Worst error?

[jag]

Oct 30, 2011 18:58:36 GMT -6 AZ Ranger said:

Jag Benteen specifically states that he gave his estimate of numbers of Indians at the time of the court of inquiry which was different than what he believed at the time. So there are examples of testimony based on current thinking.

Lets look at your example:
pg 357

Q. At the time you received the order in regard to the pack train, did you consider it necessary to take your command and go and bring the pack train up?
A. I did not consider it necessary at all, because the Indians could not get to the pack train without coming by me.

That answer is valid only until a choice has to be made to go across the river or climb to the bluffs. Benteen's answer only applies while in Reno Creek I would think. Once he climbs the bluffs and sees 900 Indians that could get between him and the pack train he might decide to wait for the pack train to catch up. Isn't that what happened?

Here is another example of current belief rather than knowledge of the day that you posted yourself.

A. If I had gone to the first valley and found nothing, as I would not, as I know now, and had gone on to the second valley, I would have been 25 miles away. I don't know where I would have been. As it was, I was certainly too far to cooperate when he wanted me.

I think it fair to say they asked questions for what they thought at the time and what they currently thought. The answers were also given as to what they believed at the time and what they currently believed at the time of the court of inquiry.

AZ Ranger

In an attempt to understand your reasoning....

1] What you're saying is that his words/testimony doesn't matter. Because time and distance can change circumstances. And from what little we do know, that distance or time doesn't even have to be over 1 1/4 mile, and-or over the time it took him to go there.

2] And you're also saying that what he said, while sitting there in that chair at the RCOI might not have been the same thing he thought at the time of the battle. Or vice-versa. And that was completely acceptable, of course, under the circumstances. And for each and every circumstance, whether the past or present statement contradicting was true or not.

And I trust that these same principles, by their very human nature and also by a certain horse sense, must also of necessity be accorded to the other commanders?

[fred]

Oct 30, 2011 18:43:21 GMT -6 AZ Ranger said:

My belief is that Benteen was ordered to report if he found something and if he thought it was a waste time to continue then he should return to Reno Creek.

I agree-- 100%-- with this statement. Anything else is sheer and utter nonsense.

You can scream and rant and rave all you ever want about Benteen, his relationship with Custer, his so-called "lies" at the RCOI, his obfuscation, his sarcasm, his nastiness... anything you want; AZ's comment above summarizes the entire thing and there is nothing else to say. From a military perspective, this was the thing to do. The "continuing-on-to-the-LBH-valley" crap is just that... crap! The "support-Reno" bunkum is just that... bunkum! In the 30 seconds Custer allotted himself to issue orders to Benteen, this is what he said... or at least what any rational commander would have ordered. "Watch our flanks and rear, Fred; if everything is clear, return to the regiment." Neat, clean, precise, concise... as it should be.

Nice job, Steve.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

Oct 30, 2011 16:22:43 GMT -6 jag said:

... Custer didn't ask for the pack train, he specifically requested the pacs, which doesn't necessarily mean the whole damn train.

Jag,

If I may give you a piece of well-intentioned advice, do not read anything into something that isn't there or cannot be proved. Custer/Cooke asked for/wrote Benteen to bring the "pacs." Period. "Pacs" = "pack train." Not "part"; not "ammo"; not hard tack; not "some"... the whole magilla. Simple.

Plus... for the benefit of others... there is no mention of Reno, LBH valley, or anything else. The orders were quite simple. "Hey, Fred; show up; make it snappy; oh, and by the way, haul those packs along with you, will you?" No fear; no trepidation; no firing yet; no worries. "Show up and we'll figure it out from there."

Best wishes,
Fred.

[AZ Ranger]

In an attempt to understand your reasoning....

1] What you're saying is that his words/testimony doesn't matter. Because time and distance can change circumstances. And from what little we do know, that distance or time doesn't even have to be over 1 1/4 mile, and-or over the time it took him to go there.

I think what occurs at a court of inquiry deviates from court procedures on what is admissible or the nature of the questions. They allow hearsay and a lot of opinion. I believe that officers could qualify as expert witnesses and give opinions. Most cases that have expert witnesses on both sides end up with some believed less than others. I see them asking Benteen question regarding his own choices but also giving his opinion as an expert witness.

If I understand you correctly than yes time and distance can change circumstances especially when the mode of transportation is a horse and each individual soldier is on a horse and the variance of endurance and speed is unlike anything the cavalry now experiences motorized.

