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Post by clw on Feb 6, 2008 17:03:00 GMT -6
.......which means a movement up or down river to find a ford which is perhaps what the NAs had to do. After all, the NAs didn't exactly have a roadmap when they moved to the river. I don't think so. They knew the land and the trails and knew the fords where the footing was good. The LBH Valley was a campground they knew. And a village on the move would have had scouts that would have reported any unforseen problems with a known ford and routed the village accordingly. I think it's safe to say that following the lodge pole trail would lead to a good ford.
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 7, 2008 8:42:25 GMT -6
Gotta believe the Indians knew the lay of the land and river better than anyone, even some of the Scouts with the command. Obviously the river course changes with conditions so any known crossing by the military's scouts could have been altered by flooding, rains, buffalo churning up known crossings, etc.
The Indians had been there for a number of days, so it would seem likely they knew where good crossings were and may have in fact been ready for any attempts by Custer's command to cross (Yates?)
Again, the river and terrain seemed to favor the Indians who either by design or luck (probably design) set up their village in a position to be defended from that direction.
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Post by harpskiddie on Feb 7, 2008 10:43:12 GMT -6
crzhrs:
You are absolutely correct about the Hostiles knowing that valley intimately, probably better than the Crows - the Rees did not know the country well at all, and certainly would not know the customary fords. The Crows would, however, and so would Bouyer. It would not take them very long while they were moving up the Rosebud, and especially after they had reached the Crow's Nest and divide, to know what the conditions would be. They could tell by the water levels in the other streams in the area. These guys lived by knowing what the water supplies were like for man and beast.
As to the camp. Iit wasn't really set up that way, was it? The camps were set up for convenience, logistical considerations, and sort of mutual support; but their positions along the river left them open to attack across many fords at once, IF Custer had been able to pinpoint the actual camp locations before launching such an attack and had husbanded his forces better than he did. Which is not to say that said attacks would have been successful, only that they would have been POSSIBLE, and that the positions of the camps were not selected for defense by utilizing the river and the bluffs.
Quite frankly, I doubt that such attacks would have been successful, on the day, since the warriors, once alerted could counter each with far superior manpower. This is a matter of speculation, of course, and probably has been speculated to death. Those who enjoy indulging in what-ifs can have a field day with this.
I do not believe that the NDNs anticipated that they would be attacked while they were in that area of the Little Horn. They knew Gibbon was to the north, and that he represented no threat to them, as he had done nothing in the preceding months to indicate that he was capable of, or particularly interested in, making an offensive move against them. They knew where Crook was, and what he was and wasn't doing - they had rotating scouting missions keeping an eye in that direction. They no longer considered him a threat, at least not at that time. Custer they knew nothing of until shortly before he showed up - everything we know shows that clearly, so they weren't protecting against an attack from that direction.
They had no reason to think they were in any proximate danger, and did not intend staying where they were for any length of time. Besides, as a few NDN accounts say, there was a feeling among the people that no one would dare to attack such an array of camps - only a madman. There is another bone to chew over. Was Custer bereft of his senses at the Little Horn? What if.............................................
Gordie Mc
PS Actually the NDNs had only been there for ONE day.
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 7, 2008 12:01:12 GMT -6
Can't say for sure whether the Indians deliberately used the river as a blocking force . . . but if it was me, I would want to use the terrain & high ground as the best possible defense I could.
Maybe they didn't care. Wasn't it Low Dog who stated that he didn't think anyone would attack the camp because it was so big?
