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Post by Colt45 on Sept 21, 2014 14:21:59 GMT -6
Brilliant work, Fred.
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Post by Mulligan on Sept 21, 2014 14:47:24 GMT -6
Thanks, Fred! Your picture tour is an absolutely incandescent visual aid. I could feel myself straining in the saddle to get a better view! It's been my Montana experience (many, many visits over the decades) that tree lines along rivers thin out over time, rather than grow up and obstruct views. My guess is that in 1876 all the timber and riverbank vegetation was as tall, deep, and inpenetrable as it was in pre-Columbian times. In the panoramic shot over the horse's head, at the top of MTC, you can see what I was seeing as I walked down that same section. The end of the coulee is clearly in plain sight and does not seem too far away. My thought, at that moment, was if Custer saw the same thing he'd be thinking: "I am going to go right down there and kick that door in! Follow me, you Wolverines!!" In this scenario (which I rejected a few minutes later) he would not be expecting to be trapped in a maze of tipis and surrounded by NAs after he charged across the river. In his mind, he'd be pretty sure -- whip your Daddy sure -- everyone was going to react as if he was Godzilla entering Tokyo. The reason I rejected the big cavalry charge scenario so quickly (although, as everyone noticed, I do really like it as a "Hollywood" scene) is that the farther one goes down MTC the creepier it feels. Suddenly you are very low, with the bluffs and ridges hemming you in, you lose all your sight lines, and the creek bed gets boggy (from rain) and starts to zig and zag. I can tell you that footing, at least for a person, is treacherous. Army horses may have fared somewhat better. Tellingly, the Rainbird horses seem to avoid that area of MTC. QC's analysis of fording a river in combat is straight out of von Clausewitz -- "Passage of Rivers", On War, Vol. VII. Bravo, QC!! Kinda reminds me of George C. Scott (as Patton) shouting to General Rommel across the desert, "You son-of-a-*****, I READ YOUR BOOK!!" What do I know, but I agree it would make sense to want some breathing room directly after crossing -- to reorganize, or form up, or whatever. This is why I think, Fred, you may have Custer's perspective a bit low in the next picture, the one at Ford B. If Custer had that exact view I think he'd be standing around with all the NAs that had come out to greet him -- and, as you point out, the low bluff to his right would be blocking his vista of the valley (your next photo). So, IMHO, the five companies probably stayed higher on the eastern ridges as they approached the Big Village, and perhaps all or part of the force was shielded from view -- as was illustrated nicely on Ian's Google Earth map. I have ZERO military experience but this "shielding" possibility is precisely what occurred to me as I drove up to the battlefield on Highway 212. It's just so obvious from that angle. Nobody in the LBH valley would ever see you coming. Mulligan
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Post by fred on Sept 21, 2014 17:20:53 GMT -6
Well... I must say, I am flattered. I thank you all for your kind words. I hope only that it is some help and gives you some perspective.
I think I need to address a couple of Mulligan's issues....
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Sept 21, 2014 17:28:34 GMT -6
In the panoramic shot over the horse's head, at the top of MTC, you can see what I was seeing as I walked down that same section. The end of the coulee is clearly in plain sight and does not seem too far away. That picture was given to me by Don Horn. What you saw was an iPhone 4 photo of the snapshot. Not the best, but I liked the picture so much I needed to include it in my book. Don told me he took just as he rounded the bend out of Cedar Coulee and into Medicine Tail, so it gives us some really good perspective. The mouth of Cedar Coulee is approximately 1¾ miles (3,100 yards) from Ford B. You may be correct here, Mulligan. I am not sure which one you are referring to, but one of the Ford B photos may have been taken on the flats, not on the bluffs above. It is my opinion Custer never "walked" on the Ford B flats, but remained on the bluffs. I do believe, however, E Company formed on the flats quite close to the river, acting as a screen. In fact, I believe E Company traveled down MTC to the ford while Custer, HQ, and Yates traveled atop the ridges to the bluffs near the ford. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Beth on Sept 21, 2014 19:55:26 GMT -6
Thank you Fred, Mulligan and everyone else who has been providing pictures. I would never be able to see these places with my own eyes because I am limited to paved areas so your pictures are invaluable to me.
Beth
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Post by tubman13 on Sept 22, 2014 5:46:26 GMT -6
When you visit the battlefield you can get overwhelmed with information of all sorts. It doesn't help if you kill some brain cells in the evening. That being said I believe that there is an account of 6 dead troopers in the Ford D area. Can't remember who stated it. I blame that on Tom and drinking beer in the evening. Regards AZ Ranger Tom who, I sure don't remember that night. Must have been another Tom, another year! Regards, Tom
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 22, 2014 5:54:09 GMT -6
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Post by Yan Taylor on Sept 22, 2014 5:56:38 GMT -6
You can see were Fred was going with the notion that Custer was feeling his way round the village, now he had 200+ men which in WW2 terms is around a Company, now there are a few on this board who have commanded a Company, so would these Officers attack an objective without determine its full extent? If Custer didn’t know how far this place stretched then he would be attacking blind, it seems obvious to me that charging into a village of this size without finding outlying areas is foolish, especially with only 200+ (a Company).
