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Post by crzhrs on Aug 19, 2016 11:31:45 GMT -6
One would think that Custer would have learned something from the Washita. That the village he attacked there (Black Kettle's) was not an isolated or "outlier village" but part of a series of villages camped along the river and they were all interconnected.
Just because he had success at the Washita should not have meant he would have success at the LBH. They were two entirely different scenarios: the Washita was a winter campaign when Indians were less mobile and hunkered down, it was a dawn attack when most Indians were in their tepees sleeping and it was against Black Kettle who as it turns out was either luckless or hapless when it came to trusting and/or fighting the US military.
The LBH was completely different, early summer, mid-day attack, not quite sure where the village was and how large it was and it was not some clueless leader but agaisnt Sitting Bull, Crazy, Horse, Crow King, Lame White Man and many other hardcore fighters who refused to submit to White authority.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 20, 2016 6:37:26 GMT -6
Herendeen had been on the 1874 Expedition and fought with Indians in SFRC. In a recent find for myself and Tom at the Billing's library there is a map which identifies SFRC as part of warrior's trail. If Custer had this information from Herendeen it would make sense that Custer sent Benteen with 3 companies. The expedition person were in the majority very good shoots and the Indians came after them several times.
On of the locations is in SFRC near the Weibert Ranch or the present day 7th Ranch.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 20, 2016 6:42:50 GMT -6
AZ et al Information from several independent sources seems to establish the fact that the Sioux are collected in camps on the Little Missouri and between that and the Powder River.Note the plural and size of area. Is it possible that Custer was expecting to find as at the Washita scattered villages? His note to Benteen of a "big village£ seems to indicate that he was suprised to find a single huge village. Hurrah Richard LTC Custer's initial deployment from the divide show that he thought there was an outlier village at the junction of Reno Creek and South Fork Reno Creek. The Benteen movement and follow on orders clearly prove this. He then assumed an outlier village vicinity Ford A. LTC Custer did not know that the village was concentrated until he saw for himself at 4311. This is surprising since he had been on the trail of a concentrated village for several days. His scouts knew what they saw from the old camp sites, and warned him repeatedly. Custer, not for the first time, kept trying to hope away the facts. Looking at the intelligence available to him, and his decisions reveals a massive gap between reality and assumptions, and bad decision following bad decision. It is like watching the Trump campaign. I agree Will. I think that Custer was not computing the real life situations and was observing and processing based upon his preconceived mental filters. He saw what he wanted but not the real situation. If he had followed Reno I believe that it would have been different. Regards Steve
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Post by herosrest on Aug 20, 2016 17:08:55 GMT -6
DucemusAt the point in time where Custer accepted that his presence was, or would shortly be, revealed to the village; his options narrowed somewhat. In regards the real life situation mentioned, there were actually situations and an objective which was to destroy the tepees, food supply and pony herds. The mission was not that different from Washita and the attack which was developed followed that successful plan to degrees. 7th Cavalry and Custer had relevant combat experience of engaging Sitting Bull. This was the greatly ignored hot pursuit of August 1873 which led to a dawn attack on 7th Cavalry by Gall & Co. A study of the action is hereA decision to attack into the valley was taken by sound reasoning to attack rather than be attacked. The SFRC was marked with reasonably fresh large trails of riders only, no travois, returning in large numbers from the Crook fight, besides the second attack against Crook which started out, aborted, and returned. It would be incredible if such sign was not detected during the advance by cavalry. Custer went on the offensive with an unplanned daylight attack. It's conduct initially surprised the valley settlement and then stalled. There was some shock but the awe didn't quite work out as hoped. If you are going to attack then that is what you do. Nelson Miles made that point. The Sioux and Cheyennes did it splendidly. Anecdote - Varnum spent some time studying the village and understood it to be ... large. By the time he reached Custer with what might be considered important information, the attack was under way. Certainly caution to the wind by Custer, but was it? Custer's experiences of August 1873 considerably influenced his thinking and expectation. There was nothing else to do but attack and that is true regardless of his personal situation and its difficulties.
