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Post by fred on Nov 18, 2007 16:55:32 GMT -6
Reno’s men climbing bluffs—obliquely—with the van reaching what is later called Reno Hill. * 1 officer, 14 EM, and 3 scouts remained trapped in the woods: • LT DeRudio (A) • PVT Holmstead (A) WIA • PVT O’Neill (G)• SGT White (M) • PVT McCormick (G) • SGT Carey (M) or • PVT McGonigle (G) • TMP Weaver (M) • Johnson (G) • PVT Lattman (G) • PVT Moore (G) • PVT Sivertsen (M) • PVT McGinniss (G) KIA • Fred Gerard • Billy Jackson • Petring (G) • George Herendeen • PVT Armstrong (A) KIA
* Armstrong and McGinnis' heads wound up in the village, Armstrong’s on a pole. * Herendeen confirms that 2 men remained in the woods after he and the others left for Reno Hill some 2 hours later. He does not mention them by name, however. [Hammer/Camp, Custer in 76, p. 224] * According to Willert, G Company had been somewhat dispersed in the timber and not everyone got the word that the battalion was charging out. This would account for the large number of G Company men left behind. [LBH Diary, p. 303] * By the time Reno’s men reached the top of the hill, ammo was running short. Varnum said: “‘When we reached the top of the hill, we did not average 5 cartridges to the man.’” [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 322; from Dustin] √ LT DeRudio, one of the men left behind in the timber, claimed he started hearing heavy volleys from downstream about the time Reno began reaching the top of the bluffs. [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 391] DeRudio mentioned this at the RCOI.
N.B.—Bruce Liddic writes that the Sioux thought the soldiers had retreated because they realized they attacked the wrong tribe—the Sioux rather than the Cheyenne. The Sioux later claimed that was the reason why they rode alongside the soldiers instead of in front, directly behind, and in their midst, almost letting them escape rather than finishing them off. He cites the 17Jul1932 edition of the Billings Gazette, and Thomas Marquis’, The Cheyennes of Montana (1978).
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Nov 18, 2007 17:22:47 GMT -6
* Crows meet 2 Indians, Red Bear (Ree) and White Cloud (Dakota). * Somewhere in this timing sequence of Reno’s troops gathering on Reno Hill, the Sioux and Cheyenne warriors spotted Custer’s columns. Gall apparently saw Custer himself heading towards MTC and then Ford B, but other Indians may have only seen Keogh’s battalion heading up and along Luce Ridge. • Herendeen supposedly heard a great number of volleys from farther downstream around this same time. * Varnum: “Two braves, Half Yellow Face and White Swan [Crows] were with us, the latter being wounded. Forked Horn and Goose, Ree scouts, the latter wounded, were also there. All the rest were gone.” [Varnum, I, Varnum, pp. 68-69]
* LT DeRudio, left behind in the timber, said that immense volleys from somewhere downstream, caused the Indians in the valley to turn about and head in that direction. Part of the Indians went downriver along the bluffs and part down the valley. [Willert, LBH Diary, p. 391] • “Then more than half of the hostiles left the river bottom when they heard the sound of heavy firing farther downstream… The firing which the 4 men heard apparently commenced between the time Reno left the timber and the time he reached the top of the bluffs. Girard [sic] said that it began as a few scattering shots which continued for about 15 or 20 minutes before the firing became general. The first volleys were very plain but then got farther off, but not too far off, and the firing was steady for a long time—probably for from one and one-half to 2 hours—and then died away with a small scattering of shots which lasted for only a short period.” [Stewart, Custer’s Luck, p. 376] * Varnum claimed that a few minutes after Benteen’s arrival, he heard heavy firing from downstream. “Jesus Christ! Wallace, hear that! And that!… It was not like volley firing but a heavy fire—a sort of crash, crash. I heard it only a few minutes.” [Varnum, I, Varnum, p. 141, RCOI testimony]
* Young Hawk’s trapped group of 4 Rees and 2 Crows, plus troops on Reno Hill, notice a slackening of fire and an exodus of Sioux downstream.
