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Post by "Hunk" Papa on Feb 13, 2011 16:15:05 GMT -6
I tend to agree with "Jody," but don't think Custer wasn't aware of the odds. It is not like he wasn't told. Here is a snippet from something I am putting together: Second Lieutenant Winfield Scott Edgerly (Company D) said, “[T]he Indian’s village has been located in the valley of the Little Big Horn and the object (of the night march) being to cross the divide between the Rosebud and the Little Big Horn before daylight.” And Custer “… told the officers they would have the fight of their lives.” Apparently, Frederic Francis Gerard, the interpreter for the Rees, had told Custer he could expect to find 2,500 to 3,000 warriors, but either Custer chose to ignore the warning or he was confident the numbers did not matter. (Before leaving Fort Lincoln, Gerard told Terry there would be as many as 4,000 warriors if all those who had left the reservations united. )You don't have the "fight of your life" with 800 Indians. One of my major bones of contention with "Hunk" over the years is that Custer paid little heed to his scouts. Godfrey as well, admitted the officers messed up in reading the signs along the Rosebud. Apparently Boyer did not, nor did Bloody Knife for that matter. I doubt the Crows were bamboozled. Best wishes, Fred. Of course Custer knew he would face large numbers as had personally stated earlier that the 7th was likely to face as many as 1,500 warriors. Your comment about '800 Indians' is in fact, proof of that, because Custer would not have said such a thing if he had not known there were only 800. I am gglad you brought up our 'bone of contention' because it has lain fallow for far too long. Unless I have misub=nderstood their purpuse, I believe that the primary role of Indian scouts was to follow sign in order to locate the enemy so that the soldiers had a target to attack. Having achieved that purpose they were usually free to capture horses and plunder if they could. Crook's Apache scouts and the North's Pawnees are good examples, but in neither case have I come across any reference to their involvement in whether or not the soldiers should attack. This was understandable being that the usual army tactics were employed and generally successful. Custer's Crow and Rees scouts did their job in locating the village so that should have been the end of their formal duties, yet it is suggested that Custer, against all known army practice, should have been persuaded by his scouts not to attack the village that three separate army columns had spent weeks desperately trying to find before it broke up and scattered. I can well imagine the opporobrium that would have followed if Custer had reported to his superiors that he had been unable to prevent the village from scattering because, "My scouts told me that there were too many Indians for me to attack!" I am well aware that you believe that Custer was determined to attack from the minute he was given his mission but that is a debate for another time. In my view there is a tendency to forget that Custer's decision making was coloured by two factors that seem, almost casually, to get set aside. The first is that whilst listening to information from his scouts regarding the Indian numbers, he did not share their fear of the enemy, a fear engendered by something that the soldiers then and us now, cannot really comprehend, namely the powerful force inherent in the Plains Indian's spiritual belief in 'sacred things,' particularly the vision quest. The signs left by the Sioux as they travelled up the Rosebud, especially at the sun dance site, were interpreted by the scouts as meaning that the 'Dakota medicine was too strong' and the soldiers would be defeated. Now, we might scoff, but Custer knew what influence 'medicine' had on his scouts thinking and would therefore have believed that the scouts, even Bloody Knife and Bouyer, were capable of exagerrating the dangers out of fear. He would not however, have let that deflect him from his purpose. It is interesting that you quote Gerard's warnings about the large number of Indians the army was likely to have to face and you say that before leaving Fort Lincoln, "Gerard told Terry there would be as many as 4,000 warriors etc.," yet Terry nevertheless split his forces in the 'hope' that one of his two columns would find the Indians. Clearly then, Terry must also be guilty of paying little heed to his scouts but I don't see any such accusation being made against him, perhaps because Custer is an easier whipping boy. The second factor I refer to is the army's attitude to the level of threat posed by the hostiles. I have covered this on the 'Military Thought' thread but in essence my opinion is that Custer is criticised because he does not appear to have been overly worried by the enemy numbers but we also have both Gibbon and Terry showing blithe unconcern for the enemy. Gibbon in his April 21st letter to Terry, "...moved my camp alongside Fort Pease, where I am strong enough to defy the whole Sioux nation, should they feel inclined to come this way...The position here is so strong that one company can easily hold it..." and Terry in his cable of May 