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Post by historynut1876 on Jun 12, 2006 12:44:26 GMT -6
Hi HN76 I know Curly is not the most reliable witness but in his last statement before he died he specifically said he, Custer and Mitch Bouyer were on a high point overlooking the village (Weir Point?) and that Custer did not ask either him or Bouyer about the lie of the land. You would have expected that he should. He could have had an earlier conversation with Bouyer about access from the bluffs to the river but even so you would think he might confirm the route whilst they were overlooking at least part of it. I do find it strange that Custer went that particular way and only Kanipe's doubtful story seems to suggest a reason. Regards mike mcaryf – Good point about Curly (it’s impossible to keep up with just what everyone said, not to mention some of it might be inaccurate) but Mitch could have offered information prior to Weir Point that Curly was unaware of. In any event, if Custer neglected the services of Mitch (who, according to Thomas Leforge knew the area and was an expert in his field) then he really deserves a lot of the blame for the devastating loss. They may have lost anyway, but it didn’t necessarily have to be as overwhelming. HN1876
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 12, 2006 12:48:34 GMT -6
From Weir or Sharpshooter you do get a good lay of the land but I don't think you can see the drop off from Battle Ridge down to the river and what lay there. Custer may not have realized what was in store from him until he get much closer and saw rough terrain going down to the river. By then he may have been like the monkey who put his hand through a small hole to grab candy and got stuck . . . he wouldn't let go of it because he didn't want to lose the candy (Indians).
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 12, 2006 12:53:32 GMT -6
Custer seems to have ignored much of what Boyer said . . . after Boyer voiced his concerns about the size of the village and number of Indians (I think he said "if you don't find more Indians than you can deal with you can hang me") Custer chastized him by saying . . . what good what it do to hang you?
Custer was quick to believe his Crow scouts saying there was a huge village in the valley and to attack it now before the Sioux attack you, but yet gives Boyer, one of the most experienced and best-liked scouts in the West, the cold shoulder.
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Post by mcaryf on Jun 12, 2006 14:08:45 GMT -6
Hi DC
I think my geographical knowledge of the area of LBH is reasonable, however, in a location context I might point out that you seem to be answering a post of mine that appeared in a different thread.
The distance from the Divide to Reno attacking the village was approx 12.75 miles and the time to travel that was around 3 hours so an average speed of 4 mph which was reasonably fast in the circumstances.
Regards
Mike
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Post by El Crab on Jun 12, 2006 18:33:50 GMT -6
Actually, Custer was quoted as saying "It'd a be damned good sight to see you hanged." Or something like that.
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 12, 2006 19:34:05 GMT -6
Mike, I don’t think it is difficult at all to make a guess at why Custer took his troops north along the east bluffs. To begin with, he only had two choices: frontal attack or envelopment. Envelopment is more attractive because it solves some immediate problems.
As mentioned before, surprise is his biggest weapon. That is one of the several reasons why he wanted to wait out the 25th, cross the valley during darkness and strike at dawn. He knew that if he were spotted crossing the valley, the Indians would be mounted before he could go on the attack. His odds of success at that point would be greatly reduced. He had to catch the Indians on foot and he had to hit their horse herd and scatter it to prevent their getting horsed.
I can’t tell you why Custer chose the envelopment but I can understand why. Custer knew Indians were on the east side bluffs. They had to be challenged. Remember that Custer’s train is still a few miles behind him. If Custer and Reno both cross the river and charge the village from the south, his supply train is very vulnerable. He simply cannot afford to get tied down fighting inside the village with his train that exposed to Indians fleeing eastward from the village. The Indians would have spotted that train and attacked it. He would have had a nightmare on his hands if he was cut off from the supply train. I’m sure the train’s security was weighted heavily on his mind. It certainly did at Washita. Custer can’t bypass mounted Indians on his flank. He doesn’t know what is behind the rise where the Indians disappeared. Custer has to at least, check it out.
He can do that AND provide some degree of security for his train by sealing off those eastern bluffs. With Reno sealing off the south and Custer taking the east, the supply train would be about as secure as he is going to get it.
Lastly, it complies with his orders. The emphasis is on preventing their escape. One of Custer’s officers made the statement something to the effect that all of the 7th’s Officers were well aware of the ridicule that was heaped upon a commander who, when nearly in contact with the Indians, allowed them to escape. If I remember right that statement was made in the context of trying to explain what was on Custer’s mind.
George
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Post by Dark Cloud on Jun 12, 2006 19:47:56 GMT -6
See, from the time he left the divide, he'd thought all surprise had been lost, we're told. They'd seen him, the village would be up and aroused. This assumption is further fueled by whatever happened at the lone/several lodges they San Arcs had on Reno Creek, at which point he is told the Indians are running for the first time by the crack scouts.
