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Post by George Mabry on Jun 13, 2006 17:33:10 GMT -6
Elizabeth,
You pose an interesting question about whether Custer was up to the task for the situation he found himself. Here's another though. We’ve all seen the theories about the psychological pressures Custer was under in reference to his needing a successful campaign in order to save his career. I don’t know how much credence to give that but it could have played some part. That need for a victory (or fear of defeat) could have spurred Custer into playing out a bad hand long after a more reasonable and prudent commander would have gone into survival/salvage mode.
George
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shawn
Junior Member
My sons and I...Reno Hill June 26th 2006
Posts: 98
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Post by shawn on Jun 13, 2006 22:00:07 GMT -6
Im not too sure if Custer ever knew that he was outmatched. It may be that he was put out of action early, like someone said in a different thread, around MTF. Not killed, perhaps, but wounded bad enough that he couldnt command.
Perhaps whoever (Tom Custer?) took over and thought that if they could draw the Indians far enough that Reno could hit the village, forcing the Indians to split up or even hesitate, allowing Custers men to regroup or organize. If Custer wanted to cross at MTF, he would have, or at least fought longer at that spot, until perhaps half his command was lost. If I remember correctly, there was someone who said that the village end was at MTF and was moved during the night.
Shawn
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Post by elisabeth on Jun 13, 2006 23:19:08 GMT -6
George,
Yes, that makes sense. He might have felt that "Custer's Luck" had handed him the biggest Indian village of all time, and that there was no way he was going to pass up the opportunity to redeem himself in spades ... The psychological pressures, coupled with tiredness and dehydration, may have had him not thinking too clearly. (I know his tirelessness is legendary, but he's no longer a young man; in Victorian terms, he's now middle-aged. The sheer physical strain may have got to him more than he realised.)
Shawn: it has to be a possibility -- but to me, what happened has all the hallmarks of a Custer still at the helm. If Custer had been put out of action at MTF, the most logical thing for anyone taking over (whether Tom by virtue of nepotism, or Keogh by virtue of rank) would be either (1) to beat their way back to support, or (2) to set up a sufficient guard around the wounded Custer, then crash across MTF as fast as possible, carrying all before them in Custerish style. The latter being the likeliest, given that Reno's already engaged. The one thing that it's really hard to imagine anyone but Custer doing is wandering off to the north in this (to us) incomprehensible way ...
Someone mentioned timing a few posts ago. That raises an interesting thought, perhaps. Suppose Custer had attacked immediately at MTF. Where would Benteen have been at that moment? And wouldn't it have changed things for him? It's one thing to sit around with Reno, doing nothing, when all they can hear is gunfire at a distance; but a hot fight in the valley would be something that Benteen -- no coward, after all -- surely couldn't ignore. Imagine Custer attacking the village at MTF; warriors leaving Reno, as they did, to counter this new threat; and then Benteen's battalion roaring into the fray from the south. Eight companies would still be well outnumbered, of course; but the shock of being caught between two fires might have had its effect on the Indians?
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Post by mcaryf on Jun 14, 2006 9:46:19 GMT -6
Hi GM
I do agree with you that MTC is one of the puzzles of LBH. The best idea I have is that Custer already knew Reno was beaten which is quite possible. Most accounts seem to have him only sending 2 companies to the ford so he already seems to have decided not to attack in force before testing the water.
Whilst knowing that Reno is already defeated might explain a gesture at MTC it does not really explain the continued movement North as the logical thing would be to seek to reunite with Benteen and the packs.
I suppose if everything about LBH was obvious we would not still be talking about it.
Returning to the thread, I still fancy the option of Custer attacking to Reno's left to reinforce the attempt to drive off the pony herd and keeping closer to Reno, Benteen and the packs.
Regards
Mike
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 14, 2006 14:39:32 GMT -6
Again, if you're going to imply there was a better way for Reno to have saved his guys, show on a map where people should have gone and for how long and time it all out. If people aren't willing to show that, they shouldn't damn him. Saying 'he should have formed firing lines' et al isn't enough. Place and time, and make sure it's convincing there would be less loss.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 14, 2006 20:51:56 GMT -6
George
I would agree that all units have new recruits but the composition of the 7th is not my issue.
