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Post by noggy on Mar 2, 2024 7:54:37 GMT -6
I'm of the conviction that a determined Regimental sized, or even with "just" GAC/Reno's 8 companies could have led to some sort of success on the 25th. Of course, it depends on how you define "victory", but since the main goal of the campaign was to force the NAs back to the reservations, there was a plethora of ways this could be done, thereby given US commanders like GAC strategic flexibility, in the lack of a better phrasing. (It would help if you all just learned Norwegian, so I could really go nuts in written form) So this could have been done in many ways; hostages, dispersing of the herd leaving the NAs on foot, inflicting heavy losses on the warriors, burning tipis and supplies etc. However I do think it is always important to "argue" with one self. "Am I right here? Those the other guy have a better point?" People who don't think this way may have a more pleasant everyday but my God how boring Was the 7th capable?:
First off, neither GAC or the officers of the 7th were reincarnations of Napoleon etc. During the fight, he soldiers and NCOs struggled with common fire discipline, and were not known as the Mongols of the Plains when it came to horsemanship. How would they perform in a for many first time large scale attack? Some veterans from Washita were there, but this was a whole other situation. Nothing indicates that the 7th was drilled in these kind of attacks, rather the opposite. So generally there are many aspects here, from overall organization of an attack down to the individual soldier and his horse. Terrain/ground:
During the retreat, I have read about horses stumbling over after stepping into gopher holes. Now, the location of these holes may just be the only "map" I have yet to see presented when it comes to LBH! But they were there. There has been a lot of talk about a "trench" in front of the village, a dried out creek or something. Seen conflicting things about it, both size location and how real it was, but if there; would it have been sort of a pitfall, which would lead to disaster for any cavalry men riding into it at full speed? My knowledge of flora is poor, and it has been a while since I read about the battle in detail now, but I think there were some...flowers or something which also filled the air with....stuff at that time of year. Combined with all the dust being NA response:Most of the time, the other guys tend have a say in a fight. NA response, as in fielding a defense, would to a large degree be affected by the first point, particularly the time between being aware of the enemy(understanding the enemy's intent and the actual attack. How long would it take to organize 8/11 companies into attack formation? Every second spent on this, from the moment word got around in the camp that the soldiers were coming, would go in the favor of the NAs. The correlation between time and NA combat strength is hard to pinpoint, but would be an enormous factor. So...thoughts? These are just my ramblings so far, at one point I did have a Word document with notes on this subject from when I worked on an article about the battle, but it has gone to Valhall (Valhalla, for you heathens). Any input is much appreciated. All the best, Noggy
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Post by Yan Taylor on Mar 2, 2024 14:19:06 GMT -6
Hi Geir, some say that a regimental attack in full straight up the valley is what was needed, but I thing an attack on three fronts would have caused more confusion. If you attack enmass then the enemy can gather in one area to deflect your attack.
I think that sending a force down MTC was the right choice as which an attack through the valley, maybe a third to swing round west and take away the pony herd.
The problem with this plan is timing, they would have to hit simultaneously in the valley and MTC, this would cause a multitude of confusion in the village itself.
Now here is the main problem, would around 600 soldiers be enough to subdue a village of this size. We all know that Indians had no worries in tackling a large group of soldiers as they did at the Rosebud, Crook had more men than Custer and these were the same Indians.
So it’s a case of shock and awe and a big slice of luck in an effort to scatter the village and stop warriors from forming into large bands capable of beating each attack.
Yes, there was a dry river bed facing Reno, apparently it is still there today.
