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Post by samruger on May 20, 2024 2:17:05 GMT -6
herosrest At the risk of agreeing with everyone on these boards, you and I have long held the view that this part of the fight was of a short duration, much shorter than many of the people who write about it would like to think. At one leval they need to fill their books with endless speculation and an over in less than an hour scenario would certainly mean a much shorter book. In fact the timing part is difficult, I just said an hour off the top of my head and I could well be wrong, but I definately feethat it was all over fairly quickly. I will respond to this as I'm making myself available for questions. Yes, the fight was of short duration. The reason for that is three fold and none of which are discussed here that I know of (I have not read all threads so I could be wrong.). The three factors are: 1. Grass 2. Indian ammunition 3. Weapon range Grass: In native accounts, Indians took off their head feathers so that they could not be spotted in the grass. Those same accounts mention Custer's cavalry taking off their hats for the same reason. Reno's men reported Indians using grass to get close to Reno Hill. This made the range very close. Archeology supports this: Michno, The Mystery of E Troop, pp. 51 – 52. He breaks the 1984 – 1985 archeological finds into 12 main areas. Furthermore, “ All areas had a mix of both Indian and army relics, while some had a predominance of one type over another to mark it as either a soldier or Indian position.” They were so close their relics were mostly in the same area. Indian ammunition: Ammunition for the Indians is a far more important factor than ammunition for the cavalry. According to Reno, a trooper carried 50 rounds and equipped with an ammo pouch by military design. Indians had no such military allotment. They had what they had. We know it's not much, because battlefield archeology shows Indians ran out of ammunition and resorted to firing captured 45-55 ammo, which broke in half in their barrels. The most common weapon found used by the natives was the .44 Henry. It held eleven rounds. It is not unreasonable to conclude such a Henry owner went into battle with eleven rounds. Yes, he might have carried more, but ammunition was very, very expensive and the reason why US cavalry was limited to 20 practice rounds per year. In a war of ammunition, the Indians were likely to run out first. In order for that not to happen, the battle had to be short. Weapon range: This factor seems to completely ignored on the site. The cavalry is said to have had "long range" weapons and the Indians were firing from Greasy Grass Ridge, requiring even longer range weapons. This is all BS. A trooper could hit a standing Indian at 200 yards and a prone one at 100, provided he could see him in the grass. The Indian .44 Henry owner had serious problems as well. Two were posted on this forum: The owner of a .44 magnum Henry: "Ian, bullet drop is hellish, sliding ramp sight would help, so would tangs with peep. Indians did not have them. I do ok out to 150 yds. or so on .44 mag with open sights, also hellish drop."
This poster had a .44 magnum and twice stated the "hellish drop". The Indians did not have .44 magnum. Their bullet drop was even "more hellish", over 8 feet at 300 yards. They also lacked elevation sights, so 150 yards would be a "lucky shot". It tells us the Indians were less than 150 yards from the troopers to hit them. But we can get more precise than this: Another poster: "I was a mapping scientist and looking at aerial photos and the tools available on Google Earth, I call into question lot of things based on mere ballistics.
As pointed out in a previous post, only a fool would be shooting at a target 400 yards away with a weapon using a pistol cartridge that was effective out to around 200 yards. The Indians were also using captured .45-55 cartridges in their .50 rifles. It shows to me, that despite what some would have us believe, the Indians knew little to nothing about the ballistics of rifles. They were just "boom sticks" to them. They pointed and shot. A .45 bullet would literally rattle down the barrel of a .50 rifle. The number of recovered .45 cartridges that were split due to firing them in a larger bore was substantial.
The percentage of recovered Henry cartridges that exhibited multiple firing pin marks indicates that Indians were using dirty guns with fouled chambers or with worn firing pins and it took using the catridges in multiple guns before it finally discharged. Another indication of poor marksmanship."
"Dirty guns" is a sign of not being cleaned. Spent gunpowder in an uncleaned barrel is highly corrosive to the rifling, making it inaccurate. We are now well under 150 yards to hit a trooper. The lack of magnum ammunition and corroded barrels would make the Indian range about 100 yards (I found evidence of 70-115 yards.). A cavalry trooper was trained to fire from a kneeling position in grass because to fire prone meant the grass would obstruct his view. The Indian coming towards him, crawling prone in the grass, was invisible to him. At 100 yards though, they could both hit the other. Who hit the other first, the prone Indian or the kneeling trooper? One shot, one dead trooper (And the Indian's Henry still has ten rounds left). The lifetime of a trooper was the time it took for an Indian to get within 100 yards and see him kneeling, head above the grass. This is a description of Company C at Calhoun Coolee. The troopers there fired very few rounds as they saw nothing to shoot at, only to be sniped themselves from within the grass. If the Indians crawled at just 1/2 mph towards them, they could reduce 300 yards to 100 in just 13 minutes. That's your battle time, the time it takes to eat a short meal. Let's call it 15 minutes and 15 minutes later, Company C is at FF Ridge. The real battle is now 30 minutes old. To ride from FF Ridge to LSH at just 5 mph, is about 10 minutes. If Custer has just raised his flag on LSH and he lasts 20 minutes, it's over in an hour. I doubt Company E lasted 20 minutes in Deep Ravine. So your timing is going to be pretty close.
