|
Post by jodak on Feb 14, 2016 8:48:14 GMT -6
February 14, 1941 Immediately after General Short reaches Hawaii and assumes command, he and Admiral Bloch establish several joint army/navy committees to study and coordinate air defense measures for the naval base.
www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410214a14d.html
|
|
|
Post by Mike Powell on Feb 14, 2016 15:11:13 GMT -6
The training film of the Iowa class 16" is very interesting. The US Navy had experience with turret fires. In 1924 USS Mississippi, a 14" gun battleship lost 47 dead and nine injured when a turret burned out. The same turret, Number Two, went up again in 1943, this time killing 43. In both cases this resulted from ignition of freshly loaded powder by smoldering debris left in a gun's chamber from the previous shot. The probable cause each time was attributed to failure of the crew to ensure the breech was clear of debris before loading. And of course USS Iowa suffered a turret explosion in 1989 that killed all 47 men in the turret from top to bottom, though those in the powder magazine adjacent to the turret ring survived. Aboard Iowa shortly following the explosion and before the fire inside the turret was extinguished,inspection of the turret's powder flats at its base showed the walls "glowing a bright cherry red" around tons of unexploded powder bags. The turret's magazines and powder flats were then flooded with sea water to prevent further explosion. The Navy initially determined the explosion was deliberately caused by a crew member. Sandia National Laboratories investigated independently and found the likely cause to have been overramming of the powder charge creating premature detonation with the breech open. A re-investigation by the Navy then found no cause could be determined. While each of these experiences on the Mississippi and Iowa was horrific no magazine explosions resulted. At Pearl Harbor Arizona was lost to catastrophic explosion of her forward magazine, believed the result of an unusual chain of events; deck penetration by an armor piercing bomb which ignited an oil fire that cooked off a magazine that stored black powder charges used to power catapult launches of her scout planes. That black powder magazine unfortunately was sited below, and served to detonate, the main magazine of the forward turrets. This detonation tore apart the forward hull of Arizona. All this of course having nothing to do with with any circumstances with her turrets or their trunks. The prominent British experience with turret and magazine conflagrations occurred at Jutland in 1916. The loss of three battlecruisers to magazine explosion was more likely due to powder handling measures that had been adopted to increase rate of fire, rather than any flaws in design of the turrets and their magazines. Powder bags were prematurely removed from flash-proof cases and stowed ready to hand at unintended locations in turrets and handling rooms, precipitating flash overs into the powder magazines from German shell strikes on turrets and their trunks. While it is clear that the Iowas stored their shells within the turrets rotating trunk a deck above the powder charges, I would not necessarily infer the Iowas' magazines were less protected than they were those in the battleships of other navies. The position and design of powder magazines and shell storage areas are subject to as many constraints as are all the spaces within a warship, whether for armament, berthing, propulsion, etc. The Iowa class were high-speed battleships and that necessitated not only huge power plants but fine hull lines as well. The relatively narrow forward hull that resulted constrained the width available for the magazines serving Turrets 1 and 2, bearing in mind that additional width than just the magazines themselves had to be provided for torpedo protection. I believe it was these width constraints that led to a somewhat higher placement of magazines in the Iowas. To make a comparison I'd need to understand much more than i do about deck armor, width and depth of the side armor belt and the scheme of protection against torpedoes and mines. I'm a little shy on British shell handling knowledge but the vertical storage in the Iowas is clearly shown in the fine video above. Using a parbuckle to transfer a 16" shell weighing over a ton has always seemed precarious to me especially in a rough seaway but it obviously worked. I've read that to facilitate that movement the shell handlers spread a coat of oil over the deck plates. Stowing the shells within the rotating trunk would have avoided having to wait until the turret had ceased rotation to move a shell across the boundary between fixed and rotating deck areas. As far as speed of shell handling (and loading) between British and US methods, I can't opine but the following from The Evolution of Battleship Gunnery in the U.S. Navy, 1920-1945 by William J. Jurens ( www.navweaps.com/index_inro/INRO_BB-Gunnery_p1.htm ) gives an idea of the impact of training and practice. Some exercises tested the reliability of the systems rather than the accuracy of the guns. The achronistic Short Range Battle Practice for example, in which the battleships blasted away at targets only a couple of thousand yards away typically getting eighty or ninety percent hits, was fired every year until the outbreak of the Second World War. It was retained because it tested loading and firing crews to the limit, even though the range was almost ridiculously low.33 The objects of SRBP were to test and train gun pointer groups at pointer fire, to test and train loading crews at maximum safe rates of fire to test material, and to stimulate interest in gunnery. It certainly succeeded in increasing speed. In 1919 battleship main batteries averaged about 1.9 Shots Per Gun Per Minute [SPGPM]. By 1930 the average rate had risen to about 2.5 SPGPM, though for a variety of reasons it never got much higher than this. In fact, the obsession with speed in Short Range Battle Practice finally became so great that in 1938, CNO, fearing that some ships were not checking for bore clear with sufficient care, promulgated regulations specifying a minimum twenty-four second loading interval, and imposing a penalty if it was not upheld. Finally, I'm stumped on flash gear for turret crews in the US Navy. The video above and all the pictures I can find are not "in action" but rather publicity or training situations where I suspect live powder is not in use. I'd hope someone with knowledge can give some advice on this as flash gear being absent when playing for real would be hard to understand.
