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Post by quincannon on Feb 20, 2014 16:38:50 GMT -6
Fred and Mac: I agree here with Fred that common sense is the best tool for looking at these things. The only think that those with military experience bring to the table is in the detail work that is sometimes taken for granted. They alone know how the fine tuning is done, for they have done it. That is why I picked the Reno-Benteen link up for my car wash example. Those who have never done it don't know just how long it takes, and in fact what must be done. So when those that say they should have transitioned from having their ass handed to them one moment to riding off to help Custer the next, it betrays their ignorance, not stupidity mind you, ignorance, the lack of knowledge, and if you have never done it how would you be expected to have that knowledge.
It's just like Tom with his C-130's. If you have never been around that particular arena, you might just think you jump in, light the fires, and away you go. It is all that stuff that happens during the down time between sorties, that permits those fires to be lighted in order to make the damned think fly. I know these things happen, but not being an airman I could not go into detail of what takes place, but I would wager Tom could, so he would be the place a prudent person would go to ask Were I to try it would be quite obvious to those that know that everything I would say would be bullshit from the costume shop.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 20, 2014 17:26:21 GMT -6
Mac,
I think Fred left the wrong impression about Gray. Gray DOES think Custer averaged 3.9 mph down what is now Reno Creek to the funeral lodge or lodges. That leaves the impression of - by order - they plodded down the creek. Cavalry, we read, varied their gaits to keep the mounts alert and had mandated rest periods, sometimes obeyed. At times they trotted and perhaps galloped for a bit, but the average time could well have been 4mph or so. Perhaps it made no sense to descend in a cloud of dust and alert the enemy, which faster speeds might well do, and this atop arriving to battle with exhausted mounts on a hot day (we read in the 90's)after the mounts were rejecting the bad water on the divide from the Rosebud and had not had a good drink for a while. Benteen's had not for, I think, 18 hours.
Further, he may not have wanted to hit the tribes with the pack train - the description of which is best accompanied by calliope music - falling far behind and so vulnerable in that valley. Further yet, he may not have wanted to leave Benteen far behind, given he could have no idea what the land would be like to his south and the columns were not long in view of each other. Benteen had a tough go of it.
Which is to say a modern day military man without extensive experience with horses and the Army of the time might make some bad assumptions. I'm neither military nor with vast experience with horses, but some. To my knowledge - always a leaky boat - AZ (whom I've never met) is the guy who has the needed background and contemporary experience that's too rare. He's a combat vet - Marine - and rides horses with the AZ Rangers armed and supported by long experience in the West and how people operate. He's well read about the battle, and he and some others here have horse ridden Benteen's 'scout', which is first hand info of the sort rare in Custerland. He kinda likes Benteen, as do I.
Fred also has combat experience with the added benefit of having been an officer, is well read, organized. But either can be wrong, although nowhere near as often as I and others are. Among whom are others who have served in the military and cheerfully admit to no combat experience, although some are annoyingly vague and one, when so asked a question that requires a 'yes' or 'no', answered in terms of having heard bullets sing, or some such. Hunters and inner city drug gangs can say as much or more. I'm not easily impressed, and that's an attitude that can seem rude but also is handy if applied fairly across the board. Someone who spent a short military career typing in an office without rising in rank isn't necessarily the authority he thinks he is. Or one year in ROTC.
