Was Benteen's mission a Scout?

[mcaryf]

I have been thinking about Benteen's mission to the left and been wondering who first started calling it a scout? If it was Godfrey, then I have a theory. Godfrey admired both Custer and Benteen and would not want to be seen criticising them. If the mission is categorised as a scout then perhaps Custer was unwise to split his force but he needed to take care of his left flank etc etc. Benteen did the job so that is OK and it is only later that some people start to query if he could have gone faster - I am not aware that Godfrey makes any overt criticism of Benteen over that possibility.

Now if the mission actually was not a scout but rather Custer sending off the left prong of his intended attack then both he and Benteen could be criticised. Custer because he misjudges the terrain so the left prong is sent too early and over unsuitable ground and Benteen because he actually turns back before he reaches the LBH valley where the Indians were. Of course if Benteen had continued to try to get to LBH he would have been even later and not in time to help Reno so the disaster is worse.

What evidence is there for the real purpose of Benteen's mission? We have the letter that Benteen wrote to his wife within a week of the battle when there was no reason for him to mislead her, he wrote

"I was ordered with my Battn. to go over the immense hills to the left, in search of the valley, which was supposed to be very near by and to pitch into anything I came across - and to inform Custer at once if I found anything worthy of same."

Thus if his unit had got to LBH and spotted Indians, as they would have done, then he was to attack them. This sounds more like an attack order and I presume he would have attacked if he had seen them. So why did a Benteen attack not happen? Well we have the evidence from, Gibson, the commander of the detail that Benteen sent ahead over the hills to look into subsequent valleys:

Gibson himself subsequently decided that he had failed to look into the LBH valley. In his interview with Walter Camp he is reported by Camp to have confirmed the following:

"Captain Gibson says Benteen told him to keep going until he could see the valley of the Little Bighorn and that he (Gibson) thought that he did so. He now thinks however that he only went far enough to look down on the valley of the south fork of Sundance Creek."

That creek is of course also called other names including Reno Creek.

This evidence from Camp clearly shows that Gibson was ordered to go as far as the LBH and that he personally subsequently beleived that he had failed to do that.

It is not clear to me whether Benteen did deliberately terminate the mission early as he subsequently claimed or whether the termination was due to Gibson's "error". If indeed Benteen had thought Gibson had looked into LBH and not seen Indians then the mission would have been properly completed. I guess Benteen may have subsequently realised that Gibson could not have looked into the right valley, otherwise he would have seen signs of Indians (if only smoke) so perhaps he was covering up his unit's failure (actually Gibson's) when he started to blurr the issue re valley hunting.

If my theory is correct and Custer actually intended Benteen's mission to be an attack then he plainly made an unfortunate error and sent it too early through unsuitable terrain.

Do any of you more widely read than me have any other light to shine on how Benteen's mission came to be classified as a scout?

Regards

Mike

[elisabeth]

Not electing myself as among the more widely read(!), but is it worth looking at Benteen's official report? Here it is:

www.lbha.org/Research/benteen1.htm

It's dated July 4th 1876, the same date as the letter you quote. Even in this official report he's talking about "nothing to be seen of Indians, valleys, etc." -- so he must already have realised Gibson saw the wrong valley. But he hasn't yet started the hare of terminating the mission early in defiance of orders; here, he says his orders were to return to the trail if he saw nothing.

It may be significant that Gibson is not called to testify at the RCOI ...

[Dark Cloud]

Anything MIGHT be significant, but rather than imply it and leave it, suggest why it might be so.

Mcaryf, in a letter to Godfrey in 1908, Gibson says "I can state definitely that I did find and see..." the LBH valley. This on page 262 in Gray CLC. He says he could see a long way with his binoculars. He could not see anything up north because the river curved and high ground blocked the view. The camp was ten miles away, ish.

These gullies and creeks of the now Reno Creek are verging on insignificant, and it would take an idiot to mistake this damp drip nearly capable of providing a morass as a river of any note whatsoever, or dry ravines for a river valley. Further, they could see the valley of the LBH from the divide, and knew where it lay in general and its general dimensions.

