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Post by Beth on Sept 24, 2015 18:19:48 GMT -6
May I suggest that you clear your mind and take look fresh at the battle. Don't try to make it fit into the Washita model because it won't fit. Besides every battle is different and deserves to be viewed on it's own merits.
There is a school of the thought that Custer was trying to capture the women and children but it may or may not be true, we don't know. He might have been just trying to find the north end of the village or a place to attack on the flank, or even a way to get down off the bluffs without coming out in the middle of the village.
Custer did divide his forces though. Benteen was sent off one way, Reno was sent into the valley. I am not great at remembering the names of places and who was deployed without a source in front of me but Custer deployed several companies towards what is now Calhoun Hill and Battle Ridge (Calhoun, Keogh and I?). I believe another company was deployed to cemetery ridge while Custer road on to what is called Ford D. So Custer did divide up his forces into groups that were then too far apart to support each other and too small to handle the forces that he faced. (As always corrections are welcomed)
Personally and this is JMHO, but even if Custer was attempting to get around the north end of the village to capture the noncombatants, there is no proof it would have worked. The circumstances between the two battles are so different. In Washita, Custer took hostages from the village he had already attacked so he could make his escape from the warriors from a larger nearby village. Even if Custer had been able to take a few noncombatants hostage around Ford D, there isn't any proof that so many NA would suddenly stop in their tracks and stop fighting.
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Post by fred on Sept 24, 2015 18:34:25 GMT -6
I still hope someone can explain to me how Custer thought he was going to pull this off and why so many of you believe he'd further divide his forces and attempt to take an even bigger bite out of the Indians. Because he completely underestimated his enemy, both in strength and intentions!!! This is a very common military error and Custer fell right into it. His constant division of his command is accentuated on his own battlefield: it is there for all but the blindered to see. The stupid, imbecilic morons on the other boards can't figure it out, but there it is. He would do that if he were under no pressure and he thought he had them. Even Kanipe reported that's what Custer said near 3,411 and his actions reflect it. Indian accounts say the same damn thing: he was under no pressure until less than an hour before his last man died. Simple, simple, simple!!!!Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by magpie on Sept 25, 2015 8:26:48 GMT -6
I still hope someone can explain to me how Custer thought he was going to pull this off and why so many of you believe he'd further divide his forces and attempt to take an even bigger bite out of the Indians. Because he completely underestimated his enemy, both in strength and intentions!!! This is a very common military error and Custer fell right into it. His constant division of his command is accentuated on his own battlefield: it is there for all but the blindered to see. The stupid, imbecilic morons on the other boards can't figure it out, but there it is. He would do that if he were under no pressure and he thought he had them. Even Kanipe reported that's what Custer said near 3,411 and his actions reflect it. Indian accounts say the same damn thing: he was under no pressure until less than an hour before his last man died. Simple, simple, simple!!!!Best wishes, Fred. I missed seeing/finding Indian accounts about the lack of pressure up to last hour and would like to read. I have painfully read Fox's (93) and have a very dim view of it except the physical findings. My greatest criticisms have to do with the fact 72 horses and 200 men riddled with bullets that they received elsewhere decaying onto the field and the other has to do with the invention of the recon unit moving far to the North. A lot of other physical findings have more than one explanation if I take a battle field full of celebrating Indians, shot up horses and saddlebags, firewater and Indians being Indians ( loading and testing their new weapons and shooting corpses). Then you have the trails of Bradley and other troops, mail carriers, Indians gathering and driving herds of loose shod calvary mounts. So I'm sorry If someone sees a track, sees a trail, sees some unspent shells or finds a pile of spent ones: I take it with a grain of salt. What I lack is a knowledge of the tactics of these mounted infantry. I see drawing after drawing by Indians of them coming behind the mostly already wounded soldier's column and killing them with predominantly war clubs, arrows and spears. Out of all I see only one faded buffalo hide with men on foot fighting. I note a few things more the bulk of Custer's forces align the tops of ridges. One of the combat experienced guys