Crows Nest & Line of Sight

[corbin]

From the mapping program that I have, virtually anything over 3200 feet in elevation would have blocked everything behind it for 2000 meters (1 1/4th mile). AT the 3300 foot elevations it increased exponentially out to 3250 meters (Just over 2 miles). For elevations at the 3400 foot elevations, everything behind it would have been blocked for 4500 meters (2 & 3/4th's miles). As a side note, because there are those places which do have 100 foot elevations, they still would have blocked everything behind them for 750 meters (abt. 1/2 mile). All of this is because the Elevation from which they were viewing from was so far away. The farther away the observation point the more the obstacle blocks. The only place with any certainty that they could have observed anything was the near zero gap in elevation at MTF, and this would have exposed about a quarter mile wide corridor in that direction. Of course careful shadowing of those areas behind the Reno Hill, Sharpshooter, Weir Peak area tells one alot more about what wasn't observed, ie. known/unknown that what here-to-fore has been taken for granted.

The best viewing times would have been in the dark. Any campfires still ablaze would have shown up. At night one can see lights from long distances. In a recent incident of note was the Christmas lights in another town we were going to view. It was of course after dark and one could see the lights from the town in question from a great distance. In the daytime, nothing could be discerned from that same distance, not even anything of the town where these lights from the town were seen the previous night.

Information on meters/miles conversion:

1 mile = 1 609.344 meters

1000 meters = 0.621371192 miles

250 Meters = 0.155342798 miles

500 Meters = 0.310685596 miles

750 = 0.466028394 miles

[Dark Cloud]

Insofar as location of a large village, smoke and dust would do it, even to those inexperienced. I still contend that was a good reason to ignore the Tulluch's area: no smoke seen north from Crow's Nest area or divide, and in aggregate with the trail's direction, no camp up north.

"The farther away the observation point the more the obstacle blocks." So, the area blocked by the Pentagon to a viewer standing at a distance of 6 feet from the wall of choice is less than the area blocked at five miles back? Elevation of the observation point would make it less of an obstacle at distance except for that flush against or near the opposite side of the obstacle.

[corbin]

Okay, good points Dark Cloud. I don't think either was observed from the Crows Nest or for that matter possible, except in large amounts. The Indians were sleeping off a night out celebration, so I'm not sure if dust or smoke would have been a factor once daylight came. Custer only sighted the dust when within about 2 to 3 miles of Ford "A", if I remember correctly, and he brought it to the attention of one of the Indians scouts, asking him, what it was.

[fred]

Custer had an obligation to send a scout down Tullock's Creek, to scout the creek valley and report to Terry on the findings.

By the 25th when the command was on Davis Creek near the divide, that obligation-- it its facility-- had passed. Herendeen should have been sent around 6 PM on the 24th when the command passed the gap separating the Rosebud valley from Tullock's. Once on Davis Creek it was clear to Custer and everyone else, that there were no Indians camped in Tullock's valley, so it is understandable that sending someone was a waste of time... to Custer. Of course it may have been clear to Custer, but it wasn't clear to Terry and the last I checked, lieutenant colonels were still required to serve the wishes of a general officer.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

Apr 13, 2011 15:08:21 GMT -6 Dark Cloud said:

Elevation of the observation point would make it less of an obstacle at distance except for that flush against or near the opposite side of the obstacle.

Precisely. Thus, the difficulty in viewing the village, not only from close to 20 miles away, but because it was camped near the river and the bluffs came close up on the other side.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Dark Cloud]

If Tullochs had been scouted and there were Indians there or if there were not, for either scenario, what would Terry expect as a reasonable time for the scout to report to him, and where? Wouldn't he already know from his own scout if they weren't there, and if they were wouldn't he expect the scout to take a scenic route around?

I don't get the assumption that a large village would be in Tulluchs. Too crowded and vulnerable and two easily blocked exits. Like a village in Benteen's scout area made no sense once the land was seen. Custer's obligation was lifted with the 'unless you have reason to depart from these instructions....' phrase of Terry's, like everything else.

Also, I still think the land bore small resemblance to today, and it was heavy with dust, and that 20k horses just munching about would create a cloud, and that the perpetual fires of the camp would denote the city of which not a lodge was visible.

[AZ Ranger]

I would guess the pony herds were the best indicator of numbers of Indians. The ponies could also move so exact location of the village(s) was problematic. I believe Custer wanted to make sure the Indians if they ran would move toward Terry.


The smoke could hang a long time with little wind or wind could clear a lot of smoke so the smoke could help but would not be conclusive of numbers or exact locations.

AZ Ranger

[fred]

The problem I have with the failure to scout Tullock's is simple: Custer took away one of Terry's options.

The instructions in Custer's orders/"letter of instructions" were clear and Herendeen was attached for that specific purpose.