|
|
|
Post by dave on Feb 14, 2016 16:04:11 GMT -6
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 15, 2016 7:10:00 GMT -6
February 15, 1941 The Navy Department, over the signature of CNO Stark, sends a memo to Admiral Kimmel regarding the feasibility of use of anti-torpedo baffles within Pearl Harbor and referencing the British attack on Taranto.
www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410215acno.html
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 15, 2016 7:25:48 GMT -6
February 15, 1941 Although, the U.S. has been reading Japanese diplomatic messages for some time, most have been fairly routine in nature. However, on February 15,1941, various consulates receive the following message requesting specific information of a military nature. Subsequent messages to individual consulates on the same date highlight paragraphs for particular attention by each. The message to the Honolulu consulate specifies paragraphs 1 and 2 for special attention.
www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410215ax2.html
www.ibiblio.org/pha/timeline/410215bx2.html
|
|
|
Post by Mike Powell on Feb 17, 2016 17:06:11 GMT -6
Dave,
I was unaware of Slover's page. Areal treat.
Thanks
Mike
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 23, 2016 8:23:44 GMT -6
.... America has had the habit of being poorly prepared for War and I fear we are in the same situation again. The shortage of naval vessels, especially carriers, army man power, problems with the F-35 and other issues concern me greatly. The expenditure of men and monies after 911 has left this nation weary and reluctant to get involved further against terrorists and participate in foreign affairs. Regards Dave Let me preface the following by saying that I am talking about something that I really know nothing about, but a particular concern of mine relates to the F-35 that you mention above as well as numerous other air and naval assets. It seems to me that the Navy and even more so the Air Force have become infatuated with stealth technology, making it the be all and end all of future weapon systems. As a result, they devote tremendous resources toward developing and deploying stealth technology, with little apparent real utility (i.e., how many likely opponents have the capability of effectively countering one of our planes or ships even if they do know it is there), when other systems would be "good enough", at much lower cost and with greater availability and reliability...
abcnews.go.com/International/us-doesnt-400m-22-raptor-fighter-jets-syria/story?id=37058310
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Feb 24, 2016 11:47:03 GMT -6
Jodak, As I mentioned elsewhere on the board, I am enjoying this thread. I am going to jump ahead just a bit. As Nelson Miles is discussed in conjunction with "The Great Sioux War", I thought I might bring up General Sherman Miles, son of Nelson. He was the Chief of Military Intelligence when Pearl Harbor went down. He lost that job shortly thereafter, to do with his offices handling of information and how it was distributed to Pearl.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 24, 2016 14:10:07 GMT -6
Hey Tom,
While I am of course aware of Sherman Miles and the role that he played in the lead up to Pearl Harbor, it never occurred to me that there might be a link between him and Nelson. Thanks for bringing that to my attention. As an aside, Admiral Husband Kimmel's father, Manning, was also a veteran of the Indian Wars (although in his case pre-Civil War) and the Civil War. Husband himself had originally hoped to follow his father's footsteps and make the army a career after attending West Point but was unable to secure an appointment and received one to Annapolis instead. His son was also named Manning and graduated from the Naval Academy, served in submarines in WW2, and eventually commanded the U.S.S. Robalo, which apparently struck a mine and sunk near the Philippines. Manning did not survive, but it is unclear as to whether he died in the sinking or later in captivity (There are indications that a few of the crew made it to shore, were captured by the Japanese, and subsequently died in captivity, were murdered by the Japanese, or died as a result of the sinking of a prison ship transporting them to Japan.). I feel particularly sorry for Husband in that regard - to have lost his son fighting for the navy/government that, in his mind, had turned its back on him must have been quite a blow.
