|
Post by michaelguth on Feb 15, 2012 21:44:54 GMT -6
Dear Quincannon,
Darling cites the size of the fleeing village band as about 100 with 50 warriors. He does point out that they were the first Indians 'flushed' during the campaign. So, there was about a company sized force of enemy warriors fighting an effective delaying action.
From Darling, page 204, "Some testimony from those who were near Custer at this time will illustrate what was in Custer's mind on sending Reno to the attack. Special note should be made of the fact that nowhere in the following quoted recollections of Custer's orders to Reno is there reference to the Varnum or Bouyer intelligence data suggesting hostile Indian habitation northwestward.....
As Custer's main force arrived at the lone tepee site, his (Custer's) attention was drawn to this fleeing village and its rear guard, scout Girard calling out "There go your Indians, running like devils."
Lt. George Wallace "The Indians are about two miles and a half ahead (the main encampment was further), They are on the jump. Go forward as fast as you think proper and charge them wherever you find them and I will support you. Dr. H.R. Porter specified Reno was to pursue and attack 'The Indians just ahead'. Sgt. Davern stated that Reno's orders were 'The Indian village is 3 miles ahead and moving, the general directs that you take 3 companies and drive everything before you. Sgt. J. Ryan, "We saw a few abandoned lodges, with the fronts of htem tied up. At this point I understant that Custer gave the command to Reno to overtake those Indians. Scout Girard, "He then ordered Reno to take his command and try to overtake the Indians and bring them to battle while he himself would support him".
As Darling notes, all these accounts deal with MOVING Indians, and not a stationary 3 mile long camp further north...
Regarding the Crow's nest Darling states that the Indian scouts could discern white horses within the enormous pony herd milling about, Custer saw nothing resembling this distinctness. Like Varnum, he did see some steep white buttes halfway down Reno Creek. Frustrated, Custer sat down to view again, commenting on his excellent eyesight and years of prairie experience. Finally, confessing failure with his own visual capacities he conceded to the Indian scouts that Sioux may be in the valley somewhere, but he could not tell where, in one or more villages, or in what numbers.
Darling alleges (i.e. no footnote, direct quote) that Custer ridiculed Mitch Bouyer, scouts Bloody Knife, Charlie Reynolds and the other Crows for having cautioned him that an enormous number of Indians were somewhere west in the LBH valley.
Darling is fair though in stating that Custer is reported ot have commented to his officers 'the largest Indian camp on the NOrth American Continent is ahead'. However, Custer is said to have told Herendeen and Lt. Godfrey that he, Custer, did not really believe the Indians were in the valley.
Darling does acknowledge that the Indian trail itself indicated that a vast number of hostiles were somewhere ahead west in the war zone.
Of course this is an assumption as well. I don't know whether anyone has looked at Indian sources to determine just how many Indians made the trail down Reno Creek, and whether the trail was fresh, or was a frequently used trail from the past....
Varnum made different statements of what he reported to Custer regarding the opposition faced by Reno. He does make it clear in one statement that he reported back to Custer AFTER Reno's attack was in progress. Perhaps Varnum's sighting of some tepees, the southern end of the main camp, was what sent Custer on his march to Weir Point.
My opinion is open, but here is how it currently makes sense to me. Custer sent Reno after a certain target. Custer sent Benteen south to look for Indians. Custer took himself north to look for more Indians. Custer assumed that Reno's force was sufficient to deal with 100 or so hostiles. There was no 'plan' to launch a two front attack against a 3 mile long Indian encampment to the north of Reno and Custer because no one had positively identifed the position or extent of the main encampment.
|
|
|
Post by michaelguth on Feb 15, 2012 22:01:17 GMT -6
No, I was actually arguing that Reno did not disobey orders, since his orders only applied to the fleeing village band, at least according to the testimony presented by Darling.
IMO Reno crossed the LBH with orders to pitch into a small number of hostiles, and quickly found his situation changed. He communicated this new intelligence to Custer and got no reply. I think Renowould have had his command destroyed had he remained mounted and attempted to advance into the south edge of the main encampment. But I admit that is my not terribly informed speculation. (Shooting a pistol from a horse is tough).
I am disappointed to learn that Fred thinks that there are significant errors in the new book on Reno's valley fight. It was next on my purchase list.
