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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 19, 2014 7:02:02 GMT -6
It's not very good as video and worse on what he presents as fact. You would be amazed what young kids produce these days far in advance of this. He's not young. He breezily asserts as fact totally unknown and unknowable motivations for possible events that may, of course, not be true. I have only watched a few of his offerings in places, and not the ones where he gets to Custer's demise itself, but I can well imagine. I agree DC maybe someone should watch it without the sound on. His vantage point at the start is somewhere between 3411 and Reno Hill. Either his pointing out the skirmish line is wrong or his location is almost at Reno. It looks like he has Martin leaving before entering Cedar Coulee. I believe he is calling the drainage between SSR and the road Cedar Coulee. I think he could be standing near the the SSR pull out. If you freeze the frame at 4:12 minutes you can see 3411 and Weir. Regards AZ Ranger
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 19, 2014 7:26:20 GMT -6
This the clip that caused some commotion when I first posted it a few years ago, when it gets to the seven minute mark onwards he gives his opinion on Reno’s ability to hold out in the timber (I wonder if Conz has watched this). linkThis is one of his shorter clips @ around 3 minutes long, but beware, he cuts Benteen no slack here and you may find some of his comments rather harsh, Wild would like this if he was still around. linkIan.
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 19, 2014 7:32:08 GMT -6
I think what is significant about 3411 is that it is a noticeable high point that any person on a horse would observe. It is narrow enough at the top to provide a view of the valley and maybe it would lead to wanting a view from Weir. At 3411 you can certainly see the Reno area. When Martin returns he states he rides past the same area they view the valley from. Without the road Weir is continuous and there would be not need for Martin to ride up on top of Weir. So the question is where would that place be?
Last year we rode on SSR and even one more valley to the east to look around. When on Sharpshooter Chip Watt discussed why the view of the valley by Custer could not have been from there. There were observations made that can not be seen from there. For example when looking to the valley most of it is blocked by the bluffs. You can see the frontage road and some of the valley. As far as the specific items that mentioned why he felt it was not SSR for the location I will wait till June again or if someone wants to know I can call him.
Regards
AZ Ranger
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Post by AZ Ranger on Feb 19, 2014 7:47:37 GMT -6
According to the narrator Reno loses 33 men in five minutes. Fact or fantasy?
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 19, 2014 8:02:52 GMT -6
Steve,Have not watched the video at this point, is this Reno's count when he reaches the top, after his charge? Does this include scouts? Does this include those hiding in the timber? Is this after action count of battlefield and timber? Is this from individual accounts and tied to some timeline? Or just narrator gut?
Regards, Tom
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 19, 2014 8:19:50 GMT -6
Hello Steve, have you seen the map drew by Walter Camp where he draws a line showing the supposedly route taken by Martini? It looks like he left Custer half way down MTC and in full view of the village, he then cut over the high ground instead of going back up MTC/Cedar and when he reaches the other side he sees Thompson.
Ian.
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alanw
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by alanw on Feb 19, 2014 12:55:41 GMT -6
Hello Alan, if the Keogh position broke and men presumably started to stream (as in the line of markers) to LSH, would this mean that Custer was already there? I have always wondered, why did they go in that direction, was it because the Indians had not cut that route off yet or did they see the Regimental Commander and his Colours flying. Ian. I'm not sure. It is one of the many things about the battle that has always puzzled me. Why were Company I in the swale/slope? I always thought they would have been better positioned atop Calhoun Hill, where they would have been able to support the other 2 companies, and certainly make a better defence, albeit delaying the inevitable. I wonder whether Keogh was mounted, or preparing to mount, ready to move out - either to support Custer at Cemetery Ridge, or simply withdrawing from the Calhoun area, when the heat got too much. His positioning suggests to me that whatever his plans, he was surprised and overwhelmed quickly. I can understand maybe horseholders being in the swale, but not company I. Maybe Keogh held the company back in an attempt to deceive the warriors as to the strength of his battalion, hoping to invite an attack? It is not ground I would choose to defend. A single company could easily be overrun by a mounted force, or picked off if they formed a skirmish line as there is simply no cover. I have no idea about the actual timings involved, but say Custer was arriving at LSH at the time Keogh's position was disintegrating. It would make sense for the remnants of Keogh's command to head for LSH.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 19, 2014 13:41:17 GMT -6
Alan, great questions. I have been here a month and my opinion differs from Fred, Chuck, Ian, and probably Steve as well. I hope all of these guys respond, as well as others. Me, I think Keogh quit thinking for himself and obeyed orders until too late to help anyone, mostly his command and self. I also think they were pushed farther into that swale you allude to.
