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Post by mcaryf on Jun 8, 2006 3:13:39 GMT -6
Hi DC
Part of the difficulty we have in discussing the merit or otherwise of how the Indians fought the campaign is exemplefied by your comment to the effect that the Indians had no central command so ipso facto they could not have any strategy.
Obviously the Indian decision making process differed from that of the army but the resulting effect is what counts. Thus I can give them credit for concentrating their forces which they plainly did with appeals for reinforcements going round the agencies etc. This enabled Crazy Horse to lead out a mission to defeat or turn back Crook before he could reach the key area where the Summer campaign was eventually decided. This is a very good example of the type of campaign Napoleon waged against the Allied armies closing in on Paris where you strike out from a central position.
I agree that Custer gave the Indians the opportunity to exploit internal lines of communication at LBH which they did. After all you can only fight what comes against you. I could perhaps have complimented the Indian's ability to pass information amongst themselves so that enough came to know about Custer's flank attack. There were also a few guards still posted in the Cheyenne circle who were able to mount a defence against whatever it was Custer tried at MTC.
It is true that some noncoms were killed (I assume you mean Gall's family) but actually the number was amazingly small when you consider how many there were and the indiscriminate shooting into the village by the army - this was a tribute to the Indians' evacuation drill! I personally think that the ability of the Indians to fight whilst burdened with concern about their noncoms was actually to their credit rather than their discredit. Some accounts suggest that it was the speed of Custer's final approach that caught the Indians by surprise rather than the general presence of the army in the field. Remember too that it was the Indians' strategy (here I go again with a strategy) to stand and fight and if they had sallied forth to battle Custer at some distance what happens when Terry arrives at the less well guarded village. Keeping their main strength near the village was actually the right option at this time given that there were a number of army columns in the field, it would run the risk of noncom casualties but in the event these proved to be minimal.
I totally reject your final paragraph's claim that the least incompetent side won. Overall the Indian strategy for the campaign proved superior and their tactical handling on the day worked pretty well.
Regards ] Mike
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 8, 2006 7:48:36 GMT -6
Incompetency may lose battles, but it does not win them. The Indians were able to take advantage of their opponent's failure . . . which is what wins battles. The Indians quickly turned any surprise they may have had of Reno's attack into a strong counter and flanking movement.
They stopped Custer from crossing the river, let alone get into their village . . . and when the Weir Advance took place . . . the warriors rapidly deployed and caused their opponent to retreat.
They then forced the remainder of the 7th onto a hill and checked any advance or retreat. They also inflicted more casualties during the Reno Hill fight.
When Terry's column advanced many warriors kept up a rear guard watch and some even tried to lure soldiers into a trap.
That doesn't sound like incompentency to me.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 8, 2006 8:34:01 GMT -6
Another great military saying: "Incompetence may lose, but not win battles." That doesn't conflict at all with my statement: the incompetence of the 7th overpowered the incompetence of the aboriginal street gangs and grasped the flask of defeat from the tepid hold of ........ standoff/holding action/retreat.
Again: they had no strategy. There was no social unit empowered to compose it for different tribes. So once that's admitted, subtract "strategy" from all references to what the Indians did. They had none. They had no ability, in any case, to wage a prolonged war and keep people in the field.
Second, Crzhrs, the least incompetent side did win because the other side made far more mistakes. It doesn't sound like incompetence when the larger, more powerful side sustains noncom casualties because not one of the milling groups had placed actual guards or lookouts or was able to attack Custer on Reno Creek where he was most vulnerable? You have to believe that the Sans Arcs on Reno creek warned everyone, but no. They warned some, maybe. I see more Marx Bros. than Napoleon in all of this.
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 8, 2006 9:14:19 GMT -6
DC:
Apparently you lack understanding of guerrilla warfare . . . or of Indigenous People. Obviously there was a difference in the "strategy" of Western & non-Western fighting forces. And the diffierence in cultures played as much a part of it as anything.
Any time a large standing Western Army is routed by aboriginal forces excuses have to be made to explain it. Failure to give credit to the intelligence and ability of an opponent has led to many such defeats.
And there were many excuses made for the 7th's defeat . . . white men must have been in the Indian Village, the soldiers' weapons jammed, the soldiers were exhausted, there were 10,000 warriors, it was a trap, the soldiers were incompetent, on and on.
