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Post by George Mabry on Jun 4, 2006 11:15:57 GMT -6
Much has been said about the mistakes made by Custer both before and during the LBH fight. Some critics point out that he acted on faulty or incomplete intelligence while others are quick to opine that Custer's division of his forces was the major contributor to his defeat. The list of mistakes is seemingly endless and always a joy to read. But the one thing I've never seen offered is a reasonable alternative to his actions.
Exactly what were Custer's alternatives that morning of June 25, 1976? What would you have done if you had been commanding the 7th Cavalry on that Sunday morning?
I personally believe that Custer attempted to make the best of a bad situation. Sure his intelligence was incomplete/faulty. Of course he made his attack plans without a detailed knowledge of the layout of the Indian camp and yes, Benteen's feel to the left was a boondoggle. It is my humble opinion that every decision Custer made up to the point of arriving at Medicine Tail Coulee was reasonable based on what he knew.
My question to this board is not what was done wrong but what could have been done right?
Thank you,
George
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 4, 2006 11:36:39 GMT -6
Okay.
Sure his intelligence was incomplete/faulty. And knowing that lack, what was the need for action? The supposed run of the village? But big villages didn't seem to act like smaller ones because 1) they probably could not and 2) they don't want to. At least, based on the one (1) large village action that the Army had against those Indians. The Sioux at LBH acted pretty much as they did at Kildeer.
Of course he made his attack plans without a detailed knowledge of the layout of the Indian camp and yes, Benteen's feel to the left was a boondoggle. Custer's decisions to go into the LBH valley I understand. I understand the need to cover the left and see if there were villages upstream. Got it. I don't understand the advantage of sending three companies that way when scouts could have done it faster and better and that, after all, was their job. Nobody claims detailed knowledge of the village circles is remotely necessary. What was needed was an estimate on the numbers against them and how to make contact with them. Custer detailed Reno to attack the village without knowing either and found himself unable to support him.
Benteen's jaunt wasn't a boondoggle though, although totally unnecessary. Gibson completed the mission and Benteen headed north. If Benteen had been with Custer, there would have been eight companies on terrible defensive ground with the commander OR six companies in the middle of a huge village without promised support. Either way.....
I think the order to Reno, and Custer's bad decisions after receiving Reno's info of an enemy then attacking, which transpired at Weir Point, was the last point at which something constructive could have been done.
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 4, 2006 19:34:05 GMT -6
I think the order to Reno, and Custer's bad decisions after receiving Reno's info of an enemy then attacking, which transpired at Weir Point, was the last point at which something constructive could have been done.
I appreciate you comments Darkcloud but we still haven't made any progress. You think the division of his regiment was premature. I won't disagree with that. Let's say that Custer kept his command together and delayed making any tactical dispositions until he was closer to the river and his scouts had brought him accurate information as to the location of the village, number and intentions of the Indians. What were his options? What plan of attack could he have developed that had a likelihood of accomplishing his mission?
Any and all comments would be appreciated.
George
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Post by mcaryf on Jun 5, 2006 1:21:19 GMT -6
I find it somewhat peculiar that people harp on about the risk of the Indians scattering. If we look at the "success" of the Battle of Washita it occurred becase Custer managed to find a village that was sufficiently distant from the others so that he could make an example of it. It certainly did not arise from him attacking all the Indians camped in that vicinity, he rather prudently withdrew when more started to arrive.
Thus what is the great problem of the large villager scattering? It gives the US army the opportunity to follow a smaller part of it and defeat them in detail and hopefully set another example of the penalty of being hostile.
Thus Custer's options could include a strategy of harassing the Indians until they do indeed split into smaller groups and then picking them off.
As it was the expectation of 1500 or so Indians willing to fight, that Gen Terry had reported on a month before, should have been intelligence enough to rule out the type of approach that Custer adopted. Once he had found the Indians I cannot see how it might be expected that he could not maintain contact with some significant portion of them and it becomes good news if they split up into bite sized chunks.
Thus the strategy is to close up the command, including the pack train, and make an ostentatious appearance threatening the village but from a defensible position and hope that the Indians do scatter! Who knows the stories that some of the Indians were ready to negotiate might even have been true although I rather doubt it.
