Worst error?

[fred]

Oct 31, 2011 16:02:18 GMT -6 "Hunk" Papa said:

According to Godfrey from the same source, “When they came to point where Custer’s trail separated from that of Reno there was some discussion as to which one should be followed. The debate was settled by Weir starting off on the left-hand trail, following on after Reno, while the other two companies followed the right-hand trail. Benteen, with his orderly, took a mid-position between the two trails and went on ahead.”

I also recall that Edgerly said somewhere that his company, Weir’s, “got down near river" but I cannot find the source at present.

Gordon,

Thanks!

Didn't one of them-- Godfrey, maybe?-- get the two directions confused? Someone said Benteen went left and Weir, right, but someone else corrected it...? I know I have it somewhere....

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

Yep! Here it is:

1900’s—Walter Camp interview: Undated. Hammer, Kenneth, ed., Custer in ’76. This “interview” may have been taken from correspondence between them.

When the column reached the point where the two trails separated, there was a discussion as to which one to follow. Weir moved off on the left-hand trail (Reno’s) and the other two companies took the right trail. [75]

In another interview with Camp, Godfrey said Benteen was confused when he saw the trail split. It was Weir who moved to the right—hearing the firing in that direction—while Benteen and Godfrey moved toward the river crossing following Reno’s trail. Benteen and Godfrey got close enough to see Reno’s retreat through the trees along the river. [75, footnote]

Best wishes,
Fred.

[jag]

Oct 31, 2011 13:59:28 GMT -6 fred said:

Oct 31, 2011 9:52:47 GMT -6 jag said:

The mistake, if anyone is looking for one, was Benteen's. What Benteen should've done after finding the diverging trails and what he did do afterward was his mistake to own. Those trails, both of them should have been investigated to their fullest extent possible before making a determination of which trail he should've taken to complete his orders.

Jag,

Your points are absolutely valid if these were all the facts. I think, however, you are missing some. I do not remember where I saw this precisely-- and I do not believe it came out at the RCOI-- but Tom Weir, swung off onto the left shod trail (Reno's). Obviously-- at least I would think, obviously!-- he would have told Benteen the trail led across the river. So, Benteen would have known that was more or less a dead-end.



Again, armed with Weir's info and a look-see up the valley-- as well as what he saw down the valley-- any further waste of time would have been obviated by the mess down-valley and the scouts' instructions to move up the bluffs.



My work tells me Benteen left the regiment at 12:10 PM. Forty-five minutes later would place the time at close to 1 PM, and by 1 PM, I have Benteen having last seen the Gray Horse Troop-- 12:40-- and still a good half-hour from No - Name Creek, climbing up and down ridges, probably some 3 miles south of Reno Creek. At 1 PM, Custer was at the lone tepee and there isn't a chance Benteen could have seen him or have guessed at where he was or what he was doing.

Haveing gone there and witnessed this area atop those bluffs, it's inconceivable to anyone who stands there, that he didn't see them going over it, that is, if that's what they did.

I agree with you, Jag, if this were the case, but I do not believe it to be so.

This whole thing goes back to something I have been preaching for years, ever since-- and maybe even before-- I came upon these boards. You-- the generic "you"-- cannot understand this battle without understanding the timing. If what you say, above, were the case, then Benteen would, of necessity, have to come under much greater scrutiny for his actions.

When you take his scout into consideration-- its route, its distances-- and you apply that to his watering at the, or "a," morass; then apply all that to his move down Reno Creek; add in his distance miscalculations regarding Kanipe and Martini; contextually add in the whole Reno affair, i. e., separation from Custer, crossing at Ford A, his move down the valley, the dismount, skirmish lines, pullback, retreat, mountain climbing, etc. (is there anything else for that "etc."?), we find-- or at least I find-- Benteen did about all he could have been asked to do, and were he here in front of us, we would be the ones answering his questions.