pointed out the danger of running in unscouted territory was you could top a hill, find a hole filled with a whole lot of Indians waiting in ambush so ridge running avoids that. However ridge running allows your enemy to envelope you and fire across and down your line without danger of hitting their own on the other side. This fact was brought out by officers testifying at the RCOI especially in regard to last stand hill. Defendable flat top high ground is hard to come by. Reno found one with a depression and Sheridan found a flat one. I also note Keogh was rumored (RCOI by unnamed Crow scouts to unnamed soldiers on Reno's hill) to be hit early in the fight and there are other descriptions that he had been hit in the knee and Comanche, his horse, was wounded in that position (Keogh's knee) too. One would expect extreme pain and blood loss so he fell back, his two Sergeants trying to keep him safe, keep him mounted and moving. Keogh was I troop, so was Korn. I troop led into the river at Ford B and were shot up and retreated leaving 4 on the West bank, some floating down the river and the rest riding wounded. Korn with his runaway horse runs through the village jumps Reno's ditch (amazing Korn as it's the limits of a horses jumping ability), crosses the river and runs up to Reno's hill. So this is the scenario I see but just because I can connect some dots to make a pretty good picture it doesn't necessarily make it real. I am not a Custer fan, my cousin really isn't either but his position is not to be taken lightly that Custer was a capable commander even if he wasn't the best. What seems to be suggested is he was a lunatic or a moron. So I believe a better explanation needs to be found for his actions that day. Everyone have him making too many mistakes ( especially continuing to split his men into smaller and smaller disjointed groups ), so many mistakes there is a loss of plausibility. I look at Fox's (93) Fig 6-8 on page 76, The distribution of marble markers, and see lines of retreat matching the Indian drawings of the combat and maybe an attempted rear guard action by Calhoun but smashed producing unhorsed men fleeing down Calhoun Coulee ( or perhaps they are sent there to make the box {read on}) and the Indians continuing up the tail of the column applying flank fire down the length of the column with their winchesters leveled across the pomels of their saddles, bowmen flankers lobbing arrows over the Indian rifleman flankers and into the troopers while mounted coup counters bludgeon the straggling wounded men and horses to death from behind at the tail of this 3/4 of a mile column. The buffalo hunt is on: Yea Ha. All this is consistent with the Indian drawings. Custer is at the lead of this 3/4 of a mile column, tops the hill see's Crazy Horse coming and stops. A box is whats called for in this situation, we have 5 dead horses tied together at Custer's hill so we know horse holders of the forward units were are on that hill. Looking at Fox's map I see all lines form a box. The boxes perimeter is 2 miles or 3,500 yards. I have/had 220 men that's 16 yards to a man. Not ideal, but things are happening way to fast. I also notice the box has a low spot in the middle this is looking good. If I was a more flexible commander I could make a triangle and enclose that low spot and have my troops 10 yards apart but frankly there was no time. Only the head of the column had enough time to achieve any order and form one of the 4 lines (box) that we need to survive. The rest were shot to hell and pulled of their horses before forming. Crazy Horse tells his followers to watch the smoke from their guns and gallops down the skirmish line 3 times. The Indians now know the position of every trooper on the skirmish line and move in. All over in the time it takes a hungry Indian to eat his super and not enough time to put the box defense into play. The above gives Custer credibility and still fits (I think) the evidence rather well but perhaps I have connected the "wrong" dots.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 25, 2015 11:09:43 GMT -6
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Post by Beth on Sept 25, 2015 12:22:24 GMT -6
Magpie I think that is a unique view about what may have happened
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Post by wild on Sept 26, 2015 3:34:45 GMT -6
Hi Magpie I was with you all the way until this box thingy.... The boxes perimeter is 2 miles or 3,500 yards Reno had twice the number of men and held a perimeter of approx 1000 yards. Troops spread at the intervals you suggest with manually operated single shot carbines could not produce the rate of fire nessary to stop a girl scout picnic . Cheers
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Post by wild on Sept 26, 2015 4:00:42 GMT -6
As per Magpie I still hope someone can explain to me how Custer thought he was going to pull this off and why so many of you believe he'd further divide his forces and attempt to take an even bigger bite out of the Indians
As per Fred Because he completely underestimated his enemy, both in strength and intentions!!!