Regards
Mike
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Post by elisabeth on Jun 5, 2006 5:48:19 GMT -6
If he'd had intelligence of the size and shape of the village, how about this:
Instead of attempting to capture/destroy the entire mega-village, he settles on an action replay of Washita and aims to "cut out" the individual village closest to hand. He charges with his full force (minus pack train and its guard) to inflict shock and awe, and uses a part -- maybe one battalion, maybe more -- to close off the northern end of the Hunkpapa village. It's thus effectively surrounded. He's still got a big fight with those warriors who'd already got through to its aid, but there are enough non-coms bottled up with them to make the warriors cautious -- especially if he's managed to seize some as hostages. The chances are that they would indeed negotiate. Plus, by sheer good fortune, it just happens to be Sitting Bull's village he's attacking. He doesn't know this (unless the scouts can tell him) so he can't plan on that basis; he'll just aim to grab any prominent-looking person he sees. But if he finds he's captured Sitting Bull, that's more or less mission accomplished. It won't matter if the other villages scatter; he's arrested Public Enemy Number One, and can destroy his home and possessions as an example to all.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 5, 2006 8:47:05 GMT -6
If the vague hope was that the Sioux could be caught between two parts of the Army, than the one thing that could be done - if anything whatseover - would be to drive the Sioux north into Terry. That somehow screams logic, does it not?
An organzied cavalry charge down the LBH might accomplish that if 1.) the Indians reacted as if they had Central Command or 2) if they ran the way of least resistence and most ease and 3) some effort was made to keep them from splitting east. If it were to be resolved that destroying the village and making the Sioux run in any form would be a depressing horror for them even if they escaped, that makes sense.
The problem is we have not clue one how many warriors there were, and that really precludes any assumptions and theorized manuevers. As it happens, more than enough for the competence of the 7th that day.
There's no "mystery" to this event at all. All the stapled wrists to the forehead are by those who are in love with Custer, and have to fabricate reasons for his defeat and slaughter that don't involve his responsibility in any but the vaguest form, and that hidden in weasel words like "honor," which means little more than street gang demands for 'respect' these days.
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Post by mcaryf on Jun 5, 2006 12:34:54 GMT -6
I am not sure about the practicality of attacking the Hunkpapa camp on its own, I think the circles were close enough to be mutually supporting. However, I would agree that an assault up the valley by Reno's and Custer's combined forces would have better chances of a positive outcome than what he actually did.
However, my suggestion was not originally that. I see Custer's task as being to attempt to pin at least a reasonable proportion of the village in place whilst Terry brings up more strength. So I would see him getting into position to threaten the village but hold off actually initiating an all out battle.
Just as an example if Custer followed the initial tactics of Reno and advanced up the valley and took a position in Reno's timber, then the near part of the village is within range and the larger number of men can easily hold the timber. Custer has access to water and is in a strong position to pin at least some Indians until Terry arrives. If the Indians move out en masse then he can follow whatever seems to be a reasonably large trail and attack them as and when appropriate.
This was a very large village but even so it was not the entirety of the Indians who were not responding to the Government's diktat. Thus whatever the orders literally said the reality was that Custer and Terry would be successful if they defeated/punished or brought in some reasonable number of "hostiles", probably the equivalent of 100-200 lodges would be enough as an example to the others. So even if the village splits up into 7 or 8 groups, following and dealing with any one of those groups would have served the Government's purpose.
Regards
Mike
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 5, 2006 23:16:46 GMT -6
Thank all for your comments. I don't mean to be critical of anyone's ideas but I would like to make some comments and hear what you think.
Mike,
Your plan of hitting the village, destroying what they leave behind and then doggedly pursuing them is a tactic that had been used previously with some success. That is definitely a plan that could have been employed against the roamers but that was not the plan and those were not Custer's orders. Granted you might find a time or two when a deviation from ones orders was overlooked when the mission was a success but never when it is a failure. Custer doesn't have the authority to change or modify his orders or mission statement. And those orders were to defeat/detain the Indians with the killer caveat not to let the Indians get around him and escape.
What the Indians did to Crook a week before, they could have done again to Custer had Custer made a demonstration and then went into a defensive mode. Just like in Crook's case, they would have jabbed and picked away at him. By the time the warriors fled the field, the village would be gone and Custer would have been in no condition to follow. Not only would he have had wounded to take care of, but Custer would have been relieved of his command about 5 seconds after he finished reporting to Terry. "But General, at least I didn't get my ass kicked" would not have been a mitigating condition at his Courts Martial.
This is a very difficult question to answer. Since hindsight shows us just how grim some of the options are, we're tempted to devise a plan of action that is geared more toward survival of the command than toward accomplicement of the mission.
You and Darkcloud both suggest that Custer could have possibly deployed in such a way as to pin and hold the Indians or to at least herd them northward toward Terry. I tend to believe that that might have been what he was trying to do when he left MTC.