This lack of understanding of the times-- and this permeates this entire event over the years-- skews everything and causes "students" to cast blame where none should be cast. Of course, I am the babe crying in the woods, for few will heed what I say, their opinions, preconceptions, and prejudices much too far advanced for them to re-think or re-consider... or they will throw obscure nonsense into the fray-- much like my buddies, "keogh" and "conz" are wont to do. Others will quote John Gray, who, while condemning Reno and Benteen, also condemns George Custer-- quite inadvertently and unknowingly, I am sure!!-- for sheer military stupidity. As great a historian as Gray may have been, his work-- in my opinion-- has done more to divert us from the truth than Gray ever thought might bring us closer. It is almost as bad as reading Goldin, Korn, and Peter Thompson's accounts solely and claiming to know what happened at the LBH.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Fred,

I understand your timing, and I fully respect the hard work and effort you have done, so please don't take it wrong if I insert an alternative that I think might be closer to the truth. These kinds of things are bound to happen and I think is an ever ongoing process we all must deal with. I'm not sure this is what you'd classify as quote "obscure nonsense", but at least I try to use some kind of evidence, usually more than one, to back up my half baked ideas.

I'm not convinced that Benteen's route has been uncovered. I am well aware of Conz's ongoing blather about No Name and the continued insistence upon making use of such a feature because it supposedly fits. Respectfully, I don't see it that way or from what I've read myself believe that Benteen's trail was perfectly described by Lt. Edgerly.

He indicated that they went 6 miles (Godfrey said 5) before they began their return march. While I'm quite sure that such a loop could lead some to believe that No Name had something to do with it, by this and further statements No Name should have remained as much because Benteen and his men rode right past it. Edgerly said they came on trail "again about nine miles down the valley" from where they started. And he said he thought they made a circuit of about 14 miles. Neither Benteen's or Godfrey's statements refute this estimate, in fact Benteen's was well within the tolerance and Godfrey's would have been further along. Benteen stated 12 to 15 miles and Godfrey stated 18.

What this does is say that from the point where they decided to return to where it intersected the trail was about 8 miles to the Custer/Reno's trail, and this point was 9 miles down the valley from where they had started from. Roughly the three sides of a triangle arranged so that one side was 9 and the other two were arranged at about 45 degree angles from each other and labeled 6 and 8 respectively. Overlay that over the terrain such that the 9 aligns roughly with the general direction of Reno Creek and I think it tells us alot more about named creeks and directions than what we've been led to believe.

Edgerly:
Q. About how far do you think you traveled after striking the trail before reaching the watering place?
A. We struck it close to the watering place within half a mile probably.

Benteen:
I struck the trail about a mile ahead of the pack train. I saw it coming on the trail. I then followed the trail to a kind of morass.

If this doesn't describe to a T the place where Custer was believed to have watered, I don't know what does. And it doesn't involve No Name creeks or made up morasses where none existed.

Again, respectfully submitted for you perusal, amusement, or whatever pleases you.

Jag

[AZ Ranger]

1) Ranger, you have omitted the first part of quincannon's post which was the bit I was referring too. It as as follows:-

I think Benteen should have sent a message upon mission completion also. That would be in line with normal protocols, unless Custer had said to him go out there and report to me if you run into anything, if not just come back and I will meet you (fill in the blank.

I agree with that part also and believe Benteen was told by Custer the "unless" condition. Without researching for the source I believe Custer told Benteen to return at his discretion.

Regardless the information that they saw no Indians is useless considering Custer sees Indians running down Reno Creek. Also the Indians when they left went in which direction? South was not the only choice in direction for them to flee.

AZ Ranger

[AZ Ranger]

Jag Gibson marks his location of his last observation above no name and looking down SFRC. Seems he was fairly specific to me.

When I rode with Terry (zekesgirl) we followed Darling's map. There are very few places where you can be and see Reno Creek low enough to see Custer moving down Reno Creek. If you move to close to Reno Creek the terrain is to rough. If you swing out to far to the left you miss the defiles and any chance of seeing Custer in Reno Creek and the distance would be much greater.
My GPS recorded around 10 miles but it includes the terrain feature in the distance which is what the horse actually traveled. We also went up to the Gibson lookout so went a little further than the rest.