16th to Sheridan, "I have no doubt of the ability of my column to whip all the Sioux whom we can find"[/b] and this about the time of Gerard's warning. So Fred, in my view Custer did listen to his scouts but watered down their information as overstated by reason of fear. He understood what they were trying to convey but saw no reason to let that deter him from carrying out the prime mission of the summer campaign, to force the Indians to go to reservations. That was what the army was trying to achieve and with the belief that the Indian village to his front was about to flee he went on the offense to ensure, as he saw it then, the success of the mission. We know what happened but Custer's 19th century mental conditioning did not allow for such an outcome. Your servant sir! Hunk
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Post by blaque on Feb 15, 2011 5:22:57 GMT -6
Interesting research Jose. Have you done a comparison with the Chicago Tribune version? Said version may have been copied to do the original transcript as some say. bc Thanks, bc. I’ve had no occasion to compare the official text with the Tribune version. Anyway the work of the stenographers was quite defective, and many gaps in the original text –as you say– were filled with newspaper clippings from the Tribune. A shoddy piece of work, indeed. Jose
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Post by blaque on Feb 15, 2011 5:25:05 GMT -6
Hi Blaque, You'll be happy to know I'm practicing my Spanish 'r's' with no greater fortune but with such bitter devotion nobody will laugh anymore, at least to my face. More likely the benefit of being olde, but at least a sort of progress. DC, Congratulations for your advances with the ‘r’, but I pity you when you try to assail the ‘j’ –I mean the strong, old Castilian ‘j’, not the one blandly pronounced in Iberoamerican countries. Watch out for your larinx! Jose
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Post by blaque on Feb 15, 2011 5:28:35 GMT -6
About seven miles from Custer’s battlefield Captain Benteen watered his horses at a pool in the road.Was this written in 1876 or 1976? We know there is a road next to a morrass today but what road was there in 1876? Steve, That's an easy question – A road we do not know, of course! Jose
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Post by blaque on Feb 15, 2011 5:56:11 GMT -6
I guess I'd like to read that 1876 article in toto. Don't even know who the author was. Is it on the net somewhere? bc bc, The 1876 article is not signed, but it must have been written by James Joseph O’Kelly, who had been sent by the New York Herald as his best war correspondent, and arrived to Bismarck on July 17th. O’Kelly was an Irish adventurer who came to the USA after deserting from the French Foreign Legion in Mexico, and had covered the Spanish campaign against the Cuban insurgency (and imprisoned for a time in the El Morro castle), afterwards publishing “Adventures of a Herald Correspondent in Cuba” (1874). He also covered the 1884 British campaign in Sudan, and returning to Ireland became (farther) involved in politics. The NYH article in question is digitalized and available online, but not for free –I paid for it to an information provider resource site. Jose
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Post by blaque on Feb 15, 2011 6:06:19 GMT -6
But..... No opinion whatever on Boston-Martin? None? Nobody? Someone? Hello? DC, Besides the question you mentioned in a previous post, Martin was also asked by Recorder Lee “to tell what you saw while coming back”, and he missed that opportunity to talk of Boston; and at the question “did you make any halt going back?”, which was twice formulated by Lee, he replied “no” to both, spoiling a golden opportunity to refer his brief halt to talk with Boston. It’s strange that he waited 30 years to tell W.M. Camp of his meeting with Custer’s brother, and stranger still that his description of the episode mimics that of his meeting with Benteen. And it is all the more strange, because in those 30 years he did not keep silent at all. He was interviewed by newspapers like the New York Herald or the Trenton Evening Times, and corresponded with relevant people interested in the battle, like photographer D. F. Barry; on one occasion even fragments of a diary or notebook with some recollections of Martin’s army life came to light, including his ride to Benteen. In this way, different versions of his experience at the LBH surfaced on 1886, 1894, 1903, 1904, 1905, 1906 and 1907; all of them before the Camp interviews; and in none of them he said a word about meeting or seeing Boston Custer, not even in his notebook. Now the obvious question comes to mind. Wouldn’t it be possible that Camp and his usually leading questions made Martin believe that one of the straggling troopers he undoubtly passed by in his ride back, MUST have been Boston? Camp made a similar ‘deed’ with Peter Thompson, making him believe (at least until his return to the battlefield) that the ford he tried to cross on foot in June 25 was Ford B; and Col. Graham made something similar with Godfrey, convincing him to modify his recollection of Benteen’s arrival by no less than