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Post by conz on Feb 7, 2008 12:10:50 GMT -6
Can't say for sure whether the Indians deliberately used the river as a blocking force . . . but if it was me, I would want to use the terrain & high ground as the best possible defense I could. Maybe they didn't care. Wasn't it Low Dog who stated that he didn't think anyone would attack the camp because it was so big? I agree, and furthermore, I don't think that our concept of "defense" was an Indian way of war. They either attacked, or they fled. The only "defending" I've ever run across Natives doing is a temporary screen to cover the fleeing, or if they were trapped and couldn't run. Then they sometimes surrendered, but often fought to the death. In American tactics, we can attack, defend, or withdraw, as the situation demands. With the Natives, they just attack or withdraw, and their villages are situated with this in mind. So if military considerations ever affected the placement of a camp, it would be towards: - how easily it could flee if attacked - how easily intruders could be detected so that they could be attacked. Clair
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 7, 2008 12:23:26 GMT -6
<how easily it could flee if attacked - how easily intruders could be detected so that they could be attacked.>
The Indians had the river on 1 side and a wide open plain on the other. I wonder at what point they detected Reno's charge. I believe there was at long open stretch of land after crossing the river until you get to the village.
Apparently warriors had enough time to gather in front of the village and put enough concern (fear) in Reno to cause him to halt.
The other side of the village was a wide open plain which would make it easy to spot anyone coming from that direction and/or an area to flee.
Whether the Indians deliberately set up their camps that way, it did play a factor in the outcome.
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Post by conz on Feb 7, 2008 13:38:37 GMT -6
Definitely.
When did the Indians detect Reno's advance? You could probably say anything from the time they arrived at Busby and beyond and be correct in some manner. <g>
There are all levels of "detection," different amounts of dissemination of that information, and then different levels of reaction to that information. Native intelligence about the locations and activities of Custer's command all that week and the day of the attack is a wonderful study of this process for military students.
That attack on Pearl Harbor being probably the pre-eminent study of this topic at military schools.
In warfare, even the simple is complicated.
Clair
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Post by clw on Feb 7, 2008 13:40:22 GMT -6
Horse~
I used to believe that defensive advantages were a consideration when they camped there because looking at the land it's a logical conclusion, but I've since changed my mind. It was already a known campsite, they weren't expecting to have to defend it and they were following game -- of huge importance to a village of that size. I think it was just that simple. But the topography certainly did provide a great advantage -- not that they needed it.
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 7, 2008 14:26:51 GMT -6
The only source I could find of spotting Reno before his attack was Gall:
"We saw the soldiers early in the morning crossing the divide. When Reno and Custer separated, we watched them until they came down into the valley. A cry was raised that the white men soldiers were coming, and orders were given for the village to move immediately. Reno swept down so rapidly on the upper end that the Indians were forced to fight."
Most all other Indians said they were totally unaware and surprised by the attack.
Still looking at sources, but Gall's appears to be the only one at this point.
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Post by fred on Feb 7, 2008 14:38:08 GMT -6
I agree with Harpskiddie's post above and there are a couple of points Godfrey brought out that I think we should all remember when assessing a number of points about this battle. These two issues may not seem terribly important at first blush, but when the outcome is known, they take on added significance.
From: Godfrey, Edward Settle, “Custer’s Last Battle,” Century Magazine, January 1892. OUTBOOKS, Olympic, CA, 1976.
“The bands usually camp some distance apart, and Indians of the number then together would occupy a territory of several miles along the river valley, and not necessarily within supporting distance of each other. But in view of the possible fulfillment of Sitting Bull’s prophecy the village had massed.” [21] ... and...
“In all our previous experiences, when the immediate presence of the troops was once known to them, the warriors swarmed to the attack, and resorted to all kinds of ruses to mislead the troops, to delay the advance toward their camp or village, while the squaws and children secured what personal effects they could, drove off the pony herd, and by flight put themselves beyond danger, and then scattering made successful pursuit next to impossible…. In Indian warfare the rule is ‘touch and go.’” [19]
"Thus spake... er... Gerard"
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 7, 2008 14:49:17 GMT -6
If we listen to Godfrey--the Indians did--this time anyway--gather in a defensive position because of SB's prophecy of "soldiers falling into camp".