AZ Ranger

[fred]

Jag,

You present a very interesting and cogent challenge, but I do not think you are taking everything into consideration.

First of all, I have found the distance estimates of these guys to be way off the mark. Benteen, who, according to Hugh Scott, was supposed to be very good at this sort of thing, bolloxed it all up from the beginning. If you sat down and added up all of Benteen's distance estimates along Reno Creek, he would have wound up in the foothills of the Big Horn Mountains. No hyperbole there, either.

Next... the only place we know-- from testimony-- that Custer watered was when he was beyond the lone tepee. And we know the lone tepee was about 1.7 miles from the LBH River, despite what John Gray, Bruce Liddic, Edgar Stewart, and a host of others tell us.

Next... the only description of a "watering place" that we have is what we believe is the morass, and while I will buy the gobbledygook of a traveling morass, it doesn't travel that far that fast and today's current morass ain't a whole lot farther away from "Point M" than the original. While distance descriptions can be off, it is hard to claim 1/2-mile or so to be in the vicinity of 5 or 6 miles.

In addition, the flat-line distance I show of some 4 1/8 miles for Benteen's travel, corresponds fairly well to topographical descriptions of his scout, and that includes allowances for the accounts of some of the scout's members describing a "forced" route bending to the right because of terrain.

When I determined what I believed to be a reasonable route of march-- based on readings of a very accurate topographical map-- I did so without consulting the Darling map and I did so before AZ Ranger and "zekesgirl" made their trip. When I then made the comparisons, I was stunned at how close my work resembled Darling's and AZ's/zekesgirl's. All of those works jibe with the "ridge" descriptions in the various narratives.

Furthermore, if we spin out Benteen's scout too much longer, we have to change the contextual surroundings, and that is something we cannot do. It would mean Custer walked down Reno Creek (at variance with any number of "movement" descriptions); it would mean too long a time for Reno's sojourn in the valley (already at odds with some accounts); and it would mean Reno's men spent too long on the hilltop before Benteen's arrival, also at great variance with every account we know, both from Reno's command and Benteen's.

Gotta run, Jag... work waits for no man!! Too bad we can't do this face-to-face. It would be great fun. And personally, I think you have done a great job with your opinions and theories. Better than most I do not always agree with, i. e., our boys next door!!!

Best wishes,
Fred.

[jag]

Nov 1, 2011 4:35:22 GMT -6 fred said:

Jag,

You present a very interesting and cogent challenge, but I do not think you are taking everything into consideration.

First of all, I have found the distance estimates of these guys to be way off the mark. Benteen, who, according to Hugh Scott, was supposed to be very good at this sort of thing, bolloxed it all up from the beginning. If you sat down and added up all of Benteen's distance estimates along Reno Creek, he would have wound up in the foothills of the Big Horn Mountains. No hyperbole there, either.

Next... the only place we know-- from testimony-- that Custer watered was when he was beyond the lone tepee. And we know the lone tepee was about 1.7 miles from the LBH River, despite what John Gray, Bruce Liddic, Edgar Stewart, and a host of others tell us.

Next... the only description of a "watering place" that we have is what we believe is the morass, and while I will buy the gobbledygook of a traveling morass, it doesn't travel that far that fast and today's current morass ain't a whole lot farther away from "Point M" than the original. While distance descriptions can be off, it is hard to claim 1/2-mile or so to be in the vicinity of 5 or 6 miles.

In addition, the flat-line distance I show of some 4 1/8 miles for Benteen's travel, corresponds fairly well to topographical descriptions of his scout, and that includes allowances for the accounts of some of the scout's members describing a "forced" route bending to the right because of terrain.