* Pack train halts at flats (2 3/4 miles from “lone tepee,” having traveled at 3 mph) to close up; LT Mathey spots smoke. [Liddic has this occurring at the “lone tepee.”] * As McDougall reached the van and ordered Mathey to halt so the train could close up, he mounted the small butte and spotted the men on Reno Hill. At first, he though they were Indians, so he ordered the train to close up even tighter and put some of his troops in front and at the rear of the train. * Overall, McDougall’s actions were exemplary, for he organized the defense of the pack train in case of an attack, instructing the men to circle the mules, shoot them, and hold off the attackers that way. He made sure all the ammo mules were together so if trouble arose, the men would have plenty of ammo.
* LT Varnum and SGT Culbertson, sitting near one another on Reno Hill, hear a couple of loud and heavy volleys. Afterwards, it was lighter and appeared more distant. * Reno leaves hill to search for Hodgson’s body.
* Three Crow scouts—Goes Ahead, Hairy Moccasin, and White Man Runs Him—who were with Custer, but released as the command moved down Cedar Coulee, arrive at Sharpshooters’ Hill, and hear Custer or Keogh firing. * Godfrey said that by this time, the bottoms were virtually cleared of Indians. Also about this time, heavy volley firing was heard from downstream.
* Crows arrive back at Reno Hill. Friends are thought dead, so they decide to return home. * Crows leave Reno Hill for home. * Young Hawk’s party of 4 Rees and 2 Crows, leave their hideout for Reno Hill, 3/4 mile away.
* Pack train leaves flats, sighting troops on Reno Hill.
* Curley leaves for mouth of Big Horn River. * Reno returns to hill from search for Hodgson; speaks with Varnum. • Varnum’s testimony at the RCOI confirms the timing of Reno’s trip to recover Hodgson’s belongings. While he states that he was not 100% positive, Varnum says the packs were not yet in sight, for shortly after Reno’s return to the hilltop, LT Hare was sent back to hurry along a couple of ammo mules. * LT Hare leaves hilltop with orders from Reno to speed packs and return with additional ammo. * Pack train begins arriving at North Fork; takes the Custer-Benteen trail. * Young Hawk’s party arrives at Reno Hill. * CPT McDougall hears heavy firing to the far north. [Liddic, Vanishing Victory, p. 127] * Half Yellow Face and White Swan are on Reno Hill. They arrived separately from Young Hawk and are seen by George Herendeen when he arrives. [Smalley, More LBH Mysteries, p. 1-18] * PVT O’Neill, left in the timber, estimates that at about this time he heard the last of the firing from downriver. * Pack train meets LT Hare about 1/4 mile from the North Fork. * Mathey orders 2 mules with 2 ammo boxes each, forward with Hare. Civilian packers Churchill and Mann led one of the mules. * Reno orders Varnum to bury Hodgson; must await tools.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by mcaryf on Dec 19, 2007 15:44:20 GMT -6
Hi Fred
I have the following comments on what you posted here:
* Three Crow scouts—Goes Ahead, Hairy Moccasin, and White Man Runs Him—who were with Custer, but released as the command moved down Cedar Coulee, arrive at Sharpshooters’ Hill, and hear Custer or Keogh firing.
[glow=red,2,300]The Crows had actually met Benteen's command before Benteen reached Reno and directed him to Reno Hill, he told them to accompany him which they did. I beleive they then went back along the ridge a second time when they saw enough to know that Custer was being defeated.[/glow]
* Godfrey said that by this time, the bottoms were virtually cleared of Indians. Also about this time, heavy volley firing was heard from downstream.
[glow=red,2,300]Godfrey's testimony at RCOI actually had the warriors initially heading upstream towards the pack train area until the sound of firing attracted them north.[/glow]
* Crows arrive back at Reno Hill. Friends are thought dead, so they decide to return home. [glow=red,2,300]The Crows arrived back on Reno Hill after the pack train was up - see their own and other Arikara comments.[/glow]
* Crows leave Reno Hill for home. * Young Hawk’s party of 4 Rees and 2 Crows, leave their hideout for Reno Hill, 3/4 mile away.