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Post by mac on Feb 20, 2014 17:30:10 GMT -6
I saw an excellent TV show about WW2. At the end one veteran was saying he often shivered to think of things he had done at the start of the war which he soon learned were terribly dangerous. So while I agree with the idea of common sense, there is so much more to be said for experience, be it our own or that learned from others who are experienced. Equally I am sure that those who have visited the site are much better placed to form opinions. Cheers
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Post by mac on Feb 20, 2014 17:42:09 GMT -6
DC interesting post. Thank you! I certainly take your point about relevant experience as opposed to I was in a uniform once, rode a horse once, fired a weapon once. As to AZ he is a terrific resource like your good self. Admiration society closed for lunch. Cheers
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 20, 2014 18:27:46 GMT -6
Ok, Chuck, here is where I say some real good stuff about quality officers and some operators I have known. You know of the 135th TAG(Tactical Airlift Group). In many ways we were like bastards at a family reunion. Early on we never knew who we were or who we were going to become. When I joined the Unit were the 135th SOG(Special Operations Group), before I returned to the Unit, from basic and advanced school, we became a Combat Support Group, two years later we were a TAG. The planes went from HU-16 & 0-2, to Caribou, to C-130 in 5 yrs. Without a great leadership team some of us would have been lost. I never did anything near what I was originally trained for until late 80's just prior to Panama and I was in from 1969. The points I am trying to make here is we had great officers, good officers, and some s#@t, much like the 7th Cav. The latter group, were trying to build fiefdoms and were suck ups to command, never calling a senior officer on something that should be questioned, and never taking responsibility for their own mistakes. Example, in 7th on 6/25/76 Benteen called Custer on breaking up the command. The majority went along to get along. Keogh and Reno surely knew better and maybe Yates.
I was very lucky, I for the most part had an exemplary cadre of officers that knew their jobs and responsibility and performed them in a professional manor. There was open communication at all levels at all times. That is not to say that we rocked boats or did not complete missions as prescribed. I am not so sure Custer did not take "his boys" with him on 6/25/76. Our pilots helped staff USAIR and Southwest when not working on our mission. I am not sure what Custer or some of his officers could have functioned on the outside.
In my Unit all training blocks were filled by all sections, I'm not so sure about the 7th Cav. I learned new good stuff, until I got out of the unit, and that is why I came here, that is not to say I don't have preconceived ideas.
Again, I ramble, here endeth.
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Post by quincannon on Feb 20, 2014 19:47:54 GMT -6
I think that is more or less true in any military unit. It describes a cross section of society from which unit members are drawn. The real problem is when the fish rots from the head, there is no redemptive measure that can be put in place, short of throwing the fish overboard.
I know a fellow, the son of a really good friend of mine, who since he was a little boy always wanted to be a naval officer. He aced his way through school and received an appointment to Annapolis. He graduated four years later and went through the normal course of surface warfare schooling, and found himself assigned to a brand new Burke Class DDG operating out of San Diego. A fulfillment of dreams one might say until he met his captain who sought Biblical (no I am not kidding one damned bit) solutions for problems. You were also required to be his kind of Christian or you got stuck with every shitdetail that came along. All his toadies sucked up to him and could quote a Bible verse with the best of them. The captain finally got relieved for cause, and the new captain cleaned house, but the damage was done to this young fellow who told me that if a guy like his first captain could rise in the Navy without being found out long before he made 0-5 then he did not want any part of the Navy and that they could screw themselves and the horse they rode in on. This kid is now with a beltway bandit making in excess of 200K per, and he does not turn 30 for two more years.
That is how command climate, the us vs. them, the suck ups and the shitupons can effect a units combat capability. Did I mention that this DDG did not pass one readiness evaluation during the first captains tenure, and with nearly the same crew maxed out on evaluations thereafter. The good news is that the shitupons always come out better in the long run, and the suck ups just suck canal water.
