Custer's Options

[historynut1876]

azranger said:

Running away during a rout is not an act of cowardice. It is sometimes necessary to regroup and gain control. It worked for Reno but I believe in Custer's case they waited to long during the rout to get away and regroup.

Custer wasn't stupid and he didn't have a death wish. He had the opportunity to retreat along his backtrail and he didn't take it. It is reasonable to believe that he didn't because the warrior infiltration was slow enough to fool him into thinking he still had a chance (until it was too late) or something disastrous happened so fast that it couldn't be overcome.

[mcaryf]

Hi Georgemabry

The question of Custer's orders usually comes up in respect to whether he disobeyed them. In that situation it is generally agreed that the orders were sufficiently loose so that he could virtually do what he liked. Now in a different context you are arguing that he had no discretion and must attack or be regarded as having failed. Certainly his written orders from Terry make no mention of attacking. In my view if he had managed to maintain contact with a significant number of the Indians then he has done his job - were not Gibbons final words to him "Wait for us". Attacking prematurely and getting defeated is the one way to guarrantee mission failure.

The actual outcome is often cited as a reason to demonstrate that the "attempt to hold the Indians in place" strategy would fail. After all did not the Indians parade by the 7th Cavalry to depart before the arrival of Terry. My answer to this is that the 7th Cavalry's ability to act offensively had already been destroyed by the immediate attack strategy adopted by Custer. If the main cavalry strength had been preserved and not lost in a fruitless assault then the Indians cannot depart safe in the knowledge that the cavalry will not follow. In fact the threat of the cavalry following might be enough to force the Indians to stay together for mutual protection and hence make their actual movement slow enough so that Terry and Custer can stay in contact and possibly cause the Indians to take on the combined column artillery and all. Who knows even Crook might have been stirred from his lethargy if it was known that Terry's force was maintaining close contact with the Indians.

Regards

Mike

[crzhrs]

Custer's over riding fear was the Indians would run before he could attack. It didn't matter how large the village was or how many warriors there were. His scouts had informed him of what he could expect and from his experience he may have already realized there were more Indians than intel had reported.

The military's fear of Indians running was far more of a factor in Custer's decision than anything else. He was willing to attack the village with full knowledge of what to expect . . . except the unexpected happened . . . warriors stood their ground and fought back.

I don't think Custer made any "bad" decisions . . . what he did at the LBH worked at the Washita . . . except for the time of day and time of season.

An early dawn attack may have worked at the LBH but again, the fear of Indians running forced Custer's hand to attack during the day and what little surprise he caused was quickly countered by aggressive warriors . . . most of whom had also aggressively and unexpectedly attacked Crook.

Too many factors worked against Custer . . . not enough men, separation of command, daylight attack during the summer, terrain unsuited for the cavalry to get close to the Indians for a sudden "shock & awe" attack . . . and most importantly warriors lead by hard-core and non-treaty "hostile" leaders who inspired their men to make a stand.

I don't think anything would have worked for Custer that day.

[mcaryf]

Hi Crzhrs

I do not really buy this "bad intel" argument. In May Terry had sent a report to his superiors stating that the latest information he had was that the hostiles had assembled around 1500 warriors and were determined to make a stand. It is hardly possible that Terry could send in this report and not tell Custer. Indeed Custer told his own officers to expect that they would be up against 1500 warriors.

Custer's force had been following a trail that indicated very large numbers of Indians and it would again be surprising if his scouts did not read the signs that indicated the hostiles were typically using one large encampment. From the Crow's Nest his scouts reported sighting a village and a very large pony herd. There was therefore an abundance of intelligence that indicated precisely what was going to happen and what did happen.

Again I do not see how anyone might expect this size of village to somehow evaporate itself. Was there much history of really substantial villages disappearing once the military was actually in immediate contact with them? There had after all been no problem in following their trail during the previous few days.

Custer's actions only makes sense if he thought his force strong enough to defeat the 1500 Indians that he expected to encounter. Clearly this was an error of judgement for which he and his men paid a severe price.

Again I do not buy the " there was no alternative" argument. As previously indicated I think that a strategy to either pin or follow the Indians would have had the best chance of bringing the campaign to a successful conclusion. I realise I am offering this suggestion with 20/20 hindsight but there is no reason why it should not have been an alternative that Custer could have considered.

