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Post by quincannon on Jan 28, 2015 21:14:18 GMT -6
I don't believe you misused anything Beth. A volley as we know it today is what you would see at a military funeral.
In 1876 and before, like in todays funeral musketry was massed, and it was usually massed in ranks. The idea was to provide either a continuous base of fire, or suppressive fire during an attack preliminary to a bayonet charge. As single shot breech loaders came in, the line of soldiers became more spread out between individuals. A line of a hundred say, 5 meters apart (you do the math) would be beyond the control of one man to command a volley by voice alone.
Now none of those companies had 100 men so let's settle on 40 as average. Subtract the horse holders, the commander and his other officer and the first sergeant and you are now down to 27 on the firing line. 27 X 5 is 135 meters, approximately a football field and a quarter. Still tough for all to hear any command to fire.
If you wish to see what a closed rank, period specific volley fire is, look at the movie Zulu. I am sure WO knows the scene I mean, three ranks, firing in sequence, and I am sure he can direct us all to it.
Then there is the terrain at the LBH, and not one damned bit of it lends itself to volley firing, NONE.
Add into this then the fact that the warriors of the Sioux and Cheyenne Nations were not the Army of Northern Virginia. They had no desire to get shot, so they used terrain for cover and concealment. So there were no targets suitable for volley fire.
Then we get around to the final determining factor. How does one who is only listening or may be listening hear volley fire and differentiate it from the other fire that is incoming to those firing the volley? You bloody well can't.
I am told and I cannot verify it that three volleys fired in the air was a signal of some sort. Don't know how you could differentiate what the signal meant. Did it mean I'm over here. I am in distress. I have heard many people mention it, but none seem to know the source. Maybe these guys were so sophisticated as to carry a CEOI around with them but I sort of doubt it.
There is one thing I know first hand though, that anyone who stays around the Army business for even a short time has some measure of hearing loss. The two people in question here, the cowardly drunk, and the incompetent dawdler, served on many fields in the ACW and if they did not have some hearing loss, like 1LT (Not CPT) Godfrey admits to it is the third miracle of Fatima.
Those guys all of them were using volley to mean they heard some shooting. That is all it was. Nothing more.
PS There was some sort of unverified rumor around these parts about hearing three volleys. Most surmise that was from Keogh with his three companies on L-N-C Ridge complex, signaling. Don't know if it was true or not. Don't care. All I do is wonder who they were signaling if the report is true. They were much too far away to see Benteen, and they had a terrain obstruction preventing them from seeing Reno.
DC goes., pardon the pun, ballistic over this issue. He did this just yesterday. He is absolutely correct
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 28, 2015 21:17:33 GMT -6
Scar, Chuck's question about 3411 was never answered.
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Post by montrose on Jan 28, 2015 21:18:42 GMT -6
Let's take a look at the packers.
There is another issue between their demonstrated cowardice and theft.
They were incompetent. The mule train was a clown circus. The mule packing equipment was bought none months out. But no training took place until Powder river. The mules actually pulled wagons up to that point. Then mules and enlisted men had to sort out what to do. Remember, there was a daily hey you roster of 1 NCO and 6 privates to manage each companies 12 mules. The civilian packers were in charge of supervising loading and managing the train.
They didn't do their job. Loads fell off every single day, contributing to massive straggling. They had no bell mare, no procedures. It was amateur hour.
The packers may have had experience in managing individual mules, but nothing of this scale and scope. Their incompetence was a significant factor in the LBH defeat.
After LBH, we get to see Crook's mule train operating side by side with the Custer train. The difference was widely noted in numerous letters and diaries. In fact the Shoshones were so disgusted with the Custer train, that they left the expedition.
The Custer train slowed down any unit they were with. The slow pace increased supply requirements, which further slowed down operations.
Crook organized a permanent mule train. All animals received a years training before they were allowed on operations. He kept a permanent cadre of packers who were manned, trained, and equipped to operate a mule train. He ordered numerous training exercises to keep the unit fit and ready when not needed for operations.