Regards, Tom
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Post by quincannon on Feb 19, 2014 13:58:19 GMT -6
Alan and Tom: I am afraid you will have to be patient for the answer to why Keogh was where he was. The answer will be forthcoming, and when you get it, it will change much more in how you see this battle than just why Keogh was in the swale. I know the answer. Fred ran it by me a year or so ago, for purposes of vetting the plausibility of Keogh's actions, in regard to a discovery he made in an obscure and out of the way place. Trust me on this one there is a good reason. Unfortunately we must wait until Fred's publisher delivers on his pledge to publish. I know this sounds smart ass and know it all. That's is not meant to be. It's just that the information is so material, releasing it before publication would not be the wise thing to do.
I think Keogh was in the beginning stages of moving out, and the Indians were faster than he was, but that has nothing to do with the answer you seek.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 19, 2014 14:35:53 GMT -6
Alan and Tom: I am afraid you will have to be patient for the answer to why Keogh was where he was. The answer will be forthcoming, and when you get it, it will change much more in how you see this battle than just why Keogh was in the swale. I know the answer. Fred ran it by me a year or so ago, for purposes of vetting the plausibility of Keogh's actions, in regard to a discovery he made in an obscure and out of the way place. Trust me on this one there is a good reason. Unfortunately we must wait until Fred's publisher delivers on his pledge to publish. I know this sounds smart ass and know it all. That's is not meant to be. It's just that the information is so material, releasing it before publication would not be the wise thing to do. I think Keogh was in the beginning stages of moving out, and the Indians were faster than he was, but that has nothing to do with the answer you seek. Chuck as you know, I think more happened at the foot MTC than you guys do, someone wounded, more pressure from front & left as they faced the ford. Whatever, it was more than expected. I don't think the troops that went down ever got close to rejoining Keogh, I think too many hostiles between the two commands. Please notice here that I say two commands, because from the MTC junket on, that is what I think they were. I also don't think Custer went to ford d looking for another attack point, I think he may have sent feelers there looking for a way out. I think they were cut off and pushed back to LSH. I know this is not popular, but then again I was not there. I will never know for sure.
I am confident regarding Reno and Benteen, not so much re: Custer's actions. I only have one firm belief, Custer lost this battle before noon, lack of scout, lack of planning, lack of command and control lack of communication with staff, and so on.
I look forward to Fred's answers to Alan' questions in the meantime I would welcome all thoughts. Sorry to bring up MTC again, but hey!
Regards and thanks, Tom
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Post by fred on Feb 19, 2014 15:27:09 GMT -6
Alan,
I Company was not kept in the swale. At one time I bought into the theory—I think Richard Fox was one of the first ones to mention this, so this would be one of the areas we would disagree—I Company was in some sort of administrative position. My friends and I walked that whole area several times and we always debated why the I Company markers were in those positions. It was very perplexing and we could never arrive at a credible solution.
Then I discovered something that changed everything for me. Unfortunately, I cannot tell you what it is: it is a part of this new book I have at the publishers and I do not want to jeopardize what I feel is an extremely important part of it. I can only say that I firmly believe I Company was deployed and deployed properly. All I will say is that his position contained tactical implications no one was aware of when Keogh was dropped off there.