[glow=red,2,300]Young Hawk's account makes it clear that he spotted a flag and went downstream to it. Although his party thought it was the pack train at the time clearly it was in fact the Weir advance party on Weir Peaks and not Reno Hill. You cannot see Reno Hill from the likely hiding places where YH etc were holed up. Thus YH and his companions head for Weir peaks. YH then sees the warriors heading towards that area from Custer Hill and sends his companions back up the valley to join Reno further along the bluffs whilst he joins Weir and subsequently Varnum on Weir Peaks. This is how YH gets separated from HYF and Goose.[/glow]
* Pack train leaves flats, sighting troops on Reno Hill.
* Curley leaves for mouth of Big Horn River. * Reno returns to hill from search for Hodgson; speaks with Varnum. • Varnum’s testimony at the RCOI confirms the timing of Reno’s trip to recover Hodgson’s belongings. While he states that he was not 100% positive, Varnum says the packs were not yet in sight, for shortly after Reno’s return to the hilltop, LT Hare was sent back to hurry along a couple of ammo mules.
[glow=red,2,300]I think the balance of probability is that Varnum was mistaken in saying that Hare was sent after Reno's return and this happened before pulling forward a lot of subsequent times. Hare himself, Godfrey and Reno all said it happened soon after Benteen's arrival. In addition Culbertson testified that he heard the order to go to hurry the packs being given before he and Reno went to look for Hodgson. Unfortunately Culbertson mistakenly thought the order was given to Varnum - obviously they were all close together. I think this has caused researchers to miss this testimony which for me clinches that Varnum himself was wrong. Thus Hare would have gone soon after 4.30 and returned about 4.55. This also pulls forward the departure of Weir as Hare sees Weir in the distance on his return.[/glow]
* LT Hare leaves hilltop with orders from Reno to speed packs and return with additional ammo. * Pack train begins arriving at North Fork; takes the Custer-Benteen trail. * Young Hawk’s party arrives at Reno Hill. [glow=red,2,300]See my comments above - in fact the two Crows do not meet Reno on Reno Hill but some way along the bluffs after he has lead his column forward. This is also consistent with Herendeen who clearly stated to Camp (Custer in 76) that he met Reno along the bluffs at the furthest point of his advance and the Crows were with Reno. Your timeframe and events are so far away from my own views after this that I cannot usefully comment on them - e.g. the pack train is already up by now. [/glow]
I have developed a new timeline for all the actions on Reno Hill but I am currently in a correspondence debate about it with the past President of the Custer Association of Great Britain, Francis Taunton, and I would prefer not to publish it in full whilst I am doing that although I am happy to debate/defend the points I have posted above.
Regards
Mike
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Post by erkki on Jan 20, 2008 15:59:50 GMT -6
Fred wrote "Gall apparently saw Custer himself heading towards MTC and then Ford B, but other Indians may have only seen Keogh’s battalion heading up and along Luce Ridge."
Two comments: 1) Gall was late to the battle and may have arrived only in time for the fighting around Calhoun hill. To delay Custer's approach down MTC toward Ford B until after Gall had returned to his village and discover his family dead seems an extreme extension of the time involved. 2) "Custer" in the Indian narratives is a generic terms for Custer's troops. Given that Gall was late to the Custer fight, I suspect that he is reporting what he picked up in 'camp gossip' rather than reporting what he personally saw. Also "Three Crow scouts—Goes Ahead, Hairy Moccasin, and White Man Runs Him—who were with Custer, but released as the command moved down Cedar Coulee, arrive at Sharpshooters’ Hill, and hear Custer or Keogh firing[/u].[/b]"
Goes Ahead p.59 of The Tepee Book June 1916: "We scouts went as far as the bluffs before the trenches of the pack-mules. Here we were told to make our escape. We took a drink of water near there and made haste to get away with our lives."
Goes Ahead omitted the apparent fact that the three Crow scouts (and Bouyer) followed Custer north along the bluffs to a point above Ford B. Nevertheless, Goes Ahead seems to me to be the most credible source for the point at which Custer dismissed the scouts. That is, Custer released/dismissed the Crow scouts shortly after reaching the bluffs and very near the time that he, Custer, may have been seen at the DeRudio outlook just north of the entrenchments.
