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Post by fred on Feb 19, 2014 21:50:24 GMT -6
... it just makes no tactical sense - not to me anyway. Alan, You and I agree here. There is the old story of the Wolf Tooth/Big Foot band of some 50 or so warriors, first in MTC, then dogging the Custer command all the way past LSH (or its way to Ford D). Personally, I put a lot of stock in that story, and their numbers increase, little bit by little bit. All those "bits," however, begin to add up and eventually become significant. I doubt this very much. Everything I have done has been predicated on the fact Custer caught these guys pretty much by surprise. Indians anywhere east of the river would have been incidental and fortuitous... like Wolf Tooth and Big Foot. This is very much correct. You are clearly on the right track. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 19, 2014 23:36:44 GMT -6
Alan: I want to add a little to what Fred said about warriors being concealed. Discounting Wolf Tooth who by happenstance was in the area, with as Fred said 50 or so of his nearest and dearest, for warriors to have been concealed in that area in question, the drainage on the west side of battle ridge and between that place and the river, they would have had to had foreknowledge of Custer's route and his decision making process. That assumes they had a crystal ball or that they made more of that Sun Dance than had been previously assumed. Not in the cards.
Tom: This is to yours of this afternoon. Let us suppose for a moment that Custer was driven from the Ford B area and never linked up with Keogh at Calhoun Hill or anyplace else. In fact let's take that as a given. Then you suggest that separately these two battalions were run to ground, and got the chop. Correct me if I don't interpret what you say correctly. Let's assume that I am correct in this summation. What I would expect to see is the two battalions remains some distance apart, and the evidence left behind for both those initially seeing the battlefield, and for us latter day marker counters in two fairly tight buttoned up perimeters, minus the few that would probably be lost getting into those final positions. Humans group together in peril, and so do military units,. It is just human nature. I think the distance separating the two battalions is in line with your thesis, but the tight grouping I would expect to see in each battalion is not present, especially in the Keogh area. Had Keogh been buttoned up tight he might have survived, or at least lasted longer. What I see at LSH are two company actions, but they did not have squat in the way of defensible terrain anyway.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 20, 2014 6:09:21 GMT -6
Chuck, your summation is mostly correct. I think Keogh stayed in place as long as he could, I think, as per orders. Was he waiting on Benteen and packs and trying to keep the back/side door closed, yes, that is my thought. At some point he realized he could no longer wait for Benteen, because the doors were being kicked in and he could no longer keep the NA's at a distance, that he could control, with the fire power he commanded. I think that at this point, he attempted protected retrograde movement(terminology?) towards Custer's command to seek protection for both commands. As you said humans group together in time of peril, or attempt to. As he moved the situation got progressively worse, eventually broke down completely and his remnants fled toward Custer.
I know NA's wondered why the soldiers sat in one place so long. I think they were talking of Keogh's specifically.
What you say about the markers rings true, as I said my visit to the battlefield was rushed and flawed 23 years ago, but the markers do tell a tale. Trust me, I understand the implications of assume. We mostly have NA stories about battle from Camp, Curtis, Viola, and numerous others. Many of the stories are vague, ambiguous, and contradictory. And as brought up many times, some other writers have an agenda or are just out to make a buck, trading on their name or that of the battle. While I am sure Fred wants to make a buck. I can see from his single mindedness, and approach that he is trying to focus thought on the important details of this battle, that can only be derived from a holistic approach.
Anyway thanks for the response, I am rambling, so enough.