Then water and onward to make that 4 mph rate average. I ask everyone to recall this when the next scheduled attack on Gray is made, and that we all acknowledge that nobody is saying Reno and Custer went at a steady 4 mph walk, when the average is made up of various segments and gaits. Just sayin', remember because it will be an issue soon. There are traditions.
I think Mabry is mostly correct, with the caveat that this admitted train concern - which I think was a strong motivation for Custer to get it over and done that day as he visualized another few days of the pack train heading south - means that Benteen did exactly what Custer would want, heading north with the pack train a prime concern, and that Benteen threaded the needle between 'be quick' and 'bring that grinding sea anchor of a train' as best as possible.
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 12, 2006 21:11:57 GMT -6
Czhrs,
You and some others on this board make way too much of Custer “ignoring” his scouts complaints about the number of Indians. You are using too much hindsight my friend. Try to place yourself in Custer’s shoes. Let’s just say that Custer does as you suggest and refuses to meet the Indians because “there are too many”. He without doubt would have been branded a coward and laughed out of the Army. Why not? Everyone knows that Indians will never stand up to a cavalry charge. Everyone knows that Indians won’t make a stand. No one would have believed Custer if estimated the number of warriors at 2000. Everyone knew they never gathered in groups that large. You could write a book about what everyone “knew”.
The only way anyone would believe those Indians could kick Custer’s ass was for them to kick it. Boyer’s opinion on how many Indians the 7th could whip would not influence any Army man of that period. Imagine for a moment you as a PFC in today’s Army walking up to your regimental commander on the eve of battle and telling him he’s about to get his butt kicked and needs to re-think this fight. Do you think he would have listened to you or sought your counsel? A scouts advise in certain areas is sought and given consideration but never on regimental size tactics. Hindsight my friend, hindsight.
Remember when Lt. Edgerly? walked past Boyer one night and Boyer ask him how many Indians he (Edgerly) thought they would have to fight and Edgerly said 1,000 to 1500. Boyer’s reply was simply “Well, do you think you can whip that many?” or something to that effect. Boyer, who had seen the trails, didn’t argue with the number that Edgerly suggested. 1000-1500 apparently sounded about right to him.
Under different circumstances I’m sure the 7th could have dealt a deathblow to a couple thousand Indians. I don’t know that they could capture all of them but they should have been able to give better than they got.
George
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Post by mcaryf on Jun 13, 2006 0:45:22 GMT -6
Hi George
Thank you for your suggestion as to why Custer went to the East. You go along with the idea that Custer knew there were Indians on the Eastern bluffs - is there any evidence other than Kanipe for that?
Reno's advance was almost directly on a line between the village and the pack train. If Custer was really concerned about the train then I do not see why his move to the right is any better than a move to the left of Reno. We know the fairly immediate tactic of the Indians was to start to move round Reno's left, Custer would probably have seen that from the various vantage points on the bluffs. It is a point of controversy as to whether Custer actually knew that Reno had been beaten but, given the numbers he would already have seen against Reno, it was a fair conclusion that he would be. Thus if the issue of the packs is a large one in Custer's mind why would he continue yet further North taking himself right out of the possibility of supporting his pack train?
You also mention the desirability of attacking the pony herd - that was on the valley floor and to the West of the village. Again by a move to the East Custer is leaving the herd relatively unthreatened apart from a very small number of scouts. If Custer had advanced on Reno's left he can still envelope the Indians sucked into fighting Reno, attack the pony herd and come in on the flank of the village. It would also appear that the terrain on the valley floor is better suited to fast moving cavalry than that in the area towards which he actually moved. Either he talked to Bouyer about the terrain to know that he could approach the village from that direction in which case Bouyer would probably have told him that it was not good for cavalry or he did not talk to Bouyer and the decision is even more of a shot in the dark.
Regards
Mike
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 13, 2006 7:52:58 GMT -6
George- Those circumstances would have to include a more highly trained 7th. It is apparent that personal skills in most parts of a troopers training were lacking. Combine that with the leadership of a Custer and a disaster could be predicted. Give Custer a highly trained and proficient 7th and things could be different. One of his better leadership skills was to show no fear and lead from the front. The problem is once you got there the 7th was not up to the task.
AZ Ranger
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 13, 2006 8:53:56 GMT -6
One thing to remember is that a number of qualified officers were missing or on leave during the 7th's campaign. How much that effected the men is not known . . . but surely if a new officer took command of a company the men may not have felt comfortable or even confident with his abilities . . . and at the LBH efficient and resolute officers seemed to be lacking throughout that day.