Regards

Mike

[George Mabry]

Hello PhillyBlair. I enjoyed your Lincoln pun. I don't have any trouble defending Custer's decision to attack. Remember that Custer wanted to lay up on the 25th, study the situation and form a plan of attack for dawn on the 26th when Terry would be a little closer. Sounds reasonable to me although I do have some doubts that he could have remained in place for 24 hours without someone blundering into him. Anyway, once he had reason to believe he'd been discovered, he had to act. Surprise was the biggest weapon he had. Custer is about to take on a force that by his estimate could be as much as three times greater than his own. Nothing wrong with that but if you lose the element of surprise, your odds of of success are greatly diminished.

When your thinking about Custer options, try to place yourself in his shoes. Battlefield commanders are always forced to make decisions with incomplete intelligence. They never have all the time they want to prepare their plans and ready the troops. Desert Storm being an exception of course. Conditions on a battlefield are fluid and ever changing. Plans have to be made and implemented quickly. In Custer's case, delay would most likely have been fatal to his mission.

As far as wondering how fast a large village can vanish. Just look at what happened at the LBH. When Terry got close that large village moved off and Terry was never aware of their presence until he found the Custer dead.

I'm not saying Custer was innocent or blameless in this affair. I'll leave that for others. I do believe that history has treated him unfairly to some extent. But I do not believe that if Custer was sitting here with us today that he would say "If I had it to do all over again, I wouldn't change a thing." And that is what I'm interested in. What would he have changed?

[George Mabry]

Hello again Mike. You don't really believe that, after reading Custer's orders, that that is not an order to attack the indians do you? I too believe that Terry gave Custer some wiggle room in his orders. However, there was clearly emphasis on conducting the campaign in such a way as to preclude the escape of the indians.

You either misunderstood me or I didn't make myself clear when you wrote " You are arguing that he had no discretion and had to attack or be regarded as having failed." I do believe that he had to attack. Please look at my post to PhillyBlair for an explanation. Most of what I said to him would apply to your post as well.

As to Gibbons final words about waiting for them...you know there is some doubt that that was said. But let's assume it was said. Isn't that what Custer wanted to do?

You seem to like the idea for hitting and following the indians. That is certainly reasonable and has worked in the past. But that was not Terry's concept of the operation. As the commander it was Terry's responsibility to develop the plan and as a subordinate commander, it was Custer's responsibility to implement it. We're drifting away from this thread once we start discussing the merit of Terry's orders.

And I agree with you that Custer's intel wasn't that bad. In fact it was surprisingly accurate. However it was incomplete. For example, although he had a fairly accurate estimate of the number of warriors, he didn't know the exact location of the village. His scouts had only spotted the pony herd on the west bank. That is why he had to send Benteen off to the left to probe upstream from that herd to see if there were other villages in the area. I also doubt that he had a workable knowledge of what the terrain was going to be like.

You're right about the problem with using hindsight. It can distort your reasoning when you're trying to place yourself in Custer's shoes.

You still seem to think Custer had the option to pin or follow the indians. He didn't have the manpower to pin them. Maybe if Crook or Terry had been handy it would have been a possibility. I just don't place much faith in Terry's ability to contribute much with his infantry against and bunch of fast moving indians. Let's look at the following option in another light. Crook was in a position to do that and look what happened. Once Custer flushed the indians, the warriors would come out to do battle. There were enough of them to do it too. Those warriors would have given Custer all he could handle. He wouldn't have been able to think about stopping the village from moving off. Once the indians decided to break contact and move off, Custer (just like Crook) would not have been in any condition to follow. He would have lost some horse, some mules, and he would have had a lot of wounded to care for. In order to pursue he has to leave able bodied men behind to care for the wounded and provide for their security. So just for the sake of argument lets say that after the Indians pull out, Custer mounts up everyone he can spare to pursue. That probably wouldn't have been more that half of his original force. That's just a guess but at any rate, it would have been a lot less. That lesser force would have followed the indians and again the warriors would have come out and held him off. Then the cycle starts all over again. Custer would lose more horses and men. In order to pursue further he has to leave able bodied men behind to care for the wounded and provide security. It wouldn't take many of these little pursuit engagements until Custer no longer had a force that was capable of surviving another contact.