Regards, Tomd
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 20, 2014 8:40:11 GMT -6
Hi Tom, when you and Chuck mentioned about troops grouping together when under stress, well that is one of the reasons that I don’t think they were forced away from Ford B by hordes of Indians, Reno’s men showed how a three Companied Battalion would act whilst in a flight for their lives, they all ended up in the same place (or more or less) on the same hill, so if the same thing happened to either Keogh or Custer/Yates, I would expect them to ride and ride till they could either ride no more or stand and fight as a whole, but what we have is Company markers found in groups with strings of markers showing the path of fleeing men and each one of these groups do appear to be unsupported. In answer to the question of Indians gathering out of sight of the Soldiers on Calhoun hill, listen to the first minute of Part 26/Calhoun coulee by CA, he says that says that from this place (Calhoun coulee) that the Soldiers fight on Calhoun hill are out of sight, so I am not saying that these Indians where in place before Keogh got to deploy his men because I agree with other that Custer caught them by surprise, but they certainly could have crossed the river and formed into bands whist grouped in this coulee and out of sight of Keogh’s men. linkHell this Custer Apollo is getting some hits via this board, I think at least he could make an appearance on this site to thank us all in person. Ian.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 20, 2014 11:26:24 GMT -6
You know Tom there is another thing I neglected to mention in my response to you, rather more of a question than anything else. Assuming again you scenario is totally correct, howdid Custer with Yates get where he was found, meaning what route did he take from Ford B to LSH. I think that important in validating yours, in that the logical point of intersection with Keogh would be Calhoun Hill. To get to LSH without going first to Calhoun means that he would have had to use a route similar to that of the McGuire map or the sketch map Benteen provided. This route would actually be slower due to cross compartmented terrain, although it is more direct
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 20, 2014 12:16:21 GMT -6
Reno’s men showed how a three Companied Battalion would act whilst in a flight for their lives, they all ended up in the same place (or more or less) on the same hill, so if the same thing happened to either Keogh or Custer/Yates, I would expect them to ride and ride till they could either ride no more or stand and fight as a whole, but what we have is Company markers found in groups with strings of markers showing the path of fleeing men and each one of these groups do appear to be unsupported. Ian. Ian, as bad as Reno's rout was their was some command and control. While the skirmish line existed in the bottom, outside of the timber, the horse holders went to the timber with Reno, Hodgson and Weir. As the skirmish line broke down it was covered by Company M(last to timber). The men for the most part regrouped by company, to have their horses and ammunition near by. When the command to move out was given these men either heard it or saw the move and attempted to retreat together. They moved on orders.
I think Keogh exercised command and control early, I think it eventually broke down. As for Custer/Yates, I am just sure.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Feb 20, 2014 12:30:35 GMT -6
I am probably going to regret saying this, and will probably be tarred and feathered by the fiction writers on the other board BUT, I am going to say it anyway.
Reno coming out of the timber, out of the valley, and onto the bluffs was not a retreat. He said it was a charge and strictly speaking it was, and that charge was part of a breakout operation, from a position where he was surrounded on three sides and his back to the river on the fourth. Breakouts are operations where you can EXPECT high casualty rates. This operation was no different.
So if we are going to call a troop by its correct name, a company, if we are going to eliminate squadron from the lexicon, in favor of the proper term battalion, then we ought to get ourselves straight on what Reno did. He broke out, he did not retreat. It's in the good book folks
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 20, 2014 12:58:06 GMT -6
Tom, the point I was trying to get across was that when he decided to retreat oops! Sorry Chuck, charge out of the timber, his men were harried and mauled as they galloped, but at the end of the day he lost around a third of his Battalion (Squadron) either dead or left behind, but the survivors made to the same area, and not spread out all over the valley floor.
Now Custer’s men where all over the place, so if they had encountered heavy resistance and had to run dragging along a wounded Custer, why didn’t they all end up on Custer Ridge or one of the hills further north.
Ian.
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Post by Margaret on Feb 20, 2014 13:06:18 GMT -6
..wouldn't you call it a Breakout, Retreat and Regroup.. all in one...? as that's what happened isn't it..? not much of an advance after that....
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 20, 2014 13:22:01 GMT -6
You know Tom there is another thing I neglected to mention in my response to you, rather more of a question than anything else. Assuming again you scenario is totally correct, howdid Custer with Yates get where he was found, meaning what route did he take from Ford B to LSH. I think that important in validating yours, in that the logical point of intersection with Keogh would be Calhoun Hill. To get to LSH without going first to Calhoun means that he would have had to use a route similar to that of the McGuire map or the sketch map Benteen provided. This route would actually be slower due to cross compartmented terrain, although it is more direct Well, here goes, as I have stated, I am not a good student. I have read a fair number of books, one of the more recent, by Donovan. If I took all that he says as gospel, Custer never went on the scout with Yates. He remained in place with Keogh and waited for Yates return, and was informed of Sturgis death, at which point he felt he could no longer wait for Benteen, things were getting a little hot and he must now act and get his prisoners. So he heads off down the ridge at a gallop, I think to look for another place to cross, gets caught up and retreats to the high ground and as they say his a$$ is gra$$. Very believable and probably much more believable than my theory. My theory lacks on two points, archeology and the maps you allude to. As I said early on I think he was looking for high ground and probably attempting to rejoin Keogh, but was pushed the way he went. I have also not seen this ground up close, only from the road. I am sure I will get your dander up here, but how can you be as sure as you are and Donovan as sure as he is. What am I missing? Did not Martini leave Custer and Cooke once they entered MTC?
By the way we fully agree on the Reno breakout, as that is what it was. Bad terrain and sloppy, but had to be done and was ordered. .