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Post by elisabeth on Jun 13, 2006 10:58:49 GMT -6
I'm sure you're right, crzhrs, it can't have helped ... though oddly enough, it's L that's usually credited with making the best showing, and they had new officers (one of them not even cavalry!). Maybe a saving grace was that all five companies (plus B) had been together on Reno's scout. Not exactly in action, as such, but perhaps gruelling enough to help them shake down a bit?
AZ, perhaps you've hit on one of the major problems with your reference to Custer's leadership style. Maybe if he'd been able to do what he was best at -- attack -- it would all have been OK. A psyched-up 7th, gallant leader at their head, would have been ferocious enough for little things like lousy marksmanship or inexperience under fire not to matter so much. But as it was, he'd got himself into a position where his usual leadership skills were irrelevant. Instead, the situation called more for something like Benteen's "this is a groundhog case, boys, live or die" approach. Did Custer have what it took to fight a defensive battle? Maybe ... He'd done that at the Yellowstone to some extent (though with the confidence of massive reinforcements close by); and there were one or two CW battles when he didn't have things all his own way; but I don't recall any truly backs-to-the-wall situation that he'd been in before. Is it possible that he just came up empty when called upon to fight in a different way? Or -- equally fatal to his command, as it turned out -- that the Ford D excursion was his attempt to find a way to force the battle back into the mould he knew best, by leading a charge across cavalry-friendly terrain?
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Post by crzhrs on Jun 13, 2006 11:43:05 GMT -6
If we go by what Kanipe and Martini revealed when they delivered their messages . . . we can only assume that Custer must have felt he had the village in his grasp. K/M both gave glowing reports of the village "caught napping", "we got 'em and we'll return to our station," etc.
Was Custer (and his men) so confused by the sudden turn of events that the command fell apart rapidly and they could not improvise or alter their plans . . . was the it the Indians who did the "shocking and awing" and turned organized, disciplined soldiers in to a confused state, unable to respond to the Indians turning the tables?
Was it leadership that failed Custer's command when a turn of events changed a "sure victory" into a shocking defeat?
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 13, 2006 16:54:18 GMT -6
Mike,
Right off hand I’m not sure who the source is for the presence of Indians on the bluffs. I would have thought it was one of the civilian scouts who reported it.
We’re kind of getting away from the thread but I do like the topic. When Custer turned north, ostensibly to pull off his envelopment, he stopped at the bluffs for a look-see. He found himself on high bluffs that acted as a geographical screen for Indians fleeing eastward. The train is still okay. He moves farther north along high bluffs and eventually drops down into MTC which would be the first ford he came to where the Indians would likely attempt an eastward breakout. Everything looks good and Custer is in position to give Reno the support Reno expects and Custer promised. And then nada. What happened to the support? Once Custer moves north out of MTC, I’m at a loss as to what his intentions are. A few Indians at the mouth of MTC would not have prevented an assault if that were what Custer had in mind. Whatever the purpose of that little foray to the mouth of MTC, it wasn’t an assault. From that point on, I don’t see any support or attempt to support Reno. Making a show of some kind to draw attention away from Reno is not the support Reno expected or I would have expected. Custer just committed three companies into combat. They needed support. Custer needed to strike and strike hard. So what happened?
So to answer your question, I have no idea as to why Custer loped on off to the north like he did.
I didn’t mean to give you the idea that I think a full regimental attack from the valley floor is an outrageous idea. Once they hit that village your guess is as good as mine as to what would happen. You could be the one getting all the breaks. The Army is replete with slogans like “Fortune Favors the Bold” or “He Who Dares Wins”. And they have those slogans for good reason. They appear to work.
The regimental size assault would not have been my first choice. That is why I started this thread. Some posts here I don’t necessary understand the thinking on, but there have been others that I’m slowly warming too. I still like the idea of a strike down MTC. But then timing is important. If Reno were in retreat by the time Custer could attack, just how effective would it have been? That is why boxers like to hit you with a combination left/right punch. Neither one alone is particularly damaging but together they can stagger you.
George
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Post by George Mabry on Jun 13, 2006 17:31:03 GMT -6
Hello AZ Ranger,
You make a good point there but I just don’t believe that the lack of seasoning for the troopers of the 7th played a large part in the outcome. All military units have a lot of green in them. That is where leadership comes in (both Officer and NCO). And leadership, not experience, was the more conspicuously absent that day.
Elizabeth, Czhrs mentioned problems connected with a shortage of Officers. That too would have only played a small part as far as Custer’s wing is concerned. The best Company Commander in the world is still going to die along with his troops if his Commander places him in an intenable position with no support. He will just simply die better than his less experienced but just as unfortunate counterpart.
Had the Officers and NCOs with Reno performed better they might possibly have been able to step in and give their retreat a little more military bearing. I don’t know. I’m still astounded that Reno’s KIA weren’t more. He was very lucky to get back to the bluffs with more than half of his battalion.
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