Crzhrs, I'm inclined to agree with you. Custer was forced to make a decision before he wanted to. He had to act and he had to come up with a plan of attack in a very short period of time. We on this board have been beating this thread around for several days and haven't come up with an alternative that is any better than what Custer developed in just a short time. But I'm still trying.

[AZ Ranger]

Hello Historynut 1876

Custer wasn't stupid and he didn't have a death wish. He had the opportunity to retreat along his backtrail and he didn't take it. It is reasonable to believe that he didn't because the warrior infiltration was slow enough to fool him into thinking he still had a chance (until it was too late) or something disastrous happened so fast that it couldn't be overcome.

I guess were saying the same thing. Reno took his opportunity to retreat sooner rather than waiting for the Indians to infiltrate to sufficient numbers to prevent him from retreating.
azranger

I am curious though how hundreds of Indians could sneak up a drainage and not make any dust?

[historynut1876]

Azranger - Yes, we're saying the same thing. I should have started my post with the words, "I agree" before expanding on what you said.

Everyone:

As for the two options I presented:
1 - the warrior infiltration was slow enough to fool him into thinking he still had a chance (until it was too late)

or

2 - something disastrous happened so fast that it couldn't be overcome

Any opinions on which seems more likely?

[mcaryf]

Hi Georgemabry

I do not think I misunderstood you with respect to Custer's orders - this is an extract of what you posted:

Custer doesn't have the authority to change or modify his orders or mission statement. And those orders were to defeat/detain the Indians with the killer caveat not to let the Indians get around him and escape.

Actually your formulation does not reflect Custer's actual orders, in no place is the word "defeat" or even "attack" mentioned. The caveat as you describe it was actually the focus of the order. Custer was to persue the Indians to ensure that they did not escape to the South or to his left (effectively the West). By initiating his attack on the 26th Custer made it virtually certain that very substantial numbers of the Indians would escape whatever the outcome of the battle. As soon as he committed his cavalry to an all out assault he made it certain that he would incur substantial casualties and would be in no position to persue or contain the Indians even if he achieved some measure of success in battle with the warriors. It was only by maintaining his force as a credible threat that he could maintain contact and potentially harry the Indians until Terry comes up and they decide reservation life ain't so bad after all.

Some other points - did Terry's own orders preclude any attempt at negotiation? For example might Custer have been aware that Gen Terry was ordered to attack regardless, in which case there might be a somewhat weak argument that he had to attack despite it not being stated in Terry's order to him?

There seems to have been a general consensus at the time that a US Army column could defeat 2 or 3 times its own number of Indians. Was there any basis of fact for this attitude? What examples were there of the Army defeating a larger number of Plains Indians whilst the army was on the offensive? At Washita for example the odds were very much on the cavalry side.

Finally I repeat my point that the Indians only managed to leave the area without being persued because Custer chose to attack. If the 7th Cavalry had still been in reasonable shape then both army columns could have followed the Indian trail. As it was, no attempt could be made to do so because of the wounded.

Regards

Mike

[crzhrs]

Shortly after the LBH Sheridan finally was able to get a message to Terry(?) that the government now "estimated" there could possibly be 5,000 warriors at the LBH. How long did Sheridan have the info . . . and could that possibly have affected Terry's plans?

The LBH was one of those moments in history where everything that could go wrong did. Benteen was sent on a scout that may have been militarily correct but turned out to be a waste of time and kept Benteen out of action. Reno was sent to attack running Indians, but instead ran into a stationary village with warriors not running, but making a stand. Custer heads north to try to possibly capture non-coms or hit the village from the far end, but for some reason doesn't even get close, let alone cross the river to get into the village.

Maybe we should be discussing why the Indians won and the vision by Sitting Bull for a Indian victory.

