|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 17:29:39 GMT -6
Post by welshofficer on Mar 17, 2015 17:29:39 GMT -6
QC,
IJN lost the war at Midway.
They had to wipe out the existing USN carriers, and then keep taking out the new Essex class carriers as they joined the fray.
Prevent the overwhelming build-up that did for them in the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf.
They could never do that without the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu.
WO
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 18:23:42 GMT -6
Post by dave on Mar 17, 2015 18:23:42 GMT -6
WO I agree that Japan lost the war at Midway and the US turned the corner. However I suggest that we had the turn signal on after the Battle of the Coral Sea. Japan lost one small carrier that was sunk. But they lost the use of 2 fleet carriers for Midway, one due to damage the other to loss of aircrews and planes. Would the addition of 1 more carrier and the combined pilots and aircrew have possible effected the outcome of the battle? QC The relationship between the Japanese Navy and Army command staffs ensured their defeat. Midway was a perfect example of the acrimony between the services. Yamamoto was at war with the Army at all times. The Army cared about China not the Pacific. My father was on the USS Portland, a heavy cruiser, during the action off Guadalcanal during the Battle of Savo Island. He always felt that the US Navy won that battle. The merchant ships carrying supplies and reinforcements for the Japanese on Guadalcanal were decimated by Navy and Marine aircraft next day.
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 18:45:24 GMT -6
Post by welshofficer on Mar 17, 2015 18:45:24 GMT -6
Dave,
I have discussed this above on an earlier page. The Coral Sea was fine for Japan. They sank a fleet carrier (Lexington) and badly damaged another (Yorktown) for the loss of a light carrier. Nimitz couldn't trade like that in May 1942. The Shokaku was a non-runner for Midway, but the Zuikaku could have been sent if the will was there. Her aircraft might have proved very valuable in maintaining a CAP when the USN dive bombers arrived. And in facilitating an earlier combined strike against Midway and the assumed carrier/s (Enterprise and Hornet) so the carriers weren't in such a vulnerable condition when the USN dive bombers arrived. Remember that the dive bombers caught the Kuido Butai at its most vulnerable moment, when one bomb through a flight deck was basically enough to devastate a carrier. I think it was just one hit on the Akagi, the pride of the IJN.
WO
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 19:16:35 GMT -6
Post by dave on Mar 17, 2015 19:16:35 GMT -6
WO The Japanese were unable to operate each carrier separately so they could not recover the Midway strike force and launch an attack at the same time. They were inflexible in their doctrine which led to their defeat. Thank God! Regards Dave
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 19:39:36 GMT -6
Post by jodak on Mar 17, 2015 19:39:36 GMT -6
QC, IJN lost the war at Midway. They had to wipe out the existing USN carriers, and then keep taking out the new Essex class carriers as they joined the fray. Prevent the overwhelming build-up that did for them in the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. They could never do that without the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. WO They could never do that with the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, and Soryu. Japan lost the war at Pearl Harbor, the outcome was never in doubt.
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 19:48:47 GMT -6
Post by welshofficer on Mar 17, 2015 19:48:47 GMT -6
QC, IJN lost the war at Midway. They had to wipe out the existing USN carriers, and then keep taking out the new Essex class carriers as they joined the fray. Prevent the overwhelming build-up that did for them in the Philippine Sea and Leyte Gulf. They could never do that without the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu and Soryu. WO They could never do that with the Akagi, Kaga, Hiryu, and Soryu. Japan lost the war at Pearl Harbor, the outcome was never in doubt. Jodak,
If the IJN secures Midway and the Kido Butai keep sinking US carriers without loss, what does Nimitz do...?
It's improbable, because of the glass jaw which accompanies the Kido Butai's powerful fist, but not impossible.
The US Pac Flt was down to one combat ready fleet carrier in early 1943, even with the Midway win, and had to temporarily borrow one from the RN.
WO
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 19:51:09 GMT -6
Post by welshofficer on Mar 17, 2015 19:51:09 GMT -6
HMS Victorious suddenly became USS Robin!
