shaw
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Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Nov 27, 2015 15:02:26 GMT -6
Fred, Good points. Of you are right about putting times by events.
Colt 45, I actually agree with your comments. Of course I always add in motivation (which gets me in trouble ;-).
Regards
Shaw
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Post by fred on Nov 27, 2015 15:15:39 GMT -6
Of course I always add in motivation (which gets me in trouble Not in my book!!! < G >Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by herosrest on Nov 29, 2015 4:15:13 GMT -6
Ducemus When the command came up, I ordered a trot,and went on ahead to the crossing of the Little Big Horn. That was my first sight of it. There I saw an engagement going on, and supposed it was the whole regiment. There were twelve or thirteen men in skirmish line that appeared to have been beaten back. The line was then parallel with the river, and the Indians were charging through those men. I thought the whole command was thrashed, and that was not a good place to cross. To my right I noticed three or four Indians four to five hundred yards away from me. I thought they were hostile, but on riding toward them I found they were Crows. They said there was a big 'pooh-poohing' going on. Then I saw the men who were up on the bluff, and I immediately went there and was met by Major Reno.So, as I have said and only in repeating statement of Benteen himself, the idea (that is what it is) that Benteen was to go to Custer, by order of the message carried by Trumpeter Martin, was not and therefore is not so. It's very simple.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 29, 2015 8:19:08 GMT -6
HR
You seem to have things backward. You don't believe officers can deviate from orders when there is substantial change but you also believe that Benteen could chose to obey an order and go wherever he decided.
If Benteen believed that Custer was in the valley then he would be going to Custer. That is the way that I read what you posted: "There I saw an engagement going on, and supposed it was the whole regiment. "
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by herosrest on Nov 29, 2015 12:04:29 GMT -6
HR You seem to have things backward. You don't believe officers can deviate from orders when there is substantial change but you also believe that Benteen could chose to obey an order and go wherever he decided. The trust of the argument was disdain for those who conclude that Custer's last order intended that Benteen follow Custer East of the river. It is an amusing position for students to adopt and entirely silly. Custer's intentions are known from participants. Custer intended Benteen to support Reno's fight in the valley. Custer intended to be in the valley and Reno charged out of the valley into a river. Reno did not wait for his support. Benteen did not aarive in time to support Reno and did not himself open an attack in the valley. Because Custer was in command, Reno and Benteen were there to follow orders. Reno was not under pressure in the timber, and was told he would be supported. In charving the river rather than wait for his support, Reno disobeyed his orders. He was not under pressure in an excellent defensive position and with Benteen nearby and RAPIDLY closing. Reno should be dug up again, if they got the right body for reburial, and shot. Then they should hang him from a tree in the timber until he learns not to run away. Reno and Benteen both specifically disobeyed orders issued by Custer in battle and under fire in Reni's case and avoiding it in Benteen's. A sad and sorry performance lacking grit and those round things. They were hardly going to wander about trumpeting having disobeyed their orders. Were they. If Benteen believed that Custer was in the valley then he would be going to Custer. That is the way that I read what you posted: "There I saw an engagement going on, and supposed it was the whole regiment. " Regards Benteeneast A very well practiced anti Indian tactic was circling wagons. The concept was and is age old and afapyed into military practice on the Plains with mobile irregular skirmish lines. At LBH Reno abandoned a defensive position which influenced the battle and which was being reinforced, and fled in panic into a river. Those who belive and consyruct the affair as a planned move to the hill upon which his command found itself, do the dane majority great injustice and should be seen as foolish with such incompetance. Virtually an entire company were left behind. Dozens were killed from behind or dragged down from their mount. Three officers lost their lives because of rank incompetance.
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shaw
Full Member
Posts: 187
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Post by shaw on Nov 29, 2015 16:34:52 GMT -6
I have always felt that if I had the choice, Custer would not be the one I would want to follow into battle. I can add, for what it is worth, if I were expecting support, Reno and Benteen would not be the ones I would want leading those troops either. Weir, for all of his issues, had one thing in mind when he reached Reno hill which was to continue moving forward to find Custer. The fact that it was already too late was another issue. The leadership of the 7th was badly flawed. They were not cowards or men wishing their commander an early grave. But they were not a unified command either in mind or in body. Custer allowed divisions in the command and social structure. He had his favorites and for the most part those are the ones he took with him (C,E,F,I,L). They paid the ultimate price for that relationship. Weir got left behind. He got to live and kill himself by drinking himself to death.
