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Post by Beth on Jun 10, 2015 14:39:21 GMT -6
Truth of the matter Steve is that I don't think we will ever know about the saber issue. Did Custer feel the saber obsolete on the then modern battlefield, or was Ryan correct, and lack of saber training was the deciding issue? It may have been both. We spend an awful lot of time on a ten minute issue I think, and you could say the same thing about the Gatling Guns, or Field Artillery, or not having Infantry, having no concept of the combined arms team. Good God the man, a regimental commander, had to borrow field glasses. Speaking for myself, my interest in the sabers have nothing to do with whether they had any value as a weapon. To me they seem to be symbolic of the changing of the guard--the last reminder of a different type of war. Whether Custer felt they were obsolete, or if it was a training issue, the fact that Custer left his own saber in a box to me at least is an acknowledgement that he is in a way leaving everything he had previously done in battle behind. When you think of almost any image of Custer in the Civil War he is out front riding with confidence with the saber raised. However at LBH, he never leads a charge into the enemy, at most we have a final image of him waving his hat from above the fray as someone else leans the attack. Or I am looking for symbolism that doesn't exist and he just didn't want the thing clanking at his side for miles of trail. Beth
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Post by quincannon on Jun 10, 2015 15:34:19 GMT -6
Risking the stones thrown in my direction when I go against character and comment on what is in someone's head, and rightly so, because we cannot possible know, you want me to climb out on that limb Beth?
My guess, and that is what it is, is that Custer was a throw back to the days of yore type. He wanted it to be as it was in the stories of his youth, a game where gentleman set about killing each other in the name of King and country. Grant, Sherman, and emerging technology changed all that in the American experience, and the gentleman's game became waging of total and unconditional war. In reality war always had been, and the gentleman part only a storybook myth, but now it was codified in concrete.
He was sent to a backwater to do a job he was ill equipped by temperament to perform. He sat on his silver oak leaves for ten years. He was in financial trouble. The bloom had come off his ACW rose. All these things and he was not mentally and emotionally equipped to deal with it.
So his decision making process and general attitude must have been effected by the entire Custer not just the part we see.
Sabers are not symbols of command. If that's all you have got your troops are poorly served. Character is the symbol of command.
You must always remember Beth that the role of leader and commander is first and foremost a servant of those he leads and commands. If service is desired from, they must first be served. Same way as raising children and other things in life. Loyalty, obedience, and love does not come from a biological act. It comes from giving of one's self, for the welfare of the whole.
Many years ago I took over from an officer that had been relieved. The first thing I noticed is that the unit was still equipped with old style web equipment, rather than the newer lighter weight equipment that had been introduced a year or so before. The rest of the companies in the battalion had the new stuff. I knew because I had come from one of those companies. I then began to notice the poor state of uniform repair. Many soldiers were wearing uniforms mended and frayed, stained and the like. I went to the unit supply sergeant and said what's up with this. His comment was they don't need it. That's all he needed to say to me and I fired him on the spot. I asked the unit armorer if he knew enough about supply records and procedures to correct this problem. He said he did, recommended someone to take his place. Long story short over the next several weeks we corrected the problem, and my troops were like kids in a candy store, because someone cared enough to serve them.
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Post by mac on Jun 10, 2015 16:07:31 GMT -6
You must always remember Beth that the role of leader and commander is first and foremost a servant of those he leads and commands. If service is desired from, they must first be served. Same way as raising children and other things in life. Loyalty, obedience, and love does not come from a biological act. It comes from giving of one's self, for the welfare of the whole. Amen!