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 20:26:21 GMT -6
Post by dave on Mar 17, 2015 20:26:21 GMT -6
WO Fantastic! I never knew we had the USS Robin. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 20:30:01 GMT -6
Post by welshofficer on Mar 17, 2015 20:30:01 GMT -6
WO Fantastic! I never knew we had the USS Robin. Regards Dave Dave,
I imagine her crew quite enjoyed Norfolk, Pearl Harbor and the South Pacific after the delights of Scapa Flow and the Arctic Convoys....
WO
|
|
|
Post by dave on Mar 17, 2015 20:37:10 GMT -6
WO I would imagine they enjoyed the food also. Many stories from Americans flying for the RAF prior to December 1941 about the quality and quantity of British food and rations. Brussels Sprouts were especially mentioned often and negatively. Regards Dave
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 20:37:16 GMT -6
Post by jodak on Mar 17, 2015 20:37:16 GMT -6
It might have taken a little longer, but ultimatley Japan couldn't sink ships as fast as the U.S. was building them. The U.S. supposedly launched more ships in the 4 or 5 years of WW2 than had been launched in the entire history of the war world, by everybody, up to that point. I find that hard to believe but have seen it stated numerous times. Regardless, the U.S. certainly launched many more ships, built many more tanks, and planes, equipped many more infantry troops, etc. than Japan could ever come close to matching. The situation in the Pacific was never as dire as it is sometimes portrayed as being, and the U.S. governemt/military never really viewed the Pacific war as being much more than a nuisance that interfered with pursuit of what they saw as the real war in Europe. In fact, many senior army officers assigned to the Pacific felt that they were being slighted and relegated to a secondary struggle and were none too happy about it.
What is oftened overlooked in naval discussions which tend, as they have here, to center on the carriers, is the role played by American submarines. We hear so much about the Battle of the Atlantic and the impact that German U boats had there, but that pales in comparison to what the American subs did to Japan in the Pacific. By 1945 Japan was literally starving, and the flow of resources from the Dutch East Indies and Malaya that she had gone to war over in the first place had been slowed to virtually non-existant. Above all, Japan lacked fuel to effectively operate their carriers, regardless of how many they might have remaining. US. carriers, or lack thereof, had very little to do with that, and it was primarily the result of the U.S. submarine campaign.
Even early in the war Japan's war making capability was stretched to the breaking point and impossible to maintain - they simply didn't have the resources or manpower. To put it in perspective, in the Pacific each U.S. soldier/marine was supported by an average of 50 lbs of supplies per day, each Commonwealth soldier by about 18 lbs, and each Japanese soldier by 3 lbs. Some might look at that and interpret it as meaning that the Japanese were lean, mean fighting machines, while the Americans were oversupplied, but that was not the case. The figures reflect both the amount of direct personal supplies (ammunition, food, clothing, etc.) as well as a prorated portion of indirect supplies (artillery support, fuel, medical supplies, and so forth). When viewed in that light, 3 lbs per man per day was pitifully little and reflective of how overstretched and unsustainable the Japanese war effort truly was.
Japan's leaders recognized that and knew that they had no chance of prevailing in a drawn out conflict. As a result, their entire strategy for war with the U.S was predicated upon the assumption that Americans were soft, without the stomach for waging a prolonged war, and would therefore be agreeable to some sort of negotiated peace that would allow Japan to keep much of what it initially gained and needed. In that they were mistaken and sorely misjudged the American character, especially in light of the rage that permiated the American military and populace in the wake of Pearl Harbor. After that, nothing short of the absolute destruction of Japan would have sufficed, and, as I said, the issue was never in doubt, regardless of how long it might have taken. Therefore, the war wasn't "lost" as a result of this battle or that loss, but when the first bomb fell on Pearl Harbor.
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 20:45:38 GMT -6
Post by dave on Mar 17, 2015 20:45:38 GMT -6
Jodak I would agree with you regarding the role of US submarines in conquering Japan. The war effort was mainly against Germany and the Navy did what they could in the early part of the war. The shame is that it took 18 months to fix American torpedoes. Many lives and possible some subs were lost because of this fiasco. Regrads Dave
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 21:10:12 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on Mar 17, 2015 21:10:12 GMT -6
I was watching the season finale of Rizzoli and Isles while you guys were refighting 1942 in the Pacific. I take heart medicine, but Angie Harmon and Sasha Alexander is what I keep the damned thing running for. ANYWAY
Jodak is correct. The Japanese lost the war about 1000 hours local on 7 December 1941. It was a war they could not win. They sure could make it costly for us though, and they should have done much better than they did.