How long can a battalion move at a gallop and still be effective?
Is the target stationary or moving? Is there an urgency that would cause you to burn up the horses ability to maneuver in the long run in order to react to an immediate short distance threat?


2] And you're also saying that what he said, while sitting there in that chair at the RCOI might not have been the same thing he thought at the time of the battle. Or vice-versa. And that was completely acceptable, of course, under the circumstances. And for each and every circumstance, whether the past or present statement contradicting was true or not.

And I trust that these same principles, by their very human nature and also by a certain horse sense, must also of necessity be accorded to the other commanders?

I think they do. I hold Reno accountable for knowledge that if they retrograde at a true gallop and are involved in QCB they will separate over time from any formation at the beginning and will run out of revolver ammunition. I also believe that officers have to make choices that result in high casualties.

I truly believe there is a limitation to a horse soldiers ability to make choices based upon the horse. Long distance is most likely to be at a trot or walk. Closing in for combat then some trot and military gallop. Engaging in close quarter combat or moving away from a threat then a true gallop. Terrain effects the choice of a gait. Steep slopes require a walk and/or extended spacing between troopers.

A motorized vehicle can travel at speed as long a the fuel holds out and the terrain permits. A horse is limited to relatively short distances at gaits above a trot. I believe that Custer moved down Reno Creek at that top speed for covering a distance greater than 10 miles by mixing a trot and military gallop.

I can drive my LE truck fast over long distances if necessary but can't go a long distance at a gallop on my horse.

So back to Benteen's decision making is it a long distance say over several miles, an unknown distance or is it less than 2 miles and if he doesn't make it then all goes bad. The exact mph numbers aren't as important as the principal of deciding which gait to use.


AZ Ranger

[benteen]

I believe in attempting to ascertain Benteens thought process, you have to look at all the factors involved and not just the note. The old what did he know and when did he know it.I believe the following,

Benteen....A rider, Sgt Knipe, says he has a message for the packs. Benteen doesn't discuss anything with him, but rather sends him to McDougall. On the way Knipe blurts out "Hurrah boys we got them". 10 minutes later Martini shows up with the note. In it the packs are mentioned twice, thats 3 messages for packs. Benteen now questions Martini. Whats the situation, what are the hostiles doing Martinis answer Their running away, as he put it "Skedaddling".He also says something about Reno riding through the village. The other part of the message is ambiguous. Benteen cant come quick dragging 70 mules with him. He can come quick or bring mules he cant do both.Based on all of this I think a reasonable person could believe that 8 companies of US Cavalry have successfully attacked an Indian village and that Custer's main request was for more ammo. Benteen was not about to burn out his horses when it didn't appear that it was necessary

Custer... I pound him enough so I would like to cut him a little slack this time. Custer has no idea that Knipe was sent (If he was sent) and certainly doesn't know that he has run at the mouth saying" Hurrah boys we got them". Custer also didn't write the note, Cooke did.Is it possible, and I say possible that Custer told Martini "Go to Capt Benteen and tell him more than we thought, they are attacking not running, I need you right away, and tell McDougall to bring up the packs"Cooke a fine Officer, knew Martini had problems with English and wrote the note trying to incorporate Custer's order, but it just didn't come out right

If there is any blame for this mis-communication I believe it is on Knipe and Martini for running at the mouth and giving wrong information and perhaps a little on Cooke for the contradictory message. Not Custer or Benteen.

Be Well
Dan

[jag]

Oct 31, 2011 7:52:26 GMT -6 AZ Ranger said:

In an attempt to understand your reasoning....

1] What you're saying is that his words/testimony doesn't matter. Because time and distance can change circumstances. And from what little we do know, that distance or time doesn't even have to be over 1 1/4 mile, and-or over the time it took him to go there.

I think what occurs at a court of inquiry deviates from court procedures on what is admissible or the nature of the questions. They allow hearsay and a lot of opinion. I believe that officers could qualify as expert witnesses and give opinions. Most cases that have expert witnesses on both sides end up with some believed less than others. I see them asking Benteen question regarding his own choices but also giving his opinion as an expert witness.

If I understand you correctly than yes time and distance can change circumstances especially when the mode of transportation is a horse and each individual soldier is on a horse and the variance of endurance and speed is unlike anything the cavalry now experiences motorized.

How long can a battalion move at a gallop and still be effective?
Is the target stationary or moving? Is there an urgency that would cause you to burn up the horses ability to maneuver in the long run in order to react to an immediate short distance threat?