two hours. Martin, once convinced by the self-assurance of researcher Camp that for the sake of his own credibility he must have seen Boston, perhaps proceeded to embellish the story and give such identity to the unknown cavalryman who went past him asking –from a distance and without stopping– for the whereabouts of the command. If at the time Martin believed him to be a straggling trooper (as he probably was) it’s natural that he forget to mention him in his replies to Recorder Lee and to the press, because that was an absolutely irrelevant piece of information –but the General’s young brother catching up with the command all alone? Impossible to forget that, specially when interviewed by journalists always eager to uncover that kind of news, so cherished by the general public. The above explanation may be a bit convoluted but not at all unlikely, and decidedly is more charitable than the alternative –that Martin was deliberately telling a lie. Unfortunately, there is a precedent in Martin’s record about his lying on purpose. During his RCOI testimony, he gave many details about his ride to Captain McDougall, about which he was repeatedly questioned by both Lee and Gilbert. In none of his subsequent interviews, however, did he ever mention that ride; and when questioned by Col. Graham, he denied having ever carried a message to McDougall, saying that the Court “misunderstood me and made the report of my testimony show that I took an order to Cpt. McDougall. But this is a mistake” (Custer Myth, p. 291). Well, whoever reads Martin’s testimony will conclude that the alleged “misunderstanding” is an utter imposibility. The questions about that second ride were many and up to the point, and Martin’s replies were crystal clear. Only a particularly credulous believer in conspiracy theories could say that the Court did change Martin’s testimony for some dark purpose. In his press interviews, Martin is portrayed as very proud of his participation in the RCOI, on one occasion (in The State of September 30th, 1906) boasting that “his testimony swung the balance in Reno’s favor”, and that he still had “a copy of the report of the government board of inquiry”, probably from the Chicago Tribune. Bearing this in mind, I suspect that Martin told the truth to the Court about his ride to McDougall, told nothing to the press, and when directly questioned about it by one of the few men who knew the proceedings –Col. Graham– told him a lie. And I guess he did so on behalf of his beloved Captain, Fred Benteen, to whom he had inadvertently but blatantly contradicted on the subject of the order to McDougall, exposing him to the criticism of journalists and historians unless he retracted. IMO, with this retractation Martin wouldn’t be over-reacting, because to the sincere admiration he felt for his Captain (not uncommon among his subordinates) I think he also added a deep sense of gratitude for the personal help received in several occasions –albeit I only know of one incident, extracted from Martin’s diary and reproduced in The State quoted above. On May 29th, 1876, while camped on the Little Missouri river, Martin had “some words” with Chief Trumpeter Voss, who arrested him for insubordination and had him tied up to the picket line, strung up by the thumbs. Benteen hurried to the General’s tent, interceded for his bugler, and got from Custer that the matter would be investigated at their return to FAL. No doubt episodes like this helped to raise a strong sense of loyalty in Benteen’s subordinates, as perfectly shown by the case of Martin (if I’m right at all with my hypothesis!). Possibly only one thing remains to be done in order to settle whether Martin was right or wrong about his meeting with Boston: To check the questionnaire Camp submitted to Martin, or at least Camp’s interview notes on his answers. If we then find out that the subject was brought up by Martin alone, without being prompted by Camp, perhaps we should conclude that Martin, after all, met Boston, and that he kept silent about it at the RCOI because, as he explained to Camp, “it was not desired that he should tell all he knew” (Hammer’s Ci76, p. 101). My bet, however, is that the story of the Boston/Martin crossing paths was brought up by Camp and Martin made it his; not realizing, of course, that it might be used by some to tarnish Benteen’s reputation, accusing him of dawdling along his march. Jose
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 15, 2011 7:04:24 GMT -6
About seven miles from Custer’s battlefield Captain Benteen watered his horses at a pool in the road.Was this written in 1876 or 1976? We know there is a road next to a morass today but what road was there in 1876? Steve, That's an easy question – A road we do not know, of course! Jose Jose So maybe Bloody Knife wrote the article. It is amazing how often a "fact" comes from a writers imagination. Steve
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 15, 2011 7:25:07 GMT -6
So we think that Camp made up Ford B and that it was not common knowledge at RCOI where Ford B was located? We are to believe that Thompson thought another ford was Ford B more than 25 years after Ford B was used on a map at the court of inquiry.