The Indians were "believed" to be in the Little Big Horn valley, but it was also believed they would be heading up the valley, not down and Terry's plans were drawn with that contingency in mind. Even John Gray wrote that Terry's plans did not envision the Indians moving north... and indeed, there is some evidence that when they left the Reno Creek encampment and reached the river, they turned south and camped there one night before game herds were reported north and they moved to the area of the battle.

Terry sent scouting parties up Tullock's... the Crows, as usual, failed miserably, and it was Bradley, I guess, who went the farthest before cutting cross-country.

When Terry wrote his orders/"letter of instructions" he believed Custer would be heading farther south up the Rosebud and not encountering a trail that cut sharply right and headed to the LBH.

Tullock's had been scouted a couple months earlier, as had the lower LBH valley, by Ball and Roe (I believe; my main file has been corrupted, so some of this is being winged), and while they reported to Gibbon that no Indians were there, it was believed generally that a modicum, certainly, of Indians could be there eventually and the whole idea of the campaign was to bag the lot.

My primary gripe-- again-- about Custer's failure to scout Tullock's, lies not so much in the decision-making process, i. e., Custer's following the trail rather than continuing up the Rosebud, but in his arrogance at taking away from a general officer that officer's prerogative of choosing routes. It would be extremely difficult for me to believe that these things were not discussed prior to the jump-off on June 22.

Without trying to stick it in your eye, DC, my own experience as an officer-- albeit only a company grade officer-- was that you do not tinker with a general's wishes. That may stick in the craw of a number of civilian never-weres who refuse to accept a military person's viewpoint on military matters as being something of added value-- again, you and my buddy "wild" seem to understand this rather well, unlike some others-- but it is that experience that makes me hold Terry's desires regarding Tullock's to be important.

There is no proof Terry would have used that as a route to the LBH, but he may have, especially in light of the difficulty he encountered in the route he did use. Again, Tullock's was a perfect and easy egress into the middle LBH area, especially in light of the belief the Indians were up-valley and not down.

The irony here-- or fortuitousness, if you will-- is that being wrong cost Custer his life. If they had been correct, Custer would have interjected himself between the Indians and Terry, very much like Reno did between Custer and Benteen.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[Dark Cloud]

The instructions were clear, including the exculpation if the officer on the ground felt there was reason to ignore them, which I'd assumed would apply to the Tulluck's part as well. The only realistic area for the camp was the northern part anyway, it looks like.

I still have issues with Tulluch's as an Indian campground except very near the Bighorn and so would be obvious to Terry's group. Not a huge runoff, not much water. It's a canyon the further south you go with bad ground on either side, and not all that protective, and if attacked, it's not like the Indians could spring to all points of the compass like on LBH, but to the two ends.

For the same reason, I would think it a bad choice for the Army, given the cover for ambush, as an entrance to the LBH by Terry. Bradley's write up does not suggest time share attractions.

I understand there is a rideable route, but small for all of Terry's guys. And if they were attacked in Tulluck's, what then? My impression is that it becomes not unlike Benteen's scout route in land and dangers. Suspect it's something that has to be decided on that ground, but supposedly the scouts would have known. I just find that whole aspect odd and reflective of the bad maps and dubious knowledge of the scouts, white and red.

Wild served, he said, apparently as a clerk of some sort. I never served at all.

[fred]

Apr 14, 2011 9:42:30 GMT -6 Dark Cloud said:

The instructions were clear, including the exculpation if the officer on the ground felt there was reason to ignore them, which I'd assumed would apply to the Tulluck's part as well. The only realistic area for the camp was the northern part anyway, it looks like.

Here is part of the rub, at least with me. I do not accept that phrase as exculpation, at least with certain specifics. Of course that is fodder for eternal debate, though I believe most military officers would take my side in that argument. I know AZ does not, however.

I still have issues with Tulluch's as an Indian campground except very near the Bighorn and so would be obvious to Terry's group.

I agree with you, but remember too, DC, no one expected that large a village. I am sure that by the time Custer began his move on the 22nd, Bradley's findings had been discussed. They pointed to a village of some 380 to 400 lodges, and I do not know if Boyer expressed any doubt to Terry, Custer, or Gibbon that the abandoned sites he saw when he was with Reno were not simply the same village, moving south. Interesting poser!

Bradley's write up does not suggest time share attractions.

Good one!

I understand there is a rideable route, but small for all of Terry's guys. And if they were attacked in Tulluck's, what then?

Well... that was the danger along the entire route, Ellis to Pease and beyond, Fort Lincoln west.

My impression is that it becomes not unlike Benteen's scout route in land and dangers.

Less difficult to maneuver; rather a straight-shot as opposed to up and down ridges.

I just find that whole aspect odd and reflective of the bad maps and dubious knowledge of the scouts, white and red.

I agree... completely. I guess that is why Herendeen-- who seems to have been quite competent-- was sent along. It is almost that issue, precisely, which makes me believe Terry was adamant about the scout there.

