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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 4, 2015 14:58:53 GMT -6
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Musashi
Mar 4, 2015 16:10:26 GMT -6
Post by Colt45 on Mar 4, 2015 16:10:26 GMT -6
Saw this earlier today. Very cool that he found it. Hope he posts more video or pictures. Would like to see what shape it is in.
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Musashi
Mar 4, 2015 17:51:27 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on Mar 4, 2015 17:51:27 GMT -6
Does anyone know at what depth she was found?
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Musashi
Mar 4, 2015 18:18:44 GMT -6
Post by chris on Mar 4, 2015 18:18:44 GMT -6
Chuck, haven't checked charts to verify but articles say 1000 meters down. Best, c.
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Post by Colt45 on Mar 5, 2015 8:39:32 GMT -6
Chris is correct. The depth was at least 1 thousand meters.
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Musashi
Mar 5, 2015 11:12:58 GMT -6
Post by dave on Mar 5, 2015 11:12:58 GMT -6
The discovery of the Musahi gives me the same visceral reaction I felt when several of our subs lost in WW II were discovered. The same sense I feel being in a National cemetery. Regards Dave
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Musashi
Mar 5, 2015 12:24:09 GMT -6
Post by welshofficer on Mar 5, 2015 12:24:09 GMT -6
Dave,
A big battlewagon, but not what the IJN needed to commission a few months after Midway.
Take a look at the reconfigured Ise and Hyuga to see the problem facing the IJN.
WO
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Musashi
Mar 5, 2015 14:23:59 GMT -6
Post by chris on Mar 5, 2015 14:23:59 GMT -6
Chris is correct. The depth was at least 1 thousand meters. Probably the first time I've been correct on this site - too bad it had nothing to do with the LBH! Best, c.
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Deleted
Deleted Member
Posts: 0
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Musashi
Mar 5, 2015 14:25:34 GMT -6
Post by Deleted on Mar 5, 2015 14:25:34 GMT -6
Some day I hope they find the wreck of the USS Tang. What an incredible story. Another famous sub wreck is the Wahoo which was located several years ago. Back to ships - did they ever find the USS Indianapolis?
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Musashi
Mar 5, 2015 14:31:48 GMT -6
Post by chris on Mar 5, 2015 14:31:48 GMT -6
Littlebigman, Best I could find is two searches have been done. No luck. Best, c.
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Musashi
Mar 5, 2015 15:55:00 GMT -6
Post by dave on Mar 5, 2015 15:55:00 GMT -6
WO
I agree with your post regarding the Japanese navy's plight after Midway. The Japanese like the Americans had too many officers from “the black shoe navy” to properly plan for modern warfare.
I think the Japanese lost the war before it started. They placed greater emphasis on quantity and not quality. They were unable to make up the loses in pilots, air crews and mechanics. The Battle of the Coral Sea showed another weakness in that the Japanese who only had a light carrier sunk but lost the use of 2 fleet carriers, one damaged the other lost its air group. They kept their air groups with the same carrier while the Americans moved their air groups from carrier to carrier as needed. The Battle of Midway was so vital because they could not replace the mechanics and the armament technicians as fast as needed.
Regards Dave
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Post by Dark Cloud on Mar 5, 2015 16:26:30 GMT -6
The Yamato is in worse shape, but the Imperial blossom on the bow is still there.
The thing about the IJN was that it was a better educated service than the sometimes bovine and vicious army and an extremely well trained group at the start. Reading translations of their writings and thoughts before the war suggest the Navy asked all the right questions and spent hours and brain power solving the immediate implementation and then, once in war, delved back into mythology and magical thinking. This like the Confederacy, the Sioux, the Irish and Scots. The US essentially fought the navy and China fought the army, and the two services got on so poorly they often ignored each other.
Just like everyone, the Japanese Navy believed in Decisive Battle, where after skirmish warmups there was a big naval battle and the war was won. Everyone bought into this concept with national trimmings. But as recent historians have pointed out there had never actually been such a battle. Not Jutland, nor Leyte Gulf, nor Tsushima, nor Trafalgar ended their wars. The concept was flawed and rather baseless, and everyone prepared for the latest war rather than the likely one. What seems so obvious now wasn't clear at all back then.
Nobody thought it odd that naval battle in 1940 was just like in 1600, the two sides on parallel course hammering away. The idiot mentality that kept horse cavalry into 1940 kept both the air forces and the navy from constructing ways to best use the technology and not just mimic the past. It's not shocking that the Japanese, with the juvenile (and fake) Bushido Code of the Empire did not issue parachutes to their pilots because weight and you wanted to die in combat. It IS shocking to know the British didn't push parachutes till the 1930's because they were bad for morale. Honest. The Japanese Navy officer corps went down with their ships, pointlessly. Men would die saving the damned portraits of the Emperor and allow their highly trained and excellent captain to drown lest he get a newer command.
In any case, the belief was that the US could not go on the attack as soon as it did and by then the IJN would have the ships to defeat us. Unlike the US, their combat planes were not separate units, and were assigned to ships and could not be transferred.
There is this juvenile insistence upon Decisive Battle with all the melodrama that permeates right through WW2, on land and sea. Winning the Decisive Battle could lose you the war, something Jellicoe understood and Churchill, Beatty, and many others don't seem to have grasped. Interesting that the not highly regarded British monarchs did grasp it.
The whole LBH battle was Custer implementing the Army's belief in one Decisive Battle. This is because once the Army had casualties, unless it was huge well beyond budget, it had to retire because it could not send wounded home insufficiently guarded, which essentially meant a larger number of available soldiers than normal. In reality, it turns out all they had to do was bring the tribes to battle, win or lose, because the effect was the same on the enemy: they could not support themselves in wars, only odd battles.
We won, we're told, near every battle in Vietnam but didn't win the war, but we have won the peace. This is exactly opposite of what the military (and near everyone else) thought would happen. Win the battles, you win the war, we thought. Often true, but not always.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 5, 2015 16:47:01 GMT -6
DC,
The oddity is that the IJN's own war planning indicated that the USN sailing west and engaging in a decisive battle in the Western Pacific was extremely unlikely. Kantai Kessen was a nonsense, long outliving the ghost of Tsushima.
WO
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Post by quincannon on Mar 5, 2015 16:53:10 GMT -6
Both Dave and DC eluded to it, but it is best said that the air group was not separate, but part of the ship's company, which includes pilots, air crew, deck crew, and airframes.
Air groups in U S service were tenant units as they are today, and it was not uncommon for one air group to serve aboard several different carriers. That also included squadrons of the air group as well. Some of Yorktown's at Midway were assigned to Air Group 3 nominally the Saratoga Air Group of that time.
Dave I think you meant they emphasized quality over quantity. 5000 good enough beats the crap out of 500 of the absolute best.
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Post by welshofficer on Mar 5, 2015 16:58:07 GMT -6
QC,
That was a big flaw, together with the failure to prepare sufficient air crew reserves for a prolonged war.
Whilst the Kido Butai was being crippled at Midway, ultimately dooming the IJN, the Zuikaku was an available carrier hull without an air group.
WO
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