It does show that Thompson was not interested in research to facilitate the correctness of his narrative.
I think his daughter's account regarding what he told her about his spurs is telling to the veracity of the narrative. He told her his hands were shaking so bad he could not fasten his spurs. Seems very truthful and believable but is quite different than what is in the narrative. It bothered me long before I heard of his account to his daughter.
AZ Ranger
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 15, 2011 10:02:53 GMT -6
I'm not willing to grant that Martin 'undoubtedly' ran into stragglers, either. This guy didn't know his horse was shot. I'm no horse authority, but what little experience I have had suggests a bullet entering a horse would provoke a set of tells to the minimally alert rider. Aural expression of distress, blood, limp.
Given the point of the RCOI, and the fact nobody mentions the meeting that would be the image citadel condemnation of Reno could be constructed around, I don't think it happened, and any correlation derived from timing such a phantom has to be let go and reevaluated.
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Post by bc on Feb 15, 2011 14:49:05 GMT -6
So did Voss call Benteen a dawdler on the 29th?
I guess this is the first that I've heard of the story about Boston talking to some officers at the morass that is part of dc's theory he posted. Guess I'd like to read this story.
I'm also trying to remember what the back story on Martini going to McDougal and why is it relevent at the RCOI? Just wondering why would Gilbert be trying to discredit Martini in cross examination if Martini's testimony ended up swinging the jury in Reno's favor?
bc
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 15, 2011 15:07:56 GMT -6
Boston's talking to some officers was quoted by blaque quoting a newspaper account. But Edgerly speaks of it page 264 in Gray2.
Also, without that meeting, the 'check' on times Gray formulated and anchored by it is gone, and the time frame changes, either tightens or expands depending on view.
Think what changes: if Boston told his bro squat of note, he did so before Martin was sent.
His time back to Benteen with a wounded horse would have been slower than granted. If Kanipe isn't recalled jogging back, the ten minutes dif in arrival time doesn't speak well of him OR TWC sent him back without informing Custer yet, who sent Martin with essentially the same message unaware of the duplication. OR Kanipe told the truth and wasn't necessarily expected to see Benteen going to the train, and Martin was just assurance Benteen was specifically informed.
But speeding up Boston to get him there before Martin left - or advancing the whole time frame later - cannot leave these scenarios unscathed.
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Post by fred on Feb 15, 2011 19:36:15 GMT -6
The problem with your theory Darkcloud, lies in the timing... as usual. There are too many other events dictating against the paths of Martini and Boston Custer not crossing.
Forget where Boston changed horses; forget whether McDougall was correct or SAD Bailey was correct. Boston was seen by Benteen's command at the morass. That gives us a specific starting time.
Up until that time, Boston was moving at a mere trot. From then on for him to reach Custer, he had to be bustin' it. Not ridiculously so, but busting it nonetheless.
You also have to accept Martini's RCOI testimony as to where he was given the note, viz, near the head of Cedar Coulee. That could mean near the approach or just a ways down. Immaterial. It's the distance that matters. Martini then tells us he saw Reno on the skirmish line... another time point.