2] And you're also saying that what he said, while sitting there in that chair at the RCOI might not have been the same thing he thought at the time of the battle. Or vice-versa. And that was completely acceptable, of course, under the circumstances. And for each and every circumstance, whether the past or present statement contradicting was true or not.

And I trust that these same principles, by their very human nature and also by a certain horse sense, must also of necessity be accorded to the other commanders?

I think they do. I hold Reno accountable for knowledge that if they retrograde at a true gallop and are involved in QCB they will separate over time from any formation at the beginning and will run out of revolver ammunition. I also believe that officers have to make choices that result in high casualties.

I truly believe there is a limitation to a horse soldiers ability to make choices based upon the horse. Long distance is most likely to be at a trot or walk. Closing in for combat then some trot and military gallop. Engaging in close quarter combat or moving away from a threat then a true gallop. Terrain effects the choice of a gait. Steep slopes require a walk and/or extended spacing between troopers.

A motorized vehicle can travel at speed as long a the fuel holds out and the terrain permits. A horse is limited to relatively short distances at gaits above a trot. I believe that Custer moved down Reno Creek at that top speed for covering a distance greater than 10 miles by mixing a trot and military gallop.

I can drive my LE truck fast over long distances if necessary but can't go a long distance at a gallop on my horse.

So back to Benteen's decision making is it a long distance say over several miles, an unknown distance or is it less than 2 miles and if he doesn't make it then all goes bad. The exact mph numbers aren't as important as the principal of deciding which gait to use.


AZ Ranger

Then by this line of reasoning, it extending to Custer's substantial decisions in particular. When and not specifically where his orders were sent from, should indicate by those very orders, whether or not he should change the orders of his subordinates to achieve initiative over his foes. True or not? And would not such orders, as you stated by the fluid nature involved (mobility, horse not foot), depend upon communication distance as to whether that commander, sending those orders, thought it possible to achieve the orders he would send? And, would not the responses given by the subordinate, after the fact, be in accord with achieving that same initiative over those same foes?

Fred's observation that there was no mention of Reno in those orders sent back to Benteen indicated what? As Benteen openly testified at the court, he thought those troopers in the valley was Custer's. As there was no mention of Reno in those orders, the orders as Benteen himself knew, meant that he should go to Custer not just some random place on his own hook. The evidence of that is in the very nature of the orders themselves. "He needed Benteen and ammo (not clothes, clothes pins, pots and pans, hard tack and coffee) in order to deal with a very fluid situation."- [wild]. And I might add, you don't send for a coffee grinder when you need a Gatling gun or troops, and Custer didn't and wasn't sending for the coffee grinders, Benteen knew this, and said as much at the COI.

[fred]

Oct 31, 2011 8:45:02 GMT -6 jag said:

... you don't send for a coffee grinder when you need a Gatling gun or troops, and Custer didn't and wasn't sending for the coffee grinders, Benteen knew this, and said as much at the COI.

Well put, "jag." And without knowing your entire point, I agree with this assessment. As Benteen himself said, when he reached the river and saw the diverging trails, he found himself "on the horns of a dilemma." If diverging trails weren't enough, the dilemma was compounded when he saw the action in the valley.

Up to this point, Benteen's only impressions were, (1) GAC wanted him to show up... along with the packs; and (2) based on Kanipe and Martini, matters were pretty much well in hand. The real dilemma occurred at the river and the decision was made easy for Benteen when he was directed up the bluffs by the Indian scouts. The packs would follow and any immediacy (as seen in the valley) seemed to be moving up toward the hills and not remaining in the valley. At this point Benteen still had to assume eight companies of the regiment were all together and paying hell.

To be honest, I am additionally impressed that Benteen-- with all he could figure from what he saw downstream-- made the move up the hills as rapidly and as determinedly as he did, without waiting to bring the packs. A lesser officer-- and I have known some-- would have been considerably more cautious and would have waited for the packs to come up, and then have moved-- cautiously-- toward the action, bringing the whole kit and caboodle.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[jag]

Oct 31, 2011 9:05:13 GMT -6 fred said:

Oct 31, 2011 8:45:02 GMT -6 jag said:

... you don't send for a coffee grinder when you need a Gatling gun or troops, and Custer didn't and wasn't sending for the coffee grinders, Benteen knew this, and said as much at the COI.

Well put, "jag." And without knowing your entire point, I agree with this assessment. As Benteen himself said, when he reached the river and saw the diverging trails, he found himself "on the horns of a dilemma." If diverging trails weren't enough, the dilemma was compounded when he saw the action in the valley.

