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Post by elisabeth on Feb 2, 2008 22:25:28 GMT -6
He doesn't name it as MTC, but I think there's little doubt that that's what he means. Here's what comes immediately before the quote I gave above: "When the Battlefield was carefully studied by Gibbon's command and remnants of the Seventh Cavalry, I cannot recall any dissenting opinion about Custer having descended from the bluffs by following down a large coulee leading to the river not far from the center of the Indian village. If he intended to strike at the hostiles or their camp when he reached this coulee, it certainly offered the first good opportunity for his command to reach the valley after it commenced to bear to the right from Reno's column."
There's an outside chance that he's talking about, say, Deep Ravine; but "first good opportunity" and "center of the Indian village" sounds like MTC more than anywhere. Godfrey was, or became, a "dissenting opinion" on the basis of that trail he saw that convinced him Custer never turned west at all until LSH, and I presume it's that theory that McClernand's referring to here. Very much a lone voice, however; no-one else seems to have bought that idea. (See Benteen's map, for instance: a trail down MTC to Ford B, as plain as day.)
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Post by bc on Feb 3, 2008 0:58:30 GMT -6
I think there needs to be another poll option which is "to cross the ford and attack". It doesn't make sense to me for Custer to intend to attack at the middle of the camp and then turn south to Reno. Looking at Custer's intentions coming up on the MTC ford (b) in the middle of the village, he could only intend (at that time, IMHO) to cross and attack into the camp in any and all directions as the flow of battle would dictate. Intending to turn south to Reno also carries the intent to leave his rear exposed to the north end of the camp which seems incredulous to me. I believe he wanted to cross, at the same time develop a bridge head, and then drive the NAs in which ever direction they fled. Just speculating on his intentions and depending upon how the battle flowed, he would have probably driven north with one part of his command and held the ford as well as also attacked south to Reno or waited for Reno to attack to the ford with the other part of this command.
I suppose another poll alternative which would be a change after the one above that I just mentioned, would be "to cross the ford B and attack with part of his command while moving north to cross ford D and attack with the rest of his command". I personally think this possible Custer intention didn't happen until they were in the vicinity of ford B but it fits the poll question. Then that automatically opens the poll for another alternative with a changing intention (in the MTC ford vicinity) which is"to cross ford B and attack, after breaking off his attack at ford B, then moving his forces back east and to the north to cross ford D and attack".
I further give Custer a little credit, IMHO, in that he probably didn't think he was going to make one unchecked horse charge into the village and wipe it out but rather it was going to be hard fought with skirmishers providing cover fire where needed and fighting their way across the ford and into and through the camp albeit that the attack would only be against the minority of the NAs who didn't run away.
I though of another poll alternative but it is late and I probably quit making sense a long time ago.
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Post by fred on Feb 3, 2008 9:32:40 GMT -6
bc--
I will present you with a scenario and I would be interested in your decision.
First of all... you assume the role of George Custer. Your answer is what you would do if you were Custer.
Some variables, facts, and thoughts: (1) you have no idea how big the village is or how many warriors there are. You expect 800, but you are prepared for as many as 1,200 to 1,500.
(2) You know, from past experience(s) and what everyone else knows, that Indians will-- in all likelihood-- scatter when attacked or when they sense danger, especially when they have their families with them.
(3) You cross the divide, you have no specific plan of attack.
(4) You know/think/believe your regiment has been spotted. You are pretty sure... not positive.
(5) It is in your mind that those who have spotted you will report your presence and approach to the village.
Okay... you head down Reno Creek... rapidly; very, very rapidly (remember, this is my scenario).
About the time you reach some tepee, some mile and change from the river, you have a plan formulated in your mind and you order Major Reno with three companies forward to attack the village and draw out the warriors. You are hoping against hope that your speed of advance has either minimized or neutralized any warnings that may have been given by Indians who managed to beat you down the valley.
For whatever reason-- it's not important here-- you theoretically deviate from your plan and you head north rather than follow your major down the valley.
Once you approach the village from atop the bluffs and you hear firing in the valley, you head to the edge of the bluffs to see what is going on. You observe, you like what you see, you wave your hat with encouragement. You also see the major move into the timber because he is facing a heck of a lot of opposition and there is so much dust and smoke, neither your major nor you can see much of the village. You figure your major has done an admirable job: he can hold those woods indefinitely.
So you head down a coulee, sending back a note to Fred Benteen, to forget that scout, bring the packs, and hustle along... we have found a big village.
You reach a broad coulee that you suspect can take you to the valley, but you need to see what the hell is happening down there and you need to assess just how big this thing is. So you move down the broad coulee and when you see the bluffs to your right ease somewhat, you turn right (north) and head up there. You may be able to see from there.