Of course Custer never thought of defeat, but if I were heading into battle I'd want my other units headed up by men I could count on instead of officers who basically hated me.
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 29, 2015 16:51:36 GMT -6
Shaw, I want a leader that communicates, if everybody is on the plan, the plan has a chance. Weir was a loose cannon.
Regards, Tom
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Post by magpie on Nov 29, 2015 18:39:10 GMT -6
I think this should be simple math. Reno had 3 companies and initially the entire Indian force against him. Without someone starting another front somewhere he had no chance. Custer without any or any significant local firing could follow the whole Reno engagement by sound. Custer had 5 companies, he chose to wait and when his turn arrived he with his 5 companies died and failed to make any impression. So as Benteen said: " what was Reno to do with 3 that Custer was unable to do with 5".
One of the most significant strategies of nature is to fein a broken wing and draw a predator from the nest. Reno unwittingly did that and Custer's actions still produced disaster. If Reno died in place he likely would have produced no more of a diversion than retreating did. At one point Herosrest quoted Sheridan as saying Reno had a ten feet deep parapet to place his soldiers on. What were these guys to stand on? They are not 12 feet tall. Reno stated he would have to put the men on a line outside the outer circumference of the timber as he could not place them in it {that they could not fire from within it}. Reno also said the spacing would be well beyond supporting range. Reno challanged an RCOI witness to debate this. No one did. I take from this no one could because it was the truth. Girard said the Indians were already on the brow {flanking} before the retreat. Indians do not normally attack positions that are difficult to take and we have many Indians saying they were going to take Reno's position just as Reno withdrew. The Indians agreed with Reno that the position could not be held.
I think too much is made of the testimony of men that were essentially deserters. Girard {a civilian still hoping to employed by the Army at ten to twenty times the wages of the times}, Derudio {who could face a firing squad} and the one Sargent also at risk of a charge of desertion. Their best strategy was to put the blame on Reno by what ever means and in this they were very successful.
Humans are flawed. I don't think any of theses men were cowards. I think one of the most courageous things a soldier does is to accept the chain of command with all it's flaws and flawed individuals and thereby risk their lives. Situation Normal All F#$&ED UP. I think to be with Custer a subordinant Officer was like being the fourth crewman on Star Track One. It would be better to be in a less celibrated unit.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 30, 2015 7:48:06 GMT -6
HR You seem to have things backward. You don't believe officers can deviate from orders when there is substantial change but you also believe that Benteen could chose to obey an order and go wherever he decided. The trust of the argument was disdain for those who conclude that Custer's last order intended that Benteen follow Custer East of the river. It is an amusing position for students to adopt and entirely silly. Custer's intentions are known from participants. Custer intended Benteen to support Reno's fight in the valley. Custer intended to be in the valley and Reno charged out of the valley into a river. Reno did not wait for his support. Benteen did not aarive in time to support Reno and did not himself open an attack in the valley. Because Custer was in command, Reno and Benteen were there to follow orders. Reno was not under pressure in the timber, and was told he would be supported. In charving the river rather than wait for his support, Reno disobeyed his orders. He was not under pressure in an excellent defensive position and with Benteen nearby and RAPIDLY closing. Reno should be dug up again, if they got the right body for reburial, and shot. Then they should hang him from a tree in the timber until he learns not to run away. Reno and Benteen both specifically disobeyed orders issued by Custer in battle and under fire in Reni's case and avoiding it in Benteen's. A sad and sorry performance lacking grit and those round things. They were hardly going to wander about trumpeting having disobeyed their orders. Were they. If Benteen believed that Custer was in the valley then he would be going to Custer. That is the way that I read what you posted: "There I saw an engagement going on, and supposed it was the whole regiment. " Regards AZ Ranger A very well practiced anti Indian tactic was circling wagons. The concept was and is age old and afapyed into military practice on the Plains with mobile irregular skirmish lines. At LBH Reno abandoned a defensive position which influenced the battle and which was being reinforced, and fled in panic into a river. Those who belive and consyruct the affair as a planned move to the hill upon which his command found itself, do the dane majority great injustice and should be seen as foolish with such incompetance. Virtually an entire company were left behind. Dozens were killed from behind or dragged down from their mount. Three officers lost their lives because of rank incompetance. If you read Whitaker's Volunteer Cavalry you will see that it was common practice to stay on a skirmish line and then run to the horses and mount up. I think French did exactly that.
