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Post by jodak on Mar 6, 2016 16:31:26 GMT -6
David,
The Washington Naval Treaty of 1922 limited the construction of new battleships and battlecruisers, which were grouped together as "capital" ships. Although the treaty addressed other classes of ships as well, its genesis was a desire to reduce the overall numbers and new construction of these tremendously expensive ships. That is why there was no new construction of battleships by Japan or anyone else from the early 1920s to the late 1930s. Limits were set on carriers as well, but, at the time, there were only a few early carriers in existence in the world's navies, and, by the terms of the treaty, these were all classified as "experimental" and did not count against the treaty limitations. That basically gave all of the powers a clean slate to construct carriers up to the treaty "tonnage" limitations, so that is why there was a boom in carrier construction during this time.
I emphasized the tonnage, as that was the limiting factor, rather than the numbers of ships, and different navies chose to utilize it differently. For example, due to the need for large numbers of ships to patrol and protect their long shipping lanes, the British chose to utilize their tonnage allotment for both carriers and cruisers to build more, smaller ships, rather than fewer, larger ones as did the U.S. and Japan. As to the U.S. and Japan, although their carriers were roughly equivalent in size, the U.S. carriers were more efficient designs that generally allowed them to carry and effectively operate greater numbers of planes. As an example of this, the U.S. Yorktown and Japanese Shokaku classes were considered to be contemporaries and both displace about 25,000 tons. However, the number of planes commonly operated was about 70 for the Shokakus and 90 for the Yokrtowns, an almost 30% difference. It seems that disparity is never taken into consideration when various battles are discussed, and it is always "The Japanese had X carriers while the U.S. only had Y", without considering that each U.S. carrier generally carried a substantially bigger punch. The disparity is much greater when discussing British carriers, which often carried only 30 or so planes, so it is important to keep all of that in mind when comparing the forces in various carrier engagements.
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Post by dave on Mar 6, 2016 20:28:43 GMT -6
jodak The Japanese made up for the disparity in the number of planes carried by having the Type 93 "Long Lance" torpedo available for use which clearly outperformed the Americans Mark XIV torpedo. The Japaneses maintained the advantage till 1943 when the Americans' finally ironed out all the bugs from their torpedo. The story about the development and flaws of the Mark XIV is a scandal that has faded away and heads should have rolled. Lack of testing, refusal to accept testimony about failures from submarine commanders and the complacency of the Bureau of Ordnance. How many lives and submarines were lost because of the miserable performance of the Mark XIV torpedo is unknown though it must have been many. This is a subject that I would love to hear your thoughts and ideas. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Mar 7, 2016 14:33:03 GMT -6
Dave, You are really talking about two different things - the Japanese Type 93 torpedo being their ship launched variety (the Type 95 derivative was submarine launched), while the aerial counterpart was the Type 91. The Type 91 was a decent and satisfactory torpedo but lacked the superior characteristics of the Type 93. However, it was just the reality that aerial torpedoes of all nations were generally inferior to their ship launched cousins. The requirement of being able to fit on and be carried by a plane [U.S. PT boats also carried the aerial variety] imposed size and weight limitations that resulted in smaller warheads and less capable engines, guidance systems, and so forth, making them generally less effective. You are correct that the Type 91 was superior to its U.S. counterpart, but I think that it is a stretch to think that it offset the U.S. advantage in numbers of planes. However, in that regard, we should not limit our consideration to the performance of the torpedoes themselves but to the overall “package” of torpedo performance, plane performance, pilot performance, tactics, etc. In all of these the Japanese were superior early on, but it is difficult to judge as to how much real bearing these had on things. As an example, in a basically equal comparison, on the second day of the Coral Sea Lexington’s planes launched 11 torpedoes against Shokaku, scoring 0 hits, while the Japanese launched 11 torpedoes against Lexington and scored two hits, a still low success rate. In addition, who is to say that the difference was not due to the Lexington’s relatively poor maneuverability, making it difficult for her to engage in evasive action, other factors, or just blind luck [maybe all of the U.S. torpedoes landed in troughs that knocked them off course]? Furthermore, the preceding day Lexington’s planes had scored five torpedo hits on Shoho and Yorktown’s planes two more, although these latter came while Shoho was almost dead