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Post by montrose on Aug 21, 2016 4:39:38 GMT -6
DucemusAt the point in time where Custer accepted that his presence was, or would shortly be, revealed to the village; his options narrowed somewhat. In regards the real life situation mentioned, there were actually situations and an objective which was to destroy the tepees, food supply and pony herds. The mission was not that different from Washita and the attack which was developed followed that successful plan to degrees. 7th Cavalry and Custer had relevant combat experience of engaging Sitting Bull. This was the greatly ignored hot pursuit of August 1873 which led to a dawn attack on 7th Cavalry by Gall & Co. A study of the action is hereA decision to attack into the valley was taken by sound reasoning to attack rather than be attacked. The SFRC was marked with reasonably fresh large trails of riders only, no travois, returning in large numbers from the Crook fight, besides the second attack against Crook which started out, aborted, and returned. It would be incredible if such sign was not detected during the advance by cavalry. Custer went on the offensive with an unplanned daylight attack. It's conduct initially surprised the valley settlement and then stalled. There was some shock but the awe didn't quite work out as hoped. If you are going to attack then that is what you do. Nelson Miles made that point. The Sioux and Cheyennes did it splendidly. Anecdote - Varnum spent some time studying the village and understood it to be ... large. By the time he reached Custer with what might be considered important information, the attack was under way. Certainly caution to the wind by Custer, but was it? Custer's experiences of August 1873 considerably influenced his thinking and expectation. There was nothing else to do but attack and that is true regardless of his personal situation and its difficulties. This is one of Heros best posts. He covers a lot of ground. I will respond to points in individual posts, rather than some huge cut and paste job that is hard to follow. But I recommend everyone carefully read this post.
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Post by montrose on Aug 21, 2016 5:04:01 GMT -6
Hero wrote: At the point in time where Custer accepted that his presence was, or would shortly be, revealed to the village; his options narrowed somewhat. In regards the real life situation mentioned, there were actually situations and an objective which was to destroy the tepees, food supply and pony herds. The mission was not that different from Washita and the attack which was developed followed that successful plan to degrees.
1. Purpose. Discuss Heros post with respect to strategy, operations and tactics. Explain correlation of forces and means.
2. Background. This post confuses mission with execution, muddled on focus.
3. The Big Three.
a. Strategy. This is the main plan of the combatants. In this case USA as a central entity, and Plains Indian Tribes, as a weak coalition. The strategy of the US was to eliminate the ability of the Plains tribes to exist on the Plains. The plan was to force them to depend on USG handouts.
The USA strategy involved the destruction of the buffalo herds, the extension of railroads into Indian territory both to push the Indians out and kill buffalo, and military actions to drive the Indians out Please note that the military was just a support element here, their role was to disrupt Indian effforts to gather resources in the summer for the winters, and disrupt the winter camps. I think an LBH centric board gets too carried away with pure kinetic options, and fails to understand that you can win a war without fighting a single battle, or losing a single KIA.
b. Operations. To simplify things: this means the specific campaign in 1876 to force the Plains tribes off there land and into US reservations. The campaign plan meant attack the winter camps Feb-Mar; then prevent their ability to gather resources spring and summer to survive in the following winter.
Here is what people miss. The plan worked, with tactical setbacks. The Plains tribes had a few survivors running for their lives in the 1876-77 winter. After, they were completely defeated and had no further influence in the Area of Operation.
I am part of a contract analyzing operations in an Afghan province, where I have been involved over 12 years. A classic example of win every battle, and lose every campaign and war. We won the Plains war, and we won it in 1876, despite the gross incompetence of LTC Custer as an officer and the 7th Cav as a unit.
3. Tactics. Google Battle focused analysis, aka BFA.
a. Hero wrote: "There were actually situations and an objective which was to destroy the tepees, food supply and pony herds". Umm, none of those objectives existed. The mission was to drive the Indians out of independent existence on the Plains. The summer operational goals were to prevent Indians from gathering supplies for the coming winter, and drive them to US reservations through combat.
b. Now if you meet an independant camp in the AOR, you must decide how to meet operational and strategic goals. Now we meet Correlation of Forces and Means. You have options based on size and ability of your force and theirs.
