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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 3, 2011 5:51:27 GMT -6
Do any of you think that refusing the four companies of the 2nd Cavalry under Brisbin, was a mistake, if Custer did want to capture the whole village before it escaped, then he would need the 7th to be united, not split into virtually four Battalions (Custer, Reno, Benteen & Pack Train), the four extra Companies could have been used to guard the packs (1 x Coy) and do the scout (3 x Coy’s) that Benteen was ordered to do.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Nov 3, 2011 7:15:01 GMT -6
Ian: When you loose a battle, especially loose a battle as badly as Custer did, everyone looks at the potential mistakes you made. Would it have been better for Custer to have had more troops so that he might have been able to be more flexible or to present more force at the decisive place and time? Yes I think that would be a good thing. That said, Custer already had sufficient combat power to win a victory. Combat power however does not mean a thing if it is not properly deployed. So in the end it was not the lack of combat power, but how he used what he had that made the difference. I don't see any reason to suspect he would have done anything different if a battalion of the 2nd had been there. He would most likely have spread them much to thin as he did with the 7th. It may in the end have led to an even greater disaster.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 3, 2011 8:09:55 GMT -6
I get what you mean Chuck, maybe Custer would have still divided up his Regiment even though he would have had the extra Battalion provided by the 2nd Cavalry. I wrote this post because, as you say the 7th may have had sufficient fire power to win a victory, but to do this Custer would need all 12 Companies in mutual support of each other and having the 2nd Cavalry would give him the option of this, you do also have a point over how Custer would have used the extra men.
The Regiment that day was composed of two wings plus Custer and his HQ.
HQ = Lt. Col. Custer
Left Wing = Capt. Benteen with two Battalions under Capt. Weir and Capt. French.
Companies = A, D, G, H, K & M.
Right Wing = Maj. Reno with two Battalions under Capt. Keogh and Capt. Yates.
Companies = B, C, E, F, I & L.
If he did try to assault the village in the same way but with the two wings having the extra Companies, would this have been enough, would the attacks have been more successful having the extra fire power. I think that Custer (as you said) may have still attacked piece meal, but what was needed was to attack with a more compact structure, but to take on such a large target as the village, he would have to split up into at least two Wings, but this time keep them in mutual support of each other.
Ian.
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Post by rosebud on Nov 3, 2011 8:58:55 GMT -6
This would have left Gibbon and Terry short handed. If the Indians were 20 miles North, Gibbon might have been the first to hit the Indians.
Rosebud
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Post by Yan Taylor on Nov 3, 2011 9:06:55 GMT -6
I know what you mean RB, it would have left Gibbon’s 7th Infantry without any Cavalry support, but in reality it was proposed to Custer that the 2nd could be offered to the 7th (I don’t think Brisbin would be in agreement with serving under Custer) in they needed it.
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Post by rosebud on Nov 3, 2011 9:12:57 GMT -6
That why Martin was sent from the bottom of Cedar
AZ
Bottom of Cedar......Highly doubtful. and you are using 20-20 hindsight. Yes Benteen could get to Reno Creek by the route he took and it is the best way to do it. However if the LBH was where they first thought it was, this would not be the best option. He would be coming down the LBH. 20-20 hindsight makes Benton's statement correct. It was not expected to be that way when Benteen was sent to the left.
Anyone looking from the Crows Nest will be able to see why.
Benteen said over and over he was to contact Custer, not that he was to turn and bring all the troops back to the trail. A messenger was expected from Benteen (IF) they found Indians, nothing more was expected.
Martini is the big proof.....Kanipe has been sent to the pack train but at that time they had not spotted Benteen. This is why they sent Martini.
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 3, 2011 12:07:59 GMT -6
Again his official report I determined to carry out the other instructions, which were, that if in my judgment there was nothing to be seen of Indians, valleys, &c., in the direction I was going, to return with the battalion to the trail the command was following. AZ, having seen Fred's rant about how stupid anyone is who believes that Benteen was meant to do anything other than return to the main trail, I will now display my obvious stupidity and risk being burnt as a heretic, by pointing out that it is Benteen himself who has created whatever doubts exist. You have cited his Official Report wording as to the orders he says he received from Custer but in his RCOI testimony he says something different:- Q. The matter was left discretionary with you in a great measure?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. State whether or not in bearing to the right to strike the main trail you complied with the instructions he gave you.