Coral Sea was the seminal battle strategically, while Midway was an operational triumph. After Coral Sea their southward movement was stopped.
Seizing Midway would have made no difference, or put Japan in any better position. It would have been for them, the same thing Wake was for us, untenable logistically.
Now lets assume for a moment that Coral Sea turned out just as it did and Midway was a tactical IJN victory. They lose no carriers, and we lose one - Yorktown. We then keep two, Sara is in the yard for another month or so, and Wasp comes to the Pac after Malta. Midway places a strain on their logistical capabilities. Hawaii is an island to far for them to seize. We concentrate our carriers in the south Pac, making sure that the San Francisco-Australia life line remains open. What does Kido Butai do, and how long will it take.
Before Midway all four carriers that participated were in very poor material condition. All four needed major work, long yard periods. Carrier Division Five was torn up as Dave said, and it would take until late summer-early fall to make them right again. I suspect there would have been an operational lull. The IJN would be content with what had been accomplished, and would have used the lull to restore operational efficiency.
Now lets look at the carriers themselves. Akagi was old technically, Kaga was then, and always was an operational weak sister basket case. Soryu and Hiryu, were faster, but operational capability clones of Ranger, which was our red headed step child. Shokaku, and Zuikaku were placed in commission a very few weeks before being employed on the Pearl strike and were the technological counterparts of the first two Yorktowns, in other words four years behine the power curve. At that time four years was an eternity.
What we would have done under those circumstances is most probably mounted more raids on the outlying perimeter, took no unnecessary risks, avoided battle, and the only difference is that the Japanese would be on one more island, and when we finally did Guadalcanal we would have been much stronger in terms of numbers of ships, and nine months more experience.
Midway was a gift.
So for me Coral Sea was the end of the beginning. Guadalcanal whenever that campaign started was the beginning of the end, and Midway was sandwiched in between, whose only real value hastened the beginning of Guadalcanal.
Boy if you didn't like what I wrote above, and I certainly understand why anyone, even most anyone's would see it differently, I am really going to get in trouble for this next:
Each of the four Savos (including the first and best known one) I mentioned above were clear cut operational victories for the USN. I know why I feel that way, but I suspect you may not
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 21:26:50 GMT -6
Post by welshofficer on Mar 17, 2015 21:26:50 GMT -6
QC,
And where are you if Kondo takes Midway and you lose all three Yorktowns without reply?
Nimitz would be down to the Saratoga and the death trap Wasp, with no combat ready Essex for another year....?
Just playing devil's advocate.....
WO
|
|
|
Musashi
Mar 17, 2015 22:01:15 GMT -6
Post by quincannon on Mar 17, 2015 22:01:15 GMT -6
Were are you? The war lasts until August 1945, and Missouri sails into Tokyo Bay in September 45. We just do it differently.
Spruance was not going to lose E and Hornet. Remember what his operational orders were. He pulled away before nightfall on the 4th, and Nagumo did not have a clue where he was. If he lost significantly on his air strike in the morning I think he would have pulled the plug faster than he did. What Fletcher would do on Ytown is anther matter, but I suspect would have turned tail, and out of range once got Ytown moving again.
Justin I think we have to make certain assumptions in whiffing this.
Assumption 1--- The morning strike against Midway remains the same.
Assumption 2--- Fletcher with Ytown is discovered at the same time it actually was by Tone #4.
Assumption 3--- Nagumo makes the exact same decision as he did in regards to rearming and going after the one carrier he knows is there.
Assumption 4 --- The dive bombers strike but are unsuccessful and losses are high.
At that point Nagumo is not going to launch a one carrier strike as Yamaguchi did out of desperation, but a full blown four carrier strike. That will take time, Yamaguchi will be having a hissy fit, but they will go with Nagumo's full strength strike.
Once they know the dive bomber strike failed and losses we heavy, I think both Fletcher and Spruance get out of Dodge before any strike could reach them.
|
|