I think you believe that if you state it enough that U.S. officers do not have the ability and in some cases an obligation to disobey an order. Part of making the best available decision would include the reason for making that decision even if it were a disobedience of an order.
Why are you trying to argue a fact.
I don't know how many heroes there are in retreats/retrogrades. Chesty Puller comes to mind but in general they are not the kinds of action that promotes heroes. Custer retreated from Indians at the Washita and on a Yellowstone expedition. I would guess those that survived with him appreciated his decision making. Some believed leaving Major Elliot behind was not a good thing.
I think you assume that Reno was ordered into the timber without a source for that order. I would like you to define what you believe was within Reno's choices when he got close to the village according to the order.
For example was there a speed element in the order?
Was there a bring them to battle element in the order?
Was Reno prevented from charging into the village in the order?
Could Reno charge and come out the other side or on the bluffs where the horses were located?
I think that Custer never ordered Reno to go into the timber at distance greater than the weapons could deliver accurate fire. That location would not prevent the Indians from moving south. That location would not slow the Indians from bring in the horses and preparing to fight and/or leave.
Somehow Reno's error (in my opinion) in moving the horses to the timber with the ammunition at a distance to far to do anything that Terry ordered in regards to a southern movement has now become what Custer ordered. I think if Reno was in the timber with open fields of fire into the village you might have a better point. To many Indians forced him to go on defense before he completed a successful offensive action as ordered. The dismount and skirmish line would have set up Custer to move to left and flank the village. Instead the horses were allowed to be driven into the village. Crazy Horse was given the time he needed to prepare for battle. The interior lines of movement were left open to the Indians.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Nov 30, 2015 7:56:10 GMT -6
I have always felt that if I had the choice, Custer would not be the one I would want to follow into battle. I can add, for what it is worth, if I were expecting support, Reno and Benteen would not be the ones I would want leading those troops either. Weir, for all of his issues, had one thing in mind when he reached Reno hill which was to continue moving forward to find Custer. The fact that it was already too late was another issue. The leadership of the 7th was badly flawed. They were not cowards or men wishing their commander an early grave. But they were not a unified command either in mind or in body. Custer allowed divisions in the command and social structure. He had his favorites and for the most part those are the ones he took with him (C,E,F,I,L). They paid the ultimate price for that relationship. Weir got left behind. He got to live and kill himself by drinking himself to death. Of course Custer never thought of defeat, but if I were heading into battle I'd want my other units headed up by men I could count on instead of officers who basically hated me. I have a little different take on Weir. He was disruptive but not overly brave. In Reno Creek Benteen caught him from behind. I view this as he had his horses watered and was impatient with others allowing thier horses to water. All horses needed to watered and Weir was wrong. When he rode off I believe it was see what was going but not to participate. I think someone should have been sent where Weir rode. Observations from there would be useful. That he stayed there and allowed Edgerly to lead the company in harms way indicates to me he was not attempting to go to Custer. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by magpie on Nov 30, 2015 10:04:55 GMT -6
HR provides a significant service to both boards by posting links to the huge amount of material he has researched. I would not want to discourage him from continuing. So far I have never seen HR cough up the underpinnings of his belief in Custer as a Genius. It is a belief that we might remember Theodore Roosevelt cautioned Curtis to dare not challenge. I guess we on this side of the board are of a more scientific leaning. I looked at Maguire's report as published in 1876/77 and can't see or find HR's timing perception. HR recently posted Terry's telegram report and I didn't notice anything there. There are so many editions of everything but I think it comes down to perception.