Camp, because his stuff hasn't been thumbed and read to pieces as much as others' have, is granted an unchallenged reverence that is sometimes hard to fathom. He claimed to have interviewed for specific hours officers who sometimes, in the case of Edgerly, had never met him at all, although they corresponded. I don't find that pretend interview falsity charming, and suggest a large keg of salt on the left shoulder. He also carried a Procrustean bed in his noggin, as Gray points out about his interviews with Indians that led to false assumptions about their "testimony."

[harpskiddie]

dc: Finally somebody else who does not believe that Camp "interviewed" everyone he says he did. I mention in another post that Camp wrote notes to himself from other sources without noting the source. Some of his "interviews" are taken from letters, newspaper accounts, and the newspaper transcripts of the Reno Inquiry. Even his actual interviews leave a great deal to be desired. To my mind the best are the ones conducted by others based upon his questionnaires, although these are still tainted by Camp's preconceptions of what happened, especially those with Indians, who must have wondered what all this Ford B and Foley stuff was all about. I've always wondered why nobody wondered why Camp would travel 750 miles, spend four or five hours with somebody, and come back with "says his horse was brown."

mcaryf: As to the Benteen mission, there is sufficient primary evidence to know what it was intended to be. Darkcloud is absolutely correct about the nature of the country traversed. It is not as bad as usually portrayed; the "watercourses" are usually dry; and with a couple of exceptions are totally insignificant, unless maybe you're a cow looking for a drink to save your life. There is no way that any of them could possibly be confused with either the Little Horn or its valley. I have ridden over that country twice. Unfortunately I'll not be able to do it again.

As to the purpose of his mission, we have his own versions of his orders from his official report of 4 July 1876, his letters to his wife dated 1 July and 4 July 1876, an interview published in the New York Herald 8 August 1876, and his unpublished narratives from the 90s. Frank Gibson wrote his wife on 4 July 1876: Benteen's battalion ....was sent to the left about five miles to see if the Indians were trying to escape up the valley of the Little Big Horn, after which we were to hurry and rejoin the command as quickly as possible."

In my own research paper on the subject [which also quotes all of the above-noted, along with Edgerly and Godfrey] I conclude: "It must be noted that nothing in Benteen's orders, notwithstanding his later statements to the contrary, told him to "pitch into anything he came across." This is evident for the following reasons: 1) his official report mentions nothing of the kind, and he would not have omitted something so significant; 2) he was not provided with any medical services or supplies, not even an enlisted medical attendant; 3) Benteen would not have failed to make use of such lack, had it truly been an oversight or deliberate act on Custer's part, but he never mentioned it at any time, even when he was telling the Reno Inquiry that he would have been beyond Custer's aid, had he in fact been forced to fight any major action."

The only people who repeat the "pitch into" part are people whom Benteen told that that's what Cooke told him.

Darkcloud is correct about Gibson's letter to Godfrey. It is dated 9 August 1908, and the relevant portion reads: I can state definitely that I did find and see it....I crossed one insignificant stream running through a narrow valley, which I knew was not the Little Big Horn valley, so I kept on to the high divide on the other side of it, and from the top of it I could see plainly up the Little Big Horn valley for a long distance, with the aid of the glasses; but in the direction of the village, I could not see far on account of a sharp turn in it....I saw not a living thing on it, and I hurried back and reported to Benteen, who then altered his course so as to pick up the main trail..."

For Gibson to have told Camp that he now thought he was mistaken, is like saying "I thought I saw Las Vegas, but now I realize it was just Rhyolite."

In fairness to Benteen, for whom I hold no particular brief, it is obvious that he fulfilled his orders exactly as to his mission, which can only really be characterized as a "scout." Benteen seemed to think that he had been purposely sent out there to keep him out of the battle, although my opinion is that he never really thought there were any Indians ahead. It is only after he strikes the main trail that he starts to falter in his duty, as far as I am concerned.

Godfrey was a gentleman and hardly ever had anything bad to say about anyone - Reno being the sole exception that I can recall, without rereading everything I've got stashed away. He tended to accept others' versions of events, probably to a fault - certainly to the detriment of the history of the campaign.