A. It was scarcely a compliance.
Q. Did you consider it a violation of his instructions?
A. I must say I did.In his post, Fred mentioned "so-called lies" and the first question that arises then is, if one of Benteen's versions is the truth, surely the other one must be a lie? The next question is, which is which? The third question is, as you and Fred must have discarded his RCOI testimony if you have a) cited his Report to endorse your opinion and b) believe that he was really meant to return to the main trail, then why do you not regard his RCOI testimony in this respect as a lie? What else could it be and why did Benteen need to lie here, when his Report said otherwise? Another point of interest is, "to return with the battalion to the trail the command was following. I accordingly did so, reaching the trail just in advance of the pack-train." If then, Benteen knew what trail the command was on, what problem would he have had in sending a messenger to Custer who was on that trail, as locating the other command could not have been rocket science? Sincerely, Hunk |
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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Nov 3, 2011 13:59:57 GMT -6
1) I don't do soap boxes Hunkkk. Just the facts ma'am. 2) You asked for clarification on this matter and I gave you the answer. 3) Knowledge of the terrain along with the strength and location of the enemy are essential.The attack should be coordinated, with the reserves actually on the same sand table and all topped off with a covering group and fall back position. 4) There is no dispute that Reno and Custer advanced on opposite sides of the river?If we can accept some things as being beyond dispute we can save ourselves some time. 5) Well the running might not have fazed Custer but surely he knew enough about the Sioux to be fazed by their stopping. Custer's tactics were faulty in that he dissipated his strength in the chase and failed to concentrate for the "catch". 6) Terrain is a dimension which requires the visual senses not the aural senses. 7) No,Custer suffered more than a routing. Reno was routed with Custer being unable to engage. Best Wishes 1) You are indeed a disappointment Sgt. Friday. 2) No need for further comment. 3) Intimate knowledge of the terrain resided with Bouyer and the Crows. They were scouting ahead and constantly reporting to Custer. Varnum and hare were also doing the same. What more did he need? You refer to the reserves, which presumably has to be Benteen. I don't think he was the reserve but part of an attack plan which he abandoned. A covering group? How many men do you think he had? A fall-back position? It may be in a military text book somewhere, but it never figured in any fights against Indians that I know of. Perhaps you think Custer should have set a precedent? 4) Advanced on opposite sides of the river? The LBH? I don't think so. They advanced together, on opposite sides of Ash or Reno Creek certainly, but always within easy contact, hence Custer is able to beckon Reno over to him at the Lone Tipi. 5) I said that knowing the exact numbers would not have fazed him, not that he would have been unfazed if they had scattered, but that is by the by. Neither Custer nor any other commander had any experience of dealing with the Lakota or other Plains tribes who had stood and fought to protect their camps. The only comparable engagement was Sully at Killdeer Mountain in 1864, where Sully claimed he faced 6,000 warriors (the Indians said 1,600), but they were drawn up in battle line waiting for him, yet they fled in the face of his attack, albeit aided by howitzers. The point is that the U.S. Army mantra of that time was that Indians always scatter and run. I have previously cited Godfrey and Edgerly on that subject, but you have chosen to ignore that information. Custer had no reason to believe that they would not do so at the LBH and if you are not prepared to take that on board, you are debating with one eye shut. Custer's tactics can only be described as faulty in hindsight. What he did up to MTC was sound and what he did after that would have worked against a fleeing village. He did no chasing, though he expected he might have to, he advanced in orderly fashion and was fully prepared for the "catch" as you call it. He was defeated by what he did not know and could not have known. The Indians' morale was high after what they perceived as a victory over Crook and Sitting Bull's vision of soldiers falling into camp was a spiritual strength that defied white logic. Ignore these if you like, but because they are not in a military manual does not make them discountable. 6) Already covered at (3) but Custer was in any case a quick study and good with terrain observation. 7) OK we are on the same page then, but the reasons you cite in your previous post for the rout and inability to engage are seriously flawed. The reason for Reno's rout lie more with Reno than Custer and the reasons for Custer's inability to engage lie more with the unexpected belligerent mood of the Indians than the tactics adopted by Custer. My guess is that we are not going to make make a lot of progress in reaching any kind of accord given our totally different views of what happened at the LBH, but if you want to keep going Richard, it's your call. Sincerely, Hunk |
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Post by benteen on Nov 3, 2011 16:27:32 GMT -6