Belief is such a powerful and irrational thing and it colors everything. We have as a society been taken through a recent "The King is Naked" scenario when our George Bush Junior took us to war in Iraq, a mistake that backfired, destabilized the entire region and one we continue to suffer from as the Iraqi people have. I don't see the Custer pop icon any differently.
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Post by magpie on Nov 30, 2015 13:04:04 GMT -6
Hero, You joke around a lot. Are you being funny here, or just irrational and wrong? Let's look at your theory, since it is a main theme of the lunatic/mindset board. The theory is that the Benteen and McDougal battalions were ordered to enter the valley and support Reno. From 3411 LTC Custer saw 900 Indians sweep around the Reno battalion open left flank. So he knew the trailing battalions would have to defeat these 900 Indians to reach Reno. Never mind the several hundred additional Indians still between Reno and the village, or in the village. This means the main battle against the Indian main body will be fought in the valley between Ford A and the Reno skirmish line. This also means whatever LTC Custer is doing in the empty badlands east of the village, he intends to do it with his 5 companies, with no support, coordination, command and control with the other 7 companies and detachments. If you so desire, I can analyze this theory. But this is a straw man argument. I have a part time job as a second reader on grad school theses, and I would not allow such an argument to be used. It fails the common sense test. If you or anyone truly believes this theory, I will discuss it. But if you are just joking around, please be a little clearer in letting us know that. I joke around a lot, and I try to be clear when I do so. Respectfully, William Herosrest posted on this tread on Nov 8, 2015 at 7:58 what I would say is his most complete, serious and clear idea of where he really stands. If you add to that his belief that Custer was a Genius ( something up his sleeve that would make this mess work if only Reno sacrificed his whole command) you have his position. I think the position flies in the face of reality: 1.) If Reno continued the mounted charge his whole command would end up in a trench and we know from World War One just how effective a trench is (ten million lives thrown away testing the theory) or 2.) If Reno goes into the Timber and holes up and we know from World War Two that such a force can be isolated and bypassed as AZ ranger points out. Actually Reno's orders were to attack at the pace Reno felt prudent and because Reno's dismounted skirmish line continued to advance (100 yards or is it 100 feet) he fulfilled that despite HR's protests. He still had the ditch to his front and the Indian mounted flankers to his rear and 1/3 of his ammo gone. Leaves one with Benteen's analysis it would make no difference what Reno does at that point. HR's idea Benteen was to commit to the Valley has no basis as Custer's soon to be received message makes clear Custer's intention that Benteen is to protect and bring up the packs. The Indians saw Benteen anyway and is why many gave up the chase of Reno. Benteen could not have Forded and got to Reno in time to effect the out come as Fred points out. Reno would be unable to see him fording and unaware support was coming. Custer burned through his Calvary horses endurance, at least 5 falling out as he reached the top of the ridge. He was coming as fast as was possible. It seems only logical that he was intent on striking the Village simultaneous to Reno. For me I have all these folks of various back grounds deciding that going the extra mile somewhat blind around and down Cedar Coulee is better than the direct route. The direct route being Martin's ravine, where you have 2-4 mile visibility and can still screen your forces from view. I don't understand Quincannon's view coming down Martini's ravine was a bad idea. Martini and the Crow's seem to agree on the near route where they don't on when Custer actually left Weir. What is Weir though? is it the hill top, the point or the whole hill from Medicine Tail to the top of the "peak". Did Custer lounge on Weir Point or Boyer's? Some of the Indians that did disengage from Reno said there was no room for them to fight at the Custer end. Reno is a man that no one liked seem's just a convenient scape goat for anyone worrying about popular pro Custer sentiment ( Sheridan to Teddy Roosevelt ).
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Post by AZ Ranger on Dec 1, 2015 5:52:48 GMT -6
I think HR digs up lots of interesting links. I differ with his opinion formed after looking at the facts, testimony, and accounts. I have no particular issue with HR. Since this is the timber area location thread what information do you have HR regarding the location?
Pitsch or Vaughn?