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Post by shan on May 20, 2024 4:34:35 GMT -6
Samruger
I bow to your knowledge with regards to the weapons, some people like yourself have a vast knowledge about paractical things like timing, weapons, be they dirty or otherwise, not to metion what type of military proceedure was in use at the time. Unfortunately being one of those people whose head is up in the clouds I'm afraid I don't, so as I say, I bow to tour knowledge.
With regard to whether Custer acually went to the ford D's, unlike some I have an open mind. It's quite possible that he left the two companies he had with him in and around the LSH area whilst he and a few others went down there to have a look for h themselves. In other words, he was acting in much the same way that Thompson tells us he did around Medicine Tail ford. Personally, I have some difficulty believing everything Thompson had to say, so let's leave that to one side.
Instead, I'd like to take a step back for a moment. I think most of us can agree that the two wings eventually united on Calhoun hill. In spite of the fact that most Indians who were watching probably thought they were witnessing a retreat, I think his command was under very little pressure so far, although both wings will have been aware that the Indian numbers were growing and would soon become a problem.
Whilst they were down at medicine Tail For, Custer's wing will have become aware that the leval of gunfire coming Reno's end of the field was diminishing, and that as aconsequence, his part of the command may have retired, which in turn may have been a factor as to why Custer didn't press ahead and cross the ford to attack the village.
Likewise, those who were moving across Luce and Nye Cartwright ridges would have been aware of Indians moving towards them from the Weir point area, and not only that, given that they must have had several binoculers between them, they may have been able to look between the gaps in the hills and seen Reno's men arriving up from the river, indeed, they may have seen Benteen's arivel. In which case there was plenty to talk about and mull over when they met up with Custer.
No one knows how long they talked for, given what we know of Cuter's charactor, I wouldn't think they talked for long, even so, given the news, why then did Custer elect to spilt the comand once again, and then move further North? What practical purpose was it meant to serve? Even more baffling, given that Keoughs wing would find itself coming under intense pressure shortly after he left, if he didn't actually take his wing off towards the fords D's, why then didn't he rush back to help them? Questions questions.
One more question which has nothing to do with the battle but has everything to do with spelling. Given that I tend to write my contributions in a terrible rush, almost as if I'll forget what i want to say if I don't get it down, I find myself so absorbed I haven't got time to worry about simple things like spelling until I'm finished. So, where on these sites can I find the spell check tool? I have one on my 21 year old Mac, but the poor old thing won't operate on these sites.
Shan
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Post by herosrest on May 20, 2024 17:13:09 GMT -6
1. Bugles were selected because they could be heard further than drums and fifes. 2. Bugles do not reach to 2,000 feet. Signal flags were developed in 1860 in order to cover 2,000 feet which bugles could not. 3. Trains do not, and never have, used bugles. 4. Buglers had 28 different signals. Which one would order Keogh to LSH? Anyone? 5. Would the firing of Company L not be louder than anything heard from LSH? 6. Custer sent bugler John Martin back to find Benteen. Why didn't he just have Martin bugle him? As it is my understanding that "Along the line from Calhoun to Custer Hills, it is possible to hear the klaxons and horns of trains travelling along the railroad in the valley." I assume the same applies to Reno Hill? 7. Bugles were used from platoon level to regiment. A Civil War regimental front was about 100 yards per 400 men, or 250 yards (750 feet) for 1,000 men. A bugler at the center of this front, under battle conditions, would appear to have a range 325 feet. There is Indian participant comment that trumpeters blew in unison. Trumpeter Martin was despatched with written orders because Benteen was beyond the range of bugles. Garryowen and the timber there are at a distance of two miles from the area of Greasy Grass Hill and mouth of Nth Medicine Tail. Regardless of your ideas about effective range pf a bugle, when stood at Calhoun Hill, Custer's Hill, and Butlers also, the horns of trains running through the valley can be heard on those heights. Without knit picking, i'd appreciate your source on the distance since it will assist my own knowledge. Added. The call would be repeating rally. To the flag. Of course Custer didn't have his flag on LSH. We know this because Yellow Nose took it.
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Post by herosrest on May 20, 2024 17:41:23 GMT -6
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Post by Yan Taylor on May 21, 2024 12:41:13 GMT -6
HR, you can have a B♭ or a B# (which is really a C) but no ♭ B# ![:)](//storage.proboards.com/forum/images/smiley/smiley.png) Ian
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Post by herosrest on May 21, 2024 12:54:51 GMT -6
Not intentionally, I agree. 'Spit boy. Spit!' ![(rofl)](//storage.proboards.com/forum/images/smiley/rofl.png)
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Post by herosrest on May 21, 2024 15:55:27 GMT -6
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Aug 2, 2024 9:04:39 GMT -6
Custer scholar Bill Rini, tweaking Dr. Charles Kuhlman's theory about the reaction caused by the appearance of Weir's company at Weir Point, argues that Keogh saw Weir's company and believed it was Benteen's battalion, and then deployed a skirmish line to Finley Ridge to facilitate the battalion's movement to Calhoun Hill:
Using Kuhlman's text as his starting point, Rini says the following:
The impatience (not to give it a harsher name) on the part of Weir, laudable as it was in intent, led Keogh to make a premature move that turned a safe holding action into a series of ambuscades for his troops which resulted in destruction.