You cannot assume a blunder [ completely underestimated his enemy] to support an assumption [the further splitting of his command] The blunder suggested goes against all intell reaching Custer . Custer is in fact a witness ; are we saying he does not believe his own eyes and the advice of his senior officers? Custer is the most important witness in the battle. If he is mistaken what about all the other accounts? Cheers
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Post by magpie on Sept 26, 2015 7:21:16 GMT -6
Hi Magpie I was with you all the way until this box thingy.... The boxes perimeter is 2 miles or 3,500 yardsReno had twice the number of men and held a perimeter of approx 1000 yards. Troops spread at the intervals you suggest with manually operated single shot carbines could not produce the rate of fire nessary to stop a girl scout picnic . Cheers Thank's for reading and your comments. I am very much aware Reno chose not to hold the "glade" in the "timber" because he couldn't obtain 5 yard spacing with the men he had (120 [-]). Here you have a very difficult situation your being chased by Gall's force from behind and you see Crazy Horse coming up to your front. You are a combat hardened and proven( except once in the CW none other than Reno and colleagues had to pull your sorry @#$ out of the coals ) commander (maybe not the best soldier but the quickest) and according to Sergeant Wintroph (spelling) of H troop (Benteen's) you used a box defense successfully within the last 2 years. You have the ground under your feet that's it. Your Realestate shopping days (seconds) are over and your frustrated agent Mitch Boyer tells you now or never. Benteen has yet to arrive. So you glance around tis all the time you have you notice a ridge running between Custer Hill and the deep part of deep ravine and from that end a ridge runs to Calhoun Hill and from Calhoun to Custer Hill a ridge (Custer Ridge) your already on. This is the only chance you got. What do you do? You could chase your tail and circle Indian style but you didn't go to Indian Westpoint. You also know that your not going to beat Indians (the finest calvary in the world) horse to horse and that's why the army decided to convert you to a mounted infantry. Take a look at that triangle and decide what your going to do. Thank you for your time and consideration; Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 26, 2015 8:07:06 GMT -6
Because he completely underestimated his enemy, both in strength and intentions!!! This is a very common military error and Custer fell right into it. His constant division of his command is accentuated on his own battlefield: it is there for all but the blindered to see. The stupid, imbecilic morons on the other boards can't figure it out, but there it is. He would do that if he were under no pressure and he thought he had them. Even Kanipe reported that's what Custer said near 3,411 and his actions reflect it. Indian accounts say the same damn thing: he was under no pressure until less than an hour before his last man died. Simple, simple, simple!!!!Best wishes, Fred. I missed seeing/finding Indian accounts about the lack of pressure up to last hour and would like to read. I have painfully read Fox's (93) and have a very dim view of it except the physical findings. My greatest criticisms have to do with the fact 72 horses and 200 men riddled with bullets that they received elsewhere decaying onto the field and the other has to do with the invention of the recon unit moving far to the North. A lot of other physical findings have more than one explanation if I take a battle field full of celebrating Indians, shot up horses and saddlebags, firewater and Indians being Indians ( loading and testing their new weapons and shooting corpses). Then you have the trails of Bradley and other troops, mail carriers, Indians gathering and driving herds of loose shod calvary mounts. So I'm sorry If someone sees a track, sees a trail, sees some unspent shells or finds a pile of spent ones: I take it with a grain of salt. What I lack is a knowledge of the tactics of these mounted infantry. I see drawing after drawing by Indians of them coming behind the mostly already wounded soldier's column and killing them with predominantly war clubs, arrows and spears. Out of all I see only one faded buffalo hide with men on foot fighting. I note a few things more the bulk of Custer's forces align the tops of ridges. One of the combat experienced guys pointed out the danger