SO when looking at packer testimony, remember that they were ot qualified for their jobs, and failed miserably. They were as qualified for their duties as Autie Reed.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 28, 2015 21:24:13 GMT -6
Chuck, I was about to bring up the three volley distress thing. It is fact, problem is in a battle of this nature it would probably be difficult to differentiate from the general din of battle. It is great for finding the lost, or in minor skirmishes.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Jan 28, 2015 21:40:39 GMT -6
Tom I believe you. I have heard many say it, but I have never seen a reference citing this is what you do.
Regardless if it was a standard procedure or not, you point is valid, how do you differentiate it through and over the noise of battle.
What I can see is you telling me, go over there a mile or so, and if you see anything fire two or three shots and I will come. Bad tactical procedure. You might as well hang a neon sign out saying I am here to any enemy that cares to have his way with you. Silence and remaining unseen even in those circumstances is of military value.
I surmise that he would not know a bench mark from the crack in his ass. I don't expect an answer now, and did not when I asked the question.
Inform Fred about what you told me this evening by PM or if you want to talk to he personally I am sure he will send you his phone number. He needs to know that.
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shaw
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Post by shaw on Jan 28, 2015 21:41:35 GMT -6
Thanks for the insight. Actually I did look over some of the Reno Court of Inquiry this afternoon. One officer definitely says he heard volleys and commented to another officer about it. But you make a good point. Volley could be a more generic word in terms of shooting of a gun or guns. There may be more references to volley in the testimony. I need to keep going through it (again). Thanks Shaw Shaw: If I were living in 1876 I could say I grabbed my Springfield went out in my back yard and fired off a volley. Everyone at that time hearing that would know what I meant --- I shot my damned gun. It was a common expression, common usage Someone hearing gunfire, either a little, one or two shots, or a lot, pitched battle, could rightly say and be understood by those at the time - I heard some volleys. I do not recall, and it would be interesting to review the testimony if any one said they heard volley firing. I don't think they did, but could be wrong. That and only that can be considered as evidence that an organized on command, volley(s) were being fired. Unless you have this evidence of organized on command firing, you do not have the modern understanding of the word volley. Everything else then is the pigeon poop that people like Scar dip their hands in to make a point usually having to do with someone lying. There is a range at Fort Benning, they take you to during the basic course. Several people around that perimeter are firing over your head. It is located in a sort of bowl shaped piece of terrain, that is quite large, and as far as brokenness is concerned not all that dissimilar to LBH. The idea is that these people start firing over your head, and you the student are required to tell where the rounds are coming from. To make it harder sometimes these folks are firing from different places at the same time. Bottom line is that it is very difficult, and it is not unknown for students being shot over not to even hear the shot. Anyone who hangs their hat on this type of testimony is hanging their hat on their bare ass.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 28, 2015 21:48:52 GMT -6
Shaw it was a common term of the day. Unless I would see someone saying that it was command initiated volley fire, and concurrently explain how they could tell it was and differentiate it from surrounding battlefield noise and other concurrent firing it is most probably just what most of us think it is a term that has been misused and distorted to mean any firing.
See my post to Beth.