You can kill their combat force, prevent them from hunting, kill/capture their horses, burn their gathered supplies for the coming winter, etc.
An option here is kill all their warriors, capture all women and children, kill all ponies, burn every tepee and every pound of meat meant for the winter. You would have to be a raving lunatic or a member of the thelbha forum to think that was possible.
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Post by edavids on Aug 21, 2016 6:57:35 GMT -6
DucemusAt the point in time where Custer accepted that his presence was, or would shortly be, revealed to the village; his options narrowed somewhat. In regards the real life situation mentioned, there were actually situations and an objective which was to destroy the tepees, food supply and pony herds. The mission was not that different from Washita and the attack which was developed followed that successful plan to degrees. 7th Cavalry and Custer had relevant combat experience of engaging Sitting Bull. This was the greatly ignored hot pursuit of August 1873 which led to a dawn attack on 7th Cavalry by Gall & Co. A study of the action is hereA decision to attack into the valley was taken by sound reasoning to attack rather than be attacked. The SFRC was marked with reasonably fresh large trails of riders only, no travois, returning in large numbers from the Crook fight, besides the second attack against Crook which started out, aborted, and returned. It would be incredible if such sign was not detected during the advance by cavalry. Custer went on the offensive with an unplanned daylight attack. It's conduct initially surprised the valley settlement and then stalled. There was some shock but the awe didn't quite work out as hoped. If you are going to attack then that is what you do. Nelson Miles made that point. The Sioux and Cheyennes did it splendidly. Anecdote - Varnum spent some time studying the village and understood it to be ... large. By the time he reached Custer with what might be considered important information, the attack was under way. Certainly caution to the wind by Custer, but was it? Custer's experiences of August 1873 considerably influenced his thinking and expectation. There was nothing else to do but attack and that is true regardless of his personal situation and its difficulties. Posts like this are what you are capable of. Your contribution to the topic is appreciated. Best, David
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Post by wild on Aug 21, 2016 16:29:28 GMT -6
It is possible that a more professional management system would call into question Terry's responsibility in this disaster. We have given George a fair kicking over the tactics he employed but similar charges can be laid at Terry's door re his strategy. The disaster is two dimentional ; Amateuriah strategy allied to tactical incompetance. Terry de facto relinquished field operations to a commander with a known personal agenda. The entire dynamic of the campaign was allowed to pass out of Terry's control. Surely a case of derliction of duty. Terry's force was inadequate and of the wrong mix to fulfill the role of a blocking force.[ a stationary blocking force is a joke] Another regiment of cavalry was required. Or Terry should have left the infantry on the Far West and marched South down the Bighorn river with all available cavalry arriving on the 22nd ,that might have been interesting. Annie thoughts ?
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 22, 2016 7:28:49 GMT -6
Hero wrote: At the point in time where Custer accepted that his presence was, or would shortly be, revealed to the village; his options narrowed somewhat. In regards the real life situation mentioned, there were actually situations and an objective which was to destroy the tepees, food supply and pony herds. The mission was not that different from Washita and the attack which was developed followed that successful plan to degrees. 1. Purpose. Discuss Heros post with respect to strategy, operations and tactics. Explain correlation of forces and means. 2. Background. This post confuses mission with execution, muddled on focus. I am glad that you are here to explain this. I know from being an enlisted man that we weren't exposed to strategy and operations as much as the tactics. As Dark Cloud would state a dictionary of terms would be beneficial.
What is funny to me is that my Department operates in a similar way and I didn't realize the connection. We have strategic plans that cover a 10 year period. A yearly operation plan and finally the jobs (tactics) in order to accomplish the operational plan with reference to the strategic plan.3. The Big Three. a. Strategy. This is the main plan of the combatants. In this case USA as a central entity, and Plains Indian Tribes, as a weak coalition. The strategy of the US was to eliminate the ability of the Plains tribes to exist on the Plains. The plan was to force them to depend on USG handouts.