[PhillyBlair]

georgemabry,

Your points are well taken and I repeat that I am NOT in the anti-Custer camp. I think crzhrs summed it up well (as he usually does) -- everything that could go wrong did go wrong. But I also share mcaryf's perspective on the alleged fear of scattering, which is where I hold Custer reponsible. It's easy to say that Terry, Gibbon, etc. did not pursue the Indians because they had scattered. The facts are that they had nearly 300 dead to deal with, as well as dozens of seriously wounded men. There was no chance of a pursuit. Custer was only several hours away from the Indian camp when he decided to attack on the 25th. If the Indians attacked him (something he didn't expect) what's the worst that could have happened? Custer's scouts would have informed him that warriors were coming and he could have found a defensible position -- maybe even in the wooded area they were trying to be concealed in.

To me, if the hardtack box story is true, and if that's all it took for Custer to launch an impulsive attack, then his decision was even more irrational than history makes it out to be. Is that all it took for him to change his "wait a day" plan? I should also add that I've never believed the stories that the camp did not know there were soldiers in the vicinity. They had battled Crook and were expecting more. They may have been surprised at how rapidly they approached, but if they were so "shocked" as some Indian accounts suggest, then why was Reno met with hundreds of swarming warriors? Also, modern scholarship and some early Indian testimony suggest that Custer was met with little resistance at MTC/Ford B. Everyone from Curley to Martin to those with Reno who were by the river and heard the initial firing report an intense early engagement at Ford B -- something I think we need to reconsider in our modern conceptions of the battle.

So to summarize, I don't think Custer was a fool, and I don't think his strategy was poor AFTER he decided to attack. I just question the wisdom of the initial decision to attack on the 25th. Crzhrs's comments about "Murphy's Law" are true, but may not have been true if the initial decision had been to wait a day, or even a few more hours to gather intelligence.

[crzhrs]

What if the Sioux had attacked Custer as the Crow thought they would if Custer didn't strike first?

That may have been more to Custer's liking . . . an open battle with large numbers of warriors . . . almost unheard of (of course no one knew about the Rosebud Battle)

Custer always stated there weren't enough Indians to stop the 7th Cavalry . . . and here would have been his chance to prove it . . . in an honest and open fight.

Again . . . it comes down to the almost pathological fear of Indians running instead of fighting . . . and that belief bit the 7th. If Custer waited the warriors may have come out to fight him just as they did Crook . . . and it may have altered the campaign of 1876 as the government had hoped and we would not be constantly trying to figure out what happened.

[crzhrs]

<Also, modern scholarship and some early Indian testimony suggest that Custer was met with little resistance at MTC/Ford B. Everyone from Curley to Martin to those with Reno who were by the river and heard the initial firing report an intense early engagement at Ford B -- something I think we need to reconsider in our modern conceptions of the battle>

Go to the timeline in Grays "Custers Last Campaign" for evidence of your volley fire. What was mistaken by those in the valley as fire from MTC was actually the reflected sound of the volleys intially fired from Luce Ridge. This is supported by the artifact finds on Luce, the Indian record of this fire as well as the time it was heard. There is no artifact evidence of a heavy engagement at the ford, there is no mention of of a heavy engagement by any of the Indians who were actually there and I have yet to see anything in the Indian record of bodies being dragged into the village. The average Indian of the period was not going to take the time or the trouble to drag a dead wasichu that far. You also might want to take a look at the Flowers acoustical study of carbine volley fire in relation to the effect terrain features would have in the direction that the sound would travel. There was no heavy engagement at Minneconjou ford simply because there were not enough warriors in the area to bring one on until much later.

[mcaryf]

Hi Crzhrs
I guess the reason why we spend less time wondering why the Indians won was because they had a number of key factors in their favour which are fairly obvious and which proved decisive.

1) With respect to intelligence they were in general terms aware of the army's intention to attack them and therefore they knew they needed to concentrate their forces both strategically and tactically (i.e. the close configuration of the various tribal circles). On the other hand the army did not know their whereabouts sufficiently so that they could concentrate all their potential strength against them in a coordinated manner.

2) The Indians enjoyed the advantage of internal lines of communication again both strategically for the campaign and tactically on the day at LBH. Thus they were able to fight Crook and then Custer and then if they had chosen Terry. On the day at LBH Custer chose to deploy his attacking forces around the perimeter of the Indian position enabling them to strike first at Reno and then move much of the same strength to strike at Custer. The Indians did benefit from the poor timing/coordination of the cavalry attacks but even if Reno's charge had been delayed to coincide with Custer's I think the Indians would still have had the option to hold off one force with a smaller number of defenders whilst destroying/defeating the other attacker and then reversing the tactic so the now defeated force is held back with a smaller number whilst the main strength defeats the other cavalry unit.