When I determined what I believed to be a reasonable route of march-- based on readings of a very accurate topographical map-- I did so without consulting the Darling map and I did so before AZ Ranger and "zekesgirl" made their trip. When I then made the comparisons, I was stunned at how close my work resembled Darling's and AZ's/zekesgirl's. All of those works jibe with the "ridge" descriptions in the various narratives.

Furthermore, if we spin out Benteen's scout too much longer, we have to change the contextual surroundings, and that is something we cannot do. It would mean Custer walked down Reno Creek (at variance with any number of "movement" descriptions); it would mean too long a time for Reno's sojourn in the valley (already at odds with some accounts); and it would mean Reno's men spent too long on the hilltop before Benteen's arrival, also at great variance with every account we know, both from Reno's command and Benteen's.

Gotta run, Jag... work waits for no man!! Too bad we can't do this face-to-face. It would be great fun. And personally, I think you have done a great job with your opinions and theories. Better than most I do not always agree with, i. e., our boys next door!!!

Best wishes,
Fred.

Fred,

I understand your misgivings about Benteen's mileages/times. However, from what I have researched, Benteen tried very hard to distance himself from that pack train, both in mileage and in duty. No, I'm not saying the man lied at all, and would never do so, as I don't believe for a moment that he did.

For the pack train to travel the 9 miles down Reno Creek and arrive at that same spot Benteen did, when Benteen stated they did ("a mile ahead of the pack train"), meant that the pack train was traveling at the expected gait of about 3 mph, this trip to that morass taking them about 3 hours. Benteen stated to the court that his mission took about 3 hours, and if we grant that he is telling the truth about this and couple that with the gait he stated, 5 mph, his travel time over 14 miles as indicated by Lt. Edgerly would have taken about those 3 hours. And where they intersected, the pack train being about a mile from where Benteen did go on trail, the timing and testimony as they all stated match to perfection.

So what was Benteen talking about when he said the pack train was about 7 miles back where he left them? Again its that distancing himself from the pack train that kicked in. Again, no, he didn't lie. The pack train was testified to have been strung out over about a 2 mile distance back up Reno Creek. When we take the estimates from where Benteen struck the trail back to the tepee, the estimates there were in the 3 mile range. The pack train at that point was about 1 mile from the morass and when you add the strung out distance (2 miles) remarkably you get the 3 miles Edgerly estimated it was back to that tepee. So yeah, the tail end of the pack train was near the tepee about 4 1/2 miles from Fd "A". So technically Benteen didn't lie about where he thought a part of that pack train was. Further, his estimate from where that tepee was from Reno's Hill he said was 4 1/2 miles and he stated when asked at that time that the pack train was somewhere in the vicinity of that 4 to 4 1/2 miles back quote "where he left them". Where does his other estimate of 7 miles back come from? You have to smile at this one because it is rather clever. Take the 4 1/2 miles from the tepee to fd "A" where he did testifiy that he went to. Add that to the mileage back to Reno's hill and you get about 6 miles. Nearly everyone testified that they (Reno/Benteen) didn't meet at Reno's Hill but further on and given this allowance its easily figured by Benteen to have been about 7 miles back to that tepee, not as the crow flies, but, over the same damn trail he took to get there.

Nearly every one of Benteen's men stated that the pack train was at the morass when they departed, this meant that that pack train was no further from Reno's hill than about a mile and a quarter. Given the fact that they did meet further on, and given that this estimate was about a mile further, by Benteen's reckoning, that pack train at the time Lt. Hare was sent back for the ammo packs wasn't over 2 and a quarter miles from them, near the morass Custer and his men watered at when he left to bring them up. He stated to the court that it took him about 20 minutes (round trip) to complete that task. Which is about 4 1/2 miles (round trip) in 20 minutes at a doable gait of just over 13 mph as he said he didn't wait for them but rode on ahead. If we try to make him ride further the gait becomes next to precariously impossible at that sustained gait over the distance he would have had to have rode. Even if we allow him the 4 1/2 miles in a straight line back to it, that's 9 miles round trip in 20 minutes. I don't think any horse could sustain a 27 mph gait over 9 miles in 20 minutes, not for a second I don't.