You get up to the ridges (Luce) and you look into the valley. What you see surprises you: a huge exodus of people, some moving into the western hills, most fleeing downriver. But the view is still not close enough: you are a mile and change away.
Assumption: you still have not formulated any thoughts regarding the size or extent of the village. In other words, you do not know yet whether this is one massive village or several smaller villages extending from where you saw Reno to the general area where you think there is a crossing. You may not care; but that knowledge is critical.
Okay, General B. C. What do you do? Attack? Recon? Forget it and head north? Any other choices?
This is the old Ford B debate, back to bite us all, but to me, it is one of the keys and one of the most controversial aspects of the whole unfolding affair.
Very best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Feb 3, 2008 11:55:41 GMT -6
By the way, anyone else want to assume BC's role as "general," please, jump in. I love all the theories.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by gocav76 on Feb 3, 2008 12:29:10 GMT -6
Fred, I have one major asset, mobility-and I want to retain it. Because I have lost the element of surprise, I do not want to become involved in a slug fest. You state about Major Reno "You also see the major move into the timber because he is facing a heck of a lot of opposition ". I would realize that he will need support and will direct Benteen in Reno's direction. I would imagine that Reno will have wounded and will limit his mobility.I'm not worried if the village flees, as they can travel only as fast as the slowest elements-children and elderly. Thus I am not concerned whether I can capture the village today, as I believe they will either scatter or fall victim to a mounted pursuit in the days to come. I would not become greedy and attempt total victory today. Using my five companies I will inflict as much damage as possible, using my advantages in longer range weapons. If I run low on ammunition, I swing back to the pack train, then take stock of Reno's position. Perhaps in the days to come I will be able to maintain contact with fleeing elements of the Indians and launch early morning attacks. I see the campaign lasting days not hours.
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Post by fred on Feb 3, 2008 13:27:27 GMT -6
Larry--
That is not the response I expected, but why not? It's sensible, smart, sound... why not?
Personally, I probably would have never thought about it... but again, there is certainly nothing wrong. It would have saved some lives, wouldn't it?
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bc on Feb 4, 2008 0:50:17 GMT -6
Fred, it's late and i'm tired but I'll get to this issue and some other stuff this week though. I just got over the flu from last week.
BTW, thanks for the promotion but I assume it is only a "brevet" general or should we call it a Fredbrevet General. A brevet general rank and $4.16 will buy me coffee at starbucks. Too bad I don't like their coffee. Compared to the others on this board, I'm still a private E-1. You will have to throw in a fredbrevet message board battlefield commission to go along with it. Once we are done with my portion of this thread then I can revert back to the rank for which I am drawing pay from this message board. You can do the math to see what my message board rank is.
I think I posted somewhere on this board about the time I went to division headquarters, went to the wrong meeting room, and sat down in the comdg. genl's chair. When I figured out everyone around me was a bird and one began pointing at me, I got the hell out of there.
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Post by fred on Feb 4, 2008 7:17:48 GMT -6
BC--
You are a damned sight higher than E-1 in my book, and if you feel like you have received a brevet, you're right, but I'm out of the message board brevet business. Take your time; I am very interested in your opinion. I like good theories.
Hope you feel better.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bc on Feb 5, 2008 14:03:50 GMT -6
Fred, I'm going to need some time to work on this and study more details before I can give much of an intelligent theory. It is a part of the battle I haven't focused on that much. I have a general idea (not well thought through) but no sooner than I spit it out, someone will come back with a "but what about this" and then bring up some minute detail that I should have known.
Basically though, at the point where he sent Benteen south, Custer probably thought the NA camp(s) were probably strung along for miles (as was typical for the time) and that Reno was sent on to plow into the camp(s) where ever he found them. It was just happenstance that Reno's route took him to the south end of the camp(s). Custer cut to the north to plow into whatever camp(s) he came across. It was when Custer got closer and sent the messengers to Benteen that he had acquired more intel on the vill. At that point he probably still didn't know if Reno was going to the south end or the middle though. But by then Custer was already committed on his path, it was too late to coordinate with Benteen and Reno for a coordinated attack, and all Custer could do is continue on towards the river making some last minute tactical changes as he was able to eyeball the situation.
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Post by fred on Feb 5, 2008 14:27:24 GMT -6
BC--
There is no one I know of who has a better grasp or knowledge of the facts involved in this battle than Harpskiddie. What I know cannot even begin to compete with his grasp of facts. Where I think I do okay, is in the interpretation of certain elements and the military aspects of events. In other words, the tactical maneuverings. This leads to theories. We all have them and oft'-times they compete. What I lack in specific facts, i.e., the knowledge of a Harpskiddie, I attempt to make up for with reason, rationale, and what I would do as a former combat officer.