of running in unscouted territory was you could top a hill, find a hole filled with a whole lot of Indians waiting in ambush so ridge running avoids that. However ridge running allows your enemy to envelope you and fire across and down your line without danger of hitting their own on the other side. This fact was brought out by officers testifying at the RCOI especially in regard to last stand hill. Defendable flat top high ground is hard to come by. Reno found one with a depression and Sheridan found a flat one. I also note Keogh was rumored (RCOI by unnamed Crow scouts to unnamed soldiers on Reno's hill) to be hit early in the fight and there are other descriptions that he had been hit in the knee and Comanche, his horse, was wounded in that position (Keogh's knee) too. One would expect extreme pain and blood loss so he fell back, his two Sergeants trying to keep him safe, keep him mounted and moving. Keogh was I troop, so was Korn. I troop led into the river at Ford B and were shot up and retreated leaving 4 on the West bank, some floating down the river and the rest riding wounded. Korn with his runaway horse runs through the village jumps Reno's ditch (amazing Korn as it's the limits of a horses jumping ability), crosses the river and runs up to Reno's hill. So this is the scenario I see but just because I can connect some dots to make a pretty good picture it doesn't necessarily make it real. I am not a Custer fan, my cousin really isn't either but his position is not to be taken lightly that Custer was a capable commander even if he wasn't the best. What seems to be suggested is he was a lunatic or a moron. So I believe a better explanation needs to be found for his actions that day. Everyone have him making too many mistakes ( especially continuing to split his men into smaller and smaller disjointed groups ), so many mistakes there is a loss of plausibility. I look at Fox's (93) Fig 6-8 on page 76, The distribution of marble markers, and see lines of retreat matching the Indian drawings of the combat and maybe an attempted rear guard action by Calhoun but smashed producing unhorsed men fleeing down Calhoun Coulee ( or perhaps they are sent there to make the box {read on}) and the Indians continuing up the tail of the column applying flank fire down the length of the column with their winchesters leveled across the pomels of their saddles, bowmen flankers lobbing arrows over the Indian rifleman flankers and into the troopers while mounted coup counters bludgeon the straggling wounded men and horses to death from behind at the tail of this 3/4 of a mile column. The buffalo hunt is on: Yea Ha. All this is consistent with the Indian drawings. Custer is at the lead of this 3/4 of a mile column, tops the hill see's Crazy Horse coming and stops. A box is whats called for in this situation, we have 5 dead horses tied together at Custer's hill so we know horse holders of the forward units were are on that hill. Looking at Fox's map I see all lines form a box. The boxes perimeter is 2 miles or 3,500 yards. I have/had 220 men that's 16 yards to a man. Not ideal, but things are happening way to fast. I also notice the box has a low spot in the middle this is looking good. If I was a more flexible commander I could make a triangle and enclose that low spot and have my troops 10 yards apart but frankly there was no time. Only the head of the column had enough time to achieve any order and form one of the 4 lines (box) that we need to survive. The rest were shot to hell and pulled of their horses before forming. Crazy Horse tells his followers to watch the smoke from their guns and gallops down the skirmish line 3 times. The Indians now know the position of every trooper on the skirmish line and move in. All over in the time it takes a hungry Indian to eat his super and not enough time to put the box defense into play. The above gives Custer credibility and still fits (I think) the evidence rather well but perhaps I have connected the "wrong" dots. Sorry for not reading the whole post but the first paragraph caught my attention. Indian accounts if it is what they saw begins not on Custer's timeline but when the make their first observation. That is part of the hard work that Fred had to contend with. If Custer moves around for two hours and the Indian account is for a short period of time less than an hour than you have to accept Custer was moving without this Indians observation or close contact. If you're going to present contrary explanations