Most of my expertise is in ancient and renaissance, or pike and shot warfare. Again, my interest in LBH started with the chance to read a 'banned' book. I can tell you that the meaning of the order 'charge' is very controversial of itself. Just get into the debate over whether Swedish cavalry of the TYW 'charged' differently or more effectively than Imperial cavalry, who charged by moving to pistol range, firing, and then going to a fast trot boot to boot and sword in hand. According to Nosworthy, most Napoleonic cavalry charges were bloodless, one side usually giving way before contact. I wonder if 'charge' to Reno would have meant 'pull out your pistols and gallop wildly on your already winded horses at an evading enemy better armed than you for close combat,' or instead 'advance ASAP to effective rifle range, dismount and start applying your range and firepower advantage.? How do the military manuals of the late 19th century describe the tactids for a proper cavalry charge without sabers?
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on Feb 15, 2012 22:21:52 GMT -6
Dear Mike: No one calls me dear except Fred, but he was in the 1st Division and they are more polite then most.
If what Darling describes through you, and that was exactly the way it played out Custer was the dumbest SOB on the planet. You mean to tell me that those scouts and guides could not judge the age of horse crap on the trail? You mean to tell me that no one could see smoke, despite the terrain and trees? I does not matter if the hostiles are 100 meters off your front or two or three miles away, only an idiot gives those kind of orders as related. One word sir and commit it to your diary and your memory - Fetterman.
Had Reno been ordered to charge a small number of hostiles that he could have easily handled, why was there a tag on that order - you will be supported by the whole command? Why would he need such support or assurences of such support?
|
|
|
Post by wild on Feb 16, 2012 5:57:52 GMT -6
It's a variation on the Balaclava theme. Great charge pity about valley. Grear charge pity about the village. Same difference. If we could state the problem as if it was a question at a Westpoint exam for entry level would be officers. Force A approaches force B. Force A commander disperses his assets. Force A is destroyed. Devise a strategy which takes Force A from point of dispersal to point of destruction. Note to students.Answers suggesting madness,delusional,head wound,Spike Jones will disqualify.
|
|
|
Post by fred on Feb 16, 2012 14:25:16 GMT -6
Darling cites the size of the fleeing village band as about 100 with 50 warriors. He does point out that they were the first Indians 'flushed' during the campaign. So, there was about a company sized force of enemy warriors fighting an effective delaying action. Okay, let’s tackle this thing from the top. What follows, of course, is my opinion, but… First of all, there is absolutely no proof—or indication—that the Indians Gerard and Hare spotted were a “fleeing village.” If it was a fleeing village, you would have women afoot and you would also have travois poles. In addition, you would have had some indication from Indian eye–witnesses that these people entered the main encampment. We have none of that. Next… I don’t know where Darling got his information, but I have never read anything that claims the column—or anyone in it—ever spotted “100” people to their front along Reno Creek. Gerard never gave a number; Hare said he saw 40 – 50; and Davern claimed 20, 30, or 40… he wasn’t that sure. Generally speaking, it was not unusual for warrior bands/societies to be out foraging around and we see another example of it with the Wolf Tooth/Big Foot group later on in the saga and much more to the north and east. So again—just like on those other boards—this is just another example of distorting accounts to fit in with some theory or fantasizing as a set-up for something else. If I am reading this correctly, then what I am reading is incorrect. Varnum had seen the village, albeit not the whole thing by any stretch… but he had seen enough. Check the RCOI; you will find the following. Varnum had been riding out front along the bluffs to the south of Reno Creek. This was not always easy to do and I suspect he rode the valley first—maybe 10 to 15 minutes ahead of the column, then when he could, he managed to climb the lesser bluffs and rode them. When Varnum arrived to report to Custer, Reno’s command was passing Custer. This was about one mile from the LBH crossing. Varnum thought this separation must have occurred after passing a tepee that stood on Reno Creek [145]. He was unsure what Reno’s command had seen, but Varnum “had seen the Indians in the bottom for an hour or more before the separation took place….” [139] (be very careful of Varnum’s times… they are notoriously inaccurate and he admitted as much). When Varnum left Custer, Custer was moving at a walk, Reno at a trot [140]. Varnum had seen the village before the commands separated [140]. You could not see a lot of the village unless you got out into the valley. The timber and the bends in the river masked much of it [140]. “There were more Indians than I ever saw before. I had seen immense numbers of Indians from the top of the bluffs while out scouting and knew there was a very large village there” [140]. All of this tells me Custer was now well aware of the village and its location and possibly he even had an inkling of its size because for the first time someone Custer could rely on wholly had actually seen the camp. That is a very important thing to remember, because it seems Custer did not really trust his Indian scouts for anything other than direction and location. Meaning what? Whatever Custer saw was small. He now knew the approximate location of the village and he had to have seen ponies in the distant