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Post by fred on Feb 20, 2014 20:27:44 GMT -6
Gray DOES think Custer averaged 3.9 mph down what is now Reno Creek to the funeral lodge or lodges. That leaves the impression of - by order - they plodded down the creek. Cavalry, we read, varied their gaits to keep the mounts alert and had mandated rest periods... The problem here, DC, is that Gray ignored everything the participants had to say about how they moved down the valley, then he ignored all the Indian accounts as to when the battle began, thus moving one event out of context and placing where he wanted it to belong. There are seven separate accounts from Custer's scouts and men who were in the command, as well as others who saw those troops moving. The "slowest" of those accounts claimed the troops moved at a fast trot. Gray admitted to ignoring Indian accounts of various events because he could make no sense of what they had to say. While I ignore an Indian claiming something occurred at 3:20, I do not ignore an account claiming an event occurred when the sun was directly overhead. We have more than 20 of those accounts, all pertaining to the approximate time the battle began. Gray also chose to ignore the only two accounts we have that give us even the slightest indication of what time standard the Seventh was on, and he failed miserably in his research by ignoring data easily obtained from the one source that could fit legitimate time references side-by-side with accounts of events by those who lived them. AZ agrees with the average speed of movement I maintain is possible for the distance I claim and a cavalry veterinarian wrote a correspondent explaining how a cavalry column would move, its capabilities, and its rest periods. I have never claimed the Seventh moved the entire distance at a single speed, but instead moved in fits and starts, speed-ups and slow-downs, and even walks for brief stretches. I find nothing wrong with a cavalry column speeding up to-- let's say-- 15 MPH, then dropping off to a walk. By the time Custer decided to go the distance, he was under the assumption that he was in the process of losing surprise, that his column had been spotted, and that Indians were already heading back to warn the village. A walk down the valley is borderline preposterous and even dust being raised by the packs (and Cooke was sent back at least once to correct that issue) was hardly enough to keep Custer at a walk. So, I completely reject Gray's analysis here as something he uses to later justify irresponsible actions of others. To me, John Gray's entire time study is laced with preconceptions, poor assumptions, and extremely poor research. His casual and off-hand dismissal of anything Indians had to claim is borderline hubris and detracts from what I believe is a brilliantly written story, up until he begins his timing analyses. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by fred on Feb 20, 2014 21:00:09 GMT -6
I do not recall Donovan saying that, but I read the book a few years ago.
Here is where I believe experience as an officer overrides a historian’s view and analysis of this event. If you are correct, Tom—and I am sure you are—there is absolutely no proof Custer did or did not go on any scouting foray with Yates. Donovan says he didn’t, but Donovan has no proof, one way or the other. My take is that Custer accompanied Yates because, (1) they were close friends, and (2) because that’s what Custer always did: he did the forward scouting. Why would he stay back now? This is the rub I have with accounts describing movements to Ford B and claiming Custer stayed back. What sense does that make?
How would Donovan or anyone make a claim about Sturgis’ death? They never even found the guy’s body. Custer was one of the most active commanders you could find. I just do not see how anyone can make a claim Custer stayed back someplace and let someone else do the scouting for him. Even in the early days of the campaign, Custer was out front and it was Custer who led the entire Terry column to the Powder River after Charlie Reynolds got them all lost. And here he has the entire Sioux nation in the palm of his hand and he lets George Yates scout for him? Where is the logic in that? This is the difference in the thinking between a historian/writer and a person with military experience.
The pressure Donovan describes also ignores the accounts of Wooden Leg and many others, that the battle unfolded slowly, and that makes me believe he is just making this stuff up as he goes along, sensible in his mind, but not enough attention being paid to details and participant’s accounts.
And no, Martini did not leave Custer and Cooke as they entered MTC. If you read Martini’s RCOI testimony, he left them near the head of Cedar Coulee, probably about a mile from MTC. Again, that MTC business is just more fiction developed by historians and writers over the years, trying to compromise with Martini’s various accounts a where he was handed the note.
Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 20, 2014 21:10:53 GMT -6
You could be entirely correct. I just want to remind that:
1. There are NO Indian accounts. There are accounts OF Indian accounts, often quite distant, but third hand is common. No, the best we have is not good enough and certainly does not rise to the level of testimony.
2. They also often appear LATE in the record. Ample time to merge tales unwittingly or just to get along. True also for soldiers, and we know Martin, Godfrey, and others either changed their story dramatically through the years or lied. Kanipe and Thompson and Golden lie outside that.
3. The accounts of Indians in contemporary newspapers have almost no chance of being correct, given there was small chance of being caught fabricating and the reporter is quoting someone allegedly translating. Anything with large numbers, distance measurements in miles, and gerunds in the sentence are provided by the whites.
I haven't read the book, and you have convinced a number of people and I look forward to it. But I remind a decade ago I said there was a rash of folks trying to prove Gray wrong about a lot of things, and that it became a goal in itself. And again: he wasn't entirely convinced of his theory and said the time lines only allowed certain things and disallowed others, and he was open to being wrong. He was in pain, and died of cancer before the last book was published. He was held in high regard by all Custer buffs for Centennial Campaign, and he was a doctor, knew the west and horses but may not have served. An awful lot of Custer historians from Utley and Hedren on down praised the book a quarter century ago. I never met him, but he's buried in Longmont up the road from me. Bob Reese, I think, knew him.