Up to this point, Benteen's only impressions were, (1) GAC wanted him to show up... along with the packs; and (2) based on Kanipe and Martini, matters were pretty much well in hand. The real dilemma occurred at the river and the decision was made easy for Benteen when he was directed up the bluffs by the Indian scouts. The packs would follow and any immediacy (as seen in the valley) seemed to be moving up toward the hills and not remaining in the valley. At this point Benteen still had to assume eight companies of the regiment were all together and paying hell.

To be honest, I am additionally impressed that Benteen-- with all he could figure from what he saw downstream-- made the move up the hills as rapidly and as determinedly as he did, without waiting to bring the packs. A lesser officer-- and I have known some-- would have been considerably more cautious and would have waited for the packs to come up, and then have moved-- cautiously-- toward the action, bringing the whole kit and caboodle.

Best wishes,
Fred.

Fred,

That was the entire point as far as I'm concerned.

The mistake, if anyone is looking for one, was Benteen's. What Benteen should've done after finding the diverging trails and what he did do afterward was his mistake to own. Those trails, both of them should have been investigated to their fullest extent possible before making a determination of which trail he should've taken to complete his orders. As with any situation like this when in close proximity to the foe, time is of the essence, a fact Benteen also knew. The problem I see with this is that there were two diverging trails of shod horses. And for him to make the determination that it was Custer's battalion in the valley after following just one of them was a false assumption on his part, as he knew there was yet another trail of shod horses leading downstream on the other side of the river. What he would have done afterward on the bluffs, after examining both trails, is anyone's guess seeing the situation at the time would not have substantially changed. That is, if the trail Custer took was over the bluffs.

Benteen stated to the court that he lost track of Custer's battalion somewhere in the vicinity of 45 minutes after he departed. What doesn't make any sense is if Custer had went over those bluffs, why didn't Benteen see all or some part of the 225+/- men who rode over it with him? Haveing gone there and witnessed this area atop those bluffs, it's inconceivable to anyone who stands there, that he didn't see them going over it, that is, if that's what they did. And it's why I most respectfully disagree with those who say that he did. (Second point here Fred. Not that I'd find agreement on this point at all. Just putting it out there for thought.)

[AZ Ranger]

Then by this line of reasoning, it extending to Custer's substantial decisions in particular. When and not specifically where his orders were sent from, should indicate by those very orders, whether or not he should change the orders of his subordinates to achieve initiative over his foes. True or not? And would not such orders, as you stated by the fluid nature involved (mobility, horse not foot), depend upon communication distance as to whether that commander, sending those orders, thought it possible to achieve the orders he would send? And, would not the responses given by the subordinate, after the fact, be in accord with achieving that same initiative over those same foes?


Not sure what your point is here. There was a failure to comunicate sufficent detail to Reno and Benteen to achieve the initiative over those same foes in my opinion. Custer moved away from Reno Creek at a gallop according to Martin and Thompson. I don't see a failure as an example of Custer's planning ability and communication skills on that day.

As far as the pack train until Benteen exits Reno Creek he is between the Indians and the pack train. When he decides to move up the bluffs he no longer blocks a route across Reno's first crossing. The Indians at that point could attack the front of pack train if it moved on its own toward the crossing or its flank and rear if it followed Benteen to the bluffs. How far from the pack train could Benteen move once he decided to move to the bluffs?

This is an example of a real time decision making for the answer of a particular question. Benteen reads the note and current conditions place him between the Indians and the pack train.

Did the note indicate which side of the river the village was on? Seems Custer depended on Martin to fill in a lot of detail.

Gibson's recon only helped Benteen to reach a decision to not continue on. It did not establish a location for a single Indian. Was it possible that the Indians could move south before a messenger from Benteen could arrive to Custer's location. I would think they could if that was thier desire.

Apparently Indians were running away down Reno Creek and never observed by Gibson. My point is that recon information gets old quickly in close contact and its value is less if not timely in the communication.

Benteen's messenger would be delivering a message that they saw no Indians in Reno Creek or in the portion of the LBH valley that could be observed. This would be shortly before or after Custer sends Reno after running Indians in Reno Creek.


AZ Ranger

["Hunk" Papa]

Oct 26, 2011 15:46:15 GMT -6 AZ Ranger said:

Hunk: I think Benteen should have sent a message upon mission completion also. That would be in line with normal protocols, unless Custer had said to him go out there and report to me if you run into anything, if not just come back and I will meet you (fill in the blank).