As I stated Fred. I try to use some kind of evidence to back up my convoluted ideas, and not just by 1 person's statement. I'm not saying I'm correct here. But given the circumstances and timing as funky fluid as too much paint on a paint brush is, get the wrong amount and you're ( not you personally, of course, absolutly none of those you's were) not painting a portrait, not even a Picasso, but just so many blotches that makes it look pretty.

Respectfully submitted for your consideration.

jag

[wild]

Estimates of interrelated time and distance based on recollection of the inattentive variety result in the accumulation of errors and as such are worthless.

[rosebud]

My belief is that Benteen was ordered to report if he found something and if he thought it was a waste time to continue then he should return to Reno Creek.

AZ Ranger


I am not sure how you come up with this statement when Benteen states just the opposite. Benteen was "expected" to be coming down the Little Big Horn. The problem is that they underestimated the distance to the LBH from the divide. When a person looks from the Crows Nest, the LBH appears to be closer than it really is. It is easy to see this. Only when you go down Reno Creek do you realize the mistake. That is the reason Custer sends messengers to Benteen to tell him to go farther. Either scouts or Custer knew they had to send Benteen farther to hit the LBH valley.

I do agree with everyone that thinks Benteen made the right decision NOT to go to the LBH and decided to turn right and go join the main trail on Reno Creek. This was the fastest way he could join.

But we all need to remember, Reno and Custer do not know Benteen has changed his route at that time. No Name and SFRC are NOT travel routes for Indians. The LBH is. This is why they needed Benteen to the left. To stop any Indians traveling South, up the LBH. It is after noon, they have no idea if the village is moving south, north, or staying in place. . And the only route they would take would be in the LBH.

Rosebud

[Yan Taylor]

Hi, I know that this maybe not the best place to post this, but I didn’t want to start a new thread just for my trifle view, sorry but here goes.

Looking over the accounts given by the men in Custer’s command who survived, there is no real evidence to what actually happened to Custer after the command reached Calhoun Ridge. These are the men who survived to tell what they seen:

Curley: he may have left around the time of the Calhoun fight, so if he did see a skirmish line fight, it may have just been L Coy.
Pvt Peter Thompson: he also claimed to have seen the Calhoun fight from his position near the river.
Sgt Daniel Kanipe: he had left before the advance down MTC.
Pvt John Martin: may have seen Custer move down MTC, and Custer turn right near the ford.
Soldiers on Weir point: through all the dust and smoke they might have seen the last minutes of the Calhoun fight with Indians shooting at objects on the ground.

As you can see going on the accounts of survivors and troopers on Weir point, the most anyone can see was the Calhoun Ridge and maybe FFR foray by C Coy. After this we have to go on Indian accounts to get any Idea. Fred has kindly posted some earlier and they all seem to point to E Coy on Cemetery Ridge and troopers on Custer Ridge and finally LSH. This could point us to two different possibilities over what happened to Custer and Yates.
The first one is that the command was under pressure and Custer tried to find a position with better fields of fire and set up a command post, maybe to attend to any wounded, and both F & E Coy's where in an area out sight of Indian fire from south, and C Coy was attacked whist organising a defence to defend the Northern part of the area.
The second one is that Custer made the mistake of trying to find another route to the village, while leaving Keogh to watch his rear, why he would try another shot at the village seems crazy to me, and placed his command in even more danger, exposed over a large area.

This could leave us with the possibility of both Custer and Keogh getting defeated piece meal, and virtually at the same time, either that or the whole of Custer command was fighting a mobile battle while all the time being attacked, but Indian accounts do say that Troopers were waiting a while out of sight of Keogh men (possibly near the south skirmish line area), why could this be, where they waiting for the rest of the command to come forward to plan their next move, or where they (as the Indians said) making preparations, maybe for a another sortie towards the village before things went pear shaped.