So, we'll see.
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Post by montrose on Feb 20, 2014 21:14:43 GMT -6
Purpose. Discuss observation and scouting.
The best observation points are not the highest point. I think we have discussed before the differences between the topo crest and the military creast, and the impact of concave and convex slopes on observation.
Tactically, an experienced scout wants to be far enough down the slope on the enemy side so that he is not skylined. A moving skylined target can draws the eye from miles off. This took me some learning back as a 2nd LT. You feel naked and easily observable if moving in open terrain. But I learned from experience how hard it was to spot enemy units masking with the terrain. And I was using tracked vehicles and HMMVs for these missions.
For following a ridgeline, you do want minimum movement on the enemy side of the terrain feature. The normal techniques are swanning or bounding. Swanning is where you move to the enemy side to observe, move back to the covered/concealed side, move further down, then peek over again. Bounding is where one element observes, then moves back to concealed side of ridge; while another element keeps moving to the next observation point. Bounding is faster, though I preferred swanning cause I think I was wrapped too tight as an LT, and wanted to see everything myself. And swanning has been renamed fan technique by the Benning School for Unruly Boys, before someone whacks me with a TRADOC stick.
SO I would not consider for a second going to Weir. Just looking at it from a distance I think better observation points are to the west. And the goal is not perfect observation of every element on the battlefield. The goal of scouting is to help the unit make decisions. The relevant information after 3411 is to find 1) fords, 2) downstream end of the village, 3) Regimental attack position (an assembly area to make last minute preparation for an attack).
Now DC has pointed out that definite information of a ford vicinity Ford B can not be seen from 3411. First, I believe LTC Custer was getting advice from Crows that there was a ford downstream, and Second, the river is clearly getting farther from the bluffs. I think it is a reasonable guess that there will be a place to cross. At some point, Custer was gambling.
In fact, I believe the uncertainty led to a major error that led to the defeat. The scout of 2 companies right up to Ford B seems a very bad tactical decision. If you plan to attack, then attack. Going ridiculously close to enemy and then withdrawing gives the game away. The enemy knows you are there, they know by your own actions that you are too weak to fight them, and you give them time to prepare.
I have seen units do this at Hohenfels and the National Training Center. The outcome is a bunch of vehicles with blinking yellow lights waiting for reset. The Indians didn't do resets.
PS. I have been extremely sick of late. I have not been able to keep up with some correspondence. I think I may finally be getting better. I have been at home for more than a month, 3 feet from the computer, without the energy to participate. I think I can be more active now.
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Post by montrose on Feb 20, 2014 21:21:43 GMT -6
Purpose. Discuss the Reno Bn breakout.
As we know, the Reno Bn organized before it broke for the river. Companies A and M mounted and formed company columns. The delay before the order to attack was caused by G Company. G Company was late in assembling.
In fact, most G CO survivors never moved at all, the ones that did were heavily beaten by the Indians.
I have never seen it discussed, but the wait for the 3rd company must have been the reason the unit delayed moving after mounting. I can see why Reno didn't want to discuss it, it was a brutal decision. But war doesn't allow for neat decisions.
Think about that in the context of the mount, dismount, remount decision when Indian infiltrators were providing effective fire. Reno was forced to either be trapped on the floodplains and die with G CO, or take an action before all choice was taken away from him.
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Post by Dark Cloud on Feb 20, 2014 21:58:27 GMT -6
Montrose,
I hear from friends and family New England has lost some charm this winter. Hope all is well.
Very glad to finally have someone experienced give some support to Reno, and you're correct, I've never heard it framed like that, specifically to G co. issues. Not saying or implying you exculpate him or favor him in general, as I don't know your thoughts, but he was an experienced soldier and probably did the best he could or, I'd contend, near anyone could do given what could be known and what he had to work with. That was nice to read. It's not my place to thank you, but thank you anyway. I've heard soldiers in private talk defend Reno by offering possibilities of what kind Army thinking was running through him, all well away from cowardice, but there is a reluctance to say so in public. And with reason. You'll hear incoming for a while.
