychology of warfare: Embattled Courage (about Civil War combat) and On Killing. On Killing might be the book I had perused briefly long ago, but probably not.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 8, 2011 7:19:09 GMT -6
Crab: You have injected human nature into combat. Well done.
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Post by wild on Nov 8, 2011 7:41:43 GMT -6
El Crab
Outstanding.
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