|
|
|
Post by tubman13 on Feb 24, 2016 15:15:28 GMT -6
Jodak, I went to high school with Ned & William Kimmel 7 miles north of Annapolis, in the late 60's. I too felt sorry for Admiral Kimmel, as when they were dealing his hand, there may have been a joker or two in the deck.
Regards, Tom
|
|
|
Post by dave on Feb 24, 2016 15:34:33 GMT -6
jodak Living about 5 hours from Mobile has allowed me to visit The Battleship Alabama Park which has the USS Drum on exhibit. Manning Kimmel had served on the Drum as her Executive Officer.
Theodore Roscoe in his United States Submarine Operations in World War II, 1949 edition has the following men listed as the crew members of the USS Robalo captured as: Ensign S.L. Tucker Floyd G. Laughlin, QM 1 Wallace K. Martin, Seaman 3 Mason C. Poston, Electrician Mate 2
In honor of all those who served in the "boats", Joseph David Elmore, and for those on Eternal Patrol: Regards Dave
Old Fuds, Young Studs and Lieutenant Commanders
Battleships are title B.
That's Lesson One in strategy.
They are the backbone of the Fleet.
Their fighting power can't be beat.
They dominate the raging Main
While swinging 'round the anchor chain,
And bravely guard your home and mine
While anchored out there all in line.
They fill the Japs with fear and hate
From well inside the Golden Gate.
Now Lesson Two in strategy--
Our subs and planes are title C.
Just send them out on any mission
And win your battles by attrition.
Where'er you send the subs or planes
They're bound to chalk up lots of gains--
And losses, too, but what the hell.
Who cares about their personnel?
For planes are chauffeured by young studs;
Lieutenant Commanders run the subs.
Richard G. Voge
Lieutenant Commander, USN
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Feb 25, 2016 8:32:15 GMT -6
February 25,1941
CONFERENCE IN THE OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF AT 10:00 A. M., TUESDAY, FEBRUARY 25, 1941
Present: Chief of Staff, General Emmons, General Arnold, General Brett, General Spaatz, General Gerow, Colonel McNarney, Colonel Anderson, Colonel Twaddle.
CHIEF OF STAFF: In view of the Japanese situation the Navy is concerned with the security of the fleet in Hawaii, and apparently the new commander of the fleet there has made a check and reported it to Washington and the Secretary of the Navy has outlined the situation to the Secretary of War. Their particular point is the type of air force in Hawaii, particularly Pursuit. They are in the situation where they must guard against a surprise or trick attack. It is necessary for the fleet to be in anchorage part of the time and they are particularly vulnerable at that time. I do not feel that it is a possibility or even a probability, but they must guard against everything. We also have information regarding the possible use of torpedo planes. There is the possible sudden introduction of Japanese carrier-based planes of the Messerschmidt type which has a speed of 322 miles per hour, armored, etc. The Navy viewpoint is that the whole fleet is involved and that the sea power of the United States might be jeopardized. We have already arranged to send 31 P-36 ships there. The. Curtis plant has moved up the delivery date of 50 additional planes to March 10th; the Navy is sending a Carrier back for these ships. The issue is the priority with regard to new equipment. Admiral Hart has six new submarines, one old cruiser, and not one AA gun. They have now brought up the question of moving some armament from Corregidor. The planes in the Philippines are of the Swedish type which the Chinese turned down. If we had a single squadron of modern planes in the Philippines it would at least give the Japanese something to think about. Then we have the question of Panama—no modern planes. I understand that the P-40s have some engine trouble which makes them dangerous flying over water.