The point is that the U.S. Army mantra of that time was that Indians always scatter and run. I have previously cited Godfrey and Edgerly on that subject, but you have chosen to ignore that information. Custer had no reason to believe that they would not do so at the LBH Hunk Hunk, not as a debate with you but rather this thought by the Army and Custer in general. I am not a student but rather a reader of this battle, in what I have read it would seem that all the historians believe this to be the case (That Indians would run) I have never understood Custer or the Army's reasoning. I don't know the average size of an Indian village but lets say 500 people with 100-150 warriors. When the Army went on search and destroy missions they had a regiment or half a regiment App 300-350 men. They outgunned and outnumbered the Indians by 2 or 3 to1, of course the Indians would run and get their families out of harms way, we all would. When however they felt they had enough to fight you they wouldn't run but fight. Custer knew this or should have from his own personal experiences. 1- Pawnee Killer attacked him and his regiment. I grant it wasn't much of an attack but it showed that Indians weren't afraid of people in blue uniforms 2- The Washita. While Custer was riding through Black Kettles village the warriors down river had plenty of time to run, but they didn't. They challenged him. It was Custer who left 3- On a Yellowstone expedition Custer took off after some warriors but realized they were drawing him into a trap, and escaped into some timber 4- I know Custer didn't know it but these warriors attacked a force of 1300 on the Rosebud Why would Custer having this personal knowledge that Indians don't always run, would he gaze upon a village, no a small city of 10000 people and 2-3 thousand warriors and have no doubt in his mine that they would run. To the degree that he would divide his command and send 140 men under Reno charging across a valley and think in any way these 10000 people were going to panic and run away. Just never made sense to me Be Well Dan |
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Post by wild on Nov 3, 2011 16:35:09 GMT -6
3) Intimate knowledge of the terrain resided with Bouyer and the Crows. They were scouting ahead and constantly reporting to Custer. Varnum and hare were also doing the same. What more did he need?Visual will give a 3 dimension picture showing distances,heights,dead ground,the lie and fall of the land,every twist in the river.Verbals are one dimension and cannot convey the tactical complexities of the terrain.Except for general navigation purposes verbals are useless.
I don't think he was the reserve but part of an attack plan which he abandoned.A rose by any other name.
A covering group? How many men do you think he had
500 approx
A fall-back position? It may be in a military text book somewhere, but it never figured in any fights against Indians that I know of. Perhaps you think Custer should have set a precedent?
It's s.o.p for attacking forces to keep one foot on the ground.
You might find a persual of Custer's tactics at the Washita illuminating.
Neither Custer nor any other commander had any experience of dealing with the Lakota or other Plains tribes who had stood and fought to protect their camps.
A lack of experience would suggest Custer should have exercised more caution?
The point is that the U.S. Army mantra of that time was that Indians always scatter and run.
And they do other things as well like counter attack and gobble up fools like Elliot or Fetterman.
Is that the best mantra the army could produce after 300 years of conflict with the Indian?
Custer's tactics can only be described as faulty in hindsight.
The tactics he employed were designed to prevent the escape of the Indians.Where he was at fault was in that he failed to configure his forces to deal with such a success.
The reason for Reno's rout lie more with Reno than Custer
Well if you have Custer --being defeated by what he did not know and could not have known[/i]and directing Reno under such lack of intell then much of the responsibility is Custer's
the reasons for Custer's inability to engage lie more with the unexpected belligerent mood of the Indians than the tactics adopted by Custer.
Custer failed because he failed to get the Indians to run.
Reno's 130 troopers hardly knocked on the door.The door should have been battered down by a massed charge by the entire regiment.
My guess is that we are not going to make make a lot of progress in reaching any kind of accord given our totally different views of what happened at the LBH, but if you want to keep going Richard, it's your call.Maybe we are just on different sides of that mantra you mentioned.You say it justified his actions.I think he failed to appreaciate it's tactical significance.
Best Regards
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Post by montrose on Nov 4, 2011 8:42:57 GMT -6
Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield was a weakness for LTC Custer and the 7th Cav.
Guides. Custer had Crow guides with local terrain knowledge. His use of the guides and their information shows a weird dichotomy.
Benteen’s scout shows a disconnect between Custer and guides. The terrain is not suitable for seeing into the LBH valley. Benteen would have had to move another six miles west to see the LBH valley. Either the Crows terrain knowledge of this area was poor, or Custer didn’t trust their knowledge.
Custer’s move to the right from Ash Creek shows the opposite. He had no eyes on for Ford B and D. He either guessed that there had to be a ford downstream, or he was placing great trust in reports from his guides. I believe the latter.
Custer’s behavior is not consistent. I believe that throughout this day his decisions show a roller coaster between indecision and recklessness.
Scouting. I believe that scouting was a constant problem of the 7th Cav since its creation. Limiting myself to LBH, the use of scouts showed an overabundance of caution and ineffective and inefficient use of scouts.
For example, let us look at LT Varnum’s testimony. He stated that two miles from the river he saw Reno move forward. He then asked Custer for Orders. This shows that he was not scouting ahead of the regiment, he was back the command post. Custer told him he could go forward with Reno “if you want to”. This showed that Custer was not using scouts to screen his advance.