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Post by fred on Feb 20, 2014 13:51:45 GMT -6
... that charge was part of a breakout operation, from a position where he was surrounded on three sides and his back to the river on the fourth. Breakouts are operations where you can EXPECT high casualty rates. This operation was no different. Stow the tar, save the feathers for a quilt. This is a very clever observation and one I was not sharp enough to pick up earlier. I totally agree with you. A "breakout" is the perfect description. On second thought, use the tar to repair potholes. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 20, 2014 13:54:24 GMT -6
Retreat is relative Margaret. If you consider it a retreat because he went back in the direction from whence he came then you can say that there was an element of retrograde in it. All breakouts do not involve retrogrades though. The breakout from a bridgehead is done in essentially the manner, and the purpose of that type breakout is the start of further offensive operations
My main reason for posting this is the nonsense that appears from time to time on the other board. One poster even suggested that Reno should have formed a square and marched out. Sure they should. Others have suggested the normal method of retreat, that being by either bounds or detachments left in contact (DLIC). None of this can be considered in this situation. A breakout is maximizing combat power at one critical point in a narrowly focused attack Yes it is always and attack, an offensive operation in a largely defensive scenario. You punch a hole with all the force you can muster and head for the tall and uncut to break contact. Once that is accomplished (in this case after reaching the bluffs and the arrival of Benteen) you consolidate, reorganize , and redistribute (CRR), and look for a better day. CRR involves several things like replacing key leaders, redistribution of assets, and if necessary forming composite units from remnants that after action are too low in strength to be viable and combat effective. All this takes time, and for the most part requires outside assistance. That is something else the fiction writers don't understand, in fact most of them don't have a clue as to what is involved.
Now that this board has settled down, I think it time that we up our game, and reach for places that we have not gone before, being tied up as we were in the trivial, Doctor Porter's there will be great killing, Reno having a nip or two or six, and the ever popular Benteen dawdle. We have a good crew now and we can make some real progress I think.
Tom: I am going to let Fred field your last pitch.
I may get started on Godfrey and his delay from Weir Point sometime later, but for now I must do my chores, as the Madam, The Queen of Potholes, is attending a county highway board meeting, ( she is the vice chairman /woman/person/whatever) where that very subject of pot hole filling is high on the agenda, and if I don't finish I will be accused of the Quincannon dawdle, and a breakout from her wrath may be in order.
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Post by mac on Feb 20, 2014 15:23:05 GMT -6
The thing here is that there are contributors on this board who are actually militarily trained and so can more fully appreciate what the real options and alternatives were for the participants. Cheers
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Post by quincannon on Feb 20, 2014 15:59:46 GMT -6
Mac: Think of it this way regarding the Reno/Benteen linkup as just one for instance.
If you take you automobile to a drive through car wash, that action takes about five minutes and you drive off and go your merry way. If all you have ever done is read about battle, then you see no reason why the CRR phase is nothing but a drive through car wash. You sprinkle a little water, create some subs, go through the blower and drive off to engage the hostiles in the MacDonald's parking lot down the street. Simple, straightforward, five minutes at most
Now if you take your automobile to that same drive through car wash, and say I want my car washed and detailed it goes through the same sprinkle, subs and blower, but at the end and before you drive away a half dozen people descend upon your car with all kinds of sprays, polishes, and mysterious substances to make the chrome look like new, while you sit in the waiting room reading a three year old issue of Popular Mechanics. It may take an hour or two. This second picture I paint is what consolidation, reorganization and redistribution is really like, and if you have never done it, all of it is lost on you,
Fiction writers are the drive through the car wash guys and soldiers are in the detailing business.
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Post by fred on Feb 20, 2014 16:12:12 GMT -6
... there are contributors on this board who are actually militarily trained and so can more fully appreciate what the real options and alternatives were for the participants. Mac, I am not sure that is a correct statement. While I appreciate a certain amount of deference to how we were trained and all the rest, "options and alternatives" are more a part of common sense than any sort of tactical consideration. And, as has so often been said, common sense forms a good part of tactics. Military training comes into focus with things like mission, speed, flanking, tying... all kinds of stuff like that. To me, a perfect example-- and I use this all the time, as I am sure you are aware-- is John Gray's insistence that Custer moved down Reno Creek at a walk of 3.9 MPH. Gray was not a military man and to me, a former officer, I look at that statement and shake my head, figuring no self-respecting officer, in the situation Custer saw himself in, would ever consider walking almost 12 miles when his target is within reach. To me, that is a perfect example of the difference between a civilian theorist who has no idea of the way the military operates, and an experienced officer... or NCO, for that matter. You know, we always squawk about officers, officers... let's not forget the importance and the intelligence and experience of our NCOs. Those are the guys who may the military what it is. Best wishes, Fred.
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