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Post by Beth on Jan 28, 2015 21:51:30 GMT -6
I'm not familiar with the movie Zulu but am with Waterloo and how infantry worked then with its lines, columns and squares. That I am well familiar with. My elder daughter has a hearing loss so we are used to how hearing loss effects everything especially conversation with background noise. We are very hearing aware and hearing protection aware. I'm pretty much surprised that anyone could hear after the battle in the valley. Add to that Benteen weren't old, but they weren't young either so they have an age factor effecting their hearing. See this is why I don't understand giving a number for the volleys. Maybe they aren't talking about a short pause but different firefights. I don't have Fred's book in front of me so I might get the sequence wrong, but the battle with one company in a coulee, followed by a fallback and regroup at in the Calhoun area then the fallback and regrouping where ever next, Keogh? Beth
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Post by Beth on Jan 28, 2015 21:59:55 GMT -6
Let's take a look at the packers. There is another issue between their demonstrated cowardice and theft. They were incompetent. The mule train was a clown circus. The mule packing equipment was bought none months out. But no training took place until Powder river. The mules actually pulled wagons up to that point. Then mules and enlisted men had to sort out what to do. Remember, there was a daily hey you roster of 1 NCO and 6 privates to manage each companies 12 mules. The civilian packers were in charge of supervising loading and managing the train. They didn't do their job. Loads fell off every single day, contributing to massive straggling. They had no bell mare, no procedures. It was amateur hour. The packers may have had experience in managing individual mules, but nothing of this scale and scope. Their incompetence was a significant factor in the LBH defeat. After LBH, we get to see Crook's mule train operating side by side with the Custer train. The difference was widely noted in numerous letters and diaries. In fact the Shoshones were so disgusted with the Custer train, that they left the expedition. The Custer train slowed down any unit they were with. The slow pace increased supply requirements, which further slowed down operations. Crook organized a permanent mule train. All animals received a years training before they were allowed on operations. He kept a permanent cadre of packers who were manned, trained, and equipped to operate a mule train. He ordered numerous training exercises to keep the unit fit and ready when not needed for operations. SO when looking at packer testimony, remember that they were ot qualified for their jobs, and failed miserably. They were as qualified for their duties as Autie Reed. Thank you for sort of confirming what I had suspected, that Custer's mule train was handled badly. I have a friend who is basically travels most of the year through the Rockies with a horse and a mule. I talked to him once about Custer's mule train and he gave me the impression he thought the mules were really mishandled. Beth
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Post by quincannon on Jan 28, 2015 22:11:32 GMT -6
Hearing loss is a very severe problem in the military. Always has been. We use protection now but that is vintage 1970 and later. All of us have hearing loss to some degree.
There is a painting, quite stylized of Company L skirmishing against Henryville. Quite nice actually but about as accurate, probably better said as realistic as a Bugs Bunny cartoon. I think Ian posted it. Maybe he will do so again. Anyway they are much to close together, and you get the impression it is a controlled fire volley exercise. It is apparent though from the artifact finds that it was a fire at will situation, where instead of having one straight line as volley fire requires, the line was actually crooked as a snake and had to be to compensate for the terrain they were on.
There could have been volley firing from only one location on Calhoun Hill that being surrounding the present road loop where those guys were packed in tighter than sardines (comparatively speaking). The only problem there is that they were addressing two different threats from two different directions, so again volley fire would be impractical even if the terrain permitted it.
The only sane conclusion that can be reached given the skirmishing tactics of the day, terrain, cover, concealment, and absent the opportunity is that there was no on command volley firing done by anyone with Custer on the afternoon of 25 June, nor could it been differentiated as such had it by slim chance occurred.
Neither Reno nor Benteen were going to report themselves to the surgeon saying they can't hear well at that point in their careers short of retirement, and I do not believe the audiometer had been invented to detect such.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 28, 2015 22:12:28 GMT -6
Chuck, I informed Fred earlier, he has posted twice about some strange stuff. Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Jan 28, 2015 22:18:46 GMT -6
Know thy enemy Tom and you need not fear the outcome of a thousand battles.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 28, 2015 23:41:22 GMT -6
Beth I have not read Fred's book, but he did share with me much of the timing conclusions over the years prior to it being published. I was also aware of the gap, and we discussed it over the phone topographic maps in hand.
It is my considered opinion that what Benteen said at the RCOI was fairly close to being accurate. By the time he received that note I think their is a more than good chance all those guys were dead, and had just not fallen down yet. In other words overextended by time and distance to where there was no hope of rescue or relief. The time/space continuum means something. It often separates the doable from fantasyland.