Elisabeth: I think it is hightly significant that Gibson was not called to testify at the Inquiry; but we'll never know what he would have said. Probably he would have closed ranks with the others - but I don't know why he wasn't given the chance. And maybe Jesse Lee would not have asked the right questions or crossed with any sense of purpose. He certainly let others off pretty lightly in terms of cross-examination - but that's a horse of another colour.

[Diane Merkel]

I inherited the web page Elisabeth cited from a former LBHA webmaster and just noticed a lot of typos. Does anyone know where I can read a hard copy of the order -- or see an accurate online version -- so I can proof that page?

[crzhrs]

In Godfrey's NARRATIVE he stated the horses were "jaded" during Benteen's scout and were falling behind . . . so he apparently felt the scout was done over some rough country.

However, he did not say whose horses were "jaded" . . . all, some, many.

[mcaryf]

Hi Harpskiddie

I have come across the argument that Benteen's mission was not a combat one because there was no doctor elsewhere. I guess you might equally argue that it could not have been a scout because none of the many available professional scouts were sent to accompany it.

I notice that Gibson's letter to Godfrey was dated 9 August 1908, whilst his communication with Camp whatever form it took is dated Dec 7th 1910.

On this forum a week or two ago Blaque was querying whether Gibson's letter referring to "we" and "returning to the command" might actually mean we as in Gibson's detail and "the command" as in Benteen's command.

Is it actually credible that Gibson can look into the LBH valley and not see signs of Indians even if it was only smoke? Varnum claimed to have been able to see the village from positions well to the East of where Gibson was which one would have thought would be even more subject to being obscured by the bend in the river.

Camp does include a justification of why Gibson might have confused the two valleys the validity of which I cannot judge.

The other problem with all this is of course why send a whole Battn. unless you actually think you might want to fight something? Is your interpretation that Custer's intention was that Benteen should spot that there are indeed Indians in the LBH and then retrace his steps to the main trail and follow Custer up onto the bluffs on the far side of the village?

Edgerley at the RCOI also claims to have heard the "pitch into" command so the only contrary indicator is that Benteen did not mention this specifically in his orders. Although in them he does say what he was supposed to do if there were no Indians but he does not say what he was to do if there were. It seems to me a very thin piece of evidence to use to counter the statements of two officers who describe what they actually reckon they heard, namely Edgerley and Benteen.

Regqrds

Mike

[Dark Cloud]

Varnum's remarks reflect vistas from the Wolf Mt.'s, totally higher back and east-NORTH-east of Benteen's furthest possible southern point. Not closer, but higher.

Sklenar's position is that Benteen was to be the southern prong of the attack on the group reduced to the Lone Tipi by Custer's arrival, Reno the center, Custer the right. Unfortunately, that explains several things that remain silly for the main camp, and it's hard to shake.

I've never ridden the field, or what is assumed was Gibson/Benteen's route, but it looks hard enough and especially for tired horses unwatered and dubiously fed as a result. And.....do we actually know the route taken, or is this an educated guess?

[harpskiddie]

An educated guess, based on Darling, and the evidence from the participants. Of course I would never claim that I followed the exact route, but I was over all of the ground that it could have been. As to the condition of the horses - they were no doubt somewhat "jaded" tired and thirsty - but they weren't in that bad shape, or the route that bad, that it wasn't completed in under two hours. My comment about the ground was meant to indicate that it was not as bad as usually portrayed. Voss and Sharrow were able to gallop over it to Benteen and back at various times, and while I wouldn't have galloped over it unless I had to, my comments on the lay of the land still stand.

The distance travelled on the oblique march is in question, and hence the actual route. Benteen claimed it was 10 miles, but also said it took only an hour and a half. The hour and a half is pretty close to actual timing, but the 10 miles is an outlandish claim. That would indicate a trot the whole way. His officers estimated the distance at 5 or 6 miles, which is much more reasonable for the march, which took about 45 minutes, at a good walking pace. One might argue that this was not "rapidly"as Custer had ordered; but that would be quibbling.

Benteen told the Inquiry that he was to "send back word to General Custer at once if I came across anything." In his official report 4 July, he states: ".........if in my judgment there was nothing to be seen of Indians, Valleys &c, in the direction I was going, to return with the battalion to the trail the command was following."