in the water after Lexington’s attack. While the failure of the U.S. torpedo attacks at Midway is legendary, that was also largely due to factors other than the torpedoes themselves. However, there is no doubt that the U.S. aerial torpedoes had significant shortcomings, but, unlike the ship launched torpedoes, the navy recognized these problems early on and worked diligently to correct them, although without much improved success until 1944. Even then the increased performance was only partially due to modifications to the torpedoes and was probably more related to changed tactics involving such things as drop speed, height, and angle. In that regard, while it may seem counter intuitive, studies and operations revealed that U.S. torpedo effectiveness actually improved when dropped from higher speeds and heights than had been the early war practice. In regard to the Type 93/95 ship/sub launched torpedo, it was, as you indicate, superb and far superior to the U.S. Mark 14 equivalent, which was defective in several respects. These included consistently running about 10 feet deeper than set and defective magnetic and contact triggers. The first two could be fairly easily compensated for by adjusting the depth settings and disconnecting the magnetic exploders, but there was much politics and inertia involved in doing that. This stemmed from the fact that a number of early war submarine commanders had been involved in the torpedo development and refused to believe that there was anything wrong with it, had career interests in proving that, believed that submarine captains were using torpedo performance as a crutch to explain their lack of success, and forbade adjusting depths and disconnecting the exploder. (See these -
pwencycl.kgbudge.com/C/h/Christie_Ralph_W.htm and pwencycl.kgbudge.com/E/n/English_Robert_H.htm Fortunately, others such as these - pwencycl.kgbudge.com/F/i/Fife_James_Jr.htm
pwencycl.kgbudge.com/L/o/Lockwood_Charles_A.htm eventually came to prominence and won out, and the problems were largely rectified.
However, in addition to these problems that are much discussed, the Type 93/95 also had a much larger warhead and range than the Mark 14. The Type 93 carried a 1080 lb. warhead vs. 643 lbs. for the Mark 14. In fact, the relatively small Mark 14 warhead was responsible for much of the resistance to deactivating the magnetic exploder, as it was felt that it was too small to do sufficient damage against the side of a Japanese ship and the only way that it could be effective was in passing under the ship and being exploded by the magnetic trigger while underneath. The other very big advantage that the Type 93 enjoyed was in range. Both the Type 93 and the Mark 14 had adjustable speed settings, but the most common for both was 46 knots. At that speed the Mark 14 had an effective range of about 4,500 yards (2.5 miles), while that of the Type 93 was an incredible 39,000 yards (22 miles !). However, it should be emphasized that, while 39,000 yards was the distance that the Type 93 was capable of traveling, the range at which an opponent could be effectively engaged was much less. This was especially true since the Japanese had no radar to speak of and were therefore limited to optical sighting, which was only a few thousand yards in the best of conditions and much less at night, when the majority of the Solomon’s engagements took place. In that sense the Mark 14’s relatively short range was probably adequate, had it been effectively used. However, the pre-war “light forces” (i.e. cruisers and destroyers) doctrines developed by the Japanese and U.S. navies were diametrical opposites. In short, the Japanese emphasized the torpedo while the U.S. emphasized gun actions. This led to differences in ship designs, tactics, etc., and was part of the reason why the Type 93 was superior. In other words, since the Japanese placed greater emphasis on the use of the torpedo they also placed greater emphasis on torpedo development. Conversely, since the U.S. emphasized gunfire, it also emphasized gun related things like effective shells and fire control and was far superior to the Japanese in those aspects. One fall out of this was that, although all U.S. cruisers had originally been equipped with torpedo tubes, as was common in all of the world’s navies, the U.S. alone had removed them in the 1930s. The reason for this was that it was perceived that having torpedoes on deck, with their attendant explosive possibilities, would be a detriment in a gun action, which was the prescribed U.S. doctrine. In theory the U.S. superior gun capabilities would allow them to effectively engage and destroy their Japanese opponents well before the Japanese got within torpedo range, but two things served to mitigate that. The first was that the Americans were not at first aware of the superior range of the type 93, which allowed it to be used at greater ranges than the U.S. had envisioned and prepared for, and secondly and probably more importantly, the U.S. consistently allowed the Japanese to dictate tactics by allowing them to close to torpedo range before engaging them with the U.S. greater and longer range gunfire capabilities. At those ranges the lack of torpedo capabilities of the U.S. cruisers was to have serious ramifications.