As those guys were reaching the hill top with Reno and to be shortly joined by Benteen and the necessary wait for the packs, Custer was decisively engaged, both parts of Custer.
As Will pointed out this morning some mistakes were made by both Reno and Benteen. They are probably on the order of the identical mistakes made in any combat action, for none are without flaw. Sending out a patrol forward to make contact for instance, would not be the first thing done, although it was a very important thing to do, Security of position s primary. It is always primary for if your position is not secure, nothing of value can follow. You establish security or fight the battle for security first. Then and only then do you commence the restoration of combat effectiveness with the view to future combat operation. Add anything peculiar to the situation and you get the picture of time required.
So with all these things going on, and you add in that once they reached Weir Point, no one could see Custer by distance, and no one could see Keogh by terrain obstruction, it is more than logical for anyone to say when questioned just what Benteen surmised.
There is no soldier that would willingly and with malice leave his comrade behind, if he could have honestly done something about it. There is something of a brotherhood that develops within the unit structure that is bigger and more important than self. I wish I had words to explain it better. I don't. You will find it in Fire and Police Departments as well. There are just some things not done, no matter what.
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Post by Beth on Jan 29, 2015 1:24:23 GMT -6
I agree. One can play different possiblities over and over in their head but once Custer headed north from 3411 the possiblities of survival seem to go down with each step. I agree totally that both Benteen and Reno made errors. The only difference was their errors weren't as fatal. There were even little things like not getting as much water as they could while waiting for the pack train and after it arrived to major things like not sending out scouts for Custer and perhaps Terry. I understand part of it in my head though I have not experienced it in my heart. You are talking about people you would have shared experiences with that absolutely no one else could possibly understand and might not even want to listen to no matter how much they love you. It has to be deeper than family even, because I know my grandfather who was devoted to family never ever talked about the war with them. It was a part of him that we couldn't reach, however from the day he came home in 1918/19 until the day he died Grandpa made sure to go to every single veteran's funeral that he could drive to so as he put it. "No one should never be left alone, even at the end." There were times when he would be the only vet there but he always went. Beth
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Jan 29, 2015 5:15:31 GMT -6
Beth I have not read Fred's book, but he did share with me much of the timing conclusions over the years prior to it being published. I was also aware of the gap, and we discussed it over the phone topographic maps in hand. It is my considered opinion that what Benteen said at the RCOI was fairly close to being accurate. By the time he received that note I think their is a more than good chance all those guys were dead, and had just not fallen down yet. In other words overextended by time and distance to where there was no hope of rescue or relief. The time/space continuum means something. It often separates the doable from fantasyland. As those guys were reaching the hill top with Reno and to be shortly joined by Benteen and the necessary wait for the packs, Custer was decisively engaged, both parts of Custer. As Will pointed out this morning some mistakes were made by both Reno and Benteen. They are probably on the order of the identical mistakes made in any combat action, for none are without flaw. Sending out a patrol forward to make contact for instance, would not be the first thing done, although it was a very important thing to do, Security of position s primary. It is always primary for if your position is not secure, nothing of value can follow. You establish security or fight the battle for security first. Then and only then do you commence the restoration of combat effectiveness with the view to future combat operation. Add anything peculiar to the situation and you get the picture of time required. So with all these things going on, and you add in that once they reached Weir Point, no one could see Custer by distance, and no one could see Keogh by terrain obstruction, it is more than logical for anyone to say when questioned just what Benteen surmised. There is no soldier that would willingly and with malice leave his comrade behind, if he could have honestly done something about it. There is something of a brotherhood that develops within the unit structure that is bigger and more important than self. I wish I had words to explain it better. I don't. You will find it in Fire and Police Departments as well. There are just some things not done, no matter what. What would have been logical for Benteen to say was he believes Custer and his entire command was dead by the time they reached Weir Pt. What is illogical is for him to suggest they were dead before Martini had reached him.
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