Worst error?

[wild]

Thanks for that explanation Richard, it most certainly helps to put our exchanges into context. It seems to me that you have made up your mind as to what happened at the LBH and that your opinion is entrenched and immovable.
No Hunc.My post was a reply to a question you put to me regarding Custer's opening moves which I described as a blunder.
The moves are known and are not in dispute.
The remainder of your post deals with Custer's mind set,the poor quality of his men and the elusiveness of the enemy.
And you suggest It is in the context of that 1876 mind set that the LBH battle was fought and in which the tactics used needs to be considered.Before getting into a discussion on tactics beyond MTC can you tell me if you think Custer's opening moves gave him the advantage?
Best Wishes

[rosebud]

With all due respect RB,

...And all of what you posted meant what? As Fred stated you have to consider everything before making these kind of statements and coming to the conclusion you did. What's evident is that Martin hadn't arrived there yet, thus Benteen's "horns of a dilemma" statement. It really is as simple as that.
jag

Jag, you know better than that. Two trails that are parallel and headed to the river will not be a problem.
When the trail turned right and headed to the bluffs is where he said the problem was. Martini was with them at that time.
Just ask Martini, Its really as simple as that.


Those trails, both of them should have been investigated to their fullest extent possible before making a determination of which trail he should've taken to complete his orders

Jag.....If you read this again you might see the part about "to complete his orders"
That can only take place AFTER Martini hands Benteen the orders or note.

So I stand by the statement that Benteen only needs to ask. that does not seem that hard to understand. It also makes it totally unnecessary to worry about the two trails.

[bc]

Don't forget that after Martini arrived, he left Benteen to go to the pack train to get a new horse. That said, there is no doubt in my mind that they knew where Martini came from, just like they knew where Knipe came from, and that there was some kind of action going on to cause Martini's horse to have a wound. It may well be that much of the talk with Martini came from other officers, sergeants, and EM within hearing range of Benteen but not him personally.

The question for Benteen was that he was hearing firing across the river which was inconsistent with what he knew of Custer's movement and position.

For those looking at timing, you can note from what was posted above that Benteen arrived in time to see the last north/south skirmish line. The soldiers he saw was probably part of Co. M that withdrew last.

bc

[AZ Ranger]

There is nothing in the note that states Custer will not cross the river to attack the big village. When asked where the village was located would Martin state across the river?

Where is there any indication in the note where to meet Custer?

[AZ Ranger]

The directions I received from Lieutenant-Colonel Custer were, to move with my command to the left, to send well-mounted officers with about six men who should ride rapidly to a line of bluffs about five miles to our left and front, with instructions to report at once to me if anything of Indians could be seen from that point. I was to follow the movement of this detachment as rapidly as possible. Lieutenant Gibson was the officer selected, and I followed closely with the battalion at times getting in advance of the detachment. The bluffs designated were gained, but nothing seen but other bluffs quite as large and precipitous as were before me. I kept on to those and the country was the same, there being no valley of any kind that I could see on any side, I had then gone about fully ten miles; the ground was terribly hard on horses, so I determined to carry out the other instructions, which were, that if in my judgment there was nothing to be seen of Indians, valleys, &c., in the direction I was going, to return with the battalion to the trail the command was following.

[rosebud]

The directions I received from Lieutenant-Colonel Custer were, to move with my command to the left, to send well-mounted officers with about six men who should ride rapidly to a line of bluffs about five miles to our left and front, with instructions to report at once to me if anything of Indians could be seen from that point. I was to follow the movement of this detachment as rapidly as possible. Lieutenant Gibson was the officer selected, and I followed closely with the battalion at times getting in advance of the detachment. The bluffs designated were gained, but nothing seen but other bluffs quite as large and precipitous as were before me. I kept on to those and the country was the same, there being no valley of any kind that I could see on any side, I had then gone about fully ten miles; the ground was terribly hard on horses, so I determined to carry out the other instructions, which were, that if in my judgment there was nothing to be seen of Indians, valleys, &c., in the direction I was going, to return with the battalion to the trail the command was following.
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx
So why is he talking about a valley he did not find?
If he was not sent to the LBH Valley, he would not need to even mention this. He also brags about not going to the valley and saying it was his idea to cut his trip short, returning to the trail.

[wild]

Where is there any indication in the note where to meet Custer?
Stating a location places a condition on the juction of the two forces.The meeting was not to be limited to a geographical position.

[rosebud]

July 2, 1876

My darling Wife---
We have just arrived at this point, marching from the indian village. on the 25th of June, last Sunday, week, Genl. Custer divided the 7th Cav. into 3 Battn's---about 15 miles from an indian village, the whereabouts of which he did not know exactly. I was ordered with 3 Co's D, H,& K, to go to the left for the purpose of hunting for the valley of the river---indian camp---or anything I could find

I have more. Is it necessary for me to get more? I sure can if needed.
valley......over and over he said he was to find that valley.