Did the Indians, in fact fool the soldiers into thinking they were going to fight and completely changed Reno's game plan? After all he was told the Indians were running--and now--they were gathering in his front looking like they were ready for a fight. By stopping, Reno caused the wheels to fall off the wagon, giving the Indians the opportunity to gather strength and confidence.
Sitting Bull may have said: "Gotcha!"
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Post by fred on Feb 7, 2008 15:16:46 GMT -6
Did the Indians, in fact fool the soldiers into thinking they were going to fight and completely changed Reno's game plan? After all he was told the Indians were running--and now--they were gathering in his front looking like they were ready for a fight. By stopping, Reno caused the wheels to fall off the wagon, giving the Indians the opportunity to gather strength and confidence. Sitting Bull may have said: "Gotcha!" If Sitting Bull said, "Gotcha!" it's because he knew how many warriors he had, not because of any "defensive" position he may have been in. To me, the only defense was that the tribes were not separated like they traditionally were. Godfrey's post-battle writings indicate to me that he believed the command should have been aware of that possibility. They should also have been aware of the signs along the Rosebud, but he admitted that they over-looked those, as well. Gordie said it best and I believe the Indians knew that area, knew the fords, knew exactly how long they could stay in a particular spot, and I do not believe they used the terrain-- such as it was-- for any defensive position. It was used more for comfort and convenience. Again, the only sop to defense was the tightening of the circles. Because of its size and because of Crook's slinking away, and because they knew Gibbon had disappeared north and east, they never expected to be attacked. With the exception of quick, early warnings by a handful of Indians coming into camp at different times-- maybe all within a few minutes of one another-- this camp was surprised. They never expected to be attacked. And of course the irony is that Custer really did achieve what he set out to achieve, then thought he failed to do: surprise the village. I think he was delighted with his move down Reno/Ash and I believe he felt that by the time he closed in on the LBH River, he may have achieved that precious surprise after all. I also believe it was Gerard's report of the Indians coming out to fight or screen, that caused the, "Aw shucks!" move to the right. Again, to me, Custer probably felt he was just a few minutes too late. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 7, 2008 17:07:10 GMT -6
Then would you say I am wrong?
Time for another shot of the big O
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 7, 2008 17:40:31 GMT -6
Since I don't like to admit being wrong:
This is from MYSTIC WARRIORS OF THE PLAINS which I consider a MUST for anyone interested in Native American culture, history, philosophy:
The desired village sites . . . offered a good water supply, ample wood, grazing and forage, protection from wind, and security from enemies. Level, wooded bottom lands cradled by bluffs or ridges were generally sought (does that sound like the lower end of the LBH village?)
To select the best campground . . . the camp leader must consider all of the dangers to which they might be exposed, either from human enemies or from the elements.
Colonel Dodge once followed a party of Comanches for more than 30 days, and the camp in which he finally surprised them was the only site in all that time that could have been approached without discovery.
A camp near water and away from all timber was probably Sioux who had a deep respect for ambush . . . _____________
From the above it seems Indians were aware of where and how to camp to provide them safety, shelter, food, etc.
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Post by fred on Feb 7, 2008 17:55:33 GMT -6
Horse--
Only if you say the Indians planned their position as a trap. That wasn't the case at all. Their idea of a defensive village was to erect the tepees closer together.
Reno's stopping had nothing to do with it. He stopped because, (a) he saw too many Indians in front; (b) he couldn't see anything because of all the dust and smoke they were raising; (c) a combination of a and b. To my way of thinking, Reno was facing a stone wall and had no other choice. Whatever he did had no affect on the Indians' strategy, simply because they had no strategy other than to screen their families and deal with the threat lumbering down the valley.
Anything else makes the whole ball of wax entirely too complicated. Reno's mission was simple, the Indians' reaction was knee-jerk, but typical. What do you do if you are walking with your wife and children in a shopping mall and a guy comes running at you. It was the same kind of reaction.
Best wishes, Fred.
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