"That would be in line with normal protocol" is what I have understood from everything I have on military procedures both in 1876 and modern times. By that yardstick then, Benteen had no leeway in the matter he should have sent a messenger.

Did Benteen have a location to send a lone messenger to Custer? Nothing specific that I know of, but I venture to suggest that Benteen had seen enough of the maps of the area to have a good idea of the general direction that Custer/Reno had taken. Also, as he had not seen any Indians at all at that stage, he should have had no qualms about sending a lone messenger. After all, Custer had sent two to him, perhaps three if Stab's story is true.

2) A messenger sent from about 2 miles from the junction of from No Name and Ash Creeks, would have reached Custer at about the time of the Lone Tipi divergence or at worst, whilst Custer watered his horses at the North Fork of Ash Creek, as there were delays at both points to aid in the catching up factor.

We will never know how that information would have affected Custer's tactics, but if he had guessed that there was no flight south a firm confirmation to that effect could have alerted him to the distinct possibility that the Indians were not going to flee that day so that he would be facing a belligerent foe. Perhaps he would then have gone with Reno. The point is that the information from Benteen could have changed Custer's thinking, so it should not have been withheld.

3) You have sat there and I have read your posts on the matter on both boards so I am not going to try and second guess you. What Gibson saw even he vacillated about in later years, but he saw no Indians and at that stage believed he was looking into the LBH valley. Doubtless he reported as much to Benteen.

I agree with the point you make at (1) that it would have been easier to send a messenger via SFRC but by all appearances Benteen's command did not go that far west as it emerged into Ash Creek from No Name Creek or valley 3 as designated by Darling.

"Hunk" Papa

[fred]

Oct 31, 2011 9:52:47 GMT -6 jag said:

The mistake, if anyone is looking for one, was Benteen's. What Benteen should've done after finding the diverging trails and what he did do afterward was his mistake to own. Those trails, both of them should have been investigated to their fullest extent possible before making a determination of which trail he should've taken to complete his orders.

Jag,

Your points are absolutely valid if these were all the facts. I think, however, you are missing some. I do not remember where I saw this precisely-- and I do not believe it came out at the RCOI-- but Tom Weir, swung off onto the left shod trail (Reno's). Obviously-- at least I would think, obviously!-- he would have told Benteen the trail led across the river. So, Benteen would have known that was more or less a dead-end.

And for him to make the determination that it was Custer's battalion in the valley after following just one of them was a false assumption on his part, as he knew there was yet another trail of shod horses leading downstream on the other side of the river.

Again, armed with Weir's info and a look-see up the valley-- as well as what he saw down the valley-- any further waste of time would have been obviated by the mess down-valley and the scouts' instructions to move up the bluffs.

Benteen stated to the court that he lost track of Custer's battalion somewhere in the vicinity of 45 minutes after he departed. What doesn't make any sense is if Custer had went over those bluffs, why didn't Benteen see all or some part of the 225+/- men who rode over it with him?

My work tells me Benteen left the regiment at 12:10 PM. Forty-five minutes later would place the time at close to 1 PM, and by 1 PM, I have Benteen having last seen the Gray Horse Troop-- 12:40-- and still a good half-hour from No - Name Creek, climbing up and down ridges, probably some 3 miles south of Reno Creek. At 1 PM, Custer was at the lone tepee and there isn't a chance Benteen could have seen him or have guessed at where he was or what he was doing.

Haveing gone there and witnessed this area atop those bluffs, it's inconceivable to anyone who stands there, that he didn't see them going over it, that is, if that's what they did.

I agree with you, Jag, if this were the case, but I do not believe it to be so.

This whole thing goes back to something I have been preaching for years, ever since-- and maybe even before-- I came upon these boards. You-- the generic "you"-- cannot understand this battle without understanding the timing. If what you say, above, were the case, then Benteen would, of necessity, have to come under much greater scrutiny for his actions.

When you take his scout into consideration-- its route, its distances-- and you apply that to his watering at the, or "a," morass; then apply all that to his move down Reno Creek; add in his distance miscalculations regarding Kanipe and Martini; contextually add in the whole Reno affair, i. e., separation from Custer, crossing at Ford A, his move down the valley, the dismount, skirmish lines, pullback, retreat, mountain climbing, etc. (is there anything else for that "etc."?), we find-- or at least I find-- Benteen did about all he could have been asked to do, and were he here in front of us, we would be the ones answering his questions.