Keogh was perfectly safe as long as he remained in his position on Calhoun Hill. He did not require any assistance there, and hence there was no need for Reno to make haste. But it was necessary that after he, or any of his troops, did start, they should come through promptly in order to support any commitments of Keogh to facilitate their passage.
The Weir Ridges can be seen plainly with the unaided eyes from Calhoun Hill when general visibility is not abnormally low. Through field glasses, troops on the Weir Peaks, especially mounted troops, would stand out like a forest against the skyline. Custer was expecting these troops to be on his trail. He had sent two very urgent messages ordering them to follow him with all possible speed.
There can be little doubt that every officer on Weir Point knew where Custer was fighting, though they could not see the troops. They, or most of them, knew also that he had been fighting for at least an hour.
If the situation up to this time was substantially as we have described it we are forced to the conclusion that what Keogh now did can be explained only on the assumption that he had seen Weir's troop on the high ridge and thought that Benteen was there with his whole battalion. Any other construction makes his action incomprehensible.
The purpose of the skirmish line on Finley Ridge was undoubtedly to facilitate the passage of Benteen, either by holding back the warriors in Deep Coulee and the Henryville position below Calhoun Hill or closing in on their rear if they left to oppose Benteen.
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Post by johnson1941 on Aug 8, 2024 5:18:20 GMT -6
Some one may need to check Kuhlman's timing on this..was Keough even among the living when Weir got to Weir Peaks?
Hare, letter via Harper "The three advanced troops, D, M, and K in the order named, reached the hills overlooking Medicine Tail Coulee and the region to the north. We could see people over there on what is now known as Custer Ridge but could not distinguish whether they were Indians or soldiers. There were some of them riding fast. I think by the time we got down there they were finishing up the wounded and mutilating. Finally, the Indians, seeing us in this position, started for us."
Godfrey "The Indians were seen by them {edgerly & weir} to ride about what afterward proved to be Custer's battlefield, shooting into the bodies of the dead men or killing wounded men"
Wylie / Morris Men dismounted and put horses behind Edgerly peaks and behind hill to east and men formed line over this hill from east to west, seeing many horsemen over on distant ridge with guidons flying Weir said "That is Custer over there and mounted up ready to go over, when Sergt. Flanagan said: "Here, Capt. you had better take a look through the glasses, I think those are Indians. " Weir did so and changed his mind about leaving the place. Accordingly the men were dismounted and the horses led behind the hill.
Edgerly, who arrived in advance of Weir {Weir} then asked me if I would be willing to go down with only D troop, if he could get permission to go. I told him I would. He then walked towards Colonel Reno and Benteen, and very shortly came back, mounted his horse, took an orderly with him and went out in the direction from which we had heard the firing and which had then almost wholly ceased. I supposed that he had received permission to go out with the troop (though he afterwards told me he had not, and had not even asked for it), so I mounted the troop and followed him. ... We moved along on that bluff for a short distance, when the Indians commenced to fire on us. The troops were all dismounted, formed on the top of the ridge and returned the fire. This firing was kept up about half an hour ... Q. What was the distinctness of that fire you heard down in the valley? A. It was perfectly distinct.... Q. How long did that firing last? A. I judge about three-quarters of an hour, the scattering fire and all. Q. How long after you joined Major Reno on the hill until that movement you speak of was made down the stream by Captain Benteen and his command? A. About three-quarters of an hour. Q. How long was it after you came up on the hill till you went out with D Company? A. About 30 or 35 minutes.
Q. Was the pack train then up? A. No, sir, it was not up till after we left and we did not leave till all the heavy firing ceased.
Q. Do you think they were killed within 20 or 25 minutes from the time you joined Major Reno on the hill? A. Yes, sir, after the first firing I heard.
A...When we got on the ridge we saw a good many Indians riding up and down firing at objects on the ground.
Hare, WMC While out with the advance D Co. the indians were thick over on on Custer's Ridge and were firing and at that moment Hare thought Custer was fighting them {hmm...}
Varnum A. I started along with A Company for a while and as that was near the river I started up ahead again. I had no command at all. About a mile and a half from there I joined Captain Weir’s company. That was on the far point of a long range of high bluffs which ran along the right bank of the Little Big Horn. I went on to where his company was dismounted and firing at Indians who seemed to be coming from out on the prairie and turning back.
“After helping with the wounded I joined Capt. Weir with the advance. We moved to a point that overlooked where Custer’s fight took place, but it was covered with Indians riding in every direction. A considerable firing was heard but there was no body of troops in sight. I saw some white objects that I thought were rocks, but found afterwards they were naked bodies of men”
Q. Did you see the point at which Captain Weir halted after he moved down the river? A. Yes, sir, I was on that point. Q. Was it possible for the column to have got any farther in that direction, having reference to the number of Indians and their position? A. I can only speak in reference to the time I got there. Then the whole force of Indians seemed to be turning back against us. It is possible that we could have gone farther but I doubt whether anyone would have moved any farther at that time because the Indians were all coming as fast as they could in our direction.