Martini's horse is wounded... a speed issue, slowing him down.
Martini, on a legitimate mission, makes note of seeing Boston. Kanipe on a:
Column A: illegitimate... Column B: legitimate...
... mission, makes no note of it. And the two men arrive in the flats only a couple of minutes apart, meaning Kanipe had to pass Boston as well... or vice versa. But where was Kanipe? In the same gully the Rees hid their stolen ponies? It isn't far off the route.... Maybe he saw the two meet and decided he better chogie on out of there with some sort of plausible tale.
Using fast, but not unreasonable speeds, there is no way in hell Boston could have reached his brother until George was on Luce Ridge. For those who claim they met in MTC or Cedar Coulee, Boston would have needed after-burners. And these are the same clowns who tell us Custer walked at 3.9 MPH down Reno Creek because horses can't go "that" fast for "that" long. Or in formation! Yuk!
There are too many other events falling within the same time parameters for the two-- Martini and Boston-- not to have crossed paths. Maybe it was only a wave, but they had to have crossed. You have the Ree scouts-stealing-ponies situation; Reno-on-the-skirmish-line situation; Reno's-retreat situation; Martini's-arrival-in-the-flats situation; Kanipe's-arrival situation; Benteen's-arrival-on-Reno-Hill situation; volley-firing situation. All these are tied into specific times and all are related, one flowing from another. Boston could not have arrived before Martini was sent. Not unless you have Martini moving at 10 or 12 MPH up Cedar Coulee and you accept his 1922 narratives in place of his RCOI testimony.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 15, 2011 21:53:26 GMT -6
The other events, in some cases, are credited with certain times because of the meeting, and the meeting cannot, in circular logic, now be dependent upon these other events. There is evidence it did not take place, which we cannot shine on.
Without denying you could be completely correct, fred, you imply things are more solid than they are, in the same manner for which you, with fair reason, fault Gray. I don't necessarily agree with much of anything in Martin, but as I think blaque agrees, it is improbable to the nth degree that such a meeting would not be mentioned before three decades had passed. As I've complained about, we HAVE to start with the RCOI.
Martin's testimony is 2 brothers and a nephew, an amount reflected by the followup question. Nobody, reading about it in the daily paper, commented on such a thing if it were untrue, including Martini.
Edgerly says 'at about this time' - an expression nearly a chronometer in comparison with others - when Benteen joined Custer's trail Boston rode by and greeted Edgerly cheerily and isn't said to have stopped. A half mile later, if Gray is correct, when Benteen stopped to water at 1445 Boston kept going. The time of the initial meeting with Benteen was 1432 by Gray. But Edgerly is saying this a quarter century or near later, and throughout his testimony is as iffy as others. There's lots of time sponge in there alone.
Gray has Boston arriving at 1549 when Custer was at 'mouth of Cedar coulee'. He has Martin leaving at 1534. I don't see the horrible conflict and departure from physics if Boston - perhaps scared into a gallop by the action towards the end of his run - arriving at 1525 or 1530 and being seen with Custer on, but not at the top of, Weir Point. Because we have sworn testimony he was there and accounts that there were Indians of some amount on the high ground by Reno Hill.
Even here, we have to assume that he followed Custer's trail. That Kanipe didn't meet him is odd.
There is no testimony that the meeting took place; there is testimony that provides evidence it did not. The pain begins.