The post civil war cavalry was not the same cavalry that Custer lead into battle and succeeded earlier. The 7th was not well trained in the use of the firearms that they took to LBH. Their ammunition issue was not sufficient to develop the skills for battle conditions. If you believe Major Reno then they had never ever fired 5 quick shots with their Springfields before LBH. The running away of horses in a charge and the bunching in the skirmish line indicate lack of training and discipline. If the Indians are to believed then the troopers did a poor showing in the ratio of fatalities. It is not how many new recruits but the lack of training in horsemanship, lack of trained horses, use of firearms, packing by mules, and military discipline that I am referring too. A well trained and disciplined army should be able to take on 3:1 odds and make a good showing. It didn't happen.
I believe Reno realized this when he left the woods. If every time an Indian came in range of a Springfield he was shot then maybe he would have remained longer. Instead what was observed from the skirmish line to the wooded area was a lack of fire discipline and too few dead Indians.
AZ Ranger
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 14, 2006 21:22:01 GMT -6
Ranger,
I understand your point and I agree with everything you said. I was simply trying to explain the perspective I take on the 7th's poor performance.
George
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 14, 2006 21:51:58 GMT -6
George
My real question is what did the experienced officers think was going to happen? The only thing that makes sense to me is they believed the Indians would run and all a new recruit had to was stay on his horse and look like a soldier.
AZ Ranger
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Post by elisabeth on Jun 14, 2006 22:48:04 GMT -6
Was the 7th uniquely bad as far as training and skills were concerned? Or were most regiments much the same?
Actually, all things considered, Reno's men didn't do that badly. Poor fire control, yes, but that's the officers' and NCOs' fault. The men seem to have stayed pretty calm until the retreat from the timber; no panic until Reno panicked. And once on the hill, and under decent leadership (Benteen), all but a few skulkers seem to have kept their heads and done their jobs. They weren't complete rubbish. Maybe it was the same on Custer's field: those who were well led did OK, while those who weren't, or who'd lost their officers/NCOs, fell apart? They killed more Indians than Crook's men did, after all ...!
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 14, 2006 23:53:30 GMT -6
Hi Elizabeth
If the 7th was one of the best cavalry units, I would hate to know the battle readiness of the others. I believe underfunding of these post CW units contributed greatly to the lack of trained soldiers.
I believe that if a trooper was properly trained they should not shoot unless they can hit something or at least be in range. At the first skirmish line they did not do that and they bunched up before going to the timber. The officers can not make them better shots while under battle conditions. They needed to do that before leaving on this mission.
If the soldier missed ninety percent of the time that still means there should have been there should have been over 100 Indians hit before moving out of the timber. If they did that the Indians would have been less likely to approach to close the timber or the mounted troopers.
AZ Ranger
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shawn
Junior Member
My sons and I...Reno Hill June 26th 2006
Posts: 98
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Post by shawn on Jun 15, 2006 0:13:49 GMT -6
I agree with you, Elizabeth, and that is close to my point...lack of good leadership. I just cant believe that if Custer was able to command, their final rest would be on LSH. Custer was, aside from bold and fearless, a veteran. I believe that he would have known when it was time to retreat, and LSH doesnt seem to be the best choise (given the village end was at MTF) unless he (or whomever was in command towards the end) counted on Reno and Benteen to show up at any moment...lol...so many unlesses and what-ifs.
So, following the thread topic, I believe that Custer was unaware that he needed any options, things were going the way he planned. I feel that Custer believed that he was in control up until the very moment he was shot/wounded.
3:1 odds is perhaps what the DOD figured, but it seems pretty high. Unless you count 3:1 needed for a stalemate. I know that if I was against 3 hostiles who were armed with knives, let alone bows, and I with a carbine (and no pistol) I have no doubt that I would lose. The victory (IMVHO) would not be decided with how many Indians killed, but the ability to command hostages, keep the hostiles at bay, plus take away the horses.