So following Fred’s photographic time line, you can see that he wanted to find the outer rim, plus it would seem from his note to Benteen that he knew he would need the extra Battalions.
Ian.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Sept 22, 2014 6:01:44 GMT -6
Nice shot Steve, clearly shows how the line of bluffs to the right made sure that Custer’s LOS was impeded, especially as they obscure the northern end plus the fords.
Ian.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Sept 22, 2014 6:16:08 GMT -6
When you visit the battlefield you can get overwhelmed with information of all sorts. It doesn't help if you kill some brain cells in the evening. That being said I believe that there is an account of 6 dead troopers in the Ford D area. Can't remember who stated it. I blame that on Tom and drinking beer in the evening. Regards AZ Ranger Tom who, I sure don't remember that night. Must have been another Tom, another year! Regards, Tom That's what happens when I drink to much too I don't remember anything. Regards Steve
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Post by quincannon on Sept 22, 2014 6:19:21 GMT -6
Ian: As a general rule it is better to fight the battle you have rather than waste time screwing around looking for the battle you wish you had.
There is another rule, applicable since the beginning of armed combat - concentrate to fight. Custer sending Benteen to the left, then compounding the error by himself moving onto the bluffs insured that no matter what he did subsequently that the Indians had the ability to concentrate to fight faster than he could. A grave tactical error, in defiance of well established principles.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Sept 22, 2014 6:33:51 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, but wouldn’t you as a Company Commander, want to know what you was attacking before committing? Modern day Officers usually carried maps and stuff, which would give them an idea just what was lying ahead, Custer had nothing, in fact he didn’t know just how big the place was, true he knew that it was huge, but to go charging in and knocking the door down without knowing what was on the other side would endanger his command, I think he knew by the time he got near MTC, that he needed extra troops, otherwise why didn’t he just throw everything he had at the ford.
Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Sept 22, 2014 6:46:12 GMT -6
Ian: There is no such thing as knowing too much about the enemy you face. That is why you conduct reconnaissance and take advantage of what that reconnaissance reveals. That is why you must be patient during the gathering process. The other side of that coin is that you never know enough, map, overhead photo, satellite reconnaissance, or fable notwithstanding. The more uncertain, the more you need to keep concentrated. There must also be a balance struck between the overly cautious and the bold. Bold reveals itself after the battle, and bold is usually ONLY the manifestation of the sound tactical principle, applied at the proper time and place, viewed in hindsight.
Custer knew ONE thing. Those Indians were in that valley. The valley then is the killing ground. Not knowing size or exact disposition made it an imperative that he keep his forces available concentrated until more is revealed to him. He should not have thrown everything at the ford (B), because he should not have been at the ford in the first place. He should have had all twelve of his companies close at hand in that valley between Ford A and the southern edge of the village. Had he done this, this battle would not generate one bit of lasting interest.
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Post by tubman13 on Sept 22, 2014 7:10:31 GMT -6
Hi Chuck, but wouldn’t you as a Company Commander, want to know what you was attacking before committing? Modern day Officers usually carried maps and stuff, which would give them an idea just what was lying ahead, Custer had nothing, in fact he didn’t know just how big the place was, true he knew that it was huge, but to go charging in and knocking the door down without knowing what was on the other side would endanger his command, I think he knew by the time he got near MTC, that he needed extra troops, otherwise why didn’t he just throw everything he had at the ford. Ian. Ian, a question I have asked myself before. The bottom of MTC/Ford B is wide, wide enough to deploy 5 companies of the 7th in attack formation. I walked to the water there, crossing would not have been difficult there. But then you have many more questions. Can I cut through and disperse the pony herd, turn south and return to Reno and concentrate my force along with Reno and hold the NA's until Benteen and packs arrive? We know the answer now, no Reno would have been gone. Next, I know I have warriors to the south of me, but what about the north? When I leave this ford area should I return south, the way I came to reunite the command for concentration of force? Or should I get back on the yellow brick road to the north after leaving the ford? Yes is the answer here as he had no conceptualized plan that was shared with his subordinates, besides he knows the Wizard of OZ is not to the south. I have some wonderful pixs of Ford B but can't get them to load as it tells me the file is too large. Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Sept 22, 2014 7:25:08 GMT -6
Had I been an Indian, Custer could have given me no greater gift than to cross at Ford B. With five companies he could have most probably forced the crossing. Then what? A bridgehead is of no use if it is shallow, and if you do not have the forces available to IMMEDIATELY reinforce it, how do you expand it? How do you secure your rear? Does anyone think that the fact that Custer gets across means that the Indians could not slam the door behind him? The only place a textbook successful opposed river crossing could have been made is a Ford A with all twelve companies.
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