Ian
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Post by noggy on Mar 4, 2024 3:28:27 GMT -6
Hi Geir, some say that a regimental attack in full straight up the valley is what was needed, but I thing an attack on three fronts would have caused more confusion. If you attack enmass then the enemy can gather in one area to deflect your attack. I think that sending a force down MTC was the right choice as which an attack through the valley, maybe a third to swing round west and take away the pony herd. The problem with this plan is timing, they would have to hit simultaneously in the valley and MTC, this would cause a multitude of confusion in the village itself. Now here is the main problem, would around 600 soldiers be enough to subdue a village of this size. We all know that Indians had no worries in tackling a large group of soldiers as they did at the Rosebud, Crook had more men than Custer and these were the same Indians. So it’s a case of shock and awe and a big slice of luck in an effort to scatter the village and stop warriors from forming into large bands capable of beating each attack. Yes, there was a dry river bed facing Reno, apparently it is still there today. Ian Yes, but probably confuse the soldiers too In theory it would be a good plan but imo there are too many things that would be against such an attack working out flawlessly. Lack of recon was also an issue, and firepower was one advantage the US troops could muster. Also, organizing such an attack would probably not go smooth or fast. The NAs would not tand there and look, like we kmnow. I don't think "subduing" the village was possible but not a must either, as there were som many things which would lead to the "hostiles" having to give up soner rather than later. Just scattering them them and without all their horses and provisions would alone be enough to make many give up, I believe. Keeping the troops together would also reduce the chance of being....well, made into ground beef like they turned out to be 600 rifles is an issue iin open terrain for anyone. All the best, Geir
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Post by Mike Powell on Mar 4, 2024 10:15:47 GMT -6
I think Noggy poses the grand scheme question here, "could things have come out differently"? Once you accept that we do know in rough terms what did occur, then a possible different outcome is about all that's left to chew on. My take is:
The numbers don't work another way. No one knows the number of NA warriors but an advantage of five to one is not improbable. Given that ballpark and the incentive to protect their families, my belief is that, nine times out of ten, recasting the fight the outcome for the 7th is as bad or worse than actual. I just don't believe it was a close-run thing.
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Post by noggy on Mar 5, 2024 1:40:29 GMT -6
I think Noggy poses the grand scheme question here, "could things have come out differently"? Once you accept that we do know in rough terms what did occur, then a possible different outcome is about all that's left to chew on. My take is: The numbers don't work another way. No one knows the number of NA warriors but an advantage of five to one is not improbable. Given that ballpark and the incentive to protect their families, my belief is that, nine times out of ten, recasting the fight the outcome for the 7th is as bad or worse than actual. I just don't believe it was a close-run thing. Hi Mike It is most common to see people argue why they are right, and why their theories are spot on. In this small mental exercise , I do the opposite The number of NA warriors is a factor which absolutely "makes the list". Simply because, as you say, there is no definitive answer to how many they were. The gaps in numbers from even credible researchers span from about one thousand (Michno in Lakota Noon) to 3-4K by others. I still think that if an attack ws executed fast enough, and especially if they could disperse the ponny herd in addition to forcing the warriors to protect fleeing non-combatants, the numbers could be worked around. But it is not a guarantee at all. All the best, Noggy
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Post by Mike Powell on Mar 6, 2024 12:07:55 GMT -6
Hello Noggy,
I think it's the right exercise you're making. There can be a curse of certainty in the area. And Michno does close his discussion of village size/ warrior headcount with Eastman's 1901 estimate of 1,000 and his, Michno's, opinion, "The Indians did not crush Custer with overwhelming numbers. He attacked a village he could have defeated."
So, for the exercise, I'll agree with Michno. If we accept that Custer, knowing what little he knew about the nature of the village, the pony herd, etc., would have ordered a massed assault in the valley then we have Reno plus 200 odd with Custer. I guess then the question is could such a force have defeated the Indians piecemeal as they came to defend the south end of the village. Would a charge have gone forward to success? Reading the accounts from Reno's men, especially the early encounter with clouds of dust obscuring the tepees and mounted warriors moving around them, I think the problem of "we don't know what we're getting into" bears greatly. If the charge stops and shock action ceases, maybe that's best and the advantage of the carbines comes to play. A big fire fight in the valley, if the flanks can be kept secure, doesn't sound dreadful in terms of not seeing a third of the regiment lost. Benteen arrives on schedule and whether it's just as reinforcement or a basis for other opportunities, that's a good thing too.