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Post by Beth on Jun 10, 2015 17:40:57 GMT -6
Risking the stones thrown in my direction when I go against character and comment on what is in someone's head, and rightly so, because we cannot possible know, you want me to climb out on that limb Beth? My guess, and that is what it is, is that Custer was a throw back to the days of yore type. He wanted it to be as it was in the stories of his youth, a game where gentleman set about killing each other in the name of King and country. Grant, Sherman, and emerging technology changed all that in the American experience, and the gentleman's game became waging of total and unconditional war. In reality war always had been, and the gentleman part only a storybook myth, but now it was codified in concrete. He was sent to a backwater to do a job he was ill equipped by temperament to perform. He sat on his silver oak leaves for ten years. He was in financial trouble. The bloom had come off his ACW rose. All these things and he was not mentally and emotionally equipped to deal with it. So his decision making process and general attitude must have been effected by the entire Custer not just the part we see. Sabers are not symbols of command. If that's all you have got your troops are poorly served. Character is the symbol of command. You must always remember Beth that the role of leader and commander is first and foremost a servant of those he leads and commands. If service is desired from, they must first be served. Same way as raising children and other things in life. Loyalty, obedience, and love does not come from a biological act. It comes from giving of one's self, for the welfare of the whole. Many years ago I took over from an officer that had been relieved. The first thing I noticed is that the unit was still equipped with old style web equipment, rather than the newer lighter weight equipment that had been introduced a year or so before. The rest of the companies in the battalion had the new stuff. I knew because I had come from one of those companies. I then began to notice the poor state of uniform repair. Many soldiers were wearing uniforms mended and frayed, stained and the like. I went to the unit supply sergeant and said what's up with this. His comment was they don't need it. That's all he needed to say to me and I fired him on the spot. I asked the unit armorer if he knew enough about supply records and procedures to correct this problem. He said he did, recommended someone to take his place. Long story short over the next several weeks we corrected the problem, and my troops were like kids in a candy store, because someone cared enough to serve them.
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Post by quincannon on Jun 10, 2015 18:23:23 GMT -6
Well unfortunately I was not a Marine, and sometimes regret the fact.
Leaders are not born. They are developed. All those things you mentioned help, but there has got to be something else, and frankly I do not know a word for that something else.
It usually takes a lot of hard work by some very patient people too. I left my rifle behind once to attend to something or other close by. My platoon sergeant asked me to walk with him out of earshot then he handed me my ass on sliced bread. Don't you dare EVER he said let my troops ever see you without your weapon EVER. That too is part of the leader development process. He cared, so he ate me alive. I did mention that he worked for me at the time didn't I.
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Post by Beth on Jun 10, 2015 18:58:40 GMT -6
Well unfortunately I was not a Marine, and sometimes regret the fact. Leaders are not born. They are developed. All those things you mentioned help, but there has got to be something else, and frankly I do not know a word for that something else. It usually takes a lot of hard work by some very patient people too. I left my rifle behind once to attend to something or other close by. My platoon sergeant asked me to walk with him out of earshot then he handed me my ass on sliced bread. Don't you dare EVER he said let my troops ever see you without your weapon EVER. That too is part of the leader development process. He cared, so he ate me alive. I did mention that he worked for me at the time didn't I. I stand corrected. I thought you were a Marine at one time. I need a crib sheet at times. Beth
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Post by quincannon on Jun 10, 2015 19:20:07 GMT -6
I have great admiration for the United States Marine Corps on several levels. Organizationally, which is right up my street professionally, they organized once in 1941 and have not changed much since. Instead of reorganizing as the Army does constantly they adapt. Adaption to change is better than reorganization for change.
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Post by Beth on Jun 10, 2015 20:00:32 GMT -6
My favorite Marine. He's been gone for almost 5 years but Alzheimer's stole him away even earlier.
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Post by montrose on Jun 14, 2015 9:43:13 GMT -6
www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/why-the-marines-have-failed-to-adopt-a-new-sniper-rifle-in-the-past-14-years/2015/06/13/cb924d96-0eaf-11e5-a0dc-2b6f404ff5cf_story.htmlIssue is appropriate weapon systems to engage enemy at 8-1200 meters. At LBH, US forces were shooting at enemies 6-1000 meters away. With the 1873 Springfield Carbine. With iron sights. With no training. Highly trained marines with awesome optics and extensive training say they can not effectively engage enemies at ranges where the 7th officers and NCOS ordered there men to engage. The 7th had a training problem. But the issue is not the privates. The officers and NCOs were incompetent. Steve, the USMC argument( as presented here, all by very junior and inexperienced personnel}| on weapons is total BS. The argument is that the majority of their engagements occur at 850-1600 meters. If this is true, my recommendation is to disband all marine sniper, scout, and special operation forces. The argument is the ragheads find you before you find them, at enormous range. For forces that get to pick when and where they engage the enemy. This argument is nonsense. We have enormous advantages at engagements over 800 meters. The casualty ration on these fights is not 10 to 1. It is 100 to 1, or greater. The argument presented here is for small isolated USMC elements to identify their locations to engage enemies beyond their ability to be effective. The end result will be to create parity between enemy and USMC, where casualties will trend towards equality. Look at the attack on the Dallas police yesterday. Bad guy was killed by a Dallas sniper, at 2-300 meters. Design your force for the most likely fight, not unique circumstances that occur in one of a thousand, in this case ten thousand, engagements.
