jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 28, 2015 10:45:12 GMT -6
I know various scenarios have been addressed but I was wondering what Custer should have done when he first realized the size of the force he was dealing with. It seems to me that the only proper course would have been to consolidate his force select a defensive position dig in and wait for reinforcements. I don't think he could simply have galloped off. Just a first impression don’t beat me up too bad if this sounds simplistic or erroneous I am looking for answers.
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Post by quincannon on May 28, 2015 11:06:15 GMT -6
Actually you are starting to think like a half assed tactician.
He has two major options, attack, and assume a temporary defensive posture as a prelude to resuming offensive operations.
Attack speaks for itself, leaving only the when, where, and how.
Assuming a temporary defense does not further campaign objectives UNLESS, the place chosen impedes or takes away an option from the enemy, and you force the enemy to withdraw in a direction you want them to, or force them to attack you, keeping in mind your inferior numbers, are no real deficiency in the defense, defense being the strongest form of combat.
If you were to chose this option, the thinking would be unconventional for that day, but it must be the right place. There is such a place, maybe more than one, but at least one, now your task is to identify that place, and outline your rational, actions and orders.
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 28, 2015 11:17:26 GMT -6
quincannon: I think I am getting use to your charm now. Custer was concerned I think that the Indians would take up stakes and leave (withdraw) but it was such a large host that unless it broke up into several groups the Indians could not have disappeared easily. I see no option for attack however once a defensive position was taken but that of course depends upon how the warriors would have reacted. I suspect they would have attacked and perhaps given up after a time. Water however would have been a big problem for Custer's forces if they took the high ground and I am not sure they could have held out long enough to obtain reinforcements. Seems like a quandary.
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Post by welshofficer on May 28, 2015 11:17:45 GMT -6
I know various scenarios have been addressed but I was wondering what Custer should have done when he first realized the size of the force he was dealing with. It seems to me that the only proper course would have been to consolidate his force select a defensive position dig in and wait for reinforcements. I don't think he could simply have galloped off. Just a first impression don’t beat me up too bad if this sounds simplistic or erroneous I am looking for answers. What were the operational objectives of the Centennial campaign.....?
When do you think GAC "first realised the size of the force he was dealing with"...?
WO
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Post by quincannon on May 28, 2015 11:27:42 GMT -6
If you came here expecting charm sunshine you came to the wrong place.
Now you have given me all the bullshit boiler plate, now give me substance. Answer the question I posed. If you do not have an answer say so and don't try to bullshit your way through it throwing cotton candy in my face. Crap or get off the pot. Read a map, form your concept, identify the position, and give me YOUR actions and orders. You want to swim with the sharks, then d**n it swim or get the hell out of the water.
You are not unlike all the amateurs,at least at first, thinking that all battles are won by firepower. More battles have been won over the centuries by maneuver and subsequent displacement, than have ever been decided by firepower.
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 28, 2015 12:38:16 GMT -6
Quincannon & welshofficer: I am not familiar enough with the Terrain to pick the ground and am not certain when Custer first became aware of the size of the force he was dealing with. I have read the books so long ago I am not sure but I believe he was informed before he split his forces. The operational objective was to locate the Indians so they could be forced on to reservations or failing that kill them.
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Post by quincannon on May 28, 2015 12:48:06 GMT -6
So what you are saying is that you are not prepared to swim with the sharks.
I addressed your current reading material on the sister thread.
Look at Appendix A of the Hatch book. He lists the five companies as the Custer battalion. He lists Tom Custer as being in physical command of C. Do you think there was one battalion or two battalions with Custer? Do you think Tom Custer was in physical command of C? Being under the impression the author gives you changes the complete dynamic of the battle. That is what we get to here, and people like Hatch hate us for it, because it exposed them as dim witted poltroons.
Can you read a topographical map? Unfamiliarity with terrain is no excuse. It is a weenie answer. I have been there once in my life. I eyeballed it enough to appreciate it, but it is in reading a map that you discern what can be done.
If you can't read a map you are wasting your time with anything military. You will never understand, what even the best lay out before you.
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Post by Colt45 on May 28, 2015 13:02:50 GMT -6
Jaguar, Custer's problems started before 25Jun76. He did not have good intelligence on the terrain he would operate over and very little intelligence on the strength of the enemy or its disposition. He had indications from his scouts that the village was in the valley of the LBH, but he didn't know exactly where. He should have had recon patrols (small in size) out in front well before he moved over the divide. Once he reached the point where he sent Reno into the valley to attack, he had not seen the village, didn't know exactly where it was, and sure as heck didn't know how large it was. His orders to Reno were to cross the river, attack the village, and he would be supported by the rest of the regiment. Reno did what he was ordered to do. Custer didn't provide the support.
Now, what he should have done, is cross at Ford A, trailing behind Reno. Once Reno had to halt and go into skirmish line, Custer should have been just behind, ready to swing around Reno's left flank and engage the force that was in process of encircling Reno. Benteen should have been given orders to cross as well and come up from behind to be a further element to either maneuver or reinforce. Company B should also have been removed from the pack train and committed to battle.