Consequently, our original allocation will be changed by the Japanese situation. Also I have a memorandum with reference to a British request for 50,000 airplanes, to be delivered in 1942. We have a deficiency of 10,000 in organizing the 14,000 program, We are concerned with the reduction of the assignment to the GHQ Air Force. It was thought to our advantage to have as many as possible in foreign garrisons. I have just been talking about pursuit. We have started a proposition to fill up outlying garrisons, those close to home aren't so much of a problem,
Colonel ANDERSON. We have made a tentative allocation of planes as follows: First priority: to the Philippine Islands—one interceptor squadron, one medium bomber squadron. To Alaska—one composite group. To Hawaii and Panama—sufficient strength to meet a two-carrier attack. To Puerto Rico one pursuit group and two bomber groups. Second priority: The equipment for an emergency force to South and Central America—three groups of heavy or medium bombers, two groups of light bombers, and two groups of intercept. Third priority: Remainder of the GHQ, minimum training requirements for the remainder of the 54 group program. We will complete training requirements before January 1942; will complete the 54 group in intercept pursuit in January 1942; fighter pursuit in July 1942; heavy bombers in April 1942; medium bombers in December 1941, light bombers in April 1942.
CHIEF OF STAFF. What do you think about this, Emmons?
GENERAL EMMONS. We have little means to accomplish our plans in GHQ Air force. We are 850 officers short on the 25 group program and we won't get the shortage made up until July, then we will only have graduates of training centers. If we make the normal assignments to staff echelons, we will have less than 100 officers with 2 years service to distribute over 34 groups. With respect to planes, we have 500 combat types for instance. With regard to the P-36 we had to get 31 to send to Hawaii, it took all we had (71) to get the 31 out, due to repairs, ships on the ground, etc. The backbone of our present airplane strength is the B-18 of which we have 140. Of the 193 P-40s we now have only 175, many are out of commission for lack of spare parts. We have 50 B-17s, also 4 P-39s and 5 A-20A. We are also short of spare parts. Although we have on paper about 500 planes, I doubt that we could put 300 in the air.
General ARNOLD. The 25 group program is supposed to be completed by July 1941; the 54 group by April 1942.
General EMMONS. With regard to sending equipment on foreign service it would be a mistake to send new planes over-seas until the defects inherent with new materiel have been ironed out. We have changes on the 50 P-40Bs to go to Hawaii, probably won't make much difference except with the engine.
General BRETT. The engine is improving all the time. The P-40D has a new engine.
CHIEF OF STAFF. How about the Air Depot in Hawaii?
General EMMONS. It functions very well.
General ARNOLD. With regard to this shortage of parts, we are going to have to manufacture parts in the depots—we used to do it before.
General BRETT. The shortage in parts is due to the fact that we have pushed the plane manufacturers so far the planes that they have been forced to neglect, in a measure, the production of spare parts.
General EMMONS. With regard to organization equipment, we are in pretty- good shape. The only shortage is in cameras and octants. With regard to the allocation, I don't know what to say. With regard to a tactical point, Hawaii has a peculiar situation—pursuit is of little value at night, at which time—due to phosforesence in the water—primary targets, dry-docks, the fleet, etc., stand out on the darkest night. They will have no warning service until they get detectors and pursuit would be useless. I would have long range bombers and not send pursuit, but bombers.
Conference adjourned.
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Mar 4, 2016 7:30:47 GMT -6
March 5, 1941
Radiogram from General Marshal to General Short -
"I would appreciate your early review of the situation in the Hawaiian Department with regard to defense from air attack. The establishment of a satisfactory system of coordinating all means available to this end is a matter of first priority…"
|
|
|
Post by jodak on Mar 4, 2016 7:42:29 GMT -6
March 5, 1941
Basic Order No. 24 regarding collaboration with Japan
The Fuehrer has issued the following order regarding collaboration with Japan:
1. It must be the aim of the collaboration based on the Three Power Pact to induce Japan as soon as possible to take active measures in the Far East. Strong British forces will thereby be tied down, and the center of gravity of the interests of the United States of America will be diverted to the Pacific.