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by herosrest on Jul 15, 2016 12:04:19 GMT -6
Hero, You joke around a lot. Are you being funny here, or just irrational and wrong? Let's look at your theory, since it is a main theme of the lunatic/mindset board. The theory is that the Benteen and McDougal battalions were ordered to enter the valley and support Reno. From 3411 LTC Custer saw 900 Indians sweep around the Reno battalion open left flank. So he knew the trailing battalions would have to defeat these 900 Indians to reach Reno. Never mind the several hundred additional Indians still between Reno and the village, or in the village. This means the main battle against the Indian main body will be fought in the valley between Ford A and the Reno skirmish line. This also means whatever LTC Custer is doing in the empty badlands east of the village, he intends to do it with his 5 companies, with no support, coordination, command and control with the other 7 companies and detachments. If you so desire, I can analyze this theory. But this is a straw man argument. I have a part time job as a second reader on grad school theses, and I would not allow such an argument to be used. It fails the common sense test. If you or anyone truly believes this theory, I will discuss it. But if you are just joking around, please be a little clearer in letting us know that. I joke around a lot, and I try to be clear when I do so. Respectfully, William Herosrest posted on this tread on Nov 8, 2015 at 7:58 what I would say is his most complete, serious and clear idea of where he really stands. If you add to that his belief that Custer was a Genius ( something up his sleeve that would make this mess work if only Reno sacrificed his whole command) you have his position. I think the position flies in the face of reality: 1.) If Reno continued the mounted charge his whole command would end up in a trench and we know from World War One just how effective a trench is (ten million lives thrown away testing the theory) or 2.) If Reno goes into the Timber and holes up and we know from World War Two that such a force can be isolated and bypassed as AZ ranger points out. Actually Reno's orders were to attack at the pace Reno felt prudent and because Reno's dismounted skirmish line continued to advance (100 yards or is it 100 feet) he fulfilled that despite HR's protests. He still had the ditch to his front and the Indian mounted flankers to his rear and 1/3 of his ammo gone. Leaves one with Benteen's analysis it would make no difference what Reno does at that point. HR's idea Benteen was to commit to the Valley has no basis as Custer's soon to be received message makes clear Custer's intention that Benteen is to protect and bring up the packs. The Indians saw Benteen anyway and is why many gave up the chase of Reno. Benteen could not have Forded and got to Reno in time to effect the out come as Fred points out. Reno would be unable to see him fording and unaware support was coming. Custer burned through his Calvary horses endurance, at least 5 falling out as he reached the top of the ridge. He was coming as fast as was possible. It seems only logical that he was intent on striking the Village simultaneous to Reno. For me I have all these folks of various back grounds deciding that going the extra mile somewhat blind around and down Cedar Coulee is better than the direct route. The direct route being Martin's ravine, where you have 2-4 mile visibility and can still screen your forces from view. I don't understand Quincannon's view coming down Martini's ravine was a bad idea. Martini and the Crow's seem to agree on the near route where they don't on when Custer actually left Weir. What is Weir though? is it the hill top, the point or the whole hill from Medicine Tail to the top of the "peak". Did Custer lounge on Weir Point or Boyer's? Some of the Indians that did disengage from Reno said there was no room for them to fight at the Custer end. Reno is a man that no one liked seem's just a convenient scape goat for anyone worrying about popular pro Custer sentiment ( Sheridan to Teddy Roosevelt ). Succinctly, Custer did not see 900 odd hostiles from 'G' on Benteen's map, which may or may not be 3,411. There is slack evidence (from Curley to Camp) that a later observation was made by Custer from the bluffs before rejoining his command. Camp was aware that Curley was not accurate in assigning event terrain, as for example the giving of the Lone tepee location near the White Buttes. (Curley generalised into an accurate enough area). His recollections of events were not found to be wanting, by Camp. There is useful research data linked here from W.M. Camp's research. So, anyway, Custer did not see the large numbers of hostiles who Benteen reported seeing from the bluffs, when Custer would have been viewing the valley with its rising dust and Reno marching down it. A broad vein of opinion was/is that the guy expected the village to run, saw that it was