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Post by fred on Feb 16, 2011 5:39:57 GMT -6
The other events, in some cases, are credited with certain times because of the meeting, and the meeting cannot, in circular logic, now be dependent upon these other events. There is evidence it did not take place... Darkcloud, Let me give you a path into my thinking, my so-called methodology. First of all, I do not use a haphazard meeting as an independent axis for other events. To me, the Martini - Boston Custer meeting is simply another event that ties in others, not the other way around. If they never met-- as you imply... and could very well be correct-- nothing else would change. Even had Boston arrived-- as Gray claimed, without any modicum of proof, I might add-- at the bottom of Cedar Coulee, GAC would have acted no differently and in that case would never have known of Reno's retreat... my original theory. Correct me if I am wrong, but after reading your post I am under the impression that you feel Gray used that meeting in much the same way I claim "axes" in developing many of my own timing scenarios. If my impression is correct-- please forgive me: I have been up since 4 AM, unable to sleep after my first work-out in a year and a half, and I am groggy as hell-- then you can see why I doubt Gray's work as much as I do. My doubting of Gray is far more extensive than the solidity of certain events. And many of them, when added together, are more solid than we think. Certainly by inference or circumstantial evidence... which, at times, can be overwhelming... and all we have to hang our hats on certainly. I have cobbled together the testimonies or narratives of 82 red participants in the battle, 17 scouts and 65 warriors. Not a single one of those narratives supports Gray's contention of time and in fact, more than 40 refer to "time of day" in such a way as to directly refute Gray. When you add to that the only two accounts we have of officers referring to time, and Gray's entire thesis becomes invalid. Only the lame-brained amongst us-- or Gray's relatives-- deny this. (There is an idiot on the other board who continues to laud Dr. Gray in such glowing terms, despite the evidence, that he has caused me to doubt the future of mankind!) I have no issue with this at all. In fact, I wholeheartedly agree. When I started doing this time - line business more than three years ago, I made the decision not to include some of these of-no-consequence events. I changed that thinking in some sort of an attempt to include every known event, and since Martini's late-breaking news brought up Boston, I was forced to include it in some terms other than Edgerly's seeing him at the morass. My debt to you regarding the RCOI-- it's a bee-in-the-bonnet type thing; you stuck it there and it stung with good effect-- will be forever acknowledged and I see no reason to waver. My discomfort with the Martini - Boston meeting is palpable, but still needs inclusion for lack of anything better. It is like I said with Kanipe... he could-- not, did; could-- have hidden in a gully. (That equivocation is for the more strident buffoons who take issue with every damn misplaced word.) Yeah... and he also said he stood there alone with George. Of course that was at a later date. Then too, there is the language problem. I would believe "one brother and a Cookie" first, especially since we have an off-hand, rather matter-of-fact comment from DeRudio that that was in fact the case. Militarily, what makes more sense? What would you believe listening to a guy who didn't know his horse was shot? Not much. Again, Gray isn't correct, and AZ Ranger and "zekesgirl" proved it. Here's the tip of the cat's tail out of the bag: forget the time zone issue for the time being; that is not pertinent here. The command began crossing the divide at around 11:50 AM and at a walk, the regiment was on top of it or just across by noon, verifying Wallace's observations. OK so far? Agreement? At 12:03 Custer halted the column and he and Cooke went off to confer. (Think about that for a sec; would ol' George not have taken Cooke to watch Reno's imbroglio?) Some seven minutes later Benteen is issued his orders and begins to move. I took the topo map and figured a point about 1/4 west of the top of the divide and used that point as the halt/divide/orders spot. From there I traced a line that to me would be a likely line of advance for cavalry... you would want to chose the easiest route you could take. I traced that line to No - Name Creek where I stopped. It gave me the necessary ridges for "Hoot" Gibson et C'ie, wider contour lines for flatter advance, and the weird thing about it is that it drew me to the right because of the difficulty of moving straight. A minor "a-ha" moment when testimonies are considered. By the time I reached No - Name, my calculations showed me I had moved-- flat-line now!