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Post by dave on Mar 7, 2016 15:45:04 GMT -6
jodak Thank you for the information about the different concepts held by the Japanese and Americans regarding guns vs torpedoes. I always look forward to reading your posts. I also appreciate the web sites for Lockwood, Christie, English and Fife. My father a submariner always talked very highly of Lockwood, calling him Uncle Charley.
I find it very interesting that America emphasized gunnery prior to the War yet the Japanese had far superior optics and night tactics than we did. The US sorta hung on to the ropes till after the Guadalcanal victory which I think was the turning point of the War. The torpedo fiasco due in large part to the cost, $10,000 (I think that is correct), coupled with poor tactical training of prewar sub commanders may have extended the War. I believe that if the Americans had a reliable torpedo the poor performing sub skippers would have been removed more quickly. Inept captains were somewhat camouflaged by poor torpedo performance.
I look forward to more posts that correct my goofy thoughts and provide more knowledge. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Mar 7, 2016 17:34:17 GMT -6
I have always thought that Lockwood is much less known and under appreciated than his contributions warrant and deserves to be thought of in the same vein as others such as Halsey and Spruance. He probably is in naval and historian circles, but he is today fairly unknown publicly.
The development of the contrasting Japanese and U.S. battle dogma for light forces was largely an outgrowth of the "one great battle" concept. As it applied to that the Japanese envisioned the role of their light forces (interestingly including carriers) as nipping at the edges of and whittling down the U.S. battle fleet as it made its way across the Pacific. In accomplishing that, since cruiser and destroyer gunfire would have had fairly negligible impact against the U.S. battleships, the Japanese emphasized the use of torpedoes, which had a much larger punch, and they tailored their tactics and training accordingly. Conversely, the U.S. saw the role of its light forces as being to screen the fleet and fend off these attacks, which was better done with gunfire. In other words the Japanese doctrine was based upon the use of their light forces against U.S. battleships, where the larger punch of torpedoes was required, while the U.S. doctrine was based upon their light forces engaging the corresponding Japanese light forces, where their lighter caliber gunfire would be effective. When things did not play out as anticipated in regard to the one great battle, the Japanese were able to apply the skills and capabilities that they had developed for that eventuality in other roles, such as the previously mentioned surface actions in the Solomons.
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Post by dave on Mar 7, 2016 17:56:36 GMT -6
jodak Thank you for the info in your posts.
In the Battle of Samar in October of 1944 the Americans successfully used their torpedoes against the Japanese capital ships. It was somewhat a reversal of the Japanese tactics used during the battles around Guadalcanal. The Samar action occurred 2 years later and the DDs and DEs used torpedoes as weapons and the Japanese were continually dodging torpedoes which helped to save to Taffy 3 along with 5" shells and planes. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Mar 7, 2016 21:55:29 GMT -6
I should have mentioned that the U.S. doctrine was developed during the time that the "battleship admirals" held sway in the navy. To them the gun was paramount, and they tended to view cruisers and even destroyers as mini battleships to be used in the same way, in battle line type formations. There were certain advantages to this, as all officers were versed in the same tactics, making it fairly easy to meld ships together in the ad hoc groupings that were common early in the war. However, there were serious drawbacks as well, in particularly in limiting the destroyers' ability to maneuver independently and bring their torpedoes to bear. However, there was a faction of generally younger officers that espoused light unit tactics similar to the Japanese, and who came to increasing prominence as the war progressed. Foremost, the navy learned to allow its destroyers to operate independently of the battle line and, in so doing, greatly enhanced their effectiveness. However, by the time that occurred the time for light forces surface actions had largely passed, with the notable exception of Surigao Straight, where the U.S. destroyers performed magnificently and were the unsung heroes that, similar to Japanese doctrine, whittled down the Japanese fleet before it was engaged by the U.S. battle line. This provides a good visual depiction of that and how destroyers operated to greatest advantage. However, it is not possible to link directly to the appropriate page and you must tab through several preliminary pages (by my count 13) before arriving at that page, which is headed "The Gauntlet of Destroyers". www.pacificwaranimated.com/LeyteGulf.html
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Post by jodak on Mar 8, 2016 10:20:18 GMT -6
March 8, 1941
From a Memorandum by Secretary of State Hull:
The Japanese Ambassador called at my apartment at the Carlton Hotel by an indirect arrangement based on the equal and joint initiative of himself and myself growing out of his talk with the President in my presence some days ago...I then inquired of the Ambassador whether the military groups in control of his Government could possibly expect important nations like the United States to sit absolutely quiet while two or three nations before our very eyes organized naval and military forces and went out and conquered the balance of the earth, including the seven seas and all trade routes and the other four continents. Could they expect countries like mine to continue to remain complacent as that movement is going on?