not when he viewed from the bluffs through DeRudio's field glasses.. What Peter Thompson reported as the state of play, occurred after the companies had moved out of his sight and over the ridge ahead on the bluffs. We know from Curley that the command rode down the west flank of the ridge to reach Medicine Tale Coulee and this is corroborated by participants such as John Two Moon who saw it. He either saw the cavalry coming ahead at the lope from Weir's Point area terrain, or from the Luce/Blummer area because cavalry moving into Medicine Tale from the modern idea of Cedar Coulee, would not be able to be seen by JTM, where ever they were in the coulee. He saw them at the lope coming down the big hill to the east with hostiles in pursuit. Put another way, JTM saw the companies on a big hill to the east and not in a coulee east of the donut ridge. So, Custer was not aware specifically of 900 hostiles confronting Reno. There were not 900 in active opposition when Reno began to FoF. Hostile strength gathered (accumulated on the Mesa, 500 yards or so from the river, circled down the valley and tried to get at the held horses to the rear. Interestingly, Maguire only stated that an officer (present) indicated to him the location of the skirmish line. That officer was Benteen, indicating where 'he' saw, quote: ' twelve or fifteen dismounted men were fighting on the plain with Indians charging and recharging them. The body numbered about 900 at this time. Colonel Reno's mounted party were retiring across the river to the bluffs. ' The 900 hostiles existed (according to Benteen) at the time when Reno was 'out of there' and charging into the river with a half a company (troop) left behind on foot. There is a good analysis here by Two Views and it is very worthwhile to study the account by Red Bear in the Ree narratives which Bede and Libby devoted to posterity. So, Custer was not aware specifically of 900 hostiles confronting Reno or that Reno dismounted, at the time that the grey horse troops were seen by Varnum as they went up a little dip to the west side of the riidge to be seen by John Two Moon. As I may have said, when Custer sent Trumpeter Martin back from Medicine Tail Coule on his roan sorrel mount, Custer intended to cross the river and attack in the valley. We know this from Martin. We know from Martin that Custer had moved downriver beyond Medicine Tale Coulee whilst Reno was still fighting in the valley. Thus, Custer sent Benteen quickly to support Reno. That is, Benteen was sent quickly to go and join the fight in the valley at the Big Village where Reno had been sent. There is interesting discombobulation as to whether Reno actually stated he was to attack the village or not. Quite usual, of course. It is your wonderful self who fails the test, i'm afraid such is life. Context and insight, is everything and understanding timing is usually rather helpful. Please do click link and enjoy true excellence. Now we grist with the real howling wolf of this battle. Benteen did not wait for the pack train because he was not ordered to. The note carried by Martin states, 'B bring Pacs', and the fact that Benteen changed his interpretation after the fact, July 4th, simply goes to show what a sly old dog he was. For better or worse, as anyone and Benteen understood, the hostiles would have to go through him to get at the supplies and Company B. B bring Pacs. It's very simple and quite correct. A very good description of the timber fight location was given by the Montana Column's engineering officer in his report to the Chief of Engineers, the location having been pointed out to him by Wallace, as they rode past it, on 27th June and as Wallace stated that the last that was known of Custer was seeing him galloping along the bluffs. This was before the news of the massacre reached 7th Cavalry. It is a very interesting report. Almost immediately after the arrival of Terry, Reno began lying to him about what happened on the bluffs certainly and probably about everything. We will never know if Custer could have won with better support but did learn that Reno and Benteen could not. Thank you for the motivation. Regards Bill The dropout of mounts from Custer's march which you enthuse, is 2% and across the regiment is insignificant. In regards your view that - This means the main battle against the Indian main body will be fought in the valley between Ford A and the Reno skirmish line. This is not so, since Custer intended to attack, Benteen was sent to the village and the pacs would also arrive, with the written order countermanding that carried by Sgt. Kanipe. Custer intended to concentrate his fighting strength in attack in the valley. We do not know why the five companies did not cross the river. We do know why they retreated from it.
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Post by edavids on Jul 15, 2016 13:01:18 GMT -6
BS PhD-Bullshit piles higher and deeper.
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