foothills. Any Indians he saw had to have been wandering bands or pony drovers. He could not have been stupid enough to believe anything else. They were incidental. Hogwash! The pony herd was 14 miles away: 1+ mile, Crow’s Nest to divide; 11.81 miles, divide to LBH; 1 mile across the LBH valley. I say again, hogwash!Standard stuff; every writer and historian would agree. You bet it did! And Benteen thought so, too. This was the route the Indians used when they left the Rosebud. In addition they camped along Reno Creek and it was from this area where they left to attack Crook. You have a myriad number of estimates as to the size of that force, but I would venture to say some 1,200 warriors. I would also say that certainly 600 more remained in the camp to defend it, and that entire group was augmented a couple days later by more massive parties coming down the LBH valley. The length of the camp along Reno Creek was probably in the vicinity of four miles long… though not nearly as wide as the camp along the LBH. This is complete fiction!Varnum never spoke to Custer—never even saw him, personally—after the two commands divided. If Darling said this, then he is either smoking hemp or he is making the stuff up as he is going along. Totally incorrect. The village; nothing else. Bring the warriors to battle… that was Reno’s sole mission. Problematic. Benteen’s mission was to make sure there was nothing to the south of the regiment. If there was, Benteen was to bring them to battle and inform Custer of same. No. Custer rode north because he was petrified the Indian camp would be breaking up and scattering. His sole objective—reconning along the way—was to get below the fleeing Indians, cut them off, and drive them back into the Indians Reno would be “smashing.” That is a legitimate military operation and mission. No one was hunting down small bands of warriors or looking for warriors to hunt down. The big fish-fry was in the valley. Immaterial. Reasonable. No, I was actually arguing that Reno did not disobey orders, since his orders only applied to the fleeing village band, at least according to the testimony presented by Darling. Well, as I said, if this is Darling’s thesis, he is wrong. He is correct by saying Reno did not disobey his orders, but that was not because he was merely chasing a fleeing band. Whatever was to his front, Reno was to attack it. Period. Well, your speculation, Mike, is right on the money. No, no, no, no, no, no!!!!! By all means, buy the book; it is worth the money because Moore has—apparently—a different view of things and has done enough work to have a valid and informed opinion. First of all, I am only on page 62, and the errors I have found—so far—are not “significant.” I used the word, “basic.” For example: he calls Tom Weir a lieutenant, not a captain (p. 16). He spells Libbie Custer, “Libby”… basic error. He claims all three columns began moving in April (p. 28). He mentions LT Bradley, but never uses rank, first name, or who the hell he was (p. 29). On p. 35, he says Gerard warned about the “Indians running like devils,” before they crossed the divide, and then on p. 39, he gets it right. He talks about PVT Horner and that he enlisted on 8 April and by 4 July he had only a little more than three months service. A small gaffe, but that is a little less than three months service. There are also several punctuation mistakes… but who’s counting. And he got several of the company horse colors wrong. Moore makes several very fine observations: (1) he claimed the timber was indefensible— yahoo-o-o-o!; (2) he claimed someone named William Allen found forked aiming sticks along some of the Indian positions—I had never heard that before; (3) he does the best job I have seen in describing what a trooper carried on his horse…. Then he goes and blows it by stating that in addition, the poor nag would have to carry as much as a 200 – lb. soldier. I doubt that!! The book is worth the money and I would never tell anyone not to buy another man’s work, unless it was abominable. This is a very nice addition. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by ulan on Apr 30, 2012 10:13:41 GMT -6
I don´t know exactly what makes a man to a hero but in my opinion Reno was a good officer.
It wasn´t his fault that he find himself and his men on a mission with actually no chance of success. When his attack began he came very quick in the very same situation like Custer about half an hour later. Reno had luck because the indians in the camp had notice Custers men in their flanc and many of the warriors had to turn to that point and defend their people in the camp instead of finishing Reno off.
Reno´s command would probably wiped out if all the warriors had stayed versus him.
I read something about Reno had a problem with alcohol and that made him to a bad officer or to someone who dosn´t tell the truth or something. But to me it seems he was very clear in his action near the camp. He try do filled out his mission but was man enough to made his own decision by giving the order to retreat in the right time. Probably he and his men fell a bit in panic when he realised the situation that they were unable to halt any position. But i think that is quit understandable and it was the same with Custers men later. Reno had enough experience to overview his situation and he was moving fast back and let the indians not encircle him.
Also later when he build up a more save position together with Benteen he did the right thing to stay with his wounded in that position. Sad how it is that he was unable to help Custers command, but it was again the right decision not to risk some more of a hundered or more of his men for a mission impossible in trying to save Custer. He was aware now how strong the indians in numbers were and so there was no other chance as to stay and save the rest of the regiment.