There were points during the advance down Ash Creek that Varnum and a scout detachment covered the high ground on the left, with Hare and a detachment covering the bluffs on the right. This is local security, very close in.
The decision to launch an attack was made about two miles from the river. (I believe Fred would say 1.7 miles from the river). The scouts split, with the majority going with Reno. They were not scouting ahead, but rather ended up as flankers on the right and left of Reno’s force.
At this point Custer wanted to know more about the bluffs to his right. He got ahead of his scouts and was seen up the ridge ahead of everyone. Since he only kept the Crows, I assume he kept them as guides, vice scouts. He wanted their local terrain advice. He later appeared to task F Company for a 6 man detachment to conduct local scouting.
An interesting observation in this same area is Custer’s anger at his scouts. The Indian scouts had paused at the lone tepee. LTC Custer rode up with Gerard and was angry that they were not further ahead scouting. The key point is that Gerard was back with Custer, and not at his appointed place of duty. The Indians did not have ESP. With their translator AWOL, they did not know what Custer wanted done. The inability of Custer to keep a translator with the Rees showed a fundamental flaw in command and control. This should have been identified and sorted out at the beginning of the campaign. Figuring out you have a problem on the day of battle is bad.
Scouts out. The 7th Cav would have been better served by sending their scouts forward. The concept is having the scouts far enough ahead to provide timely information to make a decision. Given the situation on 25 June, this is one or two miles ahead. There is no reason that a scout patrol reach the bluffs vicinity bench mark 3411 before Custer ordered Reno to attack. There was no opposition in this area.
Covering Reno’s advance is a bit harder, since there were Indians fleeing ahead of them. In addition there were scattered Indians across the river in LBH valley. Scouts would need to stay closer to main body as they made contact. Scouts would need to move to flanks and take advantage of local terrain for observation.
Of course, any use of scouts is again challenged by Gerard. He fled to the rear and tried to recross the river. He was stopped by Cooke and Keough and ordered to return to his duty. He disobeyed this order and went and hid in the brush.
Sending scouts out, when you have no ability to receive their reports, is useless. The scout function was broken starting at Fort Abraham Lincoln The 7th Cav as an entity never understood how to scout, nor how use Indian allies.
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Post by rosebud on Nov 4, 2011 9:01:27 GMT -6
Benteen’s scout shows a disconnect between Custer and guides. The terrain is not suitable for seeing into the LBH valley. Benteen would have had to move another six miles west to see the LBH valley. Either the Crows terrain knowledge of this area was poor, or Custer didn’t trust their knowledge.
As I have stated before. The view from the Crows Nest gives the impression that the LBH is closer than it is. This is hard to understand until you look for yourself and then it will become clear.
or Custer didn’t trust their knowledge
There you go. Now you are on the right track, stick to it and you will stay on the right track.
RB
The decision to launch an attack was made about two miles from the river
No not really. The decision to launch an attack was 15 miles from the LBH. Benteen was just step #1
The main problem is the time.....It is about noon, all of the Indians will not all be in the village, they will be scattered and that has to be taken into consideration. How they will proceed with the attack? BIG PROBLEM!!!
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Post by rosebud on Nov 5, 2011 19:29:54 GMT -6
By Fred on other board.
To me, that legitimizes Benteen's mission, and it wasn't until Benteen realized the intervening valleys were all too narrow to support any Indian encampments-- and that the LBH valley, as he got nearer, was empty farther up-valley-- that he queered his mission and returned to the main trail.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------
That is what everyone has been trying to tell you. Yet you call us names.
queered......Deviating from the expected or normal;
Good job Fred you finally got it right. I am proud of you.
Best wishes
Rosebud
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Post by fred on Nov 5, 2011 19:50:08 GMT -6
My God, what a confounded ass!
Why don't you get a life, you silly fool... that, or crawl back into your sump. Quit following me around like some teen-age groupie. Interesting that I rile your fat ass so much; maybe if you weren't so insecure in your miserable existence you could see things for what they really are. And "what everyone has been trying to tell" me? I need you-- you, of all people-- to tell me something... anything? My feelings and impressions of Benteen and what he did, what he didn't do, what he said, what he didn't say, have been set for years and those people with half a brain know precisely what I mean and understand how consistent I have been. It is only an imbecile who thinks he has discovered an "aha" moment in what I post who thinks otherwise. Maybe if you could write better, express yourself better, and read better, you would understand, as well.
Now be a good little boy and go back to playing your cow-chip checkers. Go haunt a house. Oo-o-o-o! Terrible me! Was that name-calling?
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Post by quincannon on Nov 5, 2011 20:10:51 GMT -6
Now what was that color Sea Blue or Dark Gray on the Arizona that fateful day?
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