Glad you've raised this issue.
Best regards, Mike
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Post by herosrest on Mar 9, 2024 17:20:20 GMT -6
Nosing around this history as I do, I concluded that village size was established by Terry's staff. They counted the number of vacated sites which could be seen on the ground. There are three numbers, being 1700, 1800, and 1900. Discussing this becomes problematic because, for example, there is always someone who wants to know beyond doubt where the tribes stored their pumpkins and how many they had harvested.
1800 is the safe number. This falls across the two camping sites pre and post Custer fight. Some who moved from the first camp did not erect their lodges at the second site. That's the Intel available from the military on the ground. I figure there were 1100-1200 tips which on the basis of 1876 military reckoning, yields a fighting force of 2500. There is no way what whichever to know how many were out hunting but it could easily have been one per lodge. Taking only 1.5 combatants per lodge then there were potentially 1600 warriors.
Tactics employed at Washita worked. It was not and is not necessary for the attacks to arrive in unison and is actually preferable they arrive in succession. Hit, enemy responds. Second strike, enemy adjusts. Third strike, enemy adjusts. Fourth strike, enemy goes hunting buffalo ticked of at Sitting Bull fairy stories.
In 1874, 147 civilians fought three battles in the area with the same tribes and returned to Bozeman virtually unscathed. There were a huge number of Indians and military Intel gave worst case numbers as 1500. That came from Lt. Bradley after he debriefed members of the 1874 expedition which stood off odds of 10 to 1 (1500) and fought in the South fork of Reno Ck. They were defensive actions in entrenched positions.
A concerted attack into the valley would attempt to capture the lodges by driving the occupants away. The valley attack that was undertaken, arrived undetected and there I rest the matter. Could 8, 11, 12, 13 companies have held the village long enough to destroy it?
The pumpkin question is easy, by the way. The tribes grew melons.
Regards all.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 9, 2024 18:01:20 GMT -6
From Walter M. Camp Interview with Richard E. Thompson, February 14, 1911. SourceFound Porter's coat with 2 bullets through it and next Sturgis5 drawers all bloody. This was in village in a.m. June 27 before Bradley had reported finding Custer. Counted 1,900 lodges and wickiups in village. 3 tepees in village. 11 dead Indians in one. 8 dead Indians in another. 3 dead Indians in another. All finely dressed.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 9, 2024 18:34:11 GMT -6
E. B. Gibbs, 1st Lieut. 6th Inf., was aide de camp to Gen. Terry, was on field Little Bighorn June 27 and June 28. Ed. Smith, Adjt. Genl. to Gen. Terry. Hughes was aide-de-camp. Michaelis ordnance officer. Col. Thompson, Capt. Hughes 3rd Inf., Michaelis, Nowlan2 went all over the battlefield to identify dead on June 27. These four officers went with Benteen and Co. H to Custer ridge.
1. Walter Camp field notes, folder 51, BYU Library. Richard E. Thompson was appointed second lieutenant, 6th Infantry, after graduating from the Military Academy on July 1, 1864. He was on the supply steamer Far West at the time of the Little Bighorn River fight. He was probably interviewed by Walter Camp at Fort Snelling, Minnesota.
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There were several counts made of tipi sites, with the results mentioned previously. 1800 entered into general knowledge as is quoted variously at the time and of course by researchers, since then. There is little reason to ignore the information since Terry was certainly in one of those, 'How did this happen and what do I do next - moments; which field duty brings. Literally, what the hell do I do now. Of course, he did what every defeated commander does - coffee. He did better than Crassus whose death changed the World.
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Post by herosrest on Mar 9, 2024 18:39:16 GMT -6
It might be worth contemplating the battles of Cannae and Carrhae. What do you think?