But this is just my very humble opinion
Shawn
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Post by mcaryf on Jun 15, 2006 3:33:27 GMT -6
I would like to go back to thinking about Custer's options and in particular the choice to take his main body on the flanking or blocking move whilst the initial attack was conducted by Reno's weaker force. An option to send 3 companies to the right along the bluffs wih 5 companies making the charge might well have had a better outcome. One interpretation of Custer's demonstration at MTC and then further North at Ford D is that these were attempts to dissuade the Indians from withdrawing in an Easterly direction. If indeed this was the case then more troops in the main assault make sense. I have already mentioned that the move North and East is problematic as it is both the wrong side of the river and into at best uncertain and at worst known to be poor terrain for cavalry. Thus a smaller blocking force makes sense. Once Reno starts sending messages to Custer about the strength in front of him Custer has two options, neither of which he takes, the first is to advise Reno to delay his final charge by 10 -15 minutes to better coordinate with a flank attack and/or to send some additional force (e.g. the Left wing) to help him. In Co Coughlan's critique of the battle www.rootsweb.com/~nalakota/wotw/military/tacticalstudy_wotw033034.htm He criticises Custer for accompanying one of his 4 commands and hence losing control/sight of the other 3. Might it have been an option for Custer plus his HQ and some additional guards to have stayed on Weir Point directing and overseeing the battle with the main action being in the valley. I am not sure how good an option that is but I guess it must be what Coughlan means. Regards Mike
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Post by elisabeth on Jun 15, 2006 6:41:13 GMT -6
A good point, Mike. At Washita, although he headed one of the four columns (as here), he was careful to put himself in a position where he could oversee the others. But there, of course, he had the luxury of time to construct a battle plan and -- usefully -- to divulge it to his officers ...
Re your point about his two options when he receives Reno's messages: I wonder if he took the messages seriously? The fact that he did neither of the things you mention suggests that perhaps he didn't. See if this sounds credible:
As far as Custer's concerned, he's sent Reno after a fleeing village. He thinks the inexperienced Reno is simply getting over-excited about the usual rearguard screening action. He goes up onto the bluffs fully expecting to see the entire hostile village, encumbered by children, the elderly, travois etc., heading north away from Reno. Hence he takes his main body of troops to hit a slow-moving, disorganised and lightly protected column of Indians. By the time he gets to Weir Point/Sharpshooter and sees that this isn't happening -- that Reno was in fact giving him an accurate picture of events -- he's blown his chance to attack in the way he'd have done had he realised the village was staying put. (Maybe this is why he now sends for Benteen, in the hope that he'll reinforce Reno ... as he now realises that three companies are fine for harrassing fleeing Indians, but nowhere near enough as the main strike force against a standing village?) And from here on, he's improvising frantically, having wrong-footed himself by misreading the situation ...
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 15, 2006 7:10:43 GMT -6
If Custer didn't take Reno's two messengers seriously then what of Girard's message to Cooke telling him the Indians were not running but coming up the valley and making a stand? Girard stated Cooke would convey that message to Custer.
I can't remember if Reno sent the messengers before Girard told Cooke . . . I think Girard may have told Cooke before the enlisted men left. If so then Reno's messengers would only have reinforced the concern by Reno & Girard.
Were the messages from the Reno command enough to alter Custer's plans . . . if so then he failed to send messenger(s) back to Reno to inform him, but TWO to Benteen and/or pack train, leaving Reno on his own.
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Post by elisabeth on Jun 15, 2006 9:40:04 GMT -6
crzhrs --
Indeed. Of course, we only have Reno's word for it about the messengers. The fact that they're both Co. I guys, sent off just after it's become clear their company commander isn't going in with the Reno assault after all -- and sent off within minutes of each other with allegedly identical messages -- makes one wonder. And Cooke: did he pass on the info? He has a poor track record for telling Custer things he may not want to hear; look how he ducks giving him Benteen's sensible thoughts about guarding the packtrain. So it's not impossible that Custer knew nothing of this until he got to his hat-waving position (if it was him) on the bluffs. From there, he'd have been able to see for himself that things were getting pretty fierce down in the valley.
This is the difficulty with working out his options, really; we have to do it on the basis of what he knew, or thought he knew. If he did know Reno's situation, he might see it as a bonus: Reno acting as a magnet for the warriors, thus giving him time to sneak around to the north with his main attack force. But in that case he must have known the numbers Reno was facing, with the risk that he couldn't hold out long.
At the point when he commits himself to the option he actually takes, he knows very little. He's had no intelligence from Benteen, so can't even be sure there aren't further villages to the south; if there are, he'll expect Benteen to engage them, so he can't bank on Benteen as reinforcement. The scouts' earlier reports indicate that the bulk of the Indians are to the north, which makes sense of his decision to head that way; the evidence when he sends Reno in is that they're running. Perhaps he does have only three options: (1) to follow Reno's charge, committing all his available force from the south; (2) Mike's idea of hitting from the left flank; or (3) the one he took, trying to keep the element of surprise by getting round unseen to attack the supposedly fleeing village from the east. Not many choices, really, once he's convinced he has to act right away ...
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