I don´t know if this was enough for seeing him as a hero, but he was obvisionly the best officer in the staff....at least much better then Custer.
|
|
|
Post by benteen on May 1, 2012 14:09:14 GMT -6
I don´t know exactly what makes a man to a hero but in my opinion Reno was a good officer. . Ulan, I agree with you. Reno was a fine Officer and I believe did as well as anyone could expect under the situation he was put in by his commanding officer. I believe he got a little rattled after the Bloody Knife incident but all in all handled himself well. The majority of people both then and now that trash Reno do it to use him as a scapegoat for their General.To them Custer cant be wrong it has to be somebody elses fault. Enter Major Marcus Reno, plus a little sprinkle of Capt Benteen dawdle Be Well Dan
|
|
|
Post by elkslayer on May 1, 2012 22:44:17 GMT -6
About the timber being indefensible... Didn't Sitting Bull think it was VERY defensible and a threat to the village? Hence his order to the women to start to break the camp? As for Reno handling himself well, where was he most of the time when on Reno Hill....didn't Benteen basically take over the defense of that position?
Jim
|
|
|
Post by fred on May 2, 2012 6:13:01 GMT -6
About the timber being indefensible... Didn't Sitting Bull think it was VERY defensible and a threat to the village? Hence his order to the women to start to break the camp? ....didn't Benteen basically take over the defense of that position? Jim, Sitting Bull wouldn't have known "defense" from "picket fence" and anyone who tells you that timber was defensible has no clue what he is talking about. Even the best military thinkers-- then and now-- would not have a command the size of Reno's attempting to defend those woods against what he was facing. All you have to do to figure it out is to go there, walk it, and do a little map work, something most of these idiots couldn't put together if Davy Crockett guided them. The artifact field in the old dry channel brow was extensive, but only for some two hundred seventy yards, indicating a fifty-four-man line were the proper interval maintained, but interval was not maintained and men began to bunch as pressure mounted and they were withdrawn. Fred Gerard thought the men on the brow were no more than six feet apart (150 – 158 yards), versus the textbook solution of fifteen feet (375 – 395 yards). The distance along the dry creek bed from the right flank of the line to the river was two hundred thirty-five yards (considerably more than Charlie Varnum’s estimate of one hundred), which was almost as long as the brow line itself (or much longer if you were to use Gerard’s measurement). The distance along the channel from the left flank of the line to the active river was much greater, some four hundred twenty yards. This latter area was especially troubling, for it was the troops’ left flank the Indians had been concentrating on and it was along this route any breakout to safety would have to occur. It was an impossible situation to maintain and if the line had been spread from one end of the dry channel to the other, the distance between men would have been some thirty-five to forty feet, completely unacceptable in any sort of fluid defense. And while it did not pertain to forests, per se, Napoléon too, did not much care for “fortifications,” claiming the side that stays within is beaten. Varnum was correct in his assessment of the brow—if properly manned—affording a good defensive position, but that was not the case here, and his observation about the rear was quite prescient. Another serious issue in defending a densely timbered area is fields of fire, especially when the defender is outnumbered as Reno’s command was. This was the case with Reno’s men in the timber. While the preponderance of force was located on the skirmish line brow, other men struggled in the brush, many held to the buffalo trails leading hither and yon. Within the timber, there were no proper fields of fire, no areas where interlocking carbine fire could maintain a proper defense and withstand Callwell’s “sudden rush.” Other, much-needed troops kept the horses in the glade, unable to contribute to any action and strapped with the possibility of being hit by infiltrators. With an inability to cover the entire area, the new line’s rear was in peril from easy ingress from the right and increasing danger from across the river behind. There was enough brush and timber on the east bank of the Little Big Horn to cover warriors fording the river, and not enough troops to prevent such a crossing. Infiltration was a major concern and at the 1879 inquiry there was ample expression of just such fears. There were reports Indians were beginning to set fire to the timber, a common enough ploy, and even if that had not happened prior to the retreat, it was to occur shortly after the troops left for the bluffs, threatening the twenty men left behind. And that does not even consider the continuing and increasing threat from the left, the direction the command needed to go if it was to reach safety. It is clear from the size of the area, the size of Reno’s force, and the size of the Indians itching to make a point, the men of this battalion would have been doomed had Reno chosen to stay. Author Donald W. Moore, agreed when he wrote, “… the ‘timber’ was not a defensible position and would have been fatal to Reno and his men….” Civilians, used to civilian ways of fighting, thought they could hold out, but even they were circumspect… if only… if only; but “if only” did not exist. Only one officer we know of—who was in that predicament—agreed, also “if only.” So, all in all, Reno could have stayed there a little longer... no doubt about it; but where and when do you draw the line? And what would ten or fifteen minutes more have accomplished? As for Benteen running the hilltop show... there is probably more truth to that than the officers and men of the Seventh would have liked us to believe. I do not know how the "mix" would have been. I suspect we would have had Reno issuing orders, eyes to Benteen to see what he thought, a Benteen nod of approval... and the chain of command goes on. Best wishes, Fred.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on May 2, 2012 8:36:43 GMT -6
Jim: The defense is a function of four things, the strength of the position itself, the numbers available to the defender and the attacker, sustainment, and the overall tactical environment.