Going on what the Indians said, The Grey Horse Soldiers were attacked and where separated from the rest of the command, and subsequently losing their horses and forced in to a ravine (some say Deep Ravine) and then to be annihilated, and leaving F Coy to fall back to either Custer Ridge or LSH.

Some of the Indian account mention about 100 soldiers on foot and about 20 still mounted up on a hill, could these have been the HQ and F Coy joined by the remains of the Keogh wing. The Indians now say that they get reports of a leader (maybe Custer) being killed and then 40 troopers fled for the river, the ones on foot went to the ravine, the mounted ones to FFR, some Indians mention that about this time there was about 50 or so men left around the area where they say Custer fell, some still with horses. After these men were overrun and who or what men where left, the Indians say that at the end the only Troops now remaining were the ones on the western end of the ridge, concealed behind dead horses.

So this is all the data we have from what happened over on the Custer side of the battle field, all from Indian accounts, because all the other reports by the survivors can only really say what they saw on Calhoun Ridge.

Ian.

["Hunk" Papa]

Oct 31, 2011 17:25:52 GMT -6 fred said:

Yep! Here it is:

1900’s—Walter Camp interview: Undated. Hammer, Kenneth, ed., Custer in ’76. This “interview” may have been taken from correspondence between them.

When the column reached the point where the two trails separated, there was a discussion as to which one to follow. Weir moved off on the left-hand trail (Reno’s) and the other two companies took the right trail. [75]

In another interview with Camp, Godfrey said Benteen was confused when he saw the trail split. It was Weir who moved to the right—hearing the firing in that direction—while Benteen and Godfrey moved toward the river crossing following Reno’s trail. Benteen and Godfrey got close enough to see Reno’s retreat through the trees along the river. [75, footnote]

Best wishes,
Fred.

The second interview you cite appears on page 173 in "On The Little Bighorn With Walter Camp" compiled and edited by Richard G. Hardorff. The actual wording is :

"Godfrey says that when Benteen came to where Reno's and Custer's trails parted, Benteen was undecided what was best to do. They were hearing firing to [the] right and Weir took that trail, and Benteen and Godfrey too left trail, or Reno's, and followed it close enough to [the] river to see Reno's retreat through the trees along [the] river. Weir took the right and he was ahead of the other two troops. "

Now I have a couple of problems with that. In his RCOI testimony, Benteen says:

"When the command came up near enough to me, I ordered a trot. I went on ahead of it to the crossing of the Little Big Horn River, at the ford. That was my first sight of the Little Big Horn. There I saw an engagement going on, and I supposed it as the whole regiment. There were twelve or thirteen men in skirmish line that appeared to have been beaten back. The line was then parallel with the river, and the Indians were charging and recharging through those men. I thought the whole command was thrashed, and that was not a good place to cross."

Unless I have misunderstood the topography which is quite possible, surely Benteen could not have seen anything from the crossing so to have seen what he describes he can only have been on the bluffs I think, which seems to be borne out by what he said next:-

"To my right I noticed 3 or 4 Indians, probably 4 or 500 yards from me. I thought they were hostiles, and rode with my orderly towards them, and saw, as I approached them, that they were Crows. They said there was a big ‘pooh poohing” going on, which I had already seen. Then I saw the men who were up on the bluff, and I immediately went there, and was met by Major Reno"

No doubt you will be able to confirm whether or not I am mistaken.

My best.