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Post by noggy on Mar 10, 2024 3:35:41 GMT -6
Tactics employed at Washita worked. It was not and is not necessary for the attacks to arrive in unison and is actually preferable they arrive in succession. Hit, enemy responds. Second strike, enemy adjusts. Third strike, enemy adjusts. Fourth strike, enemy goes hunting buffalo ticked of at Sitting Bull fairy stories. In 1874, 147 civilians fought three battles in the area with the same tribes and returned to Bozeman virtually unscathed. There were a huge number of Indians and military Intel gave worst case numbers as 1500. That came from Lt. Bradley after he debriefed members of the 1874 expedition which stood off odds of 10 to 1 (1500) and fought in the South fork of Reno Ck. They were defensive actions in entrenched positions. A concerted attack into the valley would attempt to capture the lodges by driving the occupants away. The valley attack that was undertaken, arrived undetected and there I rest the matter. Could 8, 11, 12, 13 companies have held the village long enough to destroy it? Hei ("Hi" in Norwegian!), HR There is no doubt dividing up your forces to attack from several directions, outnumbered or not, is as valid as any plan of action goes. Not disputing that. Of course. But it still has certain conditions which its success will depend on, not counting the "uncertain factor" of what the enemy will do. For instance a minimum of knowledge about the enemy's position/location and terrain, and at its foundation should be a plan which everyone is on board with. I mean, you wouldn't want to have..oh, let's say three columns wandering about no knowing where they had each other, would you So, larger attack: I'm all for it not working out and would like any arguments for this. In general, there was a large degree of "lack of quality"in the 7th which like I alluded to in the opening post could lead to a number of things going South (not the direction), and that is before even thinking about the guys who shot back at them. All the best, Noggy
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Post by noggy on Mar 10, 2024 3:41:48 GMT -6
Would a charge have gone forward to success? Reading the accounts from Reno's men, especially the early encounter with clouds of dust obscuring the tepees and mounted warriors moving around them, I think the problem of "we don't know what we're getting into" bears greatly. If the charge stops and shock action ceases, maybe that's best and the advantage of the carbines comes to play. Agreed. There would have been a huge difference if they had time to scout and actually plan an attack properly. Be it "full attack" or a pincer move attack with columns. Without it, amassing numbers of rifles would be the safest bet imo. But this would also need the soldiers to stay in formation and act properly, which demands that officers and NCOs did their job too. It was easier said than done, many units at Rosebud were almost lured out and cut off. But with the civilians in the area, I think the battle would have a totally different "vibe" to it. All the best, Noggy
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Post by herosrest on Mar 10, 2024 8:09:48 GMT -6
The failed outcome of the initial attack is known as also the succesful army defence. That suggests sufficient force existed to hold the village whilst it was destroyed. Defence worked. Offence failed and suggests the Indians would retain mobility, their pony herds and thus a half the job was done. A moderate success could have been achieved if the camp had been captured and destroyed leaving the residents mobile and roaming. Terry's arrival would have hastened Indian departure and scatter further into the wilds. The issue of scouting ahead of attack was given up by Custer once 'he' understood his presence was detected. I doubt that eventuality came to him as a surprise and he made best do, with a developing situation. The valley attack spread panic and mayhem and emptied the village quickly. The exodus was, I imagine, along the lines of a baseball or football stadium departure (on steroids) when the game ends. It happens very quickly and within 10 minutes the stands are deserted. Troops arriving by company into the camp would rout out anyone thinking of making a stand. This is the regiment et al, fully commited to driving defenders away and taking and holding the camp. Certainly there were pitfalls but gaining the standing camp played into cavalry hands by allowing a defensive action. I don't accept that the troops were deficient beyond anything prevalent at that time and a concerted attack gained local superiority in terms of strength at the Garyowen end of the settlement. The decision made at Crow's Nest, was advance