Keogh may have been mounted—it wouldn’t have made any difference—but his troops certainly were not. I believe Keogh’s tenure in that position was to be rather short: 30 to 40 minutes at most, so to me, there was never any serious consideration of defending the position for very long. I believe he was surprised—at least somewhat—and scampered to head off disaster… and he was overwhelmed quickly, so you are correct with that assumption. You are also correct—in my opinion—about the indefensibility of the position.
Also, the remnants of Keogh’s command did reach LSH. Some say as many as 20 men, but we can only account for 10, something I am still working on.
Best wishes, Fred.
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alanw
Junior Member
Posts: 74
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Post by alanw on Feb 19, 2014 16:16:04 GMT -6
Alan, I Company was not kept in the swale. At one time I bought into the theory—I think Richard Fox was one of the first ones to mention this, so this would be one of the areas we would disagree—I Company was in some sort of administrative position. My friends and I walked that whole area several times and we always debated why the I Company markers were in those positions. It was very perplexing and we could never arrive at a credible solution. Then I discovered something that changed everything for me. Unfortunately, I cannot tell you what it is: it is a part of this new book I have at the publishers and I do not want to jeopardize what I feel is an extremely important part of it. I can only say that I firmly believe I Company was deployed and deployed properly. All I will say is that his position contained tactical implications no one was aware of when Keogh was dropped off there. Keogh may have been mounted—it wouldn’t have made any difference—but his troops certainly were not. I believe Keogh’s tenure in that position was to be rather short: 30 to 40 minutes at most, so to me, there was never any serious consideration of defending the position for very long. I believe he was surprised—at least somewhat—and scampered to head off disaster… and he was overwhelmed quickly, so you are correct with that assumption. You are also correct—in my opinion—about the indefensibility of the position. Also, the remnants of Keogh’s command did reach LSH. Some say as many as 20 men, but we can only account for 10, something I am still working on. Best wishes, Fred. Fred, Thanks for the prompt reply. Of course I would not expect you to divulge the discovery that will be in your book. I am glad you do not think I company was kept in the swale - it just makes no tactical sense - not to me anyway. It seems there are gullies and other terrain features near to Calhoun Hill where warriors could have concealed themselves - not visible from Calhoun. I have read theories that warriors - just how many, I have no idea, were tailing Custer for some time. Could dozens, of warriors have already been concealed near Calhoun Hill, possibly as early as Keogh's battalion's arrival there. I wonder whether there was what was wrongly perceived as a small threat somewhere to the 'south' of Calhoun Hill and Company I on foot went to deal with the threat, and were sent scampering back when they were met with a much larger force than expected. Whatever happened, I guess that the terrain allowed warriors to get close to company I unseen, and they simply did not have time to react.
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Deleted
Deleted Member
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Post by Deleted on Feb 19, 2014 17:22:01 GMT -6
I think there's too much emphasis on cavalry movements and less on what and where the Cheyenne and Sioux were doing. The Custer Apollo videos show terrain quite well but (imho) should be viewed while watching his conclusion video first - did he have an agenda?
Best, c.
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Post by alfakilo on Feb 19, 2014 19:04:54 GMT -6
The Custer Apollo videos show terrain quite well but (imho) should be viewed while watching his conclusion video first - did he have an agenda? Best, c. Part 38 is the conclusion video, and I think the narrator makes it pretty clear what his 'agenda' was in producing this series. www.youtube.com/watch?v=0hT3LkncTb0&list=PL7950A1D9CA754945&index=49AK
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Deleted
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Post by Deleted on Feb 19, 2014 19:35:26 GMT -6
AK, While I applaud the effort of Custer Apollo, (it takes some work to make something like that!), I'll respectfully disagree with him on a number of things. One foremost is the Benteen delay, we could go on from there. Another is through the videos there is no mention of the warriors riding or on foot, simply Indian pressure while he speaks of soldiers afoot, losing their mounts and scrambling to perceived safety.
Best, c.
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