Now, that may be fudging things a bit-- in other words, covering up my shortcomings-- but it does lead me to what I feel are interesting conclusions, conclusions that jive with the facts as I know them. Plus, if I combine this with known times and distances... well, it seems to work fairly well, especially since there are so many unknowns we will probably never get the definitive answer to.
To me, Custer's sending of Benteen to ensure the upper valley was clear, was a sound military move. Sending Reno to draw out warriors and tie them down was equally sound. Both those missions are my interpretations of what Custer did and I arrive at those conclusions only as a former army officer who has a relatively sound base in tactics. Other people feel Custer did both those things for reasons different than mine, but that's what this is all about.
As for Custer turning north instead of following Reno, I have my own interpretation of that: Fred Gerard's report that Indians were coming out to oppose Reno. To me, that meant those Indians were setting up a screen to delay the troops, which would allow their families to scatter. Again, I base this on basic tactics and the experiences of past confrontations the soldiers had with Indians.
That leads us to the following: Okay, he's heading north. To do what? Now, let's forget about where he went, where he saw the valley, what route he took to MTC, and all that stuff. What was Custer's objective? Why? What would you-- BC-- be doing down there?
That's what I want to get at. How many scenarios could there be? I have my own, but I am interested in others'. I want to know why you would have done something I might not have done... and for what reason. That doesn't mean I'm right and you're wrong... mine is a question of curiosity; not presumptive lecturing; just mere curiosity.
Just remember... as you think about this, use the set-up of urgency. That's all I ask. No picnic-place hunting; urgency. He was movin' out! That's the only "Fred-ism" I will throw in there; a high rate of speed. There are those who will disagree with that premise, but in that regard I believe them to be very wrong. So, please, that's the only caveat. Use high-rate of speed in your thinking.
Thanks, my boy!
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by bc on Feb 5, 2008 15:38:24 GMT -6
There is no one I know of who has a better grasp or knowledge of the facts involved in this battle than Harpskiddie. What I know cannot even begin to compete with his grasp of facts. Where I think I do okay, is in the interpretation of certain elements and the military aspects of events. In other words, the tactical maneuverings. This leads to theories. We all have them and oft'-times they compete. What I lack in specific facts, i.e., the knowledge of a Harpskiddie, I attempt to make up for with reason, rationale, and what I would do as a former combat officer. Now, that may be fudging things a bit-- in other words, covering up my shortcomings-- but it does lead me to what I feel are interesting conclusions, conclusions that jive with the facts as I know them. Plus, if I combine this with known times and distances... well, it seems to work fairly well, especially since there are so many unknowns we will probably never get the definitive answer to. ... That leads us to the following: Okay, he's heading north. To do what? Now, let's forget about where he went, where he saw the valley, what route he took to MTC, and all that stuff. What was Custer's objective? Why? What would you-- BC-- be doing down there? Best wishes, Fred. You said it well and all I can do is as well is apply my military type mind to the facts as we know them and through intrepretation come up with a reasonable rationale. At the time that Gerard advised Custer of Reno's contact with the NAs which I believe was when GAC was still well back from the river(and this is not dealing exactly with the timeframe at MTC and the ford), I believe Custer's intention was still to plow into the vill where he found it and attack. At that time, he didn't even know where he was going to find a ford to attack across. (It was also happenstance that Reno found his ford and crossed so easily and quickly) Also at that time, (except for the general thought that the NAs and families were generally fleeing), he had no specific knowledge of where they were at or fleeing to so his intention remained at that time to ford the river and attack the vill. I don't think GAC formed any other intention or plan of attack until he was able to eyeball the vill. And that changed again when he/his troops were denied the ford at B. I think this is the same basic rudamentary intention they had since leaving FAL as well as leaving Terry at the Yellowstone. Basically find the NAs whereever they were and attack. That was the overall strategic plan. Because they thought they were discoved by the Crow's nest, they had to move to the vill sight unseen which disallowed the chance to apply any particular battle tactics except to divide into 3 battalions, one in the center and two on either flank which is a standard battle formation. Reno was Custer's Pickett.
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Post by fred on Feb 5, 2008 17:47:17 GMT -6
BC--
I respect your opinion and your thoughts of Custer wanting to attack, but let me just clarify a couple of things.
Reno knew where there was a ford, because he was following the Indians' trail and one could make an assumption that trail was heading to a ford.