Pooh-poohing what the Indians accomplished is just sour grapes.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 8, 2006 9:39:33 GMT -6
Although I don't use the terminology if I can help it and never on bended knee as others do, I generally use it correctly and I'm pretty well read on military fiascos through the centuries. The LBH has zero to do with gueriilla warfare, so I'm perplexed by your point, if any. Sitting Bull wanted a full field battle or two.
In any case, the tribes couldn't agree on lunch, would sell each other out for newer weapons so they could kill each other as well as soldiers, and if you're going to try to specifically wrap the Sioux wars up as a "strategy" of guerilla warfare, good luck. The VietCong had such a strategy. The Sioux? There was no strategy, only depleted options of temporary expediency.
Our conflict is that you say the best team won. I say the worst team lost, which I think is the more truthful observation overall of any war or battle, at least till recently. It was clearly not true in Europe during the Second WW. The German forces, retreat or advance, had a two to one advantage in casualties on British or American forces and overall were much the better fighting army. It was higher against the Russians. But the better military clearly lost. In the Pacific, the better military won.
Note: this is not a slam against the fighting abilities, martial valor, or competence of the people's involved, but of the institutions in which they had to perform, codified long before combat.
Whatever else, I make no excuses for the 7th's defeat, they got a deserved drubbing. I think both sides on the LBH look bad. Trust me, this has nothing to do with being Indians, but I'm not willing to puff them up either. I'm just as cancerous about European warfare and elsewhere. It's an attitude born out by the words of participants.
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Post by historynut1876 on Jun 8, 2006 9:54:54 GMT -6
It is my opinion that the Indians lacked any strategy on June 25 other than to meet the enemy and keep them from the village. Any apparent strategy was really just the Indians reacting. Against Fetterman they had a strategy. Against Custer and Reno they were just reacting. Also, there can be little doubt that some of the Indians were aware of Custer's soldiers, but it is obvious that this knowledge was not universal and the ones who knew didn't make it their business that everyone should know. And had they, I suspect many wouldn't have cared, feeling safety in numbers. Heck, look what happened to the Cheyennes when Mackenzie attacked. Wasn't there an ignored warning that the soldiers were coming? Yet some obstinate personalities denied the village the right to move.
This was just good business, not really strategy. With Custer's attack fresh on their minds and the taste of blood, certainly they were more alert to approaching forces.
Anyway, at best the Indians were capable of simple strategy when they had time to plan. In this case, an immediate reaction was called for, and they most certainly answered the call. Their numbers combined with the overall poor performance of the soldiers (my opinion) were major factors in Custer's defeat.
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 8, 2006 9:58:31 GMT -6
If we look at how the Indians fought at the LBH we will see very little mass charges or "open warfare".
When Reno attacked warriors gathered in front of the village waiting for Reno's move . . . once he stopped they countered and then flanked him on the left. They also infiltrated the timber and forced Reno to his famous "charge" which resulted in mass panic with Indians riding up to soldiers and clubbing and/or killing them in fighting better suited to their style.
Custer meanwhile was heading downriver and meeting little to no resistance. Once the Indians gathered they did not attack en masse, but used cover and stealth to fight him. Typical guerrilla tactics. It was only when soldier resistance slackened that any mass charges took place.
Back at Reno Hill Indians tried to infiltrate soldier positions once again using cover and stealth. This time the soldiers were entrenched and were able to repulse them. That forced the warriors to long-range firing with some individuals being better marksmen than others which caused soldier casualties.
The Indians fought the way they have been fighting for centuries . . . sometimes it worked, other times it didn't. When advantages were in their favor they were fully capable of inflicting massive casualties or embarrassing defeats to the military.
The difference in fighting style of both sides showed what could work if things fell into place. The only thing that fell into place for the soldiers were the soldiers "falling upside down" into the Indian's village . . . just as Sitting Bull predicted.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 8, 2006 10:17:02 GMT -6
"Cover and stealth" are typical "common sense" or "hunting" tactics. Elevating every burp and duck as reflective of strategy or military tactic is silly. They knew nothing else. You equate field battle with mass charge, which is not required.