["Hunk" Papa]

Nov 2, 2011 9:24:15 GMT -6 wild said:

No Hunc.My post was a reply to a question you put to me regarding Custer's opening moves which I described as a blunder.
The moves are known and are not in dispute.
The remainder of your post deals with Custer's mind set,the poor quality of his men and the elusiveness of the enemy.
And you suggest It is in the context of that 1876 mind set that the LBH battle was fought and in which the tactics used needs to be considered.Before getting into a discussion on tactics beyond MTC can you tell me if you think Custer's opening moves gave him the advantage?
Best Wishes

Richard, you are a big disappointment to me. I hand you, an Irishman, the chance to mount a soap box and provide us with a saga of gallant Irish boys perishing through the incompetence of a vainglorious paycock and what do you do? Say over to you Hunc. Who the hell is Hunc? Never mind, he’s probably an idiot anyway. (What, no argument?)

Now I actually made no mention of Custer’s opening moves. What I asked for were your views in respect of what constituted the appropriate military tactics for Custer to use against the Indian camps as you are clearly unimpressed with those that he did use. As you are being a little coy about giving an answer I will start the ball rolling as requested.

You state a generality with ‘the moves are known and not in dispute’ but in my experience everything about the LBH tends to be disputed so you will need to elucidate that phrase in due course. We should also get out of the way the argument over whether or not Custer disobeyed his orders and should not have been at the Divide at all. That is irrelevant for our purposes as he was at the Divide and what transpired afterwards is the focus of our attention.

Let us go back to your Reply #134.

Oct 31, 2011 16:56:47 GMT -6 wild said:

1) He launched an uncordinated attack

2) against an enemy of undetermined strength

3) over unknown terrain.

4) This resulted in the rout of one column and the inability of the second column to press home it's attack.Further the attack went ahead at a time when the reserves were out of supporting range.

1) You call it uncoordinated and an attack. In my view it was neither. Custer advanced toward the camps in regular formation with Benteen sent to the left on a definite mission. The initial advance by the Custer/Reno group was a reconnaissance in force, not an attack, so Custer gained no tactical advantage as he was only doing what was militarily sound at that point. He had Varnum with some Indian scouts in the hills to the left and Hare with others to the right as evidenced by firstly an extract from Varnum’s RCOI testimony:-

"A) I do not know whether the Indians had been seen by Major Reno’s command at the time it separated from General Custer, or not. I had seen the Indians in the bottom for an hour or more before the separation took place and I was on the high bluffs."

Now from his narrative:-

“The command mounted up & I reported for orders. Custer asked if I felt able to continue scouting. I said I had to ride anyway, & one place was as good as another. He said go ahead then. Lieut. Hare reported to me the night before for duty and I sent him to the right front and I took the left front of the advance. From every hill where I could see the valley I saw Indians mounted.

We marched down a small tributary of the Little Big Horn River. I reported my observations several times. The valley of the river on the left bank is broad and level, but steep and sometimes almost perpendicular bluffs under the right bank from which we were approaching. Behind the highest part of the bluff was the main Indian village. The small branch down which we were advancing empties into it about two miles above the village.
The last time I reported, probably two miles from the river, I saw a squadron of 3 troops passing the head of the column at a trot. I asked where they were going & the Genl. said, “To begin the attack.” I asked instruction & he said to go on with them if you want to. Lieut. Hare & I and my whole party started at the trot.”

I think it is beyond dispute that if Varnum was sending reports to Custer then so was Hare, so the often cited argument that he should have been gathering intelligence as he marched is negated by what Varnum says.

2) From what the scouts reported at the Crow’s Nest, from the heavy trails they had been following and from the reports of Varnum and Hare, Custer did have more than an inkling of the large numbers in the camps. The point is it would not have fazed him or any other commander in his place even if the exact number of warriors had been known. They were expected to run and he needed to find a way to stop them.

That this was uppermost in the minds of the 7th’s officers is confirmed by the under mentioned extracts from firstly, Edgerly’s narratives, then one from Godfrey’s.

Edgerly 1: “and there was no use in trying to surprise them, as his intention had been, the next morning, we would press on as quickly as we could and attack them in the village if possible. The idea was that the Indians would not stand against a whole regiment of cavalry, and that as soon as they learned of our advance they would try to get away from us.”

Edgerly 2: “The Gen’l. came back at once, had Officers’ call sounded, and said that as our presence had been discovered it would be necessary to attack at once, He said he had hoped to lie concealed during the 25th, and attack on the morning of the 26th, but now all hopes of a surprise were gone, and the only way to catch the Indians was by marching at once.”

Godfrey: “At all events our presence had been discovered and further concealment was unnecessary; that we would march at once to attack the village; that he had not intended to make the attack until the next morning, the 26th, but our discovery made it imperative to act at once, as delay would allow the village to scatter and escape.”

3) The terrain might have been unknown to Custer and his officer’s, but it was the back yard so far as Bouyer and the Crow scouts were concerned. It is highly probable that they spelled out the lie of the land from the Crow’s Nest, advising him of the possibility that the Lakota alliance could flee south down the LBH valley which is why he sent Benteen to the left. They were also the likely source of information that Benteen was not going far enough west which prompted Custer to send his two messengers.