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Post by tubman13 on Jun 14, 2015 9:58:54 GMT -6
Will, The Marines need to upgrade from the current 40 in .308 to either .300 Win. Mag or .338 mag. I have seen these guys shoot. It ain't the Marine snipers, it's the unwillingness to move on from the .308 that some are still invested in.
Sound familiar, not moving on to a more modern weapon system, I don't know that the 7th was ordered to make those shots or not.1st it was the wrong weapon system for the overall mission of the cavalry. 2nd, the training stunk.
Regards, Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Jun 14, 2015 11:39:34 GMT -6
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Post by Yan Taylor on Jun 14, 2015 12:31:33 GMT -6
Around this time (well 1870s) British troops were armed with the Martini Henry rifle, and this was sighted to 1000 yards. Some reports say that marksmen could achieve a reasonable degree of accuracy even at this range. Most soldiers could achieve high results at between 300-400 yards, but when used in volley fire a battalion usually opened fire between 600-800 yards, when firing in volleys troops could fire up to ten rounds per minute.
Ian.
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Post by montrose on Nov 21, 2015 21:44:35 GMT -6
Fred, I started this thread to discuss a valley project. We got distracted, per usual. An area I feel is not well understood is the planning for this campaign. The following are points I feel should be brought up. 1. Sherman wanted a winter campaign. Crook was able to launch a campaign in Mar. Then he reorganizes and went out again. Gibbon was moving forces as early as March, but didn't get going to April. Last out of the gate was the 7th. The 7th had excellent rail and water LOCS, and should have been first. 2. Custer went on vacation in Sep 75, without waiting for Reno to return. Reno had been gone for 2 years. This was a significant factor in the poor preparation of the 7th for this campaign, in marked contrast to the far superior preparation of the Gibbon and Crook columns. a. Reno's wife died, leaving him a single parent. When he asked for leave in 1874, GAC recommended no. I wonder how this effected their relationship? Given the extensive leave GAC took throughout his career, there is hypocrisy here. 3. Supply Train. It appears that the initial plan was for a wagon train, with Quartermaster Department organizing wagons and drivers in Nov. Then late Jan it appears a decision was made for a mule train. I would love to know who made these decisions, but I failed. Markland had some data, but incomplete. AT some point the decision for the Custer column was to start with a wagon train, carrying several hundred saddles. Then they could drop the wagons off at a depot. The saddles would then be put on the mules pulling the wagons to form a mule train. To make this work, civilian packers accompanied the column, to manage the subsequent mule pack train. If I were to brief that plan today, to officers with no animal experience, my next command would be at Burger King. It looks to me like a compromise decision. But still, it happened far enough in advance to buy the saddles, ship them To FAL, hire skinners plan for forage for the animal force and all the other parts to make the plan work. 4. The recall of the 3 companies on Reconstruction duty started in Feb, and we know Custer was involved. He was sending telegraph messages in support and these companies arrived at FAL before GAC did. a. I wonder if this decision led to the largest planning blunder unique to the 7th. They failed to request sufficient remounts for the campaign. You think someone, somewhere would notice that they had more men than horses. Remember the chief of the remount service was COL Sturgis. But they didn't ask until May, which was too late. Fred will know the number, it was over 100. I don't know that another 100 fighters at LBH would make a difference, but it certainly can not hurt. An old post explaining my view.
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Post by tubman13 on Nov 22, 2015 5:12:04 GMT -6
Will, while you are at it how many officers were on detached duty? Many senior to company commanders in the field. You mention Sturgis, he was the tip of the iceberg. Major Merrill Major Tilford Capt. Sheridan " Tourtellotte " Isley " Hale Lt. Braden " Cracroft " Eckersen " Garlington " Jackson " Larned " Nave " Noland
There were also a number of somewhat senior EM's on detached service or leave.