I inquired further what countries like mine would have to gain by remaining complacent in the face of a movement to substitute force and conquest for law and justice and order and fair dealing and equality. The Ambassador sought to play down the view that such military conquest was really in the mind of his Government and he then said that embargoes by this country were, of course, of increasing concern, and that he did not believe there would be any further military movements unless the policy of increasing embargoes by this country should force his Government, in the minds of those in control, to take further military steps...
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Post by dave on Mar 9, 2016 20:23:31 GMT -6
jodak I got to wondering, after reading and rereading materials I have related to Pearl Harbor, has anyone come up with what Admiral Kimmel could have done better to be prepared for the attack? Everyone says that he failed but what could he have done more? As you pointed out in a post the Army was in charge of the air protection of Hawaii.
Admiral Richardson who Kimmel replaced had kept a 300 mile patrol around Pearl Harbor that was cancelled by Admiral Stark in December of 1940 I think. If Kimmel had been able to have a 300 mile patrol perhaps some positive changes could have been made.
If the fleet had sortied out of Pearl they would have been sunk in deep waters, 1,000 feet plus, and not repairable as they were. Brings up the question? What could Kimmel have done better? I have probably gotten this all balled up but you can straighten it out! Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Mar 11, 2016 13:22:32 GMT -6
Dave, Your question of what Kimmel “could” have done has virtually unlimited possible answers, most of which are very subjective and open to debate. However, what you probably meant was what “should” he have done or could have done within reason. Although not proposed within the military hierarchy, some in Congress and others had originally advocated the he be court martialed for dereliction of duty. The Naval Pearl Harbor Court of Inquiry found that there was no basis for that, but, in his second endorsement to the court’s findings, Admiral King opined that, while he concurred that court martial was not warranted, administrative action was. In that sense the charges against Kimmel were reduced to errors in judgment, so exactly what were the perceived errors of judgment as to what Kimmel should have done differently? There were a total of nine Pearl Harbor investigation (ten if we count Dorn) but three were army specific, leaving seven that dealt with the navy in whole or in part. [Here is a list with links to them. I find the Hart Investigation to be the most informative, as it includes the testimony of various principals - www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/invest.html ]. The findings varied somewhat between those that expressed them but generally fall into three categories, that Kimmel 1) Failed to adequately confer and coordinate with General Short as to overall defensive measures, particularly in regard to the meaning of the “War Warning” and other messages received in the final days preceding the attack; 2) Failed to institute a higher level of alert in the wake of these messages, and 3) failed to conduct long range aerial patrols. I think that King’s endorsement (go to www.ibiblio.org/pha/pha/navy/navy_0.html then click on line 13, Second Endorsement … in the index) provides a good overview of the issues and Kimmel’s perceived failures. They all basically boil down to the fact that, given the warning messages received, Kimmel should have more fully recognized the seriousness of the situation and taken appropriate actions, such as instigating a higher level of alert and implementing long range aerial patrols, even though they were not part of normal routine. Descriptions of Hawaii/Pearl Harbor on the morning of the attack invariably begin by saying that it was just another peaceful Sunday morning, with nothing out of the ordinary occurring – just routine as normal. Conversely, descriptions of Manila depict a very tense atmosphere within Navy and Army circles, with alerts implemented that restricted personnel to bases, Admiral Hart’s Asiatic Fleet having put to sea and made suitable deployments (as instructed by the War Warning Message), etc. Kimmel/Short and others have argued that the difference in actions taken by the Philippine and Hawaiian commanders is explained by the fact that the Philippines were specifically mentioned in the warning messages while Hawaii was not. While that is perhaps understandable, that is where the “errors in judgment” come in and where it was found that Kimmel and Short should have taken more appropriate actions based upon the information that they had. Vice-Admiral Halsey, in the first level of command under Kimmel, testified that he saw the War Warning Message, was very concerned by it, and thought that the U.S. and Japan would be at war within a matter of days. When he left with the Enterprise task force to ferry additional planes to Wake, he asked Kimmel what his orders were in light of the current situation, to which Kimmel replied, “Use your common sense”, and which Halsey said were the best orders that he ever received. Immediately after putting to sea Halsey issued his Battle Order No. 1, which began – 1. The ENTERPRISE is now operating under war conditions. 2. At any time, day or night, we must be ready for instant action.