Goes Ahead's location for the dismissal of the scouts, approximates, incidentally, the location of the letter "D" in "RENO'S COMMAND" on the Maguire map used at the RCOI where Girard said he had seen "Custer" 10 or 15 minutes before Reno left the timber. To further muddy the waters, Goes Ahead's location south of the entrenchments which equals Girard's "D" also corresponds with the place where the Crow scouts told Curtis that Custer first looked over the valley (Curtis papers p.18 and position #2 on Curtis's map). Also, they told Curtis that his next stop was Weir/Edgerly Peaks.
The most I would commit myself to is that a) the scouts were dismissed soon after GAC reached the bluffs and not near Sharpshooter or Weir and b) that Girard's estimated 10 or 15 minutes before Reno left the timber is a subjective and inaccurate estimation of the duration of time between his sighting of Custer and Reno's retreat--like most of the postulated intervals of time between events that appear in the source materials we use.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 12, 2015 14:11:56 GMT -6
Fred, this is an interesting look back after 6 years, any serious changes you would make or responses to the other posters?
Regards, Tom
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 21, 2015 5:35:05 GMT -6
Reno’s men climbing bluffs—obliquely—with the van reaching what is later called Reno Hill. * 1 officer, 14 EM, and 3 scouts remained trapped in the woods: • LT DeRudio (A) • PVT Holmstead (A) WIA • PVT O’Neill (G)• SGT White (M) • PVT McCormick (G) • SGT Carey (M) or • PVT McGonigle (G) • TMP Weaver (M) • Johnson (G) • PVT Lattman (G) • PVT Moore (G) • PVT Sivertsen (M) • PVT McGinniss (G) KIA • Fred Gerard • Billy Jackson • Petring (G) • George Herendeen • PVT Armstrong (A) KIA * Armstrong and McGinnis' heads wound up in the village, Armstrong’s on a pole. * Herendeen confirms that 2 men remained in the woods after he and the others left for Reno Hill some 2 hours later. He does not mention them by name, however. [ Hammer/ Camp, Custer in 76, p. 224] * According to Willert, G Company had been somewhat dispersed in the timber and not everyone got the word that the battalion was charging out. This would account for the large number of G Company men left behind. [ LBH Diary, p. 303] * By the time Reno’s men reached the top of the hill, ammo was running short. Varnum said: “‘When we reached the top of the hill, we did not average 5 cartridges to the man.’” [ Willert, LBH Diary, p. 322; from Dustin] √ LT DeRudio, one of the men left behind in the timber, claimed he started hearing heavy volleys from downstream about the time Reno began reaching the top of the bluffs. [ Willert, LBH Diary, p. 391] DeRudio mentioned this at the RCOI. N.B.—Bruce Liddic writes that the Sioux thought the soldiers had retreated because they realized they attacked the wrong tribe—the Sioux rather than the Cheyenne. The Sioux later claimed that was the reason why they rode alongside the soldiers instead of in front, directly behind, and in their midst, almost letting them escape rather than finishing them off. He cites the 17Jul1932 edition of the Billings Gazette, and Thomas Marquis’, The Cheyennes of Montana (1978). Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 21, 2015 5:59:59 GMT -6
I tried to pull this old post 2 weeks ago, so as to show the condition Reno's command was in on Reno hill. Among other things I wanted to see if Fred felt any different than he did 7-8 years ago. Other major questions are for the officers who post here. How would you respond, if you were Benteen, coming upon this scene? What are your priorities? How long would it take to get the combined force to move forward to aid Custer? Would you take only the ammo forward and leave the remainder of packs and wounded behind with a small detachment to guard, on Reno Hill?
Regards, Tom
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Post by fred on Jan 21, 2015 7:26:49 GMT -6
Tom,
I will get to it, I promise. Just been busy as can be; probably later today or tomorrow.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 21, 2015 8:42:46 GMT -6
Tom: I see no reason to second guess what Benteen did when he arrived at Reno's position.