Standing Bear “We saw soldiers coming on a hill toward the south and east. Everybody began yelling: ‘Hurry!’ We started for the soldiers. They ran back toward where they had come from. One got killed, and many of us got off and couped him.”
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Aug 8, 2024 9:08:05 GMT -6
Some one may need to check Kuhlman's timing on this..was Keough even among the living when Weir got to Weir Peaks? [SNIP] So now you assert that Dr. Kuhlman was horrendously off in his timeline, that he was wrong for believing that the Custer fight was not over when Weir arrived at Weir Point. Wow. Okay. Kuhlman read every participant source you cite, and he arguably spent more time at the battlefield than any other historian/scholar/researcher, yet he rejected your view. If you've read Kuhlman, you know he bent over backward to be fair to Reno and Benteen, yet he did not buy the myth that the Custer fight was over when Weir arrived at Weir Point. But, you and a handful of other Custer critics say he was wrong. I take it that you haven't seen, or that you reject, the timeline that Custer scholar Bill Rini and other veteran researchers developed back in the mid-2000s? I take it you reject Harper's analysis on this point? Obviously, you prefer to believe the old myth that the battle was over before anyone reached Weir Point. In point of fact, the evidence indicates that Custer's five companies held off their attackers for approximately 2 hours before being overwhelmed. Rini notes, "The officers clammed up pretty tight, leaving the impression that the battle was already over when they got there. However, the enlisted men tell a different story. When you factor in the length of time they actually spent atop WP (at least 2 hours and maybe a good deal more), I think we can dispense with the idea that the battle was finished before they arrived." If you've read Harper, you know that he agreed with this analysis. Rini and many other veteran researchers put Weir's arrival on the Weir Peaks at 3:15 PM. They also contend that Benteen et al did not arrive there until 5:00 PM. The Custer fight ended at around 5:10-5:20. One of Benteen's big lies was that he closely followed Weir to Weir Point, that he left Reno Hill soon after Weir did. In fact, Benteen waited nearly 2 hours before finally leaving Reno Hill. Part of the consensus timeline regarding the Custer fight: * 4:20 - 4:30 p.m.: 1st Sgt. Butler and Cpl. Foley ride off southwest from Finley Ridge in a desperate effort to reach the troops seen on the Weir Peaks. Butler's horse is shot down in the vicinity of Deep Coulee where he is unhorsed. Cpl. Foley crosses over Deep Coulee and ascends what is today called Butler Ridge, where he shoots himself in the head. Keogh's Last Stand in the swale is now over and the surviving troopers of I, C & L fight their way -- or simply run -- dismounted towards Last Stand Hill. Most do not make it. Lt. Porter and between 10 - 20 survivors of Keogh's battalion do manage to reach Last Stand Hill. Lt. Harrington is shot and killed by pursuing warriors in South Medicine Tail Coulee east of Sharpshooter Ridge. The survivors of Keogh's battalion rally with 1st platoon of E Co. under Lt. Smith on Last Stand Hill. E Co.'s 2nd platoon under Lt. Sturgis maintains its skirmish line on the upper southern edge of Cemetery Ridge protecting the led horses in the small basin area beneath them and holding open the route down to the lower Cemetery flats. The main detachment of C Co. -- just over 20 men -- remains cut off from support on Finley Ridge. D & M Troops remain on the Weir Peaks, meanwhile, Reno has just given orders to prepare to advance the remaining elements of the Regiment, pack train and rear guard to the north to seek a junction with Custer. * 4:30 - 4:40 p.m.: Reno begins his advance with the remaining 7 companies, halting a short distance north of Reno Hill to await the arrival out of the valley of the Herendeen group of 14 survivors from the valley fight. On Last Stand Hill preparations are being made to prepare the wounded -- which might include Lts. Smith and Reilly -- for transport from Last Stand Hill to Cemetery Ridge by the 1st platoon of E Co. along with the few survivors of the Keogh battalion. The main detachment of C Co. remains cut off from support on Finley Ridge. Meanwhile F Co.'s 1st platoon under Capt. Yates, along with Custer's HQ staff continue moving southwards into the next area of low ground known today as the 'Big Basin'. They dismount there and begin to deploy on the high ground just south of this basin (and overlooking the lower reaches of Calhoun Coulee) in an effort to support the withdrawal to their position of the C Co. detachment now cut off and trapped on Finley Ridge. * 4:40 - 4:50 p.m.: The led horses and spare ammunition of E Co. are held in the low ground just below their position. The horses of F Co.'s 2nd platoon are kept in the same area. The horses of Yate's 1st platoon are in the 'big basin' area; F Co.'s 2nd platoon under Lt. Rielly are deployed on the small ridge between these two basins, while their 1st platoon has deployed on the next ridge line on the south end of the 'big basin' to prepare to cover the withdrawal of C Co.'s detachment on Finley Ridge to their position. Reno continues to delay his advance with the remaining 7 companies of the Regiment while resupplying the arrival of the survivors from the valley fight. With the destruction of the Keogh battalion, a number of warriors in and around Deep Coulee, Calhoun Hill and Finley Ridge notice additional troops on the Weir Peaks and begin to move that way. Godfrey and Benteen, tired of waiting, begin to advance to the Weir Peaks once again. Reno attempts to halt this advance through his trumpeter but his orders are ignored by Benteen and Godfrey. At this critical juncture, the suicide boys mentioned by John Stands