-- some 4 1/8 miles. If, as Benteen and others claimed, it took them some X-amount-of-time to travel that route before making the right turn down the small creek, then Benteen made this turn around 1:25 PM. That would be a speed of 3.3 MPH. A walk at best. AZ and "zekesgirl" confirmed that for me, and considering that this was a military mission after all, there was some modicum of haste included, especially since the first part of the journey was relatively easy and I have Benteen moving at a 6 MPH trot for that stretch. With nothing else to do but return to the main trail, I think it is reasonable to figure Benteen moved down No - Name at a speed of 7 MPH, a fast trot, and considering the man's personal steed, a speed that is far from unreasonable. This distance is approximately 2.9 miles, again, based on the topo map's contour lines, AZ and Terry's on-the-ground experience, and a reasonable angle of deviation based on testimony. That puts Benteen on Reno Creek at 1:50 PM... and Boston Custer is seen approaching them. At this juncture, Boston is 8 1/8 miles from a point just east of the divide which is where I have assumed he switched horses... again, based on McDougall testimony, not SAD Bailey's. This assumes speeds of up to 7 MPH for Boston, but an average in the range of 5.3 to 7 MPH... not unreasonable again. Now... you need to work all of this into a "Benteen-arrival-on-Reno-Hill" at some time shortly before 3 PM, which is when the overwhelming preponderance of testimony has him arriving. Of course Gray has this arrival at 4:20 PM, which is patently ludicrous, especially since there are so many other events tied to it. As you say, Gray had Benteen stopping to water at 2:45, which is almost irresponsible, as it would bring Benteen's average travel time down to about 2.8 MPH. While I can abide a 2.8 MPH pace up and down hills, the hills weren't that bad and that average speed does not allow for any variation over flat terrain, i. e., from the divide separation to the beginning of the hills and down No - Name Creek. To me, this is just another reason why Gray's work is invalid. Your reasoning is sound here, if speculative, but then again so much is. But Darkcloud, we have no sworn testimony-- at all-- that Custer was ever atop Weir Point. In fact, we have just the opposite. This is not "fact" by omission; this is eye-witness account. And remember, there were only three white people who saw Custer below Reno Hill. If we add in the Crows, we substantiate that even further. Yes... very. I am not sure I would call it "testimony." "Supposition" might be a better word. In my opinion, your strongest argument is with Kanipe. Why did he not make mention of it? Of course, we can also wonder if Kanipe was too busy hiding... again, in the same vicinity as the pony stealers' gully. After all, it is right there and the Rees reported seeing a soldier with stripes on his sleeve. That means they were fairly close. Best wishes, Fred. PS-- By the way Darkcloud, in my post # 56, that first line, "as usual," was not meant to be a shot at you. The "as usual" pertained to the fact I believe "timing, as usual," always seems to be the universal problem with this mess and if it can be resolved we can have more answers. FCW
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 16, 2011 8:21:26 GMT -6
Well, just to be consistent, if we're accepting the RCOI as the baseline for consideration, you have to start with the testimony that Boston was already there, accepted as fact by the Recorder and with no contrary evidence. You cannot cherry pick from the RCOI, but you can disprove it. Meanwhile, I'd think you'd have to start with that and work it backwards.
I don't follow why Custer would have to be on Luce Ridge before Boston got to him. I'm not sure that I'm in accord with your conclusions from AZ's ride, either, but he'd have to respond so I don't imply an opinion he does not hold in error. He had a map up. Does his route accord with yours?
I'm also not sure that details appearing for the first time years later, especially about time, since the oral canon allows melding of tales, reflect the memory of the account giver or the PC wisdom of the time the tale is recounted.
And again, Gray's contribution is irrefutably that even those who disagree with him, like yourself, HAVE to deal with HIM. He identified the existing chains, although he may have mismeasured them. He can be wrong, but the Custerland sandbox is dead.
I'm interested in seeing your theory lain out in detail, but sometimes, Fred, you seem to take anticipatory glee in announcing Gray in error more than in having obtained a link of truth or a refinement of truth. I worry that the creeping emotional goal of proving someone wrong rather than joy in obtaining fact can easily lead to error - if any, and only in the event you are in error for which I have zero evidence nor motivation to find any - and its inevitable public correction would be unnecessarily painful. Just because Custerland itself is painful.
I disagree with Gray's conclusions, but I take no satisfaction in it. That he pissed so many off is good enough for me. Removing what wasn't and isn't remotely possible - and there was a lot in that column out there pre-Gray - was a huge achievement.
Without Gray, imagine conz's theories today. Shudder.....
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