The sooner it intervenes, the greater will be the prospects of success for Japan in view of the still undeveloped preparedness for war on the part of its adversaries. The "Barbarossa" operation will create particularly favorable political and military prerequisites for this. [Marginal note "slightly exaggerated"]
2. To prepare the way for the collaboration it is essential to strengthen the Japanese military potential with all means available.
For this purpose the High Commands of the branches of the Armed Forces will comply in a comprehensive and generous manner with Japanese desires for information regarding German war and combat experience and for assistance in military economics and in technical matters. Reciprocity is desirable but this factor should not stand in the way of negotiations. Priority should naturally be given to those Japanese requests which would have the most immediate application in waging war.
In special cases the Fuehrer reserves the decisions, to himself.
3. The harmonizing of the operational plans of the two parties is the responsibility of the Navy High Command.
This will be subject to the following guiding principles:
a. The common aim of the conduct of war is to be stressed as forcing England to the ground quickly and thereby keeping the United States out of the war. Beyond this Germany has no political, military, or economic interests in the Far East which would give occasion for any reservations with regard to Japanese intentions.
b. The great successes achieved by Germany in mercantile warfare make it appear particularly suitable to employ strong Japanese forces for the same purpose. In this connection every opportunity to support German mercantile warfare must be exploited.
c. The raw material situation of the pact powers demands that Japan should acquire possession of those territories which it needs for the continuation of the war, especially if the United States intervenes. Rubber shipments must be carried out even after the entry of Japan into the war, since they are of vital importance to Germany.
d. The seizure of Singapore as the key British position in the Far East would mean a decisive success for the entire conduct of war of the Three Powers.
In addition, attacks on other systems of bases of British naval power extending to those of American naval power only if the entry of the United States into the war cannot be prevented -- will result in weakening the enemy's system of power in that region and also, just like the attack on sea communications, in tying down substantial forces of all kinds (Australia) .
A date for the beginning of operational discussions cannot yet be fixed.
4. In the military commissions to be formed in accordance with the Three Power Pact, only such questions are to be dealt with as equally concern the three participating powers. These will include primarily the problems of economic warfare.
The working out of the details is the responsibility of the "Main Commission" with the cooperation of the Armed Forces High Command.
5. The Japanese must not be given any intimation of the Barbarossa operation.
The Chief of the Armed Forces High Command Signed in draft: Keitel
Note: This and subsequent postings involving general background information for the reader, but of which the U.S. authorities would not have been aware and therefore could not have been expected to factor into their decisions, are differentiated in green type.
|
|
|
Post by edavids on Mar 6, 2016 9:38:49 GMT -6
"I fear all we have done is awaken a sleeping giant and filled him with a terrible resolve" Admiral Yamamoto when he was told the attack did not get the carriers. Be Well Dan Hi Dan,
Actually it was the fact that the attack occurred prior to a declaration of war that precipitated Yamamoto's above comment. Also, I'm not sure that either navy initially placed the importance on carriers that we now seem to think that they did but, rather, viewed them almost as auxiliaries to and with the primarily responsibility of scouting for the battle force. Some of the Pearl Harbor conspiracy theories point to the fact that none of the carriers were in port at the time of the attack as evidence that we knew that the attack was coming and sent the carriers elsewhere for safety. However, inherent in that is the idea that the carriers were deemed to be the most valuable assets that most needed to be saved, but I would argue that no such supposition existed and that the battleships were still viewed as being the primary naval asset, and, if special measures were to be taken to protect anything, it would have been them.
Spent some time on combinedfleet.com and the following stood out to me; the Japanese built 0 battleships between 1921 and 1941 but instead focused on aircraft carriers. 6 carriers were included in the fleet that assaulted Pearl Harbor. Thank Heaven the Japanese tied themselves up in knots over battle complexity. Also they seemed to show timidity in finishing battles or seeing underlying layers. 8 battleships sunk or damaged at Pearl but the repair facilities were largely intact and Nagumo chose to not send in another strike. Best, David
|
|