Also, Charlie Varnum had been moving along the bluffs on the south side of Reno/Ash Creek. (This was the same side Benteen had been moving along.) Varnum could see the village from somewhere along there and he could also see into the LBH valley. One particular place, aptly named "Varnum's Lookout"-- and do not get this confused with the author Vern Smalley's "Varnum's Lookout" (they are two different places)-- was where Varnum first saw Indians and they were heading down the LBH valley. When Varnum re-joined the column-- somewhere near the western "lone tepee," he informed Custer of this. It was either this report of Varnum's [0] or Gerard's report of the Indians coming out to meet Custer [X] that caused Custer to head north.
I agree with you-- partially, anyway-- that Custer's plan for his column was to attack. Or maybe not specifically to attack, but to intercept the refugees. (I like "intercept" much better than "gather up," which I've used in the past.)
Now what?
Best wishes, Fred.
PS-- Oh, and I might add, that it's very nice of everyone else to leave poor BC here dangling from old Freddy-Boy's limb!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! Nice, doncha think, BC? FCW
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Post by bc on Feb 6, 2008 1:47:28 GMT -6
Reno knew where there was a ford, because he was following the Indians' trail and one could make an assumption that trail was heading to a ford. Maybe and maybe not. That my friend calls for an assumption that I'm not prepared to make just yet. Reno really didn't know what they would find until they got there which was happenstance. I suspect however that conditions were such that they could have crossed about anywhere they wanted to. After all, they were all on horseback and not under fire. Reno could assume he is following a trail to the river but that doesn't necessarily mean it is fordable at that point. Wasn't the trail following a creek drainage? The confluence of a creek into a river or a small river into a big river usually (to me anyway) results in a deeper pool which means a movement up or down river to find a ford which is perhaps what the NAs had to do. After all, the NAs didn't exactly have a roadmap when they moved to the river. But then, on the other hand, the LBH wasn't the Mississippi either. Many of these summer time rivers on the plains really had flat and shallow beds that could be fordable for miles and especially by horseback(they had no wagons or infantry to worry about). For instance consider the Arkansas River and the Smoky Hill River where the 7th spent a lot of time which were virtually fordable/crossable about anywhere except during a time of flood. The only thing (other than the beaver dams) that could affect fordability would be the steepness of the banks/bluffs leading up to and at the river's edge. You could take that assumption one step further. They were all experienced in travelling through that type of hilly and bluffy terrain along side of rivers. Throughout their military careers, they all routinely camped alongside and crossed rivers and streams all the time. It could easily be assumed that any natural drainage headed towards the river, such as a coulee (medicine tail for instance) or a ravine (deep for instance) would automatically cut through any bluffs and end up flowing into the river at the same elevation making for a good ford especially with a now dry drainage. Now, after giving it further thought and and applying the above analysis, I believe that not only could Reno assume he could easily find a ford but also Custer or any other experienced cavalryman/plainsman could easily find a ford at the LBH. Also maybe the word "ford" isn't the correct term. Ford to me implies a crossing point in the middle of a river that doesn't have places to cross on either side of the ford because they are too deep, etc. Since I now believe the LBH was virtually crossable by horseback anywhere along it for miles, it was also fordable for miles. The term ford would apply to the places where they actually did cross. Look at Reno's retreat/charge across the river and up the bluffs from the timber. Probably not an ideal ford but still a place to cross the river. For those of us who don't regularly ford rivers, but occasionally fish in them, we all know the deepest part of any channel where the river bends is usually on the outside of the bend.
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Post by fred on Feb 6, 2008 6:56:08 GMT -6
BC--
Wow! Nicely done! You know your stuff here.
Reno was, however, following the trail and if memory serves me correctly, it had split-- the trail that is. Yes, he did move into a drainage: you can still see it on the maps and I believe you can still see it on the ground.
Truck on! my boy! Truck on!
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by crzhrs on Feb 6, 2008 9:33:56 GMT -6
During Reno's retreat his command was deflected away from their original crossing to an area that consisted of steep banks. The horses started to back up from fear of the height of the banks, which caused other horses to force them into the river.
The river was deeper and the other side extremely steep. I believe Varnum said he had difficulty staying in the saddle due to its steepness and he was an experienced horseman.
The river has been discussed many times and may have been one of the reasons for the commands difficulty in attacking the village.
Reno had better access to the village once he crossed it. He then came upon a large plain, but was still 2 miles(?) from the village which gave warriors an opportunity to gather in its front, shielding non-coms and creating dust to conceal movement.
Meanwhile, Custer who may or may not have altered his plans after finding out Indians weren't running may have had more difficulty in finding a suitable crossing--after going further downriver than planned--which may have enabled warriors to gather in areas they knew were suitable for crossing.
The river was as much of factor in the battle as everything else. Whether the Indians consciously established camps with the river as a barrier is another consideration. Regardless it did affect the military's attack plans.
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