In other words, one of Kimmel’s chief subordinates recognized the significance of the message and took appropriate actions, even if Kimmel himself did not. In that sense Rear-Admiral Newton, who was in the second rung of command below Kimmel (he reported to Vice-Admiral Brown who reported to Kimmel) and at sea with the Lexington task force, testified that he was not even briefed on the warning messages and had no inkling that anything out of the norm was afoot. That calls into question Kimmel’s judgment in sending an important component of the fleet to sea without even briefing its commander on the developing situation and further points out that Kimmel did not have an adequate awareness of it himself. He was to later testify that he did not understand what “War Warning” meant, as it was not a standard term that he had ever seen before. I believe that even I would have understood what was intended and that this was an example of Kimmel’s later penchant for excuse making.
Finally, let me address two things that you said in your query. The first was that Admiral Stark had ordered Admiral Richardson to cease conducting long range aerial patrols in 1940. That is what Richardson contended, but I do not believe that to be the case. I can’t locate it just now, but I’m fairly certain that Richardson stated that Stark “questioned the necessity” for the patrols, which he (Richardson), “took” as an indication that he should cease them. He may have taken it that way, but it was not an order, and Richardson was to later say that, had he not stopped the patrols, Kimmel would have found it easier to keep them going, indicating that he had discretion in the matter. (For an overview of the issue scroll to page 275 of Richardson’s book here – books.google.com/books?id=kBJPpHrOeooC&pg=PA277&lpg=PA277&dq=admiral+james+richardson+and+pearl+harbor+aerial+patrols&source=bl&ots=eTp1CdTD01&sig=jCL_C9f1ifOv4J7UGtXYfq30lTM&hl=en&sa=X&ved=0ahUKEwjdy-C-m7nLAhUD2SYKHZbeDtwQ6AEIKzAC%20-%20v=onepage&q=admiral%20james%20richardson%20and%20pearl%20harbor%20aerial%20patrols&f=false#v=snippet&q=admiral%20james%20richardson%20and%20pearl%20harbor%20aerial%20patrols&f=false) Your second point was that, had Kimmel sent the fleet to sea many of the ships would have been irrevocably lost in deep water. Many, including Nimitz, have contended the same thing and opined that it was a blessing that the ships were in port. However, that is opinion, and I doubt that you would be able to find anything stipulating that the preferred method for receiving an aerial attack was in port, rather than maneuvering at sea. It is of course questionable if the Japanese would have even been able to locate the fleet at sea, keeping in mind that Pearl Harbor was pretty much at the maximum range of the Japanese planes, leaving little leeway for searching. That would open up a whole can of “what ifs”, along the lines of would the Japanese fleet have tarried around to search for the fleet, at which time Enterprise and Lexington would have been back in the area and what consequences, good or bad, which may have entailed. In regard to Enterprise and Lexington, it was left to Kimmel’s discretion as to whether or not to send them on their missions to ferry planes to Midway and Wake, so, a proper interpretation of the warning messages may have caused him to have retained them in Hawaiian waters, where they could have provided cover for the fleet if it went to sea. Likewise, the Saratoga was at San Diego pending immediate return to Pearl, so it is possible that Kimmel could have hastened her return had he chosen to do so. There were other dispositions steps that he could have taken short of sending the fleet to sea. For example, although Kimmel was already exceeding the in port requirements by having at least one anti-aircraft battery manned on each ship, he could have enhanced that further, as well as "buttoned up" the ships, particularly the Oklahoma, to better withstand an attack. Also, although not gathered together to deter sabotage, as were the Army planes, the Navy's planes were not dispersed as under wartime conditions, and steps could have been taken in that regard and so on.