Wild served, he said, apparently as a clerk of some sort. I never served at all.

I know you didn't, but it makes you no less an authority other than maybe as witness to the adrenaline rush and the crack of a bullet over your head. Some of our most brilliant strategists never served and as far as I am concerned, your knowledge and your humility about it counts for a lot. By the way, there is no sarcasm in that comment. Both you and Wild have shown a far better range of understanding than some West Pointers I know... of.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[fred]

By the way, "Wild" is doing a marvelous job next door eating someone else's lunch. A good show and well deserved.

Best wishes,
Fred.

[montrose]

I may not fully understand the arguments presented, so bear with me.

Tullock's creek. Terry's order was to send a single messenger from Custer to Terry on this line. This means that neither Terry nor Custer expected Indians in this area. One man is not sneaking past 10,000 Indians.

Intent. Terry gave Custer one of his own messengers. The purpose was to keep Terry, the commander of this expedition, informed of friendly and enemy activity.

The argument that Custer could use his own discretion applies to his own force. If Custer found that situation changes meant retaining his own messengers, so be it. Not sending Terry's messenger in response to Terry's direct order is mind boggling, and in and by itself justifies a relief for cause.

Tullock's creek was expected to be unoccupied. It was an easy avenue of approach to send a messenger from Custer to Terry to inform the commanding general of the situation.

Custer's decision to leave the Rosebud and cross the divide after the Indian trail is clearly within his orders and Terry's intent. Custer's refusal to send the messenger provided by his CG specified by his orders is not. If Custer lived, this issue would be prominent in his court martial.

[Dark Cloud]

I'm under the impression Custer was to scout upper Tulluck's in passing as Terry's guys were to scout lower, and that there was assumption of possibility of Indian presence. I don't think Tullucks was assumed to be the route of choice, but the object of investigation.

Any number of possibilities might at least delay a fast rendeavous by Herendeen with Terry, who might well have his own issues. If the Indians had been defeated and Custer and Herendeen were drunk, I doubt any charges would be filed.

Terry didn't exactly swing into action to notify Crook he'd been defeated, not knowing about the Rosebud himself.

I don't think it was a concern other than they didn't want two large clumps of soldiers to miss a village they had surrounded in Tulluchs.

I suspect Custer thought he'd be meeting Terry at roughly the same time Terry might meet up with Herendeen so dispatched if he had to circle round. Also, its reasonable to assume with the numbers about that a lone guy wouldn't make it at all, no matter how skilled.

[tel]

Apr 14, 2011 12:44:08 GMT -6 montrose said:

I may not fully understand the arguments presented, so bear with me.

Tullock's creek. Terry's order was to send a single messenger from Custer to Terry on this line. This means that neither Terry nor Custer expected Indians in this area. One man is not sneaking past 10,000 Indians.

Intent. Terry gave Custer one of his own messengers. The purpose was to keep Terry, the commander of this expedition, informed of friendly and enemy activity.

The argument that Custer could use his own discretion applies to his own force. If Custer found that situation changes meant retaining his own messengers, so be it. Not sending Terry's messenger in response to Terry's direct order is mind boggling, and in and by itself justifies a relief for cause.

Tullock's creek was expected to be unoccupied. It was an easy avenue of approach to send a messenger from Custer to Terry to inform the commanding general of the situation.

Custer's decision to leave the Rosebud and cross the divide after the Indian trail is clearly within his orders and Terry's intent. Custer's refusal to send the messenger provided by his CG specified by his orders is not. If Custer lived, this issue would be prominent in his court martial.

I think if Custer had lived he might have won the battle or at least come off with a draw that he would have claimed was a victory.

I have stood at the Eagles Nest and looked into the valley of the Little Big Horn. It was early morning (we spent the night in sleeping bags and rousted ourselves at around 4 AM to see what the scouts might have seen). Frankly, even with high power binoculars, we could see little. Even though we knew exactly where to look, it was hard to see. We stayed there, cooked breakfast and waited until the sun came up. Even in mid morning we could not see clearly. The haze was very apparent. I guess if we had had the highest level of technology we might have been able to see very well. And we had better tools than Custer did. But we could still not pick out anything specific.

[Dark Cloud]

I haven't been to Bertesgarten since 1965, and I couldn't see much of the LBH either, although that might be because the Eagles Nest is in the south German Alps. Only this chick Sarah somebody said she could see it.

I have high hopes the Crow's Nest in Montana will provide better results.

Custer was a spin doctor, but I don't think his mere survival would have generated a victory. Survival was an option till crossing MTC, and if he'd kept the regiment together earlier he might have fought a more successful fight on the supreme cavalry ground across the river.

I think Benteen had it right when he intuited the Indians had their s___ together that day and were of the correct mindset, and had rest and food and something dear to fight for, and were numerous. The 7th had none of that.