The USA strategy involved the destruction of the buffalo herds, the extension of railroads into Indian territory both to push the Indians out and kill buffalo, and military actions to drive the Indians out Please note that the military was just a support element here, their role was to disrupt Indian effforts to gather resources in the summer for the winters, and disrupt the winter camps. I think an LBH centric board gets too carried away with pure kinetic options, and fails to understand that you can win a war without fighting a single battle, or losing a single KIA. So if I understand correctly if you keep the Indians moving and they don't have time to gather the winter supplies without even made contact you are accomplishing what is set forth in the strategic plan.b. Operations. To simplify things: this means the specific campaign in 1876 to force the Plains tribes off there land and into US reservations. The campaign plan meant attack the winter camps Feb-Mar; then prevent their ability to gather resources spring and summer to survive in the following winter. Here is what people miss. The plan worked, with tactical setbacks. The Plains tribes had a few survivors running for their lives in the 1876-77 winter. After, they were completely defeated and had no further influence in the Area of Operation. So Custer's defeat was still part of an operational success and furthered the strategic plan while being a tactical failure ?I am part of a contract analyzing operations in an Afghan province, where I have been involved over 12 years. A classic example of win every battle, and lose every campaign and war. We won the Plains war, and we won it in 1876, despite the gross incompetence of LTC Custer as an officer and the 7th Cav as a unit. 3. Tactics. Google Battle focused analysis, aka BFA. a. Hero wrote: "There were actually situations and an objective which was to destroy the tepees, food supply and pony herds". Umm, none of those objectives existed. The mission was to drive the Indians out of independent existence on the Plains. The summer operational goals were to prevent Indians from gathering supplies for the coming winter, and drive them to US reservations through combat. b. Now if you meet an independent camp in the AOR, you must decide how to meet operational and strategic goals. Now we meet Correlation of Forces and Means. You have options based on size and ability of your force and theirs. At this level there is choice as long as it meets the operational and strategic goals? So my question is given the level of training and experience did Custer make the right choices? You can kill their combat force, prevent them from hunting, kill/capture their horses, burn their gathered supplies for the coming winter, etc. An option here is kill all their warriors, capture all women and children, kill all ponies, burn every tepee and every pound of meat meant for the winter. You would have to be a raving lunatic or a member of the thelbha forum to think that was possible. Post like yours Will and HR make this board both informative and educational . Thanks AZ Ranger
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Post by herosrest on Aug 22, 2016 7:56:47 GMT -6
DucemusGentlemen, in abandoning a dawn strike on the 26th, there remained simply two options for Custer. Attack or be attacked and the choice was entirely unrelated to enemy force size. 7th Cavalry would have been attacked or compromised during a night march into the following morning. The surprise of arriving at the camps midday of the 25th, would not have existed on the 26th. There was a prepared position in SFRC where the 1874 expedition camped and fought. Herendeen was aware of it. Custer could have hunkered 7th Cavalry down but his orders were to prevent escapes. In this, if the Minnieconjou history is accepted, a half of those present on the 23rd, escaped towards the Tongue on the night of 23/24. G. Harper. That is, the village attacked on the 25th, had twice as many occupants a couple of days earlier. Funny old world. Still, who's interested in tribal history?
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Post by edavids on Aug 22, 2016 8:59:44 GMT -6
DucemusGentlemen, in abandoning a dawn strike on the 26th, there remained simply two options for Custer. Attack or be attacked and the choice was entirely unrelated to enemy force size. 7th Cavalry would have been attacked or compromised during a night march into the following morning. The surprise of arriving at the camps midday of the 25th, would not have existed on the 26th. There was a prepared position in SFRC where the 1874 expedition camped and fought. Herendeen was aware of it. Custer could have hunkered 7th Cavalry down but his orders were to prevent escapes. In this, if the Minnieconjou history is accepted, a half of those present on the 23rd, escaped towards the Tongue on the night of 23/24. G. Harper. That is, the village attacked on the 25th, had twice as many occupants a couple of days earlier. Funny old world. Still, who's interested in tribal history? "And then he had to spoil it all by saying something stupid like......."