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Post by jodak on Mar 11, 2016 14:55:37 GMT -6
Dave,
We recently discussed the perceived failings of General MacArthur in the Philippines, and, as an adjunct to your question of what could Kimmel have done differently, I ask "What could MacArthur have done differently". I recently viewed one of those all knowing History Channel type shows where about three historians in a row made the same definitive statement that "MacArthur did nothing". Really? How do they know that? As I mentioned in a previous post, about the only account that we have of what transpired at MacArthur's headquarters is the one given by General Brereton, who is known to have been self serving in his writings. In it he says that he twice attempted to see MacArthur but was unable to do so because MacArthur was pre-engaged behind closed doors. That being the case, how does anyone know what MacArthur was or was not doing? Also, given that MacArthur's responsibilities were to defend the Philippines from attack and that he had already made the appropriate defensive deployments, placed his forces on alert, and presumably issued all of the necessary orders and instructions to that end, what more was there really for him to do until such time as he was actually attacked and had to react to it?
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Post by dave on Mar 11, 2016 15:17:01 GMT -6
jodak Thank you so much for the posts and the information and web sites. I shall study them closely and holler back if I have any intelligent questions.
Some of the questions and thoughts I had come from Air Raid: Pearl Harbor edited by Paul Stillwell, 1981. LCDR Logan Ramsey wrote an article about the attack and then it presents part of his testimopny at the 1944 court of inquiry. Ramsey's 1937 article was a prescient vision of the future attack on Pearl Harbor. Once again thank you. Regards Dave
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Post by jodak on Mar 14, 2016 6:31:45 GMT -6
March 12, 1941
CinC File No. S81-5/0398 UNITED STATES FLEET U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship AT SEA, HAWAIIAN AREA, March 12, 1941. Confidential From: Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet. To: The Chief of Naval Operations Subject: Anti-torpedo baffles for protection against torpedo plane attacks, Pearl Harbor. Reference: (a) CNO Conf. ltr. file CP-30C1-AJ (SC) N20-12 Serial 09330 of 15 Feb. 1941.
1. In view of the contents of reference (a), the Commander-in-Chief, U. S. Pacific Fleet, recommends that until a light efficient net, that can be laid temporarily and quickly is developed, no A/T nets be supplied this area. H. E. KIMMEL.
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Post by tubman13 on Mar 15, 2016 5:10:36 GMT -6
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Post by jodak on Mar 15, 2016 7:45:41 GMT -6
I love how simple wooden fins on their torpedoes becomes a "triumph of Japanese technological prowess". As the article alludes to, conventional wisdom held that air dropped torpedoes needed more depth than what existed in Pearl Harbor in order to make an initial plunge, due to being dropped, before leveling off. However, while I don't know what precipitated it, the U.S. began to be increasingly concerned that might not necessarily be true, and, as reflected in several of the previous posts, began to see an aerial torpedo attack as the main threat. There were torpedo nets or "baffles" that could be placed around ships to at least somewhat protect them, but they were apparently quite slow and cumbersome to place and remove, greatly restricting the ships' ability to get under way in a timely manner, especially in an emergency, and both Admirals Kimmel and Bloch concluded that they were too restricting for proper fleet/port operations. A lighter weight, more easily managed net was being explored, but I don't think that much progress had been made.
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