When Custer sent Reno on the attack and then cut north to the bluffs, I believe Custer fully intended to support Reno with an attack from the east. But after looking at the village from the bluffs something changed. Maybe it was seeing the size of the village for the first time. I don't know. By the time Custer entered MTC he no longer intended a calvary charge down that creekbed. If Custer had been determined to make the assault from MTC, a handful of snipers at the mouth would not have stopped him. Trying to determine Custer's thinking once he leaves MTC is difficult. Considering the way he deployed his companies, he wasn't attacking but then he wasn't in a defensive mode either. I'm leaning toward the idea that Custer was simply making a strong demonstration to the east by displaying his troops along the high ground in the hopes that the Indians would stay on the west side and he would somehow be able to shephard them toward Terry. By the time Plan B, so to speak, fell apart and it became apparent that herding or containing wouldn't work, it was too late to do much of anything else but die. What do you think? Striking and following is not practical. Herding didn't work either. Following along with Reno and hitting the village enforce would add a whole new group of horrors that would have to be dealt with, have little chance of success, and probably result in a Courts Martial.
I apologize for this long post but one more thought. I don't figure Terry into any of the plans. He didn't have the capability to act as a blocking force except under some narrowly defined conditions and those didn't exist out there.
Elizabeth I didn't mean to exclude you in this but my comments to Mike would pretty much be the same to you.
Thanks again everyone.
George
Terry was useless as a blocking force. Infantry just can't do it and he didn't have enough cavalry to matter. Granted it's just my opinion but I don't believe Terry ever expected to be in the fight. Why would he have offered Custer his gatling guns and cavalry if he was expecting to meet the indians?
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Post by bubbabod on Jun 6, 2006 0:10:39 GMT -6
mcaryf, you stated: "If we look at the "success" of the Battle of Washita it occurred becase Custer managed to find a village that was sufficiently distant from the others so that he could make an example of it." Wasn't that more just blind luck that Custer attacked the hapless Black Kettle's village? I thought, due to a lack of intelligence, he didn't really know about the large village(s) downstream on the Washita. Poor Maj. Elliott found out about them the hard way.
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Post by elisabeth on Jun 6, 2006 1:43:23 GMT -6
George,
Much appreciated.
I'm interested that you incline towards a "demonstration" explanation. I'd wondered about that possibility myself (see the recent "Was Custer planning a waiting fight?" thread) -- since otherwise it's so hard to account for (a) his failure to attack when he had the opportunity, and (b) his high-visibility deployment along the ridgeline. Shepherd them towards Terry? Or hold them till Terry came up? Either might have been in his mind ... with, perhaps, the thought that once the Indians found themselves confronted with yet another force of soldiers, this time with Gatlings, they'd give up and negotiate. (Since even Custer must have recognised the unlikelihood of defeating that many warriors in outright battle.)
Suppose that was the plan: was it inevitably doomed to failure? Given the degree of Indian infiltration on the east side, it probably was. But two things happened that needn't have happened, and it's interesting (perhaps) to speculate how Plan B might have held up, or held up longer, if they hadn't.
One was Custer's -- presumed -- Ford D excursion. Whatever good reasons he may have had for it, it made it possible to isolate and surround the right wing, with the results we know. And the other was Reno's interception of Benteen and the packs. How would it play if neither of these had occurred? We'd have an unbroken line of five companies looming along the ridge from Calhoun Hill to LSH, parallel with the village, in a threatenng posture; and then a third force, looking almost as large, appearing from the south. I don't know about anybody else, but if I were an Indian and saw that, I might well think the time had come to throw in the towel ...
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Post by mcaryf on Jun 6, 2006 4:04:54 GMT -6
Hi Georgemabry I think you and many others over emphasise the risk that Custer ran of being dismissed if he failed to defeat all the Indians on his own. Was Crook dismissed for his failure to do that?
Remember also that as far as Custer is concerned, Crook is also in the field and possibly heading in the right general direction. Thus if he succeeds in holding the Indians in place it is not just Terry who might arrive. I do not see it as Custer's job to defeat the main strength of the Indians on his own and I do not beleive that you can reasonably interpret his orders as requiring that.
Hi Bubbabod
I was not suggesting that Custer's tactic at Washita was implemented in the knowledge of where the other Indian villages might be but the effect was as I indicated. A punishing example made of Black Kettle's village lead to the others becoming more tractable, it was not necessary (and probably not possible) for Custer to sweep on and attack all the other Indians camped along the Washita.
Hi Elisabeth
I am not sure that the idea of the Indians throwing in the towel was ever likely at LBH, the cavalry faced a fight against a foe that took no prisoners but the Indians faced one where the enemy would kill or enslave their women and children and destroy their way of life. This was their last stand and unless Custer had somehow managed to herd up a large number of noncoms the Indians would have continued to attempt to cover a withdrawal from the village. Even with Custer in strength along the ridge line and Benteen/Reno appearing at Weir Point, the Indians still had the option to retreat across the river and defend the Fords.
I think that it is too easy to dismiss the Indian defence at the MT ford as just a few snipers. Even two Indians armed with repeaters could make that a very unfriendly area and lots more were hurrying to the vicinity so you have to ask whether a successful crossing actually results in a fight with the cavalry's backs to the river which might be an even worse place to be than LSH.