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Post by fred on Nov 22, 2015 10:57:45 GMT -6
... while you are at it how many officers were on detached duty? Many senior to company commanders in the field. You mention Sturgis, he was the tip of the iceberg. Major Merrill Major Tilford Capt. Sheridan " Tourtellotte " Isley " Hale Lt. Braden " Cracroft " Eckersen " Garlington " Jackson " Larned " Nave " Noland Major Merrill—Just before the Summer Campaign of 1876, he was sent on detached service to Philadelphia as Chief-of-Staff to Gen. Joseph R. Hawley, the President of the Centennial Exhibition. Took part in the Nez Percé Campaign of 1877. Major Tilford—On extended sick leave at Fort Rice for rheumatism. Overweight and a heavy drinker. After sick leave caused him to miss the Sioux Campaign of 1876, he rejoined the regiment in October 1876. During the rest of his time in the service, he served as post commander for various forts: Rice, Lincoln, Buford. Capt. Sheridan—Detached service as ADC to LTG Philip Henry Sheridan since February 18, 1871. Tourtellotte— Detached service as colonel and A-d-C to GEN W. T. Sherman since December 31, 1870. Ilsley— Detached service as ADC to BG John Pope since January 30, 1868. His position in the Seventh Cavalry was essentially nominal until August 1879 when he joined the regiment at Fort Meade. Hale— On detached duty to St. Louis—recruiting service—at the time of the LBH. Braden— On sick leave since October 5, 1875. He applied for leave, then did some recruiting duty before requesting disability retirement, June 28, 1878. Craycroft— Went on detached duty prior to the 1876 campaign. Ordered to appear before Retiring Board, May 18, 1876. At Fort Lincoln. Applied for sick leave in October 1876 and retired on disability, June 28, 1878. Eckersen—Appointed to Company L, vice LT Braden (promoted), May 2, 1876, but had not yet joined unit, being “temporarily” replaced by LT Crittenden. At Fort Lincoln. Joined Seventh Cavalry on the Yellowstone on August 2, 1876. Garlington— Graduated from USMA on June 15, 1876, and assigned to Company H, vice LT De Rudio. Jackson— Detached service in Washington, D. C., since August 9, 1871 (had not served with company since February 28, 1868). He secured an appointment with the Seventh Cavalry, but after his promotion to 1LT, July 31, 1867, he was sent on detached duty, at first in the Department of Missouri, then in Washington, D. C. Promoted to fill vacancy left by the death of Tom Custer at the LBH. Larned— Detached service at West Point since July 18, 1874 (had not served with the company since August 4, 1873). Detached as Aide-de-Camp to President Grant in July 1874, then appointed Professor of Drawing at the USMA, and even though he was appointed to fill the vacancy left by Henry Jackson, he remained at the Academy, resigning from the regiment and active service in September 1876. Nave— Sick leave from July 14, 1874 – August 11, 1876, because of injuries suffered shortly after the Black Hills Expedition. Nowlan— On detached service as AAQM on Terry’s staff. You forgot LT James Montgomery Bell, Company D—On six months leave since March 24, 1876. Company A— SGT Gannon, Peter—At the PRD. Company B— SGT Carroll, Daniel—At Fort Lincoln on DS. Company C— SGT Miller, Edwin—At Fort Lincoln on DS. Company D— SGT Morton (aka, Rush), Thomas H. – At Fort Lincoln, sick. Company E— SGT Murphy, Lawrence—Douglas Scott claims he was on Reno Hill, but this is probably wrong as everyone else lists him at PRD. SGT Wells, John S. —On leave, but at Fort Lincoln. Company F— SGT Drago, Henry—At Fort Lincoln on DS. Company G— 1SG Garlick, Edward—On four-month leave since March 30, 1876, visiting England. SGT Lloyd, Frank J. — At Fort Lincoln on DS. Company H— None. Company I— SGT Caddle, Michael C. – At PRD. SGT Gaffney, George—With AAQM in the field, for duty. SGT Murphy, Robert L.—With Department HQ in the field, for duty as orderly for Terry. Company K— None. Company L— SGT Bender, Henry—At PRD. SGT Findeison, Hugo—At Fort Lincoln on DS. Company M— SGT Capes, William G. – At PRD. I did not count corporals. Best wishes, Fred.
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