in Timber's account launch their mounted charge over the top of Cemetery Ridge and down into the northernmost smaller basin just below Cemetery Ridge, stampeding the led horses of E & F Co. being held there. They are supported in this charge by additional warriors coming up from Deep Ravine to join them in the small basin. Upon reaching this basin, the suicide boys split up, with some driving the led horses of E & F Co. down to Deep and Cemetery Ravines, and the rest swinging up towards the remaining troopers on Last Stand Hill. 2nd platoon of F Co. deployed on the ridge to the south of the small basin and the 2nd platoon of E Co. under Lt. Sturgis, dismounted on the southern edge of Cemetery Ridge, turn and race down into the small basin where their horses are being stampeded by the suicide warriors. This move is noticed by warriors who spoke of seeing about 40 troopers running dismounted from higher ground down into the small basin towards Deep Ravine. Seeing the loss of their horses and spare ammunition contained in the saddlebags, the platoons of E & F Co.'s charge down into the basin in an attempt to recover their mounts, and more importantly, their ammunition. This charge into the basin of roughly 40 troopers was accompanied by Mitch Boyer. Yate's 1st platoon and Custer's HQ staff, now deploying around the big basin area further to the south immediately move to mount up and ride to the ridge immediately north of the big basin (where 2nd Platoon of F Co. had been) in an effort to provide support for this attack. * 4:50 - 5:00 p.m.: On reaching that ridgeline, Yate's 1st platoon and Custer's HQ staff see two things occurring at once. In the small basin below them they see the horses of E & F 2nd platoons being stampeded down into Deep and Cemetery Ravines with both dismounted platoons following them down into this ravine in an effort to retrieve their mounts. At the same time they notice the other half of the suicide boys charging uphill directly towards the position of 1st platoon of E Co. (under Lt. Smith) on Last Stand Hill. Custer makes a quick decision to gallop Yates' 1st platoon and his HQ staff back to Last Stand Hill in an attempt to hold that position and rally the survivors of Keogh's battalion and provide support there for his remaining platoons now fighting for their mounts in Deep Ravine. Nearly all of the suicide warriors who made this charge are killed by the troopers. * 5:00 - 5:10 p.m.: Custer is able to briefly stabilize the situation on Last Stand Hill and orders whatever remaining horses there to be shot down as breastworks at the top of the hill. 6 horses of the survivors of C Co. are thus dispatched in this manner, providing breastworks for Custer's HQ detachment. Capt. Benteen and Lt. Godfrey arrive and deploy on the Weir Peaks with H & K Co.'s and Reno has begun his advance northwards with the remaining troops and pack train under his command. Some warriors begin to converge on the high ground south of Medicine Tail Coulee in reaction to the troops on the Weir Peaks. D Co. moves to the forward slopes of the Peaks and deploys there to confront them. * 5:10 - 5:20 p.m.: As the 2nd platoons of E & F Co.'s -- most dismounted except for the officers and a few NCO's -- continue their dismounted charge from the basin into Deep Ravine, following their stampeded horses directly towards the river and Ford C, hundreds of mounted warriors follow them off Cemetery Ridge down into the basin. Some of these warriors assault the remaining troopers on Last Stand Hill, who direct their fire westward against these warriors in the basin and on Cemetery Ridge. While the troopers on Last Stand Hill were focused on repelling the attack west of Last Stand Hill, they were hit from behind by mounted warriors east of Last Stand Hill, wherein the fighting on Last Stand Hill devolved into melee combat, ending in the death of the remaining troopers there. At roughly the same time, the C Co. detachment isolated on Finley Ridge come under heavy attack. About 7 - 9 troopers from the Big Basin area mount and race up Calhoun Coulee towards the troopers of now fighting on Finley Ridge but most are killed before reaching it. The remainder of C Co.'s detachment soon after go down fighting on Finley Ridge. During the final minutes on Last Stand Hill, the remaining troopers under Porter and Sturgis who had made it into Deep Ravine -- Boyer had likely been shot down a short distance before reaching the ravine -- were killed in the attempt to recover their horses by warriors positioned on the high ground above and on either side of Deep Ravine shooting down into the ravine. Roughly 28 men were killed in this fashion with several making it to the river and at least one trooper -- Pvt. William Brown of F Co. -- making it onto the west side of the river before being shot down. Both Porter and Sturgis were killed in or near Deep Ravine or the west side of the river, with Sturgis possibly being captured alive and burned later in the evening. The troopers in Deep Ravine were killed at roughly the same time as the final troopers were killed on Last Stand Hill, ending the final action on Custer's field at about 5:20 p.m. Groups of warriors now begin engaging in long range skirmishing with D Co. out on the forward slopes of the Weir Peaks. * 5:10 - 5:20 p.m.: The warriors from the Custer Fight begin to head south to the bluffs to confront the troops now seen skirmishing on the Weir Peaks with warriors who had reached this position earlier. Getting back to Kuhlman for a moment, it is interesting that Custer critics don't like Kuhlman, in spite of his eminent qualifications and high standing among other historians. Why do Reno-Benteen apologists dislike Kuhlman? Because he rejected too many components of the Reno-Benteen version of the battle, even though he accepted and even defended certain other parts of their version.