The first priority would be to clear and secure the area.
The second would be a reorganization and consolidation phase where it is ascertained just how badly Reno was damaged, then start to replace key leaders, consolidate companies reduced by casualties (if necessary), tend the wounded, redistribute ammunition, and all of the tasks necessary to reestablish combat effectiveness as quickly as possible.
Concurrent with the above I would put out small patrols, primarily north and east, and would not move squat until I heard from them. Their mission would be finding Indian concentrations, but not necessarily finding Custer. News of him would be a bonus. Depending upon what they told me, I would move OR NOT.
All this is based upon the fact that I have a battle to fight, MY BATTLE, not Custer's battle. I must do what I feel best to sustain, preserve, and fight my force. If I can help Custer in the process OK, but it is not my priority.
In any instance I don't move wounded, nor do pack trains go in with any engagement I might initiate.
How long would it take? AS LONG AS NECESSARY.
Damned good questions on your part.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 21, 2015 8:56:13 GMT -6
Chuck, I am sure Lt. Varnum was sent out to locate Custer and Lt. Hare was sent in the opposite direction to bring in the packs, I think that Skirmish lines were also formed, so someone was asserting some control on the hill.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 21, 2015 9:02:31 GMT -6
That's what these people are paid to do Ian, assert control.
It is only the fakers and pretenders that think this thing was a shambles, ringmastered by a couple of ninnies. They were beaten, order was restored, effectiveness returned. Was it pretty? No. Was it done? Yes.
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Post by tubman13 on Jan 21, 2015 9:06:28 GMT -6
Thanks Chuck, the 1st of what I was looking for. I think the situation on Reno hill has played out on numerous hills in succeeding wars. While I am not looking to discuss those, responses such as the one you have given, have probably played out in a very similar fashion.
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jan 21, 2015 9:10:51 GMT -6
Yes I agree, I would imagine if Benteen saw that Reno had taken his eye off the ball and went down to search for the body of his Adjutant, he would have started organising on his behalf, one thing I would be sure about, that he never wondered about aimlessly kicking stones around.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 21, 2015 9:23:40 GMT -6
Actually Tom, we do train for this. Often during training exercises, say an assault on a position, I would go around to a few key people in my platoon, and tell them during the assault, you will be killed, while you will be wounded, this machine gun will run out of ammo, things like this. Once the assault phase was concluded, the dead are tended to, the wounded evacuated, ammunition redistributed, batteries replaced, and junior leaders replace the "fallen" seniors. The "fallen" would take their places as privates in the squad or platoon, while the juniors took over, and the seniors including myself could evaluate their performance. I was not immune, nor was my platoon sergeant. Many times a Staff Sergeant or on a few occasions a Buck Sergeant would take the platoon, and the more senior people, including myself would fall in as riflemen. You study theory, but as near under fire evaluations are the only way you can determine performance.
My favorite place to do this was on the live fire platoon courses down at The Hill, with all of the pressure that live fire exercises apply.
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Post by quincannon on Jan 21, 2015 9:57:01 GMT -6
One of the things rarely discussed is the leadership techniques required in such situations.
Reno's men were beaten, but that is not your only concern. Benteen's men could see they wrre beaten so they must be tended to as well. These folks could count, they saw what happened to Reno's similar sized force. They knew too that they would soon be in it.
Therefore it is the leaders job to reverse the situation and set the future tone of operations. You don't do this by yelling and screaming, running around like a chicken with its head cut off. You do it my calm, deliberate actions and orders, setting the example by your own actions. You restore calm and a sense of purpose.
You halt panic and stop the kneejerk reactions. If Weir for instance had done what is reported, he would be placed under field arrest, and if it continued he would be physically restrained, or shot. It is that serious. I would worry about my own courts martial later.
Your mission is to get things back in order as quickly as possible. That does not mean hurry, because haste makes waste and if you hurry too much you are likely to become the wasted. Deliberate calm actions on the part of the leader, can restore order faster than all the yelling, screaming and hurrying in the world.
Only pretenders would think otherwise.
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