Inflating the language to where flinch and hide becomes "cover and stealth" is terribly reassuring. It's why the Custerphiles love Fox, so they can say "tactical disintegration" rather than "panicked like the French, wet pants, were killed." It just doesn't fool anyone and is no more reassuring of the source than elevator shoes, a toupe, and a fake Marine tatoo make short bald guys with military wannabe issues more impressive. It makes them look insecure, silly, and pathetic.
It's not the intent, but this revisitation of aboriginal warrior procedures and trying to match to western theory does the same thing.
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 8, 2006 10:59:32 GMT -6
Mike, Blair, and Crzhrs. I appreciate all the effort and thought you put into my question. If, after all your research and what you've read on this board, you still believe that Custer had any option but to attack, then we'll just have to be in disagreement on that point.
Crzhrs, I enjoyed your question: "what if the sioux had attacked first?". That would have been interesting to see. I believe that would have worked to the Indians advantage moreso than Custer's. Once the indians are on horseback, the advantage goes to them. I don't believe the 7th could have defeated 300 indians, much less a couple of thousand, once they are horsed up. The 7th would have killed a few indians and the indians would have killed a few soldiers but they day would have ended with a "no decision" call. That's no to say that we wouldn't have claimed a victory. Crook did after the Rosebud fight.
George
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 8, 2006 11:20:07 GMT -6
<"what if the sioux had attacked first?" >
The difference between Crook's and Custer's command was the large number of Indian allies Crook had. They were the ones that took the initial brunt of the attack and gave the soldiers an opportunity to regroup. The 7th did not have that many Indian auxilliaries with them and as it was many of them ran once things looked bad.
Another question is: Was Crook's command better trained and organized than Custer's? I don't have an answer to that, but we do know Crook had approximately 1,300 men with him, almost twice as many as Custer who faced more warriors than Crook.
There was some harsh criticism of Crook's "victory" by a number of Western newspapers who blamed him for Custer's defeat and I believe a few officers had some negative words also. I'm not sure of the esprit de corps of Crook's command and any animosities between fellow officers . . . but surely they could not have been as bad as the feelings between Custer and some of his offices and/or men.
The Rosebud Battlefield was more open and flat than the LBH site which gave both sides the opportunity to hit, run, hit and run again. It was said more bullets were fired at the Rosebud with less damage done to both sides than at the LBH. Does that mean there was more parrying than fighting . . . or were both sides bad shots?
If warriors had attacked Custer first more than likely Custer and many soldiers would have survived . . . so would many Indians. I don't think Custer's command would have fought from horseback . . . but would have set up defensive positions and/or skirmishers and try to hold off mounted attacks . . . if the Indians dared to charge into the barrels of guns. It may have been more of a "feeling out" for the Indians, trying to find weak points.
In the end the battle may have ended up similar to the Crook's . . . and the Indians getting away, feeling they did what they had to in protecting their families.
A lot of "what ifs" surround the LBH and it's fun to discuss the possibilities, especially when even the "knowns" are contradictory.
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Post by mcaryf on Jun 8, 2006 11:23:19 GMT -6
Hi DC
I am surprised to see you so contemptuous of Indian tactics which are actually now more commonly adopted by Western elite forces. I speak of such things as individual empowerment, stealth, infiltration and encirclement. Plains Indians had a long history of warfare using these techniques. Set against these were the cavalry tactics of fire control, standard drills such as the 4th man holding the horses whilst the other 3 fought and obeying a commander's orders.
The cavalry tactics had some successes on the day most notably in Godfrey's rearguard action from Weir Point, however, in general they proved less effective than the techniques deployed by the Indians. Thus we see Reno deciding that he cannot hold the timber because he would be unable to exercise adequate fire control. We see apparent breakdowns of discipline at various points in the Custer fight with officers' bodies at some distance from their men. Many people have questioned Reno's judgement at various stages but his subordinates were required to follow his orders good or bad.
The army's communication systems were also on the day inferior to those of the Indians as they relied on a chain of command. Several members of Reno's command were aware of Custer's movement on the flank, however, Reno himself seems not to have been aware and as a consequence took his decision to vacate the timber in ignorance of other possibilities. The Indians on the other hand, with their more individualistic approach were able to respond fairly rapidly to the information as it circulated about Custer's threat at MTC.