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Post by johnson1941 on Aug 8, 2024 9:20:25 GMT -6
Nope. I dont assert that. I DO point out that just about EVERYONE who was actually there asserts it.
I do assert, also per those there, that Kuhlman’s take of the Weir advance sucks.
Remember - garbage in garbage out, which is again why I dont trust your heroes to get it right. {i.e. see Philbrick, kuhlman, etc}
If at all. He was near there though, along the bluffs behind. Not an issue here, but see Harper re: timing
Edgerly, who arrived in advance of Weir {Weir} then asked me if I would be willing to go down with only D troop, if he could get permission to go. I told him I would. He then walked towards Colonel Reno and Benteen, and very shortly came back, mounted his horse, took an orderly with him and went out in the direction from which we had heard the firing and which had then almost wholly ceased.
A...When we got on the ridge we saw a good many Indians riding up and down firing at objects on the ground.
Godfrey, WMC "The Indians were seen by them {Edgerly & Weir} to ride about what afterward proved to be Custer's battlefield, shooting into the bodies of the dead men or killing wounded men"
At this time Weir's and French's troops were being attacked. Orders were soon brought to me by Lieutenant Hare, Acting Adjutant, to join the main command.
Godfrey, diary We got on some very high bluffs and large numbers of Indians were seen on some bluffs about two miles away but the firing had ceased except an occasional shot.
Corporal George Wylie, or Pvt Morris “Seeing many horsemen over on the distant ridge with guidons flying, Weir said, ‘That is Custer over there.’ And mounted up ready to go over, when Sergeant Flanagan said: ‘Here, Captain, you had better take a look through the glasses; I think those are Indians.’ Weir did so and changed his mind about leaving the place. Accordingly the men were dismounted and the horses led behind the hill.”
Sgt John Ryan, M Troop We went in that direction for probably half a mile until we gained a high point and could overlook the Indian camp and the battlefield. We saw at a distance of from a mile and a half to two miles parties whom we supposed were Indians, riding back and forth, firing scattering shots. We thought that they were disposing of Custer’s wounded men, and this afterward proved to be true.
Varnum, 2nd narrative, harper “After helping with the wounded I joined Capt. Weir with the advance. We moved to a point that overlooked where Custer’s fight took place, but it was covered with Indians riding in every direction. A considerable firing was heard but there was no body of troops in sight. I saw some white objects that I thought were rocks, but found afterwards they were naked bodies of men,”
Q. Did you see the point at which Captain Weir halted after he moved down the river? A. Yes, sir, I was on that point. Q. Was it possible for the column to have got any farther in that direction, having reference to the number of Indians and their position? A. I can only speak in reference to the time I got there. Then the whole force of Indians seemed to be turning back against us. It is possible that we could have gone farther but I doubt whether anyone would have moved any farther at that time because the Indians were all coming as fast as they could in our direction
Or not. The officers as shown above, and the NCO & enlisted men, were pretty specific. Not sure what Rini was talking about here. See above.
Hare "Returned right away was gone from Reno about 20 minutes. ... "Just as {Hare} got back he looked and saw Co. D advancing toward Custer. They were some distance out but still in sight. Thinks other 6 cos. did not advance until at least a full hour after Reno retreated up" ... "When I reported to Major Reno he told me to go and tell Captain Weir, who had gone while I was gone for the pack train, to open communication with General Custer, and he would follow as soon as the pack train came up." … "{Hare} found Edgerly out ahead but says Edgerly did not hold his advanced position more than 10 min. M, K and H cos. were strung out along bluffs behind Co. D parallel with river but no co. quite up to Co. D." {Edgerly: "We moved out and went to a point which I now mark “9.” Hare's point 6}
"The three advanced troops, D, M, and K in the order named, reached the hills overlooking Medicine Tail Coulee and the region to the north. We could see people over there on what is now known as Custer Ridge but could not distinguish whether they were Indians or soldiers. There were some of them riding fast. I think by the time we got down there they were finishing up the wounded and mutilating. Finally, the Indians, seeing us in this position, started for us."
Q. What was the reason of Captain Weir’s ceasing his movement in the direction of General Custer’s battlefield? A. The whole country in front of him was covered with Indians.
Harper French, Godfrey and Benteen reached the Weir Point area at about 6:00 p.m., after marching for twenty minutes. French brought his M Company up onto a ridge just behind Weir’s D, while Godfrey took position on a spur just to the east of both of them. Benteen, who had supposedly been so anxious to see what could be seen, put his H Troop by file along the lower ridge closest to the river.
In the meanwhile, of course, Weir and Edgerly had long since reached the high ground down the bluffs, at approximately 5:10 p.m.
Some one may need to review the timing. I suggest that to include Weir arriving at 3:15...