Regards
Mike
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Post by PhillyBlair on Jun 6, 2006 6:53:52 GMT -6
georgemabry,
A rather broad question, but an interesting one nonetheless. Thanks for bringing it up.
You said:
"Sure his intelligence was incomplete/faulty. Of course he made his attack plans without a detailed knowledge of the layout of the Indian camp and yes, Benteen's feel to the left was a boondoggle. It is my humble opinion that every decision Custer made up to the point of arriving at Medicine Tail Coulee was reasonable based on what he knew."
The old joke comes to mind, "Other than that Mrs. Lincoln...."
I'm not at all a Custer-basher, but I also don't feel the need to defend his every action. My question to you (I am not asking this sarcastically -- just looking for feedback) is: If his intelligence was incomplete and if he had no layout of the Indian camp, do you let him off the hook too easily by saying his decisions were "reasonable based on what he knew"? What did he know for sure???
I may actually have a reverse opinion from yours -- I feel his actions in deciding to attack so quickly are fairly indefensible. After he made the commitment however, I don't feel that his plan was (militarily speaking) a bad one. That may seem strange considering that he was wiped out, but a few unexpected events occurred in order for that to happen. Reno and Benteen were able to defend themselves and if the logical scenarios had taken place Custer could have as well.
So to answer your question -- I feel he had a very clear option NOT to attack so quickly. I'm always intrigued by the defense of Custer that says (paraphrasing) "He was afraid the village would run away." Consider that for a moment. He was told it was a HUGE village. He knew he was within miles of the HUGE village. With all of the elderly and children in the village, where exactly were they going to go in such a hurry to avoid the US cavalry? This is one defense of Custer that I just can't accept. In the end he was no buffoon, but he wasn't innocent either.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 6, 2006 7:21:11 GMT -6
I believe the plan was to drive the Indians toward Terry. One of the surviving officers testified so at RCOI to that effect. Small village(s) and loosely joined was probably anticipated. The unexpected Big Village lead to the famous order. As short as it was the fact that "Big Village" was included implies to me it was not expected and the plan even if only in Custer's mind was changing.
From that point (MTC) on there were two choices retreat or engage an overwhelming Indian force. Custer may or may not have had any plan but I must believe it did not include retreat. The outcome becomes predictable. The Indians won the battle.
azranger
Running away during a rout is not an act of cowardice. It is sometimes necessary to regroup and gain control. It worked for Reno but I believe in Custer's case they waited to long during the rout to get away and regroup.
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 6, 2006 7:37:40 GMT -6
Mike, I didn't mean to imply that Custer would have been dismissed if he simply failed. I do believe he would have been relieved and Courts Martialed if he had disobeyed his orders AND failed. Our good General Crook is a completely different ballgame. He was simply ambling along in the performance of his mission when he got sneaked up on and spanked. The indians dictated the pace of the fight and when they decided to stop Crook was no longer combat effective and withdrew from the field without ever seeing the village. I believe that would have been what would have happened to Custer had the Indians caught him out along the Rosebud.
You and Elizabeth mentioned Custer possibly trying to hold them in place until Crook and Terry arrived. That might have been his plan after crossing MTC. And to some extent that was a success. The 7th Calvary, to their chagrin, held the indians in place for two days. The indians didn't run or escape. They stayed right there. When Terry got close, and he did get close, the indians vanished. Off hand I don't remember how close Terry was when he camped on the night of the 26th but it was close. (8 miles?) And he had no idea that a fight was going on. So just how much help could you expect from Terry's slow moving infantry and token Calvary battalion? Granted, their arrival saved the 7th but they were obviously inadaquate in supporting an attack.
Comments are often made about a pincher movement with Crook, Terry and Custer. There was never a pincher movement in the classical sense where the different units make a coordinated attack. That was next to impossible with 19th century technology (i.e. runners) and the distances between the cooperating units. It's very difficult to doing using radios. Terry made a comment in a letter from the Yellowstone that he "hoped" one of the elements would find the indians. He apparently though either of the three elements were capable of defeating the indians on their own and he expected who did find them to do so.
Elizabeth, your proposal would have been interesting. I would have like to have seen what would have happened had Custer been able to close off retreat to the east and about the same time and Crook arrived from the south and Terry from the north. They might not have been able to trap all the indians but I doubt the indians would have been able to escape with a single lodge cover. But such are the fortunes of war. That didn't happen and wasn't likely to happen.
So where do we stand now? I appreciate all the thought you've given this thread. We're just beating around ideas here but does anyone still think that they have an acceptable option?
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Post by PhillyBlair on Jun 6, 2006 7:40:55 GMT -6
Isn't waiting to attack an acceptable option? ??
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