As to the other officers overhearing, I think that very doubtful. Custer had motioned Benteen over to him, and then had Cooke meet him and give him the orders [which Benteen might have considered a slight]. The troops were then in column, halted, according to Benteen's second narrative. This is where he was actually given his battalion command, and I don't think that his companies were necessarily in order, although H was leading the column. I doubt that any of his officers heard the orders. Remember that they were verbal, and not delivered at the head of his company. There is no reason for any of them to have been near, except maybe Gibson. Remember also that the battalion assignments had not yet been made previously, and when Benteen pulled the three companies out of line and started off, Reno was miffed, because he had not yet received a command.

Varnum and some of the Rees had been assigned to this side of Ash Creek, but had not yet reported anything relative to the Little Horn Valley. The Crows and Bouyer were on the other side. Varnum's observations, and report, of the valley would come much later near the time and place of Reno's order to take the lead.

The only contemporary evidence of Benteen being an attack force is, as I recall, Davern's testimony that the "pursue and charge" order to Reno included the information that Benteen would be on Reno's left. I don't have the testimony in front of me so may be mistaken, but I think that was the gist of it.

Custer can be blamed for assuming that he would hear from Benteen one way or the other, before he had to commit to anything. It is interesting to speculate what Custer might have done had Benteen sent a messenger to him reporting that he had found nothing, and was returning to the main trail. This would have been entirely possible, since even when Benteen came back to the main trail, he was only about 3 miles and half an hour or so behind Custer. Had he dispatched a fast courier when Gibson signalled or reported that there was nothing to be seen in the valley, obviously that courier would have overtaken the main command before they reached the Lone Tepee, and Custer might just have waited for Benteen there, or at least altered the disposition of the troops.

The Lone Tepee was the Lone Tepee early that morning, and seen by Varnum from the Crow's Nest, along with another knocked-down lodge. Nobody had lived in that camp site for a couple of days, according to Indian sources, because it was occupied by a dead warrior,and nobody got chased out of it by the advancing troops. There are some very real questions as to who the 40 or so Indians were that everybody says Girard characterized as "running Like devils," and more importantly where they were. Nobody else claimed to see them on the Ash Creek side of the Little Horn, and the Crows who were in an excellent position to see them, never mentioned seeing any Indians on Ash Creek. I think they would have mentioned such a thing, but maybe not.

Fred Girard said they were on the opposite side of the Little Horn: "A few minutes before Major Reno received his orders, I rode up a little knoll near where there was a lodge with some dead Indians in it, and from this knoll I could see the town, the Indian tepees and ponies. I turned my horse sideways, and took off my hat and waved it and then I hollooed to General Custer, "Here are your Indians, running like devils!" And I rode down from that knoll and joined General Custer and he was still marching on."

Cross examined by Reno's counsel: Q: "Where were the Indians when you saw them from that little hill?" A: " They were down in the bottom of the Little Big Horn River." Q: "How far down the valley were they, and on which side of the river?" A: "I should say over three miles from where we were, and I judged them to be of the left bank of the river."...............Q: "They were on the side of the river to which Major Reno afterwards crossed?" A: "Yes, sir."

Ah, me.......ain't life grand and ain't speculation fun!!!!!

[harpskiddie]

Diane: You will find Benteen's report reproduced in Overfield's The Little Big Horn, 1876. If I knew how to utilize my computer properly, I would send you a copy. Maybe someone else will.

[George Mabry]

Mike, size alone would not prelude a maneuver unit from being a “scout” Nowadays it would probably be called a reconnaissance in force. Benteen’s order, according to him anyway, had a little flavor of both reconnaissance and attack in it. I don’t think one can justify calling Benteen’s maneuver an attack because he was never assigned a target to attack. He was told to check out the upper part of the LBH valley and if he didn’t see anything, to return to the main body. That sounds like scouting. If I’m not mistaken, Benteen was also instructed to send word to Custer if he saw anything. That doesn’t sound like an attack order.

I think it is insignificant as to whether or not Benteen was told to pitch into anything he came across. Just the fact that he took his battalion with him would indicate to me that he was expected to fight anything he found.