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Post by herosrest on Aug 22, 2016 9:24:17 GMT -6
DucemusGentlemen, in abandoning a dawn strike on the 26th, there remained simply two options for Custer. Attack or be attacked and the choice was entirely unrelated to enemy force size. 7th Cavalry would have been attacked or compromised during a night march into the following morning. The surprise of arriving at the camps midday of the 25th, would not have existed on the 26th. There was a prepared position in SFRC where the 1874 expedition camped and fought. Herendeen was aware of it. Custer could have hunkered 7th Cavalry down but his orders were to prevent escapes. In this, if the Minnieconjou history is accepted, a half of those present on the 23rd, escaped towards the Tongue on the night of 23/24. G. Harper. That is, the village attacked on the 25th, had twice as many occupants a couple of days earlier. Funny old world. Still, who's interested in tribal history? "And then he had to spoil it all by saying something stupid like......." Ducemus There was nothing to do, but attack! Pursuant to Terry's letter of instruction which instructed Custer to prevent escape. That is why Varnum got a hard time and was sent back to investigate a missed trail. That was also a bit of one upmanship from Godfrey.... 'Naughty Varnum! Custer will not be pleased.... You may click the clapping smiley, if you wish.
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Post by tubman13 on Aug 22, 2016 10:43:52 GMT -6
Ducemus There was nothing to do, but attack! Pursuant to Terry's letter of instruction which instructed Custer to prevent escape. I note you don't say orders, ok, then why did he ignore the other instructions, there in included. Had he, he would not have found himself in this predicament, pants down and all!That is why Varnum got a hard time and was sent back to investigate a missed trail. Kind of like Custer missed, Tullock's even though reminded and did not understand feeling left. Game, Set, & Match. Better luck next time.That was also a bit of one upmanship from Godfrey.... 'Naughty Varnum! Custer will not be pleased.... You may click the clapping smiley, if you wish.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Aug 22, 2016 13:14:08 GMT -6
DucemusGentlemen, in abandoning a dawn strike on the 26th, there remained simply two options for Custer. Attack or be attacked and the choice was entirely unrelated to enemy force size. 7th Cavalry would have been attacked or compromised during a night march into the following morning. The surprise of arriving at the camps midday of the 25th, would not have existed on the 26th. There was a prepared position in SFRC where the 1874 expedition camped and fought. Herendeen was aware of it. Custer could have hunkered 7th Cavalry down but his orders were to prevent escapes. In this, if the Minnieconjou history is accepted, a half of those present on the 23rd, escaped towards the Tongue on the night of 23/24. G. Harper. That is, the village attacked on the 25th, had twice as many occupants a couple of days earlier. Funny old world. Still, who's interested in tribal history? Are you confusing a train track location with a town? Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by benteen on Aug 22, 2016 16:27:07 GMT -6
DucemusAt the point in time where Custer accepted that his presence was, or would shortly be, revealed to the village; his options narrowed somewhat. In regards the real life situation mentioned, there were actually situations and an objective which was to destroy the tepees, food supply and pony herds. The mission was not that different from Washita and the attack which was developed followed that successful plan to degrees. A decision to attack into the valley was taken by sound reasoning to attack rather than be attacked. s Colonel Montrose, In discussing HRs post, I agree it is a good post, but I disagree with these two opinions. 1....Custers mission was not like the Washita at all. At the Washita he was ordered to destroy the Indian village, at the LBH it was not. Terry wanted the combined forces to trap the Indians hammer and anvil style. Custers mission was not to attack and destroy the village on his own, his primary mission was to prevent the Indians from fleeing to the South. (Which he did not do) 2.....Attacking rather than being attacked is certainly a wise move, however, I dont recall Custer being concerned with being attacked. Rather, his biggest fear was that the Indians would scatter. With that being said, good post HR, well thought out. Be Well Dan
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