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Post by welshofficer on Apr 14, 2015 7:47:25 GMT -6
Not sure if you can watch this new BBC TV programme outside of the UK, but a programme about the WW1 dreadnought battle in the North Sea.
Even plenty of interviews with naval historian Andrew Gordon, to keep DC happy......
The Dreadnoughts of Scapa Flow
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Post by dave on Apr 17, 2015 17:14:36 GMT -6
Not sure if you can watch this new BBC TV programme outside of the UK, but a programme about the WW1 dreadnought battle in the North Sea.
Even plenty of interviews with naval historian Andrew Gordon, to keep DC happy......
The Dreadnoughts of Scapa Flow
WO We are unable to access the BBC programme (weird spelling) how ever I can see it on you tube. Scotland's War at Sea. It is a great program and well worth watching. Thank you for bringing it to my attention. Regards Dave
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 17, 2015 17:18:13 GMT -6
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Post by dave on Apr 17, 2015 17:22:19 GMT -6
WO It sure is and what a great programme it is. Even though they speak with accents it is a great show. For any naval buff they must see this show. Regards Dave
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Post by dave on Apr 17, 2015 18:45:09 GMT -6
Scotland's War at Sea Episode 2 the U Boats is also on you tube. Excellent program. Regards Dave
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 18, 2015 10:30:12 GMT -6
By and large, very well done.
A few errors. Hipper was pronounced Hitler at least once, and Beatty's name was substituted for Jellicoe in a summation segment.
Also, they referenced the QE's as 'super dreadnoughts' which they were (compared to what else was floating) but still an error since the term SD was used for the first classes with all main turrets on the center line. This is an example of the problems with sloppy terminology. If people start using SD to reference the QE's, one could get really confused as the Royal Navy kept ships of one class in a squadron/division. The real SD's were kept under Jellicoe's control. It's possible they were called SD's because two turrets were superfiring, meaning one was above the other, both fore and aft.
Worse, though, they simplified the Jutland battle to the point of leaving out major issues. They were good in the personal estimations of Beatty and Jellicoe, but were weak on the main point Jellicoe suffered under. Fighting a huge battle and winning it convincingly would be a loss to England if it lost many ships or had a ton of damaged ships which weakened the blockade for a length of time. A couple of months of food imports could have kept the war going for years. Knowing this, Jellicoe turned away from torpedoes as opposed to heading towards them and combing them aside. Yes, he might have gained a bigger victory and sunk a lot of German ships, but to what end beyond childish Trafalgar worship, which was a real mental illness of the RN (and most navies) back then. Jellicoe kept the Grand Fleet whole and also, as opposed to Beatty, Jellicoe's ships hit their targets, kept the blockade together, and so - really - won the war, as Germany collapsed from starvation and civil unrest as much as anything.
Jellicoe was media adverse, not a strutting peacock, worked his ass off and was treated with contempt by Beatty who lied, misinformed, and tried desperately to cover for his unarguable failures. Beatty lost three battlecruisers, misplaced the QE's, lost control, did not keep Jellicoe accurately informed (his primary responsibility)and his shooting sucked, big time and throughout the war. He designed his own uniform. Jellicoe kept tight control of his ships, and of British dreadnoughts with him only one was hit by German shells (both duds, I think) and had under ten casualties till evening. Beatty lost 3k plus men.
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Post by tubman13 on Apr 18, 2015 16:37:17 GMT -6
DC, even your grousing can't ruin J. Buffet in Tampa tonight, hopefully you enjoy your night as much as I intend to. Maybe WO will engage you, on one of the many topics, I am ill read on. Maybe there are some Cheyenne Seals at MacDill AFB, again hope you enjoy your night as much as I do.