Gordon

[rosebud]

The mistake, if anyone is looking for one, was Benteen's. What Benteen should've done after finding the diverging trails and what he did do afterward was his mistake to own. Those trails, both of them should have been investigated to their fullest extent possible before making a determination of which trail he should've taken to complete his orders. As with any situation like this when in close proximity to the foe, time is of the essence, a fact Benteen also knew. The problem I see with this is that there were two diverging trails of shod horses. And for him to make the determination that it was Custer's battalion in the valley after following just one of them was a false assumption on his part, as he knew there was yet another trail of shod horses leading downstream on the other side of the river. What he would have done afterward on the bluffs, after examining both trails, is anyone's guess seeing the situation at the time would not have substantially changed. That is, if the trail Custer took was over the bluffs.
Fred

Good god!!! Some military people are dumber than a box of rocks.
Why in the hell is Benteen in a dilemma? All he needed to do is ask Martini. Is that such a tough thing to do? Is Benteen so stupid that he can't just ask. I bet Martini could have told him the direction that Custer took.
I would have thought a military mind would have figured this problem out. Didn't anyone from the military even question Benteen as to why he didn't even ask Martini where Custer went?

Martini just came from Custer. I bet he would remember the direction and the path Custer took. Or is this business as usual for all the armed forces. Is it against the rules to have Benteen ask such a question to Martini?

Those trails, both of them should have been investigated to their fullest extent possible before making a determination of which trail he should've taken to complete his orders
Fred...Do you still think they needed to be investigated to the fullest extent possible?

Just ask Martini..... Even this snot driveling shitkicker is smart enough to figure that one out.
Rosebud

["Hunk" Papa]

Oct 31, 2011 16:56:47 GMT -6 wild said:

Richard, you start by saying ‘Custer had committed a blunder’ so before we can proceed, you will need to clarify what blunder that was, as he is accused of so many.
He launched an uncordinated attack against an enemy of undetermined strenght over unknown terrain.This resulted in the rout of one column and the inability of the second column to press home it's attack.Further the attack went ahead at a time when the reserves were out of supporting range.

Thanks for that explanation Richard, it most certainly helps to put our exchanges into context. It seems to me that you have made up your mind as to what happened at the LBH and that your opinion is entrenched and immovable.

It highlights why we get nowhere in our discussions as you look upon what happened as a purely standard military operation that was badly handled whereas I see things as much more complex than that.

Our differing points of view are nicely illustrated by one of the comments you made in your Reply #99 when you said “Big difference between a division of Wolverines and 5 troops of scabby troopers.” This appears to indicate that you tend to apply ACW tactical standards to the conduct of soldiers in the Indian Wars. I suggest to you it is a false benchmark to use because the military climate in each of those Wars was entirely different.

In the ACW the U.S. Army was made of mostly Volunteers drawn to a righteous cause and imbued with an indignant fervor against the perceived evils of the aristocratic Southern gentlemen, men just like them, worthy opponents but ones who had to be defeated to stop their dreadful ways.

The post-ACW army was not imbued with any such ideals. In his book, “The History of the United States Army”, Col. W.A. Ganoe calls his Chapter IX, “The Army’s Dark Ages, 1865-1880” and this stemmed from that fact that the public was fed up with war, the standing army was cut back, pay was poor and the only enemies were various groups of aboriginal Indians who were regarded with contempt by the U.S. Military, because they would always run away rather than fight.

General Charles King put it well when he commented on the Sioux War of 1876, “There never was warfare on the face of the earth in which the soldier had so little to gain, so very much to lose. There never was warfare, like this, which had absolutely nothing to hold the soldier stern and steadfast to the bitter end, but the solemn sense of Soldier Duty.”

So bearing in mind that from Sherman on down the biggest fear of the army commanders was that the Indians could not be brought to battle, do you honestly believe that Custer, or any other commander, would have viewed the large Indian gathering in the LBH valley as other than an exercise to bring them to heel? Custer himself had spent the best part of 1867 trying to catch up to fleeing Indian villages without success and there he was, with the prey that three army groups had been trying to locate for weeks just 15 miles away. No Robert E. Lee with his army, no Jeb Stuart with his Invincibles, just Indians who had to be forced on to reservations. Not a problem for a U.S. Army force, especially one led by the highly successful Custer, who had faced greater odds in some of his Civil War battles.