rapidly and attack the village known to consist of at least an equal strength force. The history afords Benteen and his jaunt to the left a lot of leeway in this affair but I no longer do and see rather the follicles of a dastard. That said, both he and Reno 'seem' to have argued for the concerted attack across Ford A with Custer listening and dismissing their concerns. That's perfectly normal in that situation and Custer went to 'tried and tested' tactics in the hurry up situation which developed. Close and strike was the strategy and ordered at the Officer's Call - with the Ree scouts briefed at that time to raid the Sioux pony herds. That was a sad joke from Custer if he imagined, or believed, the camp was mobile and running away. What you have at Little Bighorn, is the classic risks of failure inherent of Custer's strategy of attack, ALLOWED to develop and flower. 600 on 600, is a hard fight. 600 on 1200 is into doubtful. 600 on 1800 is WTF. Custer's worst case scenario based in military intel was 1500 opponents. Could those 600 have taken the village in a concerted attack across Ford A? Yes. Could an attack by four battalions from the Cardinal Points have taken the village? Yes. Neither happened. This was perhaps a day to talk rather than beat the drums of war. An option for Custer to parley but that would probably have gotten him filled with Cheyenne arrows. Reno could then have made his attack up the valley but the opposition would be sitting waiting for it and him. Indian firepower that day was a surprise and I don't know how that plays out. They weren't wandering about with magazines and bandoliers stuffed full of ammo. Lovely to talk, and isn't it lovely to have Sweden onboard now. Switzerland next with any luck. I understand that the opposition parties in Russia are telling everyone that if they vote for Putin, they will go to Hell. The Rosebud fighting was principally manouver and counter charge type action at which the Sioux and Cheyenne excelled, however, Crook's cavalry were no slouches in the saddle. The lesson I leant studying that fight was that you invited death by turning your back on mounted warriors and there were a good number of cavalry 'redeployments', as Crook figured stuff out. The interesting thing for me, is that the Sioux simply would not mix it up with formations of Infantry. They really had a healthy respect for pig stickers.
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Post by noggy on Mar 12, 2024 5:29:17 GMT -6
Certainly there were pitfalls but gaining the standing camp played into cavalry hands by allowing a defensive action. I don't accept that the troops were deficient beyond anything prevalent at that time and a concerted attack gained local superiority in terms of strength at the Garyowen end of the settlement. --- Lovely to talk, and isn't it lovely to have Sweden onboard now. Switzerland next with any luck. I understand that the opposition parties in Russia are telling everyone that if they vote for Putin, they will go to Hell. But going back to my point about numerous outcomes being possible "wins" for the US, the same is a point here when it comes to the level of the US soldier: If we talk about some crazy, professional, balls out cavalry charge Murat style, I think the 7th would struggle pulling it off. It was not trained for it, and man for man, NCO for NCO, I think it would be a mess just to get underway. But just a show of force followed up with ha slow and steady approach towards the Village (liek Reno, only with enough men) would also be enough to scare the non-coms. In addition it would let the soldiers oeprate firing lines. So kinda like Crook/Miles against Crazy Horse later that Summer/Autumn, I can't remember the place. Like you say, the NAs knew that the sheer firepower of the rifles was a problem on especially flat ground without cover. And at LBH, GAC never really used that to his advantage. Usually I fel we play catch-up to the Swedes, but for once the tables have turne. It is a great thing, though. All the best, Noggy (Sorry for spelling errors, in quite some hurry at work)
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Post by backwater on Mar 28, 2024 22:52:22 GMT -6
I like the idea of Custer/Reno advancing wide past the dry oxbow (think it was dry?) before the NA's could man it. Maybe an L formation front and left flank on foot with 2-3 Mounted Co's covering the rear and right. But will Benteen bring pac's? Would think the level ground would intensify volley or random fire into the village enough to force them out. Would they regroup effectively. But What about the horses. And would it be like Washington at fort necessity without the fort and be stuck in the low ground.
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