Regards, Tom
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 19, 2015 7:22:23 GMT -6
By and large, very well done. A few errors. Hipper was pronounced Hitler at least once, and Beatty's name was substituted for Jellicoe in a summation segment. Also, they referenced the QE's as 'super dreadnoughts' which they were (compared to what else was floating) but still an error since the term SD was used for the first classes with all main turrets on the center line. This is an example of the problems with sloppy terminology. If people start using SD to reference the QE's, one could get really confused as the Royal Navy kept ships of one class in a squadron/division. The real SD's were kept under Jellicoe's control. It's possible they were called SD's because two turrets were superfiring, meaning one was above the other, both fore and aft. Worse, though, they simplified the Jutland battle to the point of leaving out major issues. They were good in the personal estimations of Beatty and Jellicoe, but were weak on the main point Jellicoe suffered under. Fighting a huge battle and winning it convincingly would be a loss to England if it lost many ships or had a ton of damaged ships which weakened the blockade for a length of time. A couple of months of food imports could have kept the war going for years. Knowing this, Jellicoe turned away from torpedoes as opposed to heading towards them and combing them aside. Yes, he might have gained a bigger victory and sunk a lot of German ships, but to what end beyond childish Trafalgar worship, which was a real mental illness of the RN (and most navies) back then. Jellicoe kept the Grand Fleet whole and also, as opposed to Beatty, Jellicoe's ships hit their targets, kept the blockade together, and so - really - won the war, as Germany collapsed from starvation and civil unrest as much as anything. Jellicoe was media adverse, not a strutting peacock, worked his ass off and was treated with contempt by Beatty who lied, misinformed, and tried desperately to cover for his unarguable failures. Beatty lost three battlecruisers, misplaced the QE's, lost control, did not keep Jellicoe accurately informed (his primary responsibility)and his shooting sucked, big time and throughout the war. He designed his own uniform. Jellicoe kept tight control of his ships, and of British dreadnoughts with him only one was hit by German shells (both duds, I think) and had under ten casualties till evening. Beatty lost 3k plus men. DC,
Good stuff, you are improving. Especially you picked up the point that the RN considered all dreadnoughts from the Orion class onwards as Super Dreadnoughts.
Your only significant errors were that Beatty lost 3 battlecruisers and Jellicoe only lost 10 men. Beatty actually lost 2 battlecruisers (QM/Indefatigable). The entire point of Evan-Thomas's 5BS being with the BCF at Rosyth was to provide cover as the BCS's one by one went up from Rosyth to Scapa Flow to undertake gunnery training that was not possible behind the booms at Rosyth. At the time of Jutland, the BCS undertaking gunnery training at Scapa Flow was Rear-Adm Hood's 3BCS. His flagship (Invincible) was sunk as part of Jellicoe's Grand Fleet. The armoured cruisers lost, with similar heavy loss of life, were also under Jellicoe's command. The gunnery of the 3 BCS at Jutland was actually amongst the best of the squadrons present on either side, no doubt down to their training immediately before the battle.
Jellicoe understood the strategic and operational requirements, far better than Beatty. The latter interestingly became far more cautious when he succeeded to command of the Grand Fleet when Jellicoe headed off to the Admiralty.
WO
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Post by dave on Apr 19, 2015 9:27:52 GMT -6
WO I certainly enjoyed both programmes and learned quite a bit about the Royal Navy in WW I. I had no idea of how large and beautiful Scapa Flow was. I had heard of the anchorage but had never studied anything about the harbor. I knew of Royal Oak's sinking but very little else. What beautiful scenery in the Orkney Islands. Regards Dave
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Post by Mike Powell on Apr 19, 2015 9:36:34 GMT -6
WO,
Your point on the loss of Invincible is well taken, in that I think it is likely Hood was never under Beatty's direct command on the day. The order for Hood's 3rd BCS to sortie came of course from Jellicoe. Likewise, his detachment early in the afternoon from the Grand Fleet to rejoin Beatty was prearranged by Jellicoe and Beatty. However, the reunion with Beatty did not occur until the great convergence of the capital units of the British and German fleets had begun. At that moment Hood's maneuver to effect the rejoining by reaching to lead Beatty's line, rather than falling in at the rear in squadron order, was apparently his own. I say apparently as I have found no record of signals from Beatty to Hood. Regardless, the decision seems proper as the means to most expeditiously extend the battlecruiser line across the oncoming German van. To my mind The following loss of Invincible does not invalidate the maneuver whoever may have ordered it. I believe it was a quick witted and gallant decision by Hood.
I don't hold Beatty in the same light as DC. He found the High Seas Fleet and delivered it up to Jellicoe. What advantageous maneuvers Jellicoe might have made are unclear to me if he'd received greater communication from Beatty. With the situation as presented, Jellicoe was able to discern the German approach well enough to deploy the Grand Fleet appropriately.
Beatty would be damned for poor judgement in my opinion if it can be found that the sorry state of munition handling that likely resulted in the battlecruiser losses was of his design or taken upon his urging. If similar handling occurred in the Grand Fleet as well, I would take that as evidence to exonerate Beatty. The reading continues.
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 19, 2015 10:24:16 GMT -6
Mike,
(1) That's an excellent take on Hood/Arbuthnot's, the vanguard of the Grand Fleet, actions upon reaching the northwards fleeing/delivering Beatty.