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Post by lakotadan on Aug 8, 2024 10:44:18 GMT -6
My friend, mikegriffith1,
In your previous post you stated,
“At this critical juncture, the suicide boys mentioned by John Stands in Timber's account launch their mounted charge over the top of Cemetery Ridge and down into the northernmost smaller basin just below Cemetery Ridge, stampeding the led horses of E & F Co. being held there. They are supported in this charge by additional warriors coming up from Deep Ravine to join them in the small basin. Upon reaching this basin, the suicide boys split up, with some driving the led horses of E & F Co. down to Deep and Cemetery Ravines, and the rest swinging up towards the remaining troopers on Last Stand Hill. 2nd platoon of F Co. deployed on the ridge to the south of the small basin and the 2nd platoon of E Co. under Lt. Sturgis, dismounted on the southern edge of Cemetery Ridge, turn and race down into the small basin where their horses are being stampeded by the suicide warriors. This move is noticed by warriors who spoke of seeing about 40 troopers running dismounted from higher ground down into the small basin towards Deep Ravine. Seeing the loss of their horses and spare ammunition contained in the saddlebags, the platoons of E & F Co.'s charge down into the basin in an attempt to recover their mounts, and more importantly, their ammunition. This charge into the basin of roughly 40 troopers was accompanied by Mitch Boyer. Yate's 1st platoon and Custer's HQ staff, now deploying around the big basin area further to the south immediately move to mount up and ride to the ridge immediately north of the big basin (where 2nd Platoon of F Co. had been) in an effort to provide support for this attack.”
And also,
"4:50 - 5:00 p.m.: On reaching that ridgeline, Yate's 1st platoon and Custer's HQ staff see two things occurring at once. In the small basin below them they see the horses of E & F 2nd platoons being stampeded down into Deep and Cemetery Ravines with both dismounted platoons following them down into this ravine in an effort to retrieve their mounts. At the same time they notice the other half of the suicide boys charging uphill directly towards the position of 1st platoon of E Co. (under Lt. Smith) on Last Stand Hill. Custer makes a quick decision to gallop Yates' 1st platoon and his HQ staff back to Last Stand Hill in an attempt to hold that position and rally the survivors of Keogh's battalion and provide support there for his remaining platoons now fighting for their mounts in Deep Ravine. Nearly all of the suicide warriors who made this charge are killed by the troopers.”
I don’t know, that does not make any sense to me.
Now (to me) troopers running after their horses directly into the oncoming path of the charging Native Americans, to try and catch their horses (whom they probably knew they could never catch up with), just seems wrong (and a suicidal type move).
And I also remember reading about how the dust and smoke was so thick below Last Stand Hill that even the Native Americans ran into each other while on horseback! So, how could the troopers even see their stampeded horses?
Then the troopers running into Deep Ravine to try to catch their horses is just another suicidal move. Deep ravine was just a killing field (once in it you are not getting back out of it alive) and I think the troopers would have tried to avoid that at all costs.
Maybe the about 40 troopers that ran were trying to form some sort of skirmish line?
Am I missing something?
Of course, this is all just my opinion!
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Post by samruger on Aug 9, 2024 8:58:08 GMT -6
1. Bugles were selected because they could be heard further than drums and fifes. 2. Bugles do not reach to 2,000 feet. Signal flags were developed in 1860 in order to cover 2,000 feet which bugles could not. 3. Trains do not, and never have, used bugles. 4. Buglers had 28 different signals. Which one would order Keogh to LSH? Anyone? 5. Would the firing of Company L not be louder than anything heard from LSH? 6. Custer sent bugler John Martin back to find Benteen. Why didn't he just have Martin bugle him? As it is my understanding that "Along the line from Calhoun to Custer Hills, it is possible to hear the klaxons and horns of trains travelling along the railroad in the valley." I assume the same applies to Reno Hill? 7. Bugles were used from platoon level to regiment. A Civil War regimental front was about 100 yards per 400 men, or 250 yards (750 feet) for 1,000 men. A bugler at the center of this front, under battle conditions, would appear to have a range 325 feet. There is Indian participant comment that trumpeters blew in unison. Trumpeter Martin was despatched with written orders because Benteen was beyond the range of bugles. Garryowen and the timber there are at a distance of two miles from the area of Greasy Grass Hill and mouth of Nth Medicine Tail. Regardless of your ideas about effective range pf a bugle, when stood at Calhoun Hill, Custer's Hill, and Butlers also, the horns of trains running through the valley can be heard on those heights. Without knit picking, i'd appreciate your source on the distance since it will assist my own knowledge. Added. The call would be repeating rally. To the flag. Of course Custer didn't have his flag on LSH. We know this because Yellow Nose took it. 1. How many buglers did Custer have at LSH to blow in unison? What would they blow? Because none of the 28 commands would summon Keogh. "Rally to the flag" would be obeyed by Company's E and F. Would Keough be able to hear them over the firing of Company L? Even if you were correct about bugles, which I soundly deny, it still places Keough within deliberate signal range of LSH 2.Regardless of your opinion of train horns, trains do not use bugles. Your example is worthless. 3. Custer had the 7th Cavalry battle flag on LSH. It was found pinned beneath the body of Corporal John Foley three days after the battle and sold at auction. 4. Source for regimental battle front: emergingcivilwar.com/2014/09/03/a-matter-of-tactics/#:~:text=More%20typically%2C%20a%20regiment%20in,under%20fire%2C%20often%20in%20timber.