on bullets on the field I would like to hear them. The angle of the bullet in the ground would be important. The bullets were less likely to have been removed. No one claims this is an uncontaminated location. The list of finds includes .223 so they are not withholding artifact discoveries. This is not a criminal case so finding artifacts consistent with a theory is sufficient in my opinion. The lack of artifacts could depend on location. I would not expect to find many surface artifacts of significance on LSH. As far as the markers at best the represent where some troopers were buried. There are a lot of spurious markers on the battlefield which represent the Army putting them where no body was found just because they could not put them on the reservation land in the valley. On Reno Hill you will see a grouping of Indian scout markers that look like a hedgehog formation. They didn't die there. I am not sure that I would take formation based up markers. Would the Indians move the bodies? Would the burial detail move the bodies? Did the marker placement crew who was willing to put out spurious markers take care to get the real sites correct? Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by wild on Sept 26, 2015 8:15:10 GMT -6
Hi Tom
Thank's for reading and your comments. I am very much aware Reno chose not to hold the "glade" in the "timber" because he couldn't obtain 5 yard spacing with the men he had (120 [-]). No, the spacing had nothing to do with not holding the Glade. His problem was that the Indians were also in the timber with him .
If you spread your carbines over 2 miles you are committing suicide....you are strong nowhere and once the box is penetrated it's easy peesy to roll it up. The drill is to concentrate your carbines and having a system, to wit fire control you can at least extract a price from the Indians. Best Regards Richard
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 26, 2015 8:48:40 GMT -6
As per Magpie I still hope someone can explain to me how Custer thought he was going to pull this off and why so many of you believe he'd further divide his forces and attempt to take an even bigger bite out of the IndiansAs per Fred Because he completely underestimated his enemy, both in strength and intentions!!! You cannot assume a blunder [ completely underestimated his enemy] to support an assumption [ the further splitting of his command] The blunder suggested goes against all intell reaching Custer . Custer is in fact a witness ; are we saying he does not believe his own eyes and the advice of his senior officers? Custer is the most important witness in the battle. If he is mistaken what about all the other accounts? Cheers Richard My eyes were opened by reading a book called Blink at the recommendation of montrose. I firmly believe that we don't know what Custer saw and how he interpreted what he saw. We have to rely on what an officer should do based upon 1876 training and experience. Then put together what is here to work with and form your opinion. If you gather enough information and can write then write a book. If Custer's experience was that they would run and not fight that well then he was wrong. Maybe the truth is that in sufficient numbers and close to their families they weren't even thinking about running and they were to overconfident that someone would not be stupid enough to approach this large village. Regards Steve
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Post by magpie on Sept 26, 2015 9:11:55 GMT -6
As Benteen once said: "you have to do something". They are walking up your line from the rear. Indians without ROTC learned it's not important to aim but to shoot diagonally across the line in a criss-cross. Probably one bullet always got you at least one buffalo that way. Regardless, a bad decision is often better than no decision what's yours? And don't move the battle to the bottoms, you made your mistakes this is now the only field you own how are you going to survive.
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Post by wild on Sept 26, 2015 10:53:17 GMT -6
Hi Magpie I have difficulty with scenarios that involve tactical guano .[no disrespect ]We had a poster [maybe in the next parish]who suggested that Reno could have formed a square ond walked out of the valley . We had another character who suggested that cavalry horses were trained to dodge arrows . Now I think a box of 2 miles manned by 200+ men ,actually 150[ horse holders] would come close to trumping the above.