(2) I am critical of Beatty's appalling use of 5BS (the 4 QEs present could do 24-25 knts) but, as you say, he delivered Hipper AND SCHEER to Jellicoe.
(3) I have always believed that the ammunition mishandling was a general problem across Scapa Flow and Rosyth ("feed the guns"), but exacerbated in the BCF because they could do little firing practice at Rosyth other than practice how quickly they could load their guns. The key difference was the thinner turret armour on the battlecruisers, which allowed penetration into the turret working chambers and down the trunks and into open magazines. That would have been 4 battlecruisers gone, but for Maj Harvey saving the Lion by flooding her Q magazine. The Germans seemed to home in on Q turrets in particular, and that was usually a RM manned rather than RN manned turret. And Jellicoe's reaction to the RN post-battle investigation blaming ammunition mishandling seems to have a "there but for the grace of God, go I" feel to it.
WO
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Post by welshofficer on Apr 19, 2015 10:36:27 GMT -6
Mike,
And German anti-flash procedures were actually poorer, until their Seydlitz wake up call at the Dogger Bank.
But their nitroglycerin propellant was far more stable.
WO
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Post by Yan Taylor on Apr 19, 2015 12:33:16 GMT -6
I knew of Royal Oak's sinking but very little else Dave my Father was based in Scapa Flow went the Royal Oak got hit, he was a Sergeant at the time in charge of a Bofors 40mm AA Gun. Ian.
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Post by dave on Apr 19, 2015 13:07:24 GMT -6
I knew of Royal Oak's sinking but very little else Dave my Father was based in Scapa Flow went the Royal Oak got hit, he was a Sergeant at the time in charge of a Bofors 40mm AA Gun. Ian. Ian It seems amazing how many of the famous or infamous ships, stations or battles are parents saw or participated in during WW II. My father's ship USS Portland was an escort on the Doolittle Raid, fought during the Battle of Savo Island, November 1942, later on a destroyer struck by a kamikaze and off of Iwo Jima on a fire support mission. Regards Dave
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Post by Dark Cloud on Apr 19, 2015 16:02:59 GMT -6
Not improving, WO. I've had the same stuff on this board up about Jutland for years, over a decade, long before you arrived and started pretending you were well read on it and knew all about Andrew Gordon, who I don't recall appearing in the video as you said, but I wasn't vectored in.
"Your only significant errors were that Beatty lost 3 battlecruisers and Jellicoe only lost 10 men." That isn't the quote, is it? No. "Jellicoe kept tight control of his ships, and of British dreadnoughts with him only one was hit by German shells (both duds, I think) and had under ten casualties till evening. Beatty lost 3k plus men." I am talking of shellfire and the dreadnoughts only and before evening, and what I said is correct, your presentation incorrect. I'd in years past correctly stated that the Invincible was coming from Jellicoe to Beatty but I bolluxed it here in error. Sort of. The 5th was angling out from under Beatty to join the Battle Line under Jellicoe as the 3rd joined Beatty and this unnecessary and dangerously confusing exchange was only because Beatty never took gunnery seriously and his ships were laughable shots. From both British and German sources.
After all, there is ample space other than Scapa Flow to practice gunnery between the Atlantic and North Sea between August, 1914, and May, 1916 and Beatty never did it despite ample evidence he desperately needed to. The reason the Invicible group was at Scapa was to improve her shooting, which happened in about three days, as both the Germans and Brits said those battlecruisers were crack shots. But they'd now been training under Jellicoe, and compared with the Dogger Bank and Falklands and how Beatty's ships sucked big time that afternoon, the difference was night and day. That's not opinion: that's fact. Three days. So, it was Beatty's incompetence that necessitated the exchange of ships coincident to the battle, and if Beatty couldn't improve shooting in just three days as Jellicoe somehow managed to do, you'd think he'd make progress in 20 months had there been will and time away from distractions with mistresses.
Jellicoe understood the issues better than Beatty and everyone else. Nobody actually thought Jellicoe was the only man who could lose the war in an afternoon (except Jellicoe) till Churchill put it so memorably in the World Crisis a decade later. After that, everyone pretends they understood all along.
Beatty was a creep. At the end of the war, at the Naval celebratory dinner, neither Jellicoe nor Fisher - the two most important admirals in the RN between Nelson and now - were even invited.
And while Beatty did sorta lead Scheer north in pursuit, Beatty himself was led into a trap by Hipper, who brought him to Scheer's High Seas Fleet. Beatty barely got out alive and failed to keep his boss informed, his job.
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