If any one of these things is unfavorable then the viability of the defensive posture is questionable. Given that Reno's position had some strength, but not enough of it, and that the other three factors were not in his favor, Reno did the correct thing. Was it pretty? No. Was it the finest page in U S Army history? No again. Did Reno do what was necessary? Yes
Those that in a latter day tell you or anyone this or that position can be and should have been held, normally look just at the terrain and render their judgment, insert what they would have done, and make these fine pronouncements. Invariably they leave out all or at least one of the other three factors.
I am going to take a side trip to illustrate. The Alamo was a fine defensive position. I could walk into what is left of the compound, with a knowledge of what was there that is now gone and say yes I could have held this area against up to 5000 Mexican soldiers. What is missing is that I did not have the thousand soldiers I would have needed. I had 189. What is missing is that I had neither food or ammunition in sufficient quantites to sustain the 189 much less the 1000. What is missing is that I was completely cut off from any assistance the nearest of which was 90 miles away, that would have to traverse miserable terrain. What is missing is that the government had yet to be formed and it was in the state of political upheaval, rendering the mustering of sufficient forces impossible. What is missing is that I had fourteen artillery pieces and not one trained gunner in the crowd. What is missing is that although the Mexicans did not have 5000 (they had about 2400 with 1400 making the assault) their force was sufficient to penetrate nearly anywhere they chose in the compound and the defense was so strung out due to lack of sufficient numbers.
Hope that this, along with Fred's more vivid and detailed information, helps
|
|
|
Post by Dark Cloud on May 2, 2012 8:52:28 GMT -6
I think Reno made the least worst of all possible decisions. I still don't get the demands that Reno should have done what Custer essentially did: move with delaying tactics of some sort that didn't work. Reno's guys survived, mostly. He did not want to be caught with infinite wounded men and horses so that he had neither enough to force exit nor ability to protect those for whom he was responsible.
It was awful, but nobody has yet shown how a better result would have been obtained. A better result being less casualties on the way to Reno Hill. If we cannot do it, knowing far more about terrain available than Reno could, it's pointlessly harsh to dump on him.
If the Indians didn't run, the 7th was cooked any way you look at it. Big villages cannot get it together to vacate as quick as small, so they fought and won.
|
|
walsh
Full Member
Posts: 108
|
Post by walsh on May 2, 2012 9:01:58 GMT -6
I recall reading an Indian "account" that the Indians were reluctant to enter the timber because of the close proximity/how dangerous it was. The biggest problem would of been the men inevitably running out of ammunition. It makes you wonder what Benteen would have done differently if he never came upon Reno on Reno Hill.
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on May 2, 2012 9:10:27 GMT -6
Walsh: In all probability died.
|
|
|
Post by benteen on May 2, 2012 9:42:59 GMT -6
Jim,
The Officers have expertly explained the tactics involved and I thank them for sharing their knowledge with us. I have no tactical knowledge so I believe the best way to figure if Renos decisions were the right ones the best place to go is the opinions of the Officers that were there with him. They are trained the same as Reno, they know his responsibilities, and they were there to see his situation as no others can. They all awore under oath that Reno made the right decision in leaving the timber,one stating that if they hadnt left when they did they would still be there. I also think, if this was such a great defensive position why would he leave and expose his men and himself to fire from all sides in the open.
As to Capt Benteen I believe he was in fact the ipso facto commander. He observed military protocol by making suggestions to Reno which Reno was more than happy to go along with.
Be Well Dan
|
|
|
Post by quincannon on May 2, 2012 9:49:09 GMT -6
Dan: I think you make an excellent point in your last sentence. We by now are all familiar with post traumatic stress, which we take and rightly so to mean well after the event. There is also something, immediate post traumatic stress, that I believe should be considered, from which no human, be he ever so strong otherwise, is immune.
|
|