WHAT WAS LEARNED?

[Montana Bab]

I would like to hear any theories (or proofs, if you know them) as to what was learned from the catastrophe of the LBH battle. What tactics or, military decisions changed, (if they did), what political strategies were the result?

It's common knowledge that there was a horrific uproar and outrage from common citizens, but I'm wondering what the military backlash and political backlash was, if any? And if there are any good books on this aspect of THE BATTLE?

Bab

[tatanka]

There wasn't much to be learned from Custers' defeat. All the provisions were already in place ; know the strength, disposition and location of your enemy. Custer did none of these. He ignored his scouts when they advised him of the number of Indians. He divided his command. By the time he saw the size of the village it was too late. Reno had already started his attack. He didn't recon the fords to see which would be most suitable to cross. His defeat was entirely down to him. All the military provisos were already in place. He just ignored them. As far as a military backlash was concerned fingers were pointed in all directions. Reno was blamed for not pressing home his attack even though he was outnumbered 20 to 1. He was eventually cleared of cowardice by court martial. Benteen was accused of not going to Custers' aid even though he didn't know where he was. By the time he did it was too late. He was vastly ounumbered and probably would have suffered the same fate. The only finger that wasn't pointed at the time was the one at Custer. He was the Boy General, the dashing hero of the nation. How could a bunch of savages defeat him and his elite 7th Cavalry? It had to be someone elses' fault. I don't think there was much of a political backlash. President Grant, admittedly no admirer of Custer, said ; "Custers' Luck has backfired. I regard the Custer massacre as a defeat brought on by Custer himself."

[clw]

Jul 30, 2008 6:23:18 GMT -6 tatanka said:

He ignored his scouts when they advised him of the number of Indians. He divided his command.

If the 1500 or so warriors that the scouts predicted had only scattered, as contemporary military doctrine expected, their numbers wouldn't have presented a huge problem. And under the expectation of scatteration, the division of his command was appropriate.

He didn't recon the fords to see which would be most suitable to cross.

His scouts knew the fords.

Benteen was accused of not going to Custers' aid even though he didn't know where he was.

And yet he could have simply asked Martin, if his intention was truly to follow the orders in the note.

The 'crime' wasn't Custer's. It was Grant's and Sherman's and Sheridan's determination to get Black Hills. Custer's defeat only strengthened support for their plot. As is usual in politics , the army was only a tool.

[tatanka]

Thanks for that, clw. I stand corrected on your issues. The problem for Custer was that the village didn't scatter and the fact remains he didn't do a proper recon of the village before he divided the command, hence the hurried note for Benteen. I agree with you about the Army being a tool but I don't suppose anyone in Washington foresaw the result, although, as you say, it strengthened their hand.

[elisabeth]

It worked, though ... The army got the forts they'd been arguing for fruitlessly for years; they got control of the agencies at last; they got a halt to the cutbacks, with a flurry of new recruiting to bring up the numbers. And they got a public mood that was less anti-army than it had been for some years. Against that, they lost Grant as President (but that was OK, Hayes was also an ex-military man and understood their needs); and they'd lost a swathe of CW-experienced officers, so that callow youngsters like Godfrey and Edgerly would shoot up through the ranks. With people like them and the new intake from West Point (Scott et al) it changed the nature of the army dramatically. More professional, perhaps; but also more docile and less given to individualism. That may have been a good thing, and/or inevitable, as the nation grew up to become a World Power ... but the gap between the "Old Army" and the new, respectable, temperate one may well date from 1876.

In practical terms: over the ensuing years, more emphasis on target practice, more emphasis on horsemanship, more emphasis on decent living conditions for the men. I don't know that anybody actually said "the 7th were rubbish" or "what do you expect from men treated like this", but that seems to have been the effect; the new forts, such as Fort Keogh, were constructed with provision for air and light in barracks, libraries, and that sort of thing. Perhaps it was just marching hand-in-hand with general developments in the treatment of the working class, e.g. in England; but maybe not. Maybe it did owe something to the lessons of LBH.

Politically: I wonder if we can entirely discount the effect of Buffalo Bill! He made the Custer battle his stock-in-trade. Consequently, he both convinced foreign nations of the "rugged frontiersman" idea, and implanted it in the American psyche. One wonders if Roosevelt's Rough Riders would have come about without this precedent. Even his performance before Queen Victoria may have had the effect of making British politicians think twice before challenging the might of America. ------ Yeah, OK, fanciful perhaps; but it represented America as a force to be reckoned with. When territorial disputes came up later, e.g. the 1903 boundary survey, Britain just quietly crumbled. ------ So Custer, in a way, may have given America its driving myth. Tough frontiersman ... stands out to the death, undaunted ... Nothing to do with the reality, of course, but a potent vision for potential enemies. So whatever we may think of him now, the political shadow he casts may possibly have been long?