Why should Custer have done this? He had zero knowledge of the terrain north of Ford A, little knowledge of the number of actual fighters he would face, and no idea just how big the village was or how far north it stretched. Concentrating his firepower was the thing to do, not break it up into tiny pieces and feed it to the enemy. If the hostiles pitched into his entire regiment in the above scenario, and proved to be too much for the 600 soldiers, he could have pulled back by leaps and bounds to Ford A, crossed and then defended, or moved to the high ground just west of the ford and defended. Either option would have given him a chance to hold them in battle and in the same location until Terry joined from the north. By recrossing ford A and defending, he would have the pack train on that side of the river with all his supplies, so defending at that point would have been a smart thing to do, if defending was required. It also would have allowed the resumption of the offense after resupply.
When, at the area of Ford A, he got word that the hostiles were running, he had no intelligence to allow him to realize they weren't "running away", but were in fact standing and fighting. So his move up the bluffs was based on a false assumption. At that point he really began flying by the seat of his pants. At 3411 he saw most of the village, but not the extent of it, and no ford in site from that point. So he keeps flying blind, going north hoping the hostiles are still just "running away" and all he has to do is find a place to cross and chase. Like pilots who keep pressing on when the weather deteriorates, and eventually kiss a mountain, Custer kept pressing on and the mountain kissed him.
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Post by quincannon on May 28, 2015 13:16:07 GMT -6
So Jaguar you have been informed by a tactician. Colt has offered the correct tactical solution.
Ford A was not the place I had in mind for a deliberate defense that would take away the options I referred to, but it could have been defended in extreme following a forced retrograde. The area west of that Ford Colt mentioned is the one area I have identified, and my personal Deaf Smith (The AZ Ranger) verified what I had seen on a map. A MAP.
There is another place where there very well could have been decisive outcomes achieved had Custer scouted Tullocks and brought Terry into the battle in a timely manner, that being the area between Battle Ridge extension and Crow Agency. Again it is the MAP that reveals to you these possibilities.
What Colt describes in his last paragraph is called target fixation, a place you never want to go, a place where you lose sight of reality.
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Post by Beth on May 28, 2015 13:24:16 GMT -6
Jaguar may I suggest that watch a series of videos done by CusterApollo link I don't necessarily agree with his views of how the battle went but the video gives you a really good idea on what the battlefield is like and how the different sites relate to each other. I know I have to go back and refer to different sections regularly.
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Post by fred on May 28, 2015 13:29:16 GMT -6
... am not certain when Custer first became aware of the size of the force he was dealing with. Forty minutes before he coughed up blood. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on May 28, 2015 13:30:51 GMT -6
Custer's problems started before 25Jun76. He did not have good intelligence on the terrain he would operate over and very little intelligence on the strength of the enemy or its disposition. He had indications from his scouts that the village was in the valley of the LBH, but he didn't know exactly where. He should have had recon patrols (small in size) out in front well before he moved over the divide. Once he reached the point where he sent Reno into the valley to attack, he had not seen the village, didn't know exactly where it was, and sure as heck didn't know how large it was. His orders to Reno were to cross the river, attack the village, and he would be supported by the rest of the regiment. Reno did what he was ordered to do. Custer didn't provide the support. Now, what he should have done, is cross at Ford A, trailing behind Reno. Once Reno had to halt and go into skirmish line, Custer should have been just behind, ready to swing around Reno's left flank and engage the force that was in process of encircling Reno. Benteen should have been given orders to cross as well and come up from behind to be a further element to either maneuver or reinforce. Company B should also have been removed from the pack train and committed to battle. Why should Custer have done this? He had zero knowledge of the terrain north of Ford A, little knowledge of the number of actual fighters he would face, and no idea just how big the village was or how far north it stretched. Concentrating his firepower was the thing to do, not break it up into tiny pieces and feed it to the enemy. If the hostiles pitched into his entire regiment in the above scenario, and proved to be too much for the 600 soldiers, he could have pulled back by leaps and bounds to Ford A, crossed and then defended, or moved to the high ground just west of the ford and defended. Either option would have given him a chance to hold them in battle and in the same location until Terry joined from the north. By recrossing ford A and defending, he would have the pack train on that side of the river with all his supplies, so defending at that point would have been a smart thing to do, if defending was required. It also would have allowed the resumption of the offense after resupply. When, at the area of Ford A, he got word that the hostiles were running, he had no intelligence to allow him to realize they weren't "running away", but were in fact standing and fighting. So his move up the bluffs was based on a false assumption. At that point he really began flying by the seat of his pants. At 3411 he saw most of the village, but not the extent of it, and no ford in site from that point. So he keeps flying blind, going north hoping the hostiles are still just "running away" and all he has to do is find a place to cross and chase. Like pilots who keep pressing on when the weather deteriorates, and eventually kiss a mountain, Custer kept pressing on and the mountain kissed him. Absolutely beautifully stated! A magnificent post!!Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by dave on May 28, 2015 13:43:01 GMT -6
Colt Thank you for a great post that is right on the mark. Regards Dave
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jaguar
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by jaguar on May 28, 2015 14:12:17 GMT -6
Fred: What would be the product of the assualt you propose? Would they be forced to surrender or pick up camp and leave while Custer was engaged with some of them? I think your proposal works for a surrender so long as the engagement could last until Terry arrived and the Indians did not disburse and retreat. Is my reading correct?
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Post by quincannon on May 28, 2015 15:28:19 GMT -6
You have not been answered in a hours time, I think primarily because no one knows what assault Fred proposed
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