This lack of understanding of the times-- and this permeates this entire event over the years-- skews everything and causes "students" to cast blame where none should be cast. Of course, I am the babe crying in the woods, for few will heed what I say, their opinions, preconceptions, and prejudices much too far advanced for them to re-think or re-consider... or they will throw obscure nonsense into the fray-- much like my buddies, "keogh" and "conz" are wont to do. Others will quote John Gray, who, while condemning Reno and Benteen, also condemns George Custer-- quite inadvertently and unknowingly, I am sure!!-- for sheer military stupidity. As great a historian as Gray may have been, his work-- in my opinion-- has done more to divert us from the truth than Gray ever thought might bring us closer. It is almost as bad as reading Goldin, Korn, and Peter Thompson's accounts solely and claiming to know what happened at the LBH.

Best wishes,
Fred.

["Hunk" Papa]

Oct 31, 2011 3:08:06 GMT -6 wild said:

Hi Hunk
Our divergence of opinion appears to hinge on the interpretation of what constituted appropriate military tactics for Custer to use against the Indian camps and what he needed to consider in deploying those tactics. Perhaps therefore you could let have your views in that respect so that we at least have a benchmark from which to start
Custer had committed a blunder thus he had two challenges.1 To recover/stabalise the situation and 2 to reasses his options.
Falling back on Benteen was not an option.It was tantamount to admitting defeat.
Resuming the attack at MTC Ford with his puny force of 200 men had little or no chance of success.Likewise an attack across any other part of the river would result in total annihilation.
He has one card to play and that is calling up Benteen and reserve ammo.
Note:I'm refering to the ridge which runs from Calhoun Hill to LSH as Battle Ridge.Perhaps I'm wrong?
It will take Custer an hour to cover the distance from Weir Point to LSH travelling at 3.5 miles an hour.
On LSH we find our hero and 40 men and horses dead.There is no evidence of an organised fight and the rest of his force is scattered about 800 yards back along Battle Ridge.
If you can determine how long it took sufficent Indian forces to build up opposite Custer so as to be able to strike at him then you can suggest how Custer might have entertained himself and why he offered no serious resistance.

You have not really answered the question. He either did or did not move beyond MTC. If he did not, then your assumption appears to be that he went on the defensive along Battle Ridge and its environs. Is that correct?
We must clarify just where "Battle Ridge"is.

Best wishes

Richard, you start by saying ‘Custer had committed a blunder’ so before we can proceed, you will need to clarify what blunder that was, as he is accused of so many.

Without that information I am in no position to place your other comments into context.

I do confirm that my ‘Battle Ridge’ is the same as your ‘Battle Ridge’, otherwise known as Custer Ridge, so we are at least in accord there and you will now be able to answer my original question!

In anticipation.

Hunk

["Hunk" Papa]

Oct 31, 2011 13:59:28 GMT -6 fred said:

Your points are absolutely valid if these were all the facts. I think, however, you are missing some. I do not remember where I saw this precisely-- and I do not believe it came out at the RCOI-- but Tom Weir, swung off onto the left shod trail (Reno's). Obviously-- at least I would think, obviously!-- he would have told Benteen the trail led across the river. So, Benteen would have known that was more or less a dead-end.
Fred.

Fred,

From Hammer's "Custer in '76" Camp's interview with Francis Gibson, “When came to point where Custer’s trail parted from Reno’s Benteen said: ‘Here we have the horns of a dilemma. ‘ Gibson advised taking the right hand trail and says that Co. H, at least, took it. He does not remember Co. D taking the left, but sure that H took to right. Does not recall about Benteen personally taking to center between two trails.”

According to Godfrey from the same source, “When they came to point where Custer’s trail separated from that of Reno there was some discussion as to which one should be followed. The debate was settled by Weir starting off on the left-hand trail, following on after Reno, while the other two companies followed the right-hand trail. Benteen, with his orderly, took a mid-position between the two trails and went on ahead.”

I also recall that Edgerly said somewhere that his company, Weir’s, “got down near river" but I cannot find the source at present.

Hunk

[wild]

Richard, you start by saying ‘Custer had committed a blunder’ so before we can proceed, you will need to clarify what blunder that was, as he is accused of so many.

[wild]

Richard, you start by saying ‘Custer had committed a blunder’ so before we can proceed, you will need to clarify what blunder that was, as he is accused of so many.
He launched an uncordinated attack against an enemy of undetermined strenght over unknown terrain.This resulted in the rout of one column and the inability of the second column to press home it's attack.Further the attack went ahead at a time when the reserves were out of supporting range.