4) I can only presume that the routed column was Custer’s and the one unable to press home its attack was Reno’s, but you will need to confirm this before I comment further, as you have their fates in the wrong chronological order.

I await your pleasure sir, keyboard primed and ready.

Hunk

[rosebud]

Don't forget that after Martini arrived, he left Benteen to go to the pack train to get a new horse. That said, there is no doubt in my mind that they knew where Martini came from, just like they knew where Knipe came from, and that there was some kind of action going on to cause Martini's horse to have a wound. It may well be that much of the talk with Martini came from other officers, sergeants, and EM within hearing range of Benteen but not him personally.
BC

Yes I think you are on target with this.

[wild]

I don't do soap boxes Hunkkk.Just the facts ma'am.

Now I actually made no mention of Custer’s opening movesYou asked for clarification on this matter and I gave you the answer.

What I asked for were your views in respect of what constituted the appropriate military tactics for Custer to use against the Indian camps as you are clearly unimpressed with those that he did use
Knowledge of the terrain along with the strenght and location of the enemy are essential.The attack should be coordinated, with the reserves actually on the same sand table and all topped off with a covering group and fall back position.

You state a generality with ‘the moves are known and not in dispute’ but in my experience everything about the LBH tends to be disputed
There is no dispute that Reno and Custer advanced on opposite sides of the river?If we can accept some things as being beyond dispute we can save ourselves some time.

Custer did have more than an inkling of the large numbers in the camps. The point is it would not have fazed him or any other commander in his place even if the exact number of warriors had been known. They were expected to run and he needed to find a way to stop them.
Well the running might not have fazed Custer but surely he knew enough about the sioux to be fazed by their stopping.
Custer's tactics were faulty in that he disipated his strenght in the chase and failed to concentrate for the "catch".

The terrain might have been unknown to Custer and his officer’s, but it was the back yard so far as Bouyer and the Crow Terrain is a dimension which requires the visual senses not the aural senses.

I can only presume that the routed column was Custer’s and the one unable to press home its attack was Reno’s, but you will need to confirm this before I comment further, as you have their fates in the wrong chronological order.
No,Custer suffered more than a routing.
Reno was routed with Custer being unable to engage.

Best Wishes

[AZ Ranger]

Nov 2, 2011 14:58:43 GMT -6 @rosebud said:

July 2, 1876

My darling Wife---
We have just arrived at this point, marching from the indian village. on the 25th of June, last Sunday, week, Genl. Custer divided the 7th Cav. into 3 Battn's---about 15 miles from an indian village, the whereabouts of which he did not know exactly. I was ordered with 3 Co's D, H,& K, to go to the left for the valley of the river---indian camp---or anything I could find

I have more. Is it necessary for me to get more? I sure can if needed.
valley......over and over he said he was to find that valley.

My belief is that Benteen was ordered to report if he found something and if he thought it was a waste time to continue then he should return to Reno Creek.

AZ Ranger

I am not sure how you come up with this statement when Benteen states just the opposite.


RB There is nothing about valleys in my belief so can you post on them ad infinitumbut it doesn't affect my belief that Benteen only had to report if he found something and at his discretion could carry out the rest of his order to return and follow the command.

You asked a question how I came up with my statements.

Here its is again from Benteen's official report

• with instructions to report at once to me if anything of Indians could be seen from that point.
  
  
• I determined to carry out the other instructions, which were, that if in my judgment there was nothing to be seen of Indians, valleys, &c., in the direction I was going, to return with the battalion to the trail the command was following.
  
  

[rosebud]

RB There is nothing about valleys in my belief so can you post on them ad infinitumbut it doesn't affect my belief that Benteen only had to report if he found something and at his discretion could carry out the rest of his order to return and follow the command.

AZ Ranger

Then I will keep trying. He was to send a messenger if he found Indians. That did not mean he was to return to the trail with his battalion. Benteen even stated that the LBH was expected to be closer than it was.
I am sure that if you reject Benteen's own words, it will be a waste of my time. But what the heck I will still try.

Rosebud

[rosebud]

Feb 24 1892

From where the battalions were formed---the point from which I stuck out at about a left oblique with my battalion of three troops, to the spot where Custer's body was found, is estimated by me to be about (15) miles. Now if I had carried out to the letter the last order brought to me from General Custer by the Sergeant-Major of the regiment---which was, to the effect that if from the furthest line of bluffs which we then saw, I could not see the valley---no particular valley specified--- to keep on until I came to a valley ( or perhaps the valley) to pitch into anything I might come across and notify them at once.
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The decision to go come back to the trail is Benteen's decision and his alone. He was not expected to follow a creek back to Reno Creek. The point is........ Custer expected Benteen to be coming down the LBH.

When Custer is on the bluffs near 3411 he spotted Benteen coming into Reno Creek and sends Martini back with the message.

Rosebud

[AZ Ranger]

That why Martin was sent from the bottom of Cedar. Makes perfect sense or does it? What proof do you offer that Custer saw Benteen?

Again his official report

I determined to carry out the other instructions, which were, that if in my judgment there was nothing to be seen of Indians, valleys, &c., in the direction I was going, to return with the battalion to the trail the command was following.