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Post by mikegriffith1 on Aug 10, 2024 15:59:24 GMT -6
Aug 8, 2024 7:18:20 GMT -4 johnson1941 said: Some one may need to check Kuhlman's timing on this..was Keough even among the living when Weir got to Weir Peaks? [SNIP] "Someone may need to check Kuhlman's timing"?! No, the problem is that you are about 70 years behind the information curve. I take it you have not read Kuhlman? BTW, Harper agreed with Kuhlman on a 2-3-hour duration for the Custer fight, and on the fact that it was quite some time after Weir arrived before the Indians left the Custer area and headed toward Weir's locale. Way back in 1951, Kuhlman debunked the claim that the Custer fight was over when the first troops reached Weir Point, and the claim that hundreds of Indians came at the soldiers soon after they arrived there. Indeed, debunking these two myths was one of Kuhlman's major contributions, if not his most important contribution. Of all the lies that the pro-Reno witnesses conspired to peddle at the RCOI, these two were perhaps the biggest and most crucial, and Kuhlman exposed them piece by piece with irresistible logic and evidence. Said Kuhlman, Most of the witnesses contrived to leave the impression that Weir’s company was under heavy attack from the time it arrived on the ridge, Reno saying that he, Weir, kept up a heavy fire even during his first brief venture in advance of the rest. Benteen said that they had been there only a few minutes before the gorge filled with warriors rushing up to attack. . . . Both Reno and Benteen were especially emphatic in their opinion that Custer and his command had been wiped out long before they started downstream to join him.{42}
But this was not the impression they had left on the mind of Lieutenant Maguire right after the battle. Maguire, reporting to the Chief of Engineers for the fiscal year ending June 30, 1876, said of the action on Custer field: “This part of the fight did not, from all reports, last over two or three hours.”
Two or three hours!
What a difference time and circumstances had made! In the testimony the estimates ranged from fifteen minutes to an hour and a half.
Since Maguire could not have had any reports except those of the very same officers (with the exception of Weir, French, and Gibson) with whose testimony we are dealing, we are given an opportunity to see to what extent their statements were influenced by the fact that they were under attack. (p. 170)Gordon Harper spent many pages explaining why the Custer fight must have lasted 2-3 hours and debunking the claim that the Indians assaulted Weir Point soon after the soldiers arrived there.
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Post by johnson1941 on Aug 10, 2024 17:25:14 GMT -6
Make it 150 years, cause the information from most everyone actually there - as quoted and confirmed re: the 1/2 dozen above - said the Indians were mopping up. Edgerly Wylie, & Varnum were among 1st to get there. These are valuable witnesses. Godfrey refers to what Edgerly and Weir saw.
Harper also had Edgerly getting there 2 hrs after ‘your’ 3:15 timeline. Once again shows why I prefer the confirmed info/statements provided by actual witnesses (which in this case didn’t even include Benteen or Reno).
Relying on kuhlman? Again? Okaaay. Too many errors. Talk about ‘myths’…we can see how they get started.
Edgerly A. No, sir, it was not up till after we left and we did not leave till all the heavy firing ceased. We moved along on that bluff for a short distance, when the Indians commenced to fire on us A...When we got on the ridge we saw a good many Indians riding up and down firing at objects on the ground.
Godfrey “The Indians were seen by them {Edgerly & Weir} to ride about what afterward proved to be Custer's battlefield, shooting into the bodies of the dead men or killing wounded men"
Varnum Q. Did you see the point at which Captain Weir halted after he moved down the river? A. Yes, sir, I was on that point. Q. Was it possible for the column to have got any farther in that direction, having reference to the number of Indians and their position? A. I can only speak in reference to the time I got there. Then the whole force of Indians seemed to be turning back against us.
Standing Bear “We saw soldiers coming on a hill toward the south and east. Everybody began yelling: ‘Hurry!’ We started for the soldiers. They ran back toward where they had come from. One got killed, and many of us got off and couped him.”
Lt. Maguire, Report of 1876: ‘Of Custer’s fight we at present know nothing, and can only surmise. We must be content with the knowledge gleaned from the appearance of the field, that they died as only brave men can die, and that this battle, slaughter as it was, was fought with a gallantry and desperation of which the “Charge of the Light Brigade” cannot boast. … In the mean time, Custer had gone down stream and attempted a crossing at ford b but was met by an overpowering force…The column which retreated along the line B H E must have deen dismounted, and fighting along the whole distance, a portion of its men, taken to the ravine H for shelter… From H to E stretched a line of dead men at skirmish intervals…the indians must have been present in overwhelming numbers, for this part of the fight did not, from all accounts, last over two or three hours.”
From his failed flank attack at B to the final throes on the Ridge…per ‘all accounts Custer lasted not more than 2 or 3 hours’’? Not very specific, but sure…ok…less than 2 hrs seems right. Custer repulsed = Reno fighting=Martin heading back Benteen arrives=reno troopers reaching bluffs edgerly goes out down to Cedar then Weir Peaks
Now THIS would be good if it had more info, from French letter “I fear the information which you have received as to the duration of the combat of the five companies has much truth in it.”
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