[bc]

Maybe a few things about Indian tactics used against the Cav.

What people tend to forget about these battles is that we have to look at the overall strategy orders, and objectives. Three columns were ordered out on the plains to take punitive actions against the NAs for leaving the reservation and teach them a lesson they better stay on the reservation (of the gov's choosing). Nothing more & nothing less.

Everybody gets all wrapped up in tactics, etc., poor scouting, dividing command, etc when you really have to construe them compared with his objective.

Did my Dad get to blame someone for all the people killed when he landed on the beaches at Leyte Gulf and Okinawa? Do we blame someone for all the people killed at any other pacific island in WW2? Guadalcanal? Do we blame someone cause the Germans had the 352d on alert at Omaha Beach on D-Day and we had all them casualties? Do we keep letting the Japs shoot kill us from Mt. Suribachi because we don't have enough scouting on their positions and cause we have to divide our battalions to attack from different angles? Do we retreat from Iwo Jima, or any other island or beach cause we don't like the casualties. In Vietnam, do we blame someone for going out on "Search & Destroy" missions (later called sweep & clear to satisfy the pantywaist pacifists) and casualties may be sustained even though we had all these sophisticated scouting methods? Do we blame someone cause a search and destroy mission into the A Shau valley had a couple NVA regiments hidden in tunnels and trees that almost massacred a US battalion?

Attacks can't always be made in optimum conditions. Sometimes you have to tell your batallions to shove off and take the objective/beach/island/hilltop/you name it. Sometimes the objective calls for damn the torpedoes, full speed ahead. Marines have proven themselves time and time again. We could probably name a thousand battles after LBH, during the Spanish American war, WWI, WWII, Korean war, Vietnam war, and subsequent actions where attacks were launched without optimum scouting and dispersion of forces. Most often retreat is not an option because you have to make your objective to win the war. Except for the atom bomb, they were gearing up incur massive casualties with an attack on Japan to win that war. No one was saying they would wait a few years until they had adequate scouting of Jap positions or that they would only land at one place cause they didn't want to divide their forces.

Basic patrolling 101 since the LBH. Go out on foot patrol and engage the enemy to determine their strength and size and also prevent them from doing the same to you. Walk into too big a force and patrol gets massacred.

So, IMHO, putting this battle into perspective, Custer was out trying to acomplish the Sheridan's objective and came up short/dead. There's been millions of casualties since then with soldiers doing the same thing, their duty. Nothing more, nothing less.

[biggordie]

bc:

Thank you for that perspective, and I mean that seriously and sincerely. It is one I tend to agree with.

Gordie

[tatanka]

Thanks for starting this thread, Montana Bab. I think we have all learned something from "What Was Learned?"

[crzhrs]

There would be no happy ending to this "story" of the American Indian.

[Montana Bab]

Jul 30, 2008 12:22:40 GMT -6 crzhrs said:

There would be no happy ending to this "story" of the American Indian.

I appreciate the input to my question. I've always been interested in the lasting effects of historical events on future decisions made, especially in this country. This country of ours that was given so much treasure with which to develop and grow, but which was squandered and abused, given away and lost!

Craze's last post just about says it all. The only time I know of that the Winner came out the Loser!

[bc]

Jul 30, 2008 13:38:42 GMT -6 Montana Bab said:

The only time I know of that the Winner came out the Loser!

Bab, you've never been a fist fight then. Back in the day we settled our differences the old fashioned way out at the woodpile by the woodshed behind the barn. Win or lose I always felt like a loser for the next day or two and probably looked like a loser for a week.

[Montana Bab]

[. Win or lose I always felt like a loser for the next day or two and probably looked like a loser for a week. [/quote]

It's very noble of you to admit that, BC! No fist fights for me, but I did acquire a few yanks of hair! I wasn't too proud of that, either.

I wonder if any of the soldiers had the feelings you describe after Wounded Knee? I realize that there was the "Getting Even factor", sort of like "Remember the Alamo!", but still...........

[crzhrs]

From the Movie ZULU:

Michael Caine after the battle at Rorke's Drift: (paraphrase): "I feel disgusted" or something to that effect in which so many Zulu died and a number of British soldiers also.

A great line and something we all should remember when thinking about going to war!

[elisabeth]

Didn't the Duke of Wellington say something similar -- "nothing save a battle lost can be half so melancholy as a battle won"?

Can't help wondering if the Indian warriors didn't feel something of that once it was over. You can just imagine a moment of shocked silence when they realise they've killed the whole command. (At least, I'd love to see that in any future Custer movie. Could be immensely powerful.)

[BrokenSword]

The very quote that came to my mind, Elisabeth.

Remember the scene in 'Braveheart' immediately after the Scots had crushed and wiped out the English army. (Apologies for the reference, Elisabeth)

When the fighting was suddely over, none of them could think of anything to say. They just stood and roared out as loudly as they could.

M