Not sure what is west of Weir Pt. that's a better site for answering the queries you raise. Riding along the crest made no sense, agreed, but you could do what probably was done and stay in the coulees sorta/kinda out of sight. Although, the cheering and guidons fluttering remain an issue. Weir is about 40 feet taller than 3411 and has the view down river along with visible crease of runoffs from the east side. More important, until you clear SSR to your right, you can essentially see nothing whatever of the land north. And waving the hat at 3411 or Weir or anywhere along the ridge line would call attention to your presence. From Weir to MTCF is about a mile as the drugged bird flaps, and required speed and enthusiam to utilize it with the promised support. But how much time would not be known till viewed, if even then.
The declining slopes north trending west from Weir would offer good views as well, but you'd have to hit Weir first.
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Post by fred on Feb 20, 2014 22:49:51 GMT -6
I hear from friends and family New England has lost some charm this winter. Whew! I'll say! I think "montrose" may have meant north rather than west...(?) And I agree; hadn't thought of the "breakout" in terms of the G Company men, many of whom remained in the timber. This is not Reno's fault, either, but McIntosh's. There is no word of him ever being on the skirmish line, and even DeRudio high-tailed it into the woods leaving us with a head-scratching dialogue and only Wallace to watch over the contingent left on the line. And DC, I know it always seems I am bashing Gray. That has never been my intent, however, and I still consider his book, Custer's Last Campaign, one of the best ever written. That time-line is what eventually precipitated mine: I just found so many discrepancies and so many things that didn't fit with accounts, it appeared to me he had an agenda, the usual Reno- and Benteen-bashing business. It was also quite annoying that he ignored so much-- so it seems-- and he arbitrarily dismissed obvious information that did not agree with his own opinion. Best wishes, Fred.
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Post by Yan Taylor on Feb 21, 2014 4:36:09 GMT -6
PS. I have been extremely sick of late. I have not been able to keep up with some correspondence. I think I may finally be getting better. I have been at home for more than a month, 3 feet from the computer, without the energy to participate. I think I can be more active now.
Sorry to hear that William, as I have missed your input. Glad to know that you are feeling better and are again contributing, you posts have a knock on effect that keeps us thinking, writing and paying attention. One of the reasons I choose to post on this board is because of the military members, this is in my mind a military board focusing on military history in general, so anyone would be silly not to sit up and listen if any ex-military personnel give their views, anyway enough praise for the ex-service boys let’s get back to the job in hand.
The Reno form-up prior to breaking out is one such example. Now in my limited knowledge (well no knowledge in fact), would Reno’s job of forming up his command be impeded by the terrain? What I am trying to say is, because his three Companies were spread around a wooded area, would they lose some command and control? And did each Company commander have either a direct view or was in contact with their Battalion commander when he gave the order to form up and go? French may have been close and received orders from Hodgson, Reno may have discussed options with Moylan and McIntosh, De Rudio and Co may have been too far away and out of visual contact, Wallace received the order verbally and this may have been passed down. Varnum saw others mounting so he did likewise. I am not too sure about Hare, maybe he did similar to Varnum.
So all in all some Officer’s may have received the order to mount up and charge quicker than others, no time for an Officer’s call though, so things had to be done quickly and mistakes are bound to be made due to confusion, such is war.
Ian.
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Post by tubman13 on Feb 21, 2014 5:28:14 GMT -6
Wow, Motrose, the most succinct account of the Reno breakout I have ever read. Thank you, and I hope your health improvement continues, sorry to hear you have been under the weather.
Fred, as I understand it, the only commander on Reno's skirmish line was French, the others had retired to the timber, I may be wrong here. That, however, is my understanding. Also, it has been a while since I read Donovan's book as well. I found what I was looking for regarding the scout, on page 266 of the paperback edition, chapter 14. Grabbed it out of context, will re-read the entire chapter. I was still working and traveling when bought and read. Might be sloppy work on my part. Maybe Custer had already split from Keogh and was holding the high ground and covering above Yates Scout.
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