Fire discipline as a tactic becomes more relevant the more men you are deploying, it is probably a fair criticism of Custer to note that throughout the battle he never once deployed more than 3 understrength companies within mutually supporting firing range of each other.
Finally I should note that you have failed to answer my contention that the Indians did indeed have a clear strategy which was to concentrate their strength and where possible pick off the various columns sent against them. Plainly they had alternate options such as a policy of dispersal. Clearly the ability to intercept of Crook with a force substantial enough to turn him back was made possible by the strategy of concentration. You are also contemptuous of the Indians allowing Custer to attack their village and yet this is what Sitting Bull predicted would happen and would result in a defeat for the army. I do not think you can have much complaint about a strategy where the leader has predicted what the enemy will do and the outcome is as he says. Fighting near the village actually had many advantages for the Indians to set against the risks to the noncoms. Their strength did not have to be split into offensive forces plus a village guard, they did not have to carry supplies (unlike the cavalry), they had ready access to remounts and their wounded would be tended.
You seem to set great store by the idea of their failure to post scouts or lookouts in the surrounding countryside but, given the speed at which Custer was moving there was never going to be substantial warning. As it was there was enough warning so that the noncom casualties were limited to those foraging way out in the direction from which Reno came. It is also a sad reflection on the US policy at the time that these noncoms should have been deliberately targeted for slaughter by forces under US army command.
Regards
Mike
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 8, 2006 12:08:58 GMT -6
<"Cover and stealth" are typical "common sense" or "hunting" tactics. Elevating every burp and duck as reflective of strategy or military tactic is silly. They knew nothing else>
That's all they needed to know . . . whether hunting game or human beings . . . it was a strategy. You succeeded, you ate or survived . . . you failed and you starve or get killed.
Indian males were brought up to be hunters and fighters . . . they were trained in martial arts, stalking, surviving the elements, etc., . . . that was part of their life and a strategy that enabled them to experienced the harshes conditions that would make white people blanch.
And let's not forget the females . . . they were just as capable as their counterparts.
Whether it was "strategy" as we know it is not the point . . . it was their way of succeeding and surviving . . . a strategy that kept them able to stay one step ahead of the military most of the time or capable of inflicting casualties to those who were not prepared or alert.
"Strategy" is in the eye of the beholder . . .
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Post by historynut1876 on Jun 8, 2006 12:32:29 GMT -6
When it comes to warfare, strategy implies forethought to tactics. Ducking, weaving, keeping low and using cover are natural instincts to staying alive. You can call them a strategy, but in my opinion it alters the spirit of the common-man's idea of strategy. It just so happens that the Indians' natural style of fighting was perfectly suited to the assault they faced on that day. The soldiers fell right into their hands because they didn't attack with the ferocity and organization necessary for the task at hand.
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 8, 2006 12:45:50 GMT -6
<Common-man's style of strategy . . >
I think we are interpreting this by our culture . . . just because the non-Western foe/opponent fights differently does not mean they do not employ strategy.
All we have to do is look at Iraq. The US is using strategy that was devised by West Point training and manuals . . . the insurgents are using strategy devised by centuries of guerrilla tactics.
Both are strategies and both are effective.
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Post by historynut1876 on Jun 8, 2006 13:12:02 GMT -6
Crzhrs...Thanks for responding.
Let me try and explain again. Suppose you were on a hockey team and you knew who your opponent was going to be starting next week. You would study their team and devise a strategy how to beat them. Now suppose you are on a hockey team and the entire team magically appears in the rink lined up against the other team. The puck is dropped and you've got to start playing, ready or not. This to me, is instinctual. The first allowed for forethought and the second was thrust upon you. In this case your reaction would be a gut reaction. The manner in which you carry out this reaction can be called a strategy. To my way of thinking, having time for forethought exhibits the true meaning of strategy. Having a situation thrust upon you and how you react to that situation at a moment's notice is not quite the same thing. Add to this fact that the Indians fought individually, each man free to do as he pleases, and it further complicates the issue of strategy (since everyone would have their own agenda) unless of course, a free for all was the intended strategy. In the end, it's a matter of semantics.
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