I also don’t think you can read anything into Benteen’s mission by the absence of medical personnel within his battalion. If Custer’s thinking at that time was that they were all headed for the same place and were all within supporting distance of one another, there was no need to parcel out his medical staff. That might also explain why he didn’t assign any Indian scouts to Reno to assist in his reconnaissance. I don’t see any contradictions here.

Does anyone know if, when Custer ordered Reno on the attack, that he had to also assigned specific medical personnel to Reno’s battalion or had the medicos already been attached to their battalions at the divide halt or back at the Yellowstone?

George

[Diane Merkel]

harpskiddie said:

Diane: You will find Benteen's report reproduced in Overfield's The Little Big Horn, 1876.

Thank you. I'm glad you've joined us!

[Dark Cloud]

That sounds like Sklenar has been voided, then. He certainly thought the Indians abandoned that camp at Custer's approach, as I recall. Also, Gray negated Girard's claim of the sighting at the Lone Tipi, so that's a sound clubbing of that part of Gray. If true, and there's a rise where Girard could have seen what he says in the time frame allowed, which Gray doesn't think there is.

[harpskiddie]

I regret to say that I never checked out the existence of such a hill when I was there. Maybe somone who has taken one of the tours that goes along Ash Creek can let us know what if anything they noted. I will check it out the next time I am down there, which will be next year, all things being equal. I think most writers have become enamoured of the "chasing the fleeing rear guard of the recently departed village." But I have never found where this started. Even the order to Reno to pursue, says the enemy is about two miles away, and that tallies nicely with Girard's testimony that they were about three miles away from the Lone Tepee site.

As George said, Benteen would have been expected to take whatever action was indicated if he had encountered any Indians. I still think the absence of medical personnel indicated Benteen was not part of an attack plan, and indeed I have characterized it as a reconnaissance-in-force in my paper.

Another indication that Benteen was not under attack orders is the fact that he returned to the main trail, instead of going into the Little Horn valley. Had he been under orders to enter the valley and attack the village, how would he have justified not doing so to his commander. Just saying he didn't see anything would not have sufficed. Also launching part of an attack from just over the divide would have been nonsensical. If that had been the plan all along, why then did Custer not strike out to the right?

George: I have never seen anything regarding the doling out of the medical personnel - at the divide or anywhere else. They could not have already been attached to the battalions, since there were in fact no battalions until they were assigned at the time Benteen split. Custer and Cooke had pulled over to the side of the trail and Cooke was scribbling in his notebook just prior to the order to Benteen. My assumption is that this had to do with the battalion assignments. If it was in fact a written order to Benteen, it has never surfaced, and neither, of course has Cooke's notebook.

As far as the scouts are concerned, I'm not sure what you mean by Custer not assigning any scouts to Reno. He and Reno were marching across from one another on opposite sides of Ash Creek for most of the march, with Varnum out in the hills to the left with most of the Rees and Hare out to the right with some more of them. The Crows and Bouyer had already been as far as the bluffs above the Lone Tepee site, having spent, according to the Crows, the whole morning there. That's as may be - the point is that there were plenty of scouts out ahead, and the Rees were riding in and out with reports of what was going on, which was nothing. There was not even any big dust until the horse herds started being driven in close to the camp circles, and the smoke from the morning fires had long since dissipated. Both Varnum and Hare were under orders to constantly report, which they did through the Rees.

That the scouts were ahead even in the Ash Creek bottom is evidenced by their having preceded the troops to the Lone Tepee.

Diane: You're most welcome. And thank you for the welcome. I'm not so sure that I'm glad. I'm spending way too much time on this site. Not that it's by any means wasted, just that it's time from other pursuits - and I have to keep digging into my box of junk to find stuff. And I must say, and I say this without my tongue in cheek, that there is a very sharp bunch on this board. I just hope to be able to contribute where I can, and soak up info otherwise.

[AZ Ranger]

Harpskiddie

I believe you are correct that the recon-in-force to be the most appropriate description of what occurred. There is no advantage in slowing down the "scout only" with the most jaded horses in the battalion unless they were expected to deal with whatever they came across.

AZ Ranger