It seems apparent to me that this is what the Indians very successfully did and I think we should give them the credit for a well executed strategy.

3) Man for man the Indians were superior fighters, however, the army could usually rely on better coordination to offset this. On the day the terrain played a big part in disrupting the army's coordination advantage whilst maximising the Indian's own strength in fieldcraft. Again I think we can give the Indians credit for picking the vicinity of their camp and therefore determining the terrain to be used.

4) Again as a result of the terrain the Indian weapons proved superior. They had an indirect fire capability (plunging arrows) that the army had chosen not to bring (howitzers), they also had good short range rapid fire weapons whilst the army advantage in longer range weapons was largely negated by the terrain and the lack of weapon's training for their men.

5) The Indians had superior mobility to some extent offset by the need to protect their noncoms. It seems that they had in any event decided to fight so the fact that the army caught them to some extent by surprise had less relevance as they were planning to fight anyway. They did get sufficient warning so that the camp was not totally defenceless and their possession of rapid fire weapons meant that they could mount a reasonable defence despite their initial disadvantage in numbers at some points of contact.

6) The Indians did eventually have superiority in numbers at LBH which helped to counteract their otherwise somewhat disorganised fighting style. Reading "Lakota Noon" I have seen several examples of individual warriors who at various stages decided they had done enough or they needed to apply warpaint or whatever and bailed out for a while. On another day with less of a numbers advantage this could have hurt them.

All these various points taken together resulted in a decisive Indian victory.

Different cavalry tactics could have negated some of these effects. It was not necessary in my view for Custer to attack precipitately, thus the army could have had a better chance for exploiting their real success in finding the Indians' main strength. Again by not seeking an immediate conclusion with an encircling attack Custer could have avoided the tactical advantage he gave to the Indians wrt internal lines. By taking more time to select the ground on which he would fight, Custer could also have maximised the army's advantages and reduced those of the Indians in terms of fieldcraft and weaponry. By maintaining a threat to the village Custer could have forced the Indians to stay together for mutual protection thus both slowing them and making their trail easier to follow. By keeping his own force concentrated Custer would reduce the ability of the Indians to rapidly mass overwhelming numbers against individual units - he would still be outnumbered but not so decisively as he actually was at a number of points.

Well I hope I have made a reasonable attempt at showing how the Indians in this campaign managed to take full advantage of their strengths and minimised the impact of their weaknesses whilst the US Army managed almost the reverse. Undoubtedly the Indian leadership played no small part in their success whilst the US Army's leadership played a similar role in their own failure. Luck, which often plays a part in war, on this occasion was not much of a factor except possibly in influencing Custer's own hopes for the day.

Regards

Mike

[Dark Cloud]

mcaryf,

By paragraph.

1. In general, crediting them with strategy demands a Central Command, of which there was none and against which was the reason they fought, like the Confederacy. The camp was pretty much designed to honor SB's intent to fight if need be, but there's no evidence the camp was positioned for military concerns. As for intelligence, with their non existent command, it allowed a loud, clumsy entire regiment of cavalry to inflict civilian casualties in an attack that surprised them. That's the very definition of institutional incompetence.

2) The internal lines of communication were inflicted upon them by the 7th, not a result of their brilliance. Again, there was nobody militarily in charge whatsoever on the Indian side. Why should they get credit for circumstance inflicted on them, not a result of proactive plan or execution?

3) Again, they had to be near a river with grass for the herd and need to get buffalo. What were their options that would provide a different terrain?

4) Okay.

5) "The Indians had superior mobility to some extent offset by the need to protect their noncoms." Which they utterly failed to do. The 7th barely stopped short of buying radio time and sky writers to announce their approach.

6) Okay.

The least incompetent side won, but only because they were tanned, rested, and fed and outnumbered their enemy greatly. Military immortality was not theirs. Tactics and weaponry mean nothing if the soldiers aren't trained or competent. Once stopped and dismounted without cover, the 7th was doomed.