Yes he was arrogant and yes he underestimated the enemy that day, but name me an army commander of the time who wasn’t arrogant or one who respected the Indians as fighters. It is in the context of that 1876 mind set that the LBH battle was fought and in which the tactics used needs to be considered. To try and discuss it in any other context is tantamount to accepting the Conz ‘Hussar’ version of the 1876 7th Cavalry.

Custer was beaten because up until the time that he was repulsed at the northern fords (see the map by Lt. W. Philo Clark for evidence) then overwhelmed by sheer numbers of warriors, he was expecting the Indians to run before any attack he made. That they did not, not only surprised him but the whole army command who closed ranks and blamed a dead man rather than admit it. He is still being blamed today, largely because not enough credit is given to the winners on that day. Whatever tactics had been used, they still would have won for the simple reason they had the righteous cause and their families to protect.

Your turn on the soap box Richard!

Hunk

[jag]

Nov 1, 2011 16:46:54 GMT -6 @rosebud said:

The mistake, if anyone is looking for one, was Benteen's. What Benteen should've done after finding the diverging trails and what he did do afterward was his mistake to own. Those trails, both of them should have been investigated to their fullest extent possible before making a determination of which trail he should've taken to complete his orders. As with any situation like this when in close proximity to the foe, time is of the essence, a fact Benteen also knew. The problem I see with this is that there were two diverging trails of shod horses. And for him to make the determination that it was Custer's battalion in the valley after following just one of them was a false assumption on his part, as he knew there was yet another trail of shod horses leading downstream on the other side of the river. What he would have done afterward on the bluffs, after examining both trails, is anyone's guess seeing the situation at the time would not have substantially changed. That is, if the trail Custer took was over the bluffs.
Fred

Good god!!! Some military people are dumber than a box of rocks.
Why in the hell is Benteen in a dilemma? All he needed to do is ask Martini. Is that such a tough thing to do? Is Benteen so stupid that he can't just ask. I bet Martini could have told him the direction that Custer took.
I would have thought a military mind would have figured this problem out. Didn't anyone from the military even question Benteen as to why he didn't even ask Martini where Custer went?

Martini just came from Custer. I bet he would remember the direction and the path Custer took. Or is this business as usual for all the armed forces. Is it against the rules to have Benteen ask such a question to Martini?

Those trails, both of them should have been investigated to their fullest extent possible before making a determination of which trail he should've taken to complete his orders
Fred...Do you still think they needed to be investigated to the fullest extent possible?

Just ask Martini..... Even this snot driveling shitkicker is smart enough to figure that one out.
Rosebud

With all due respect RB,

...And all of what you posted meant what? As Fred stated you have to consider everything before making these kind of statements and coming to the conclusion you did. What's evident is that Martin hadn't arrived there yet, thus Benteen's "horns of a dilemma" statement. It really is as simple as that.

["Hunk" Papa]

Nov 1, 2011 16:46:54 GMT -6 @rosebud said:

The mistake, if anyone is looking for one, was Benteen's. What Benteen should've done after finding the diverging trails and what he did do afterward was his mistake to own. Those trails, both of them should have been investigated to their fullest extent possible before making a determination of which trail he should've taken to complete his orders. As with any situation like this when in close proximity to the foe, time is of the essence, a fact Benteen also knew. The problem I see with this is that there were two diverging trails of shod horses. And for him to make the determination that it was Custer's battalion in the valley after following just one of them was a false assumption on his part, as he knew there was yet another trail of shod horses leading downstream on the other side of the river. What he would have done afterward on the bluffs, after examining both trails, is anyone's guess seeing the situation at the time would not have substantially changed. That is, if the trail Custer took was over the bluffs.
Fred

Fred, Iam intrigued by your comment which I have italicised above.

My understanding is that Custer diverged to higher ground quite a way from the Ford A, so that the shod trail leading to that ford had to be Reno's. I am sure that I have read somewhere that the other trail was made by Indians going to join the camps, so I would appreciate learning from you where you have obtained the information that it too was shod trail.

Sincerely,

Gordon