I think Custer was over run while trying to break contact with the Indians. Or put a less romantic way ;running for his life. Cavalry are useless if not dug in or charging. I think the Indians caught Custer in line astern and made short work of him. The gap between Custer and Keogh is not sufficently wide enough as to suggest an intentional seperation of the two wings. Cheers Richard
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Post by Beth on Sept 26, 2015 11:13:12 GMT -6
As far as the markers at best the represent where some troopers were buried. There are a lot of spurious markers on the battlefield which represent the Army putting them where no body was found just because they could not put them on the reservation land in the valley. On Reno Hill you will see a grouping of Indian scout markers that look like a hedgehog formation. They didn't die there. I am not sure that I would take formation based up markers. Would the Indians move the bodies? Would the burial detail move the bodies? Did the marker placement crew who was willing to put out spurious markers take care to get the real sites correct? Regards AZ Ranger Aren't some of the spurious markers ones that should have been located at Reno Hill and the valley but never made it there? I believe I read that they had x number of markers to place based the list of casualties but didn't know that some went to Reno Hill or the valley--as well as the missing in Deep Ravine so they did the best they could to placet the extra stones where they thought it made sense. Beth
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Post by magpie on Sept 26, 2015 11:35:25 GMT -6
Sorry for not reading the whole post but the first paragraph caught my attention. Indian accounts if it is what they saw begins not on Custer's timeline but when the make their first observation. That is part of the hard work that Fred had to contend with. If Custer moves around for two hours and the Indian account is for a short period of time less than an hour than you have to accept Custer was moving without this Indians observation or close contact. If you're going to present contrary explanations on bullets on the field I would like to hear them. The angle of the bullet in the ground would be important. The bullets were less likely to have been removed. No one claims this is an uncontaminated location. The list of finds includes .223 so they are not withholding artifact discoveries. This is not a criminal case so finding artifacts consistent with a theory is sufficient in my opinion. The lack of artifacts could depend on location. I would not expect to find many surface artifacts of significance on LSH. As far as the markers at best the represent where some troopers were buried. There are a lot of spurious markers on the battlefield which represent the Army putting them where no body was found just because they could not put them on the reservation land in the valley. On Reno Hill you will see a grouping of Indian scout markers that look like a hedgehog formation. They didn't die there. I am not sure that I would take formation based up markers. Would the Indians move the bodies? Would the burial detail move the bodies? Did the marker placement crew who was willing to put out spurious markers take care to get the real sites correct? Regards AZ Ranger Without a doubt I will have to read Fred's work first. To try to use the bullet evidence is very difficult I remember getting quite a headache with Fox's book as I uploaded in my brain all his and in the end besides application of proffesional Jargon I didn't see more than Bentteen's first opinion that it was a complete rout. He saw 68 US army horses and two Indian ponies dead on the field it adds up to exactly what the Indian drawings show. I know much of the marker controversy and know it runs from Fred Dustin to now and am not at odds with the possibilities. Having been asked to hand dig a trench in the "god foresaken high plains" I would expect my hardest ground to be the top of the ridge as that's why that ground is still there and didn't wash down the draw. Also my education tells me there is a law in nature that everything tends to move to randomness. So I have a column of 2's ( because if I have foursey my middle men can't shoot) running the top of the ridge and dropping like flies at the tail , being rolled up if you like, till the whole rear of the column is dead. Bodies falling off horses blurs the line a little. I then have Indians stripping the bodies ( there is an account of a saddled Indian reaching down, hauling a body up, stripping it and dumping it during combat). This action randomizes the layout yet a little more. I then have the mutilaters come along and that randomizes the lay out a little more. Then I have gut shooting target practice but that tends to fix the corpses location but spreads gut bacteria through out. I then have a "burriel" detail it won't take these guy's long to figure out when they disturb a body black oze that stinks to high heaven gets disturbed and gets on and sticks to everything and everybody. Pretty soon we are scraping up loose soil where ever we find it and pouring it over the corpse, out of site out of mind is a powerfull force. Then some time later a grave marking detail. Now if I am a lazy digger I am going to put every marker in the soft ground (sediment) at the bottom of a draw but that is not what happened so I think the marker detail did their job. So now 140 years later I look at Foxe's (93) survey of markers {page 76, Fig. 6-8} and a see